Kevin M. Todd v. Mike Roberts ( 2022 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Kevin M. Todd, Employee, Claimant, Respondent,
    v.
    Mike Roberts d/b/a Mike Roberts Home Repair,
    Employer, and S.C. Uninsured Employers Fund, Carrier,
    Defendants,
    of which S.C. Uninsured Employers Fund is the
    Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2020-000923
    Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-up-399
    Submitted October 1, 2022 – Filed November 2, 2022
    AFFIRMED
    Samuel Thompson Brunson, of Samuel T. Brunson Law
    Offices, of Florence, for Appellant.
    Gene McCain Connell, Jr., of Kelaher Connell &
    Connor, PC, of Surfside Beach, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: The South Carolina Uninsured Employers' Fund (the UEF)
    appeals an order from an appellate panel of the South Carolina Workers'
    Compensation Commission (the Appellate Panel). On appeal, the UEF argues the
    Appellate Panel erred in (1) finding Mike Roberts, D/B/A Mike Roberts Home
    Repair, was subject to the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act (the Act)
    because he regularly employed four or more persons at the time of Kevin Todd's
    accident, (2) finding Todd suffered an injury arising out of the scope of his
    employment, (3) awarding benefits in this case, and (4) considering this matter at a
    conference and allowing Todd to submit additional evidence without Roberts's
    consent. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
    1. As to issue one, we hold the Appellate Panel did not err in finding Roberts was
    subject to the Act because the preponderance of the evidence showed he regularly
    employed four or more persons. See Harding v. Plumley, 
    329 S.C. 580
    , 584, 
    496 S.E.2d 29
    , 31 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The issue of whether an employer regularly
    employs the requisite number of employees to be subject to the . . . Act is
    jurisdictional."); Hernandez-Zuniga v. Tickle, 
    374 S.C. 235
    , 242, 
    647 S.E.2d 691
    ,
    694 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[I]f the factual issue before the Commission involves a
    jurisdictional question, [an appellate] court's review is governed by the
    preponderance of evidence standard."); id. at 243, 647 S.E.2d at 695 (stating an
    appellate court "has both the power and duty to review the entire record, find
    jurisdictional facts without regard to conclusions of the Commission on the issue,
    and decide the jurisdictional question in accord with the preponderance of
    evidence"); id. ("Workers' compensation statutes are construed liberally in favor of
    coverage, and South Carolina's policy is to resolve jurisdictional doubts in favor of
    the inclusion of employees within workers' compensation coverage."); id. at
    243-44, 647 S.E.2d at 695 (stating that although "an appellate court may take its
    own view of the preponderance of evidence on the existence of an
    employer-employee relationship, the final determination of witness credibility is
    usually reserved to the Appellate Panel"); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-360
    (2) (2015)
    (indicating the Act does not apply to "any person who has regularly employed in
    service less than four employees in the same business within the State"); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-130
     (2015) (defining an employee as a person "engaged in an
    employment under any appointment[ or] contract of hire" but excluding "a person
    whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business,
    profession, or occupation of his employer"); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-150
     (2015)
    (stating employment includes "all private employments in which four or more
    employees are regularly employed in the same business or establishment");
    Hartzell v. Palmetto Collision, LLC, 
    406 S.C. 233
    , 242-43, 
    750 S.E.2d 97
    , 102 (Ct.
    App. 2013) (indicating common characteristics of regular employment include:
    "(1) 'employment of the same number of persons,' although not necessarily the
    same individuals; (2) during the relevant period of time; (3) 'with some constancy';
    (4) 'not by chance or for a particular occasion'; and (5) without regard to the
    regularity of the days or hours worked"), rev'd on other grounds by Hartzell v.
    Palmetto Collision, LLC, 
    415 S.C. 617
    , 
    785 S.E.2d 194
     (2016).
    2. As to issues two and three, we hold the Appellate Panel did not err in finding
    Todd suffered an injury arising out of and within the scope of his employment and,
    thus, awarding benefits. See Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty, 
    411 S.C. 391
    , 395, 
    768 S.E.2d 651
    , 652 (2015) (stating an appellate court "can reverse or modify the
    [Appellate Panel's] decision if it is affected by an error of law or is clearly
    erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole
    record"); Gibson v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. No. 3, 
    338 S.C. 510
    , 517, 
    526 S.E.2d 725
    , 729 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Substantial evidence . . . is evidence which, considering
    the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the
    administrative agency reached in order to justify its action."); Barnes, 411 S.C. at
    395, 768 S.E.2d at 652 ("In a workers' compensation case, the appellate panel is
    the ultimate fact-finder."); id. at 398, 768 S.E.2d at 654 ("For an accidental injury
    to be compensable, it must 'aris[e] out of and in the course of the employment.'"
    (quoting 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160
    (A) (2015))); Gibson, 338 S.C. at 517, 526
    S.E.2d at 729 ("The question of whether an accident arises out of and is in the
    course and scope of employment is largely a question of fact for the Appellate
    Panel."); Barnes, 411 S.C. at 398, 768 S.E.2d at 654 ("Arising out of refers to the
    injury's origin and cause, whereas in the course of refers to the injury's time, place,
    and circumstances."); id. ("An injury arises out of employment if it is proximately
    caused by the employment."); id. ