Marvin Brown v. Kimberly Brow ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Marvin Luther Brown, Respondent,
v.
Kimberly D. Brown, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2020-000918
Appeal From Greenville County
Thomas T. Hodges, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-378
Submitted September 22, 2022 – Filed October 12, 2022
AFFIRMED
J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Kimberly D. Brown (Wife) appeals a final order of divorce. On
appeal, she argues the family court erred by denying her request for alimony and
failing to equitably divide the marital assets and debts. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.
We hold the family court did not err by denying Wife's request for alimony. See
Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833 S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019) ("Appellate
courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and
procedural rulings.") id. at 91-92, 833 S.E.2d at 272 ("Even under de novo review,
the longstanding principles that trial judges are in superior positions to assess
witness credibility and that appellants must show the trial judge erred by ruling
against the preponderance of the evidence remain applicable."). Although Wife
contends she showed evidence of physical cruelty and adultery prior to the parties'
separation, we find Wife failed to establish evidence of either. See Butler v.
Butler, 385 S.C. 328, 338-39, 684 S.E.2d 191, 196 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Per statute,
the complete list of factors the family court can consider in setting alimony
include: (1) duration of the marriage; (2) physical and emotional health of the
parties; (3) educational background of the parties; (4) employment history and
earning potential of the parties; (5) standard of living established during the
marriage; (6) current and reasonably anticipated earnings of the parties; (7) current
and reasonably anticipated expenses and needs of the parties; (8) marital and
nonmarital properties of the parties; (9) custody of children; (10) marital
misconduct or fault; (11) tax consequences; and (12) prior support obligations; as
well as other factors the court considers relevant."). Further, although the parties
cohabitated prior to their marriage, the statutory factors contemplate consideration
of the duration of the marriage, not the full duration of the parties' relationship.
Moreover, although Wife has demonstrated her current and reasonably anticipated
earnings are less than her current and reasonably anticipated expenses, that alone is
not dispositive of whether a spouse is entitled to alimony. See Allen v. Allen, 347
S.C. 177, 184, 554 S.E.2d 421, 425 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating that in considering the
alimony factors, "[n]o one factor is dispositive."). Because Wife failed to show a
preponderance of the evidence was against the family court's findings, we affirm.
We hold the family court did not fail to equitably divide the marital assets and
debts. See Stone, 428 S.C. at 91, 833 S.E.2d at 272 ("Appellate courts review
family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and procedural
rulings.") id. at 91-92, 833 S.E.2d at 272 ("Even under de novo review, the
longstanding principles that trial judges are in superior positions to assess witness
credibility and that appellants must show the trial judge erred by ruling against the
preponderance of the evidence remain applicable."). As to whether the family
court erred in its $0 valuation of the 2005 Chevy, we hold it did not. Husband
testified he purchased the vehicle for $7,346.50 in July 2018, it had 275,000 miles
on it, and that at the time of separation in March 2019, he estimated its value was
approximately $2,500 but he still owed $3,000; Wife admitted during the hearing
that her thirteen-thousand-dollar valuation of the vehicle was without evidentiary
support. As to whether the family court erred in its valuation of the lawnmowers,
we hold it did not. Although Wife contends the lawnmowers were not valued
properly because Husband had valued them at $7,000 and $1,000 in his April 2019
financial declaration, at the February 2020 hearing, Husband testified the zero-turn
lawnmower was valued at approximately $4,000, he provided an Ebay listing for a
similar model that was listed for $4,995, and Wife provided no evidence of its
value. Husband testified the other lawnmower was worth $0, and Wife provided
no evidence of its value. As to whether the family court erred by ordering Wife to
pay the debts in her name, we find Wife failed to establish that the debt was
marital. See Pruitt v. Pruitt, 389 S.C. 250, 265, 697 S.E.2d 702, 710 (Ct. App.
2010) ("For purposes of equitable distribution, 'marital debt' is debt incurred for the
joint benefit of the parties regardless of whether the parties are legally jointly liable
for the debt or whether one party is legally individually liable." (quoting Hardy v.
Hardy, 311 S.C. 433, 436-37, 429 S.E.2d 811, 813 (Ct. App. 1993))); id. ("When
the debt is incurred before marital litigation begins, the burden of proving a
spouse's debt is non-marital rests on the party making that assertion. When a debt
is incurred after the commencement of litigation but before the final divorce
decree, the family court may equitably apportion it as a marital debt when it is
shown the debt was incurred for the joint benefit of the parties during the marriage.
Under these circumstances, the burden of proving the debt is marital rests on the
party making that assertion." (citations omitted)). Wife did not testify as to how or
when the debt was incurred; thus, she has failed to establish a basis for dividing up
the debts in her name amongst her and Husband. Because Wife failed to show a
preponderance of the evidence was against the family court's findings, we affirm.
AFFIRMED. 1
GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.