Ard Trucking Co. v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Ard Trucking Company, Respondent,
    v.
    Travelers Property Casualty Company of America d/b/a
    The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2015-000806
    Appeal From Darlington County
    Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-010
    Heard September 19, 2017 – Filed January 10, 2018
    REVERSED
    M. Dawes Cooke, Jr., and Phillip S. Ferderigos, both of
    Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC, of
    Charleston, for Appellant.
    Martin S. Driggers, Sr., of Driggers & Moyd, of
    Hartsville, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: In this civil action, Travelers Property Casualty Company of
    America (Travelers) appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor
    of Ard Trucking Company. Travelers asserts the circuit court erred in finding a
    Loss Sensitive Rate Plan (LSRP) 1 did not apply to the insurance policy it issued to
    Ard Trucking because (1) Ard Trucking agreed to be bound by a Workers'
    Compensation Insurance Plan (the Plan), which required the LSRP to apply to Ard
    Trucking's assigned risk policy as a matter of law; and (2) Ard Trucking had
    knowledge the LSRP applied to its policy. Travelers also argues (3) the circuit
    court's prejudgment interest award was in error. We reverse.
    FACTS
    South Carolina provides a workers' compensation insurance market for policies of
    last resort, generally referred to as assigned risk workers' compensation policies.
    Assigned risk policies are for high risk employers who are unable to obtain
    workers' compensation coverage in the voluntary market. The South Carolina
    Department of Insurance (SCDOI) approved the LSRP as part of the South
    Carolina Workers' Compensation Assigned Risk Plan, naming the National
    Council on Compensation Insurance (the Council) as Plan Administrator. The
    Council dictated the LSRP would be mandatory for all assigned risk insureds with
    a standard premium equal to or exceeding $200,000. Additionally, the Council
    instructed insurers "[a]ll assigned risk policies shall be endorsed with policy
    endorsement WC 00 04 17 - Assigned Risk [LSRP] Notification."
    Allen Ard, owner of Ard Trucking, submitted an application for an assigned risk
    insurance policy with Travelers. The application contained the following clause
    above Ard's signature:
    By signing below I acknowledge that the [LSRP] has
    been explained to me or that an explanatory notice or
    brochure has been provided to me and I agree that I shall
    be bound by the terms of such plan if my estimated
    annual premium or preliminary physical audit premium
    meets or exceeds the premium eligibility requirement.
    Travelers issued the policy to Ard Trucking to cover a one-year period, with an
    estimated annual premium of $168,000. The policy stated the premium was
    subject to verification and change by audit. The policy included eleven separate
    endorsements, including the Assigned Risk LSRP Notification. The Assigned Risk
    LSRP Notification endorsement explained to the insured it was "issued because
    you may qualify to have the cost of your insurance subjected to the assigned risk
    1
    LSRP refers to a plan that adjusts the premium on a policy, following the policy
    term, based upon the actual occurrence of claims.
    mandatory [LSRP]." The endorsement provided that it applied in twelve states and
    the District of Columbia and listed the premium eligibility for each associated
    state; however, South Carolina was not one of the states listed.
    Ard Trucking's estimated annual premiums exceeded $200,000. As a result,
    Travelers issued a replacement policy to Ard Trucking for the same coverage year,
    with an estimated annual premium of $262,000. The replacement policy indicated
    the rating mode was LSRP and the LSRP Contingent Deposit was $52,116. The
    replacement policy contained an additional endorsement, the Mandatory Assigned
    Risk LSRP Endorsement, which was added "to explain the rating plan and how the
    Assigned Risk [LSRP] premium will be determined." The replacement policy
    contained the Assigned Risk LSRP Notification endorsement, identical to the one
    provided in the initial policy, which did not include South Carolina on the list of
    applicable states. After receiving the replacement policy, Ard Trucking obtained
    an irrevocable letter of credit from Carolina Bank in the amount of $52,116 and
    permitted Travelers to draw on the letter of credit with a draft.
    After the policy year ended, Travelers conducted an audit of Ard Trucking's
    operations to determine the final premium due to Travelers. Travelers notified Ard
    Trucking it owed a final premium of $29,245, which Ard Trucking promptly paid.
    Thereafter, Travelers notified Ard Trucking that it still owed $175,064 under the
    LSRP and warned that Travelers would draw the entire letter of credit if Ard
    Trucking did not pay that amount. Ard Trucking claimed the LSRP Notification
    Endorsement specifically excluded South Carolina from the LSRP and refused to
    make the additional payment. Consequently, Travelers drafted the letter of credit.
    Ard Trucking filed a claim in the circuit court against Travelers for breach of
    contract and conversion. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment,
    and the circuit court held a hearing. Afterward, the circuit court granted summary
    judgment to Ard Trucking. The court found the LSRP did not apply to the policy
    and awarded Ard Trucking $103,844.74. Travelers filed a Rule 59(e) motion to
    alter or amend the order, which the circuit court denied. This appeal followed.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    "An appellate court reviews the granting of summary judgment under the same
    standard applied by the [circuit] court," which "may grant a motion for summary
    judgment 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
    on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
    any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
    law.'" Quail Hill, LLC v. Cty. of Richland, 
    387 S.C. 223
    , 234–35, 
    692 S.E.2d 499
    ,
    505 (2010) (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP). We are also required to view "the
    evidence and all inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom . . . in the
    light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. at 235, 
    692 S.E.2d at 505
    (quoting Pye v. Estate of Fox, 
    369 S.C. 555
    , 563, 
    633 S.E.2d 505
    , 509 (2006)).
    LAW/ANALYSIS
    Travelers argues the LSRP applied to Ard Trucking's assigned risk insurance
    policy. Both parties conceded during oral argument that the policy was
    unambiguous, and therefore, we need only examine the policy. See Beaufort Cty.
    Sch. Dist. v. United Nat'l. Ins. Co., 
    392 S.C. 506
    , 526, 
    709 S.E.2d 85
    , 95–96 (Ct.
    App. 2011) (stating the interpretation of an unambiguous insurance policy is for
    the court); Williams v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 
    409 S.C. 586
    , 594, 
    762 S.E.2d 705
    ,
    709 (2014) (providing that when an insurance policy's language is unambiguous,
    the language alone determines the policy's force and effect); Way v. Way, 
    398 S.C. 1
    , 7 n.7, 
    726 S.E.2d 215
    , 219 n.7 (Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam) (finding matters
    conceded at oral argument unnecessary for discussion of issue on appeal).
    "Courts must enforce, not write, contracts of insurance, and their language must be
    given its plain, ordinary[,] and popular meaning." Sloan Constr. Co. v. Cent. Nat'l
    Ins. Co. of Omaha, 
    269 S.C. 183
    , 185, 
    236 S.E.2d 818
    , 819 (1977). When
    construing the provisions of an insurance policy, the court must examine the policy
    as a whole and adopt a construction that gives effect to the entire instrument and
    each of its various parts and provisions. Yarborough v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
    
