SCDSS v. Stephanie Schwan ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,
v.
Stephanie Schwan and Dillon Haughland, Defendants,
Of whom Stephanie Schwan is the Appellant.
In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.
Appellate Case No. 2021-001088
Appeal From Anderson County
Karen F. Ballenger, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-385
Submitted October 12, 2022 – Filed October 18, 2022
AFFIRMED
Ward Benjamin McClain, Jr., of W. Benjamin McClain,
Jr., LLC, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Andrew Troy Potter, of Anderson, for Respondent.
John Marshall Swails, Jr., of Greenville, for the Guardian
ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: Stephanie Schwan (Mother) appeals the family court's orders
finding it had jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights (TPR) action
against Mother and terminating her parental rights to her minor child (Child). On
appeal, Mother argues (1) the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) 1 and (2)
the family court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence supported the
termination of Mother's parental rights. We affirm.
In appeals from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).
Initially, we hold the family court properly found it had jurisdiction to enter a final
custody determination. See § 63-15-336(A) ("A court of this [s]tate has temporary
emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this [s]tate and the child has been
abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child,
or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment
or abuse."); § 63-15-336(B) ("If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not
commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under [s]ections 63-15-330
through 63-15-334, a child custody determination made under this section becomes
a final determination, if it so provides and this [s]tate becomes the home state of
the child.").
Moreover, we hold the family court did not err in terminating Mother's parental
rights. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2022) (explaining the family court
may order TPR upon finding a statutory ground for TPR is met and TPR is in the
child's best interest); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 254, 519
S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating the grounds must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence).
First, clear and convincing evidence showed Mother failed to remedy the
conditions that caused Child's removal. See § 63-7-2570(2) (providing a statutory
ground for TPR is met when "[t]he child has been removed from the parent . . . and
has been out of the home for a period of six months following the adoption of a
placement plan by court order . . . and the parent has not remedied the conditions
which caused the removal"). In January 2019, Child entered foster care after law
enforcement, responding to a domestic violence incident involving Mother, found
1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63-15-300 to -394 (2010).
marijuana at the scene. Mother also tested positive for marijuana. In September
2019, the family court ordered Mother to complete a placement plan requiring her
to, inter alia, complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all resulting
recommendations. Mother enrolled in various substance abuse treatment facilities
during the pendency of this case and admitted to relapsing at least four times after
she completed treatment, including only two months prior to the TPR hearing.
Accordingly, clear and convincing evidence showed Mother failed to remedy the
conditions that caused Child's removal.
Second, clear and convincing evidence showed Child was in foster care for fifteen
of the most recent twenty-two months. See § 63-7-2570(8) (providing a statutory
ground for TPR is met when "[t]he child has been in foster care under the
responsibility of the State for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months"). At
the time of the TPR hearing, Child had continuously been in foster care for over
two years, and no evidence in the record suggests the Department of Social
Services (DSS) caused this delay. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402
S.C. 324, 336, 741 S.E.2d 739, 746 (2013) ("The family court must find . . . the
delay in reunification of the family unit is attributable not to mistakes by the
government, but to the parent's inability to provide an environment where the child
will be nourished and protected."). Thus, clear and convincing evidence proved
this ground.
Finally, viewed from Child's perspective, TPR is in her best interest. At the time
of the TPR hearing, Child had been out of Mother's home for approximately
twenty-nine months, and Mother failed to provide a safe, drug-free environment to
which Child could return. The guardian ad litem (GAL) reported Child was
bonded to her foster parents, who wished to adopt her, and the DSS case worker
observed that Child was thriving in her pre-adoptive foster placement and loved
her foster siblings. The GAL and the case worker both recommended TPR.
Accordingly, TPR is in Child's best interest.
AFFIRMED. 2
WILLIAMS, C.J., THOMAS, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.