First Reliance Bank v. Charles E. Bishop ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
First Reliance Bank, Respondent,
v.
Charles E. Bishop, Brett D. Blanks, BCM of Lexington,
LLC d/b/a Dam Bar & Grill, B&H of Lexington, LLC
and Branch Banking and Trust Company of South
Carolina, Defendants,
Of whom Charles E. Bishop is the Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2020-000872
Appeal From Lexington County
James O. Spence, Master-in-Equity
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-408
Submitted October 1, 2022 – Filed November 16, 2022
AFFIRMED
Paul B. Ferrara, III, of Ferrara Law Firm, PLLC, of North
Charleston, for Appellant.
James Edward Bradley, of Moore Bradley Myers, PA, of
West Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Charles Bishop appeals an order of the master-in-equity in a
foreclosure action. On appeal, Bishop argues (1) the master abused his discretion
in not ordering a new appraisal, (2) due process requires this matter be reviewed by
this court, and (3) First Reliance Bank should be estopped from asserting this court
does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter. We affirm.
1. We hold Bishop served his notice of appeal within thirty days of receiving
written notice of entry of the order, and therefore, this court has appellate
jurisdiction. See Rules 203(b)(1), (4), SCACR (stating that a notice of appeal from
an order or judgment issued by a master-in-equity "must be served on all
respondents within thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice of entry of the
order or judgment"); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Driver, 317 S.C. 471,
477, 451 S.E.2d 924, 928 (Ct. App. 1994) (explaining the elements of estoppel as
applied to the estopped party and the party asserting estoppel).
2. We hold the master did not abuse his discretion in not ordering a new appraisal.
See Ingram v. Kasey's Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 105, 531 S.E.2d 287, 290-91 (2000)
("In equity actions an appellate court can review the record and make findings
based on its view of the preponderance of the evidence. However, this [c]ourt is
not required to disregard the findings of the trial judge who saw and heard the
witnesses and was in a better position to judge their credibility." (internal citations
omitted)); S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-680(A) (2007) ("In any real estate foreclosure
proceeding a defendant against whom a personal judgment be taken or asked . . .
may within thirty days after the sale of the mortgaged property apply . . . for an
order of appraisal."); S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-720 (2007) ("The board of
appraisers . . . shall proceed to view and value the mortgaged property and all or a
majority thereof shall make a sworn return within thirty days from their
appointment of the true value of the property as of the date of sale, taking into
consideration sale value, cost and replacement value of improvements, income
production and all other proper elements which, in their discretion, enter into the
determination of true value." (emphasis added)); S.C. Nat'l. Bank v. Cent. Carolina
Livestock Mkt., Inc., 289 S.C. 309, 311-12, 345 S.E.2d 485, 487 (1986) (explaining
that a party aggrieved by the appraisers' return and any subsequent deficiency
judgment order has the right to appeal, and if the master "determines that the
appraisal does represent the true value of the property, he confirms the appraisal
and an aggrieved party has the right to appeal" to the appellate court; however, if
the master "determines that the appraisal does not fairly represent the value of the
property, he may 'order a new appraisal upon such terms as he may deem
equitable'" (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-750 (2007))); Gowdy v. Kelley, 185
S.C. 415, 423, 194 S.E. 156, 160 (1937) (stating that equitable relief on the ground
of mistake is available only "[w]here there is a mutual mistake as to the facts upon
which it is based . . . or . . . [w]here one of the parties only is under
such mistake . . . such mistake has been occasioned by the fraud, deceit, or
imposition in any form of the other" (quoting Kennerty v. Etiwan Phosphate
Company, 21 S.C. 226, 231, 53 Am. Rep. 669 (1884))); Cleveland v. Home Ins.
Co. of N. Y., 150 S.C. 289, 295, 148 S.E. 49, 52 (1929) ("[H]owever, . . . a mere
mistake of judgment on the part of the appraisers cannot and would not vitiate an
award . . . unless it is shown that there was fraud, actual or implied, or that the
appraisers were not impartial.").
AFFIRMED. 1
GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.