    266 S.C. 584
    , 592, 
    225 S.E.2d 344
    , 349 (1976). "[T]he meaning of a particular
    word or phrase is not determined by considering the word or phrase by itself, but
    by reading the policy as a whole and considering the context and subject matter of
    the insurance contract." Id. at 593, 
    225 S.E.2d at 349
    ; see also MGC Mgmt. of
    Charleston, Inc. v. Kinghorn Ins. Agency, 
    336 S.C. 542
    , 548, 
    520 S.E.2d 820
    , 823
    (Ct. App. 1999) ("[T]he law is clear that, in construing an insurance contract, all of
    its provisions must be considered together.").
    Considering the policy as a whole and the subject matter of the insurance contract,
    we find the LSRP applied to Ard Trucking's assigned risk insurance policy. The
    replacement policy listed the LSRP as its rating mode and listed $52,116 as the
    LSRP Contingent Deposit. Although the Assigned Risk LSRP Notification
    endorsement stated the insured may qualify to have the cost of its insurance
    subjected to the LSRP, the Mandatory Assigned Risk LSRP Endorsement—
    included in the replacement policy—stated it was added to the policy "to explain
    the rating plan and how the Assigned Risk [LSRP] premium will be determined."
    (emphasis added). In accordance with clearly established contract law, this court
    may not read the provision in the Assigned Risk LSRP Notification Endorsement
    in isolation to defeat application of the LSRP. See MGC Mgmt., 336 S.C. at 549,
    520 S.E.2d at 823 ("[I]f the intention of the parties is clear, courts have no
    authority to torture the meaning of policy language to extend or defeat coverage
    that was never intended by the parties."). Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's
    grant of summary judgment. 2
    REVERSED.
    WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
    2
    Because our resolution of the prior issue is dispositive, we decline to address the
    remaining issues on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.,
    
    335 S.C. 598
    , 613, 
    518 S.E.2d 591
    , 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not
    address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018-UP-010

Filed Date: 1/10/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024