Shem Creek Development v. The Town of Mt. Pleasant ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Shem Creek Development Group, LLC, Respondent,
v.
The Town of Mount Pleasant, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2021-000501
Appeal From Charleston County
Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-421
Submitted November 17, 2022 – Filed November 23, 2022
APPEAL DISMISSED
Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann & Davis, P.A., of
Columbia; Claudius O. Tackett, II, of Sheffer &
Monhollen, PLLC, of Louisville, Kentucky; and David
Guy Pagliarini, of Pagliarini Law Firm, LLC, of Daniel
Island, all for Appellant.
E. Brandon Gaskins, of Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, of
Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: The Town of Mount Pleasant (the Town) appeals an order of the
circuit court deferring its ruling on the Town's motion to alter or amend its order
awarding Shem Creek Development Group (Shem Creek) attorney's fees and costs
in a breach of contract action Shem Creek brought against the Town. On appeal,
the Town argues the circuit court erred (1) in finding it had jurisdiction to rule on
Shem Creek's request for attorney's fees when an appeal was pending in this court,
and (2) in sua sponte deferring its ruling on the Town's Rule 59(e), SCRCP,
motion to alter or amend the award of attorney's fees without also vacating the
attorney's fee judgment when that judgment was enrolled and accruing
post-judgment interest. We dismiss the appeal because the circuit court's order is
interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See Ex parte Wilson, 367 S.C. 7,
12, 625 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2005) ("Any judgment or decree, leaving some further
act to be done by the court before the rights of the parties are determined, is
interlocutory and not final."); id. at 13, 625 S.E.2d at 208 ("[T]he immediate
appealability of an interlocutory or intermediate order depends on whether the
order falls within [South Carolina Code section] 14-3-330."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 14-3-330(1)-(2) (2017) (stating a party may appeal an intermediate or
interlocutory order only if it "involve[s] the merits", "determine[s] the action and
prevent[s] a judgment from which an appeal may be taken", or "discontinue[s] the
action"); Ashenfelder v. City of Georgetown, 389 S.C. 568, 571, 698 S.E.2d 856,
858 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Even if not raised by the parties, this court may address the
issue of appealability ex mero motu.").
APPEAL DISMISSED. 1
KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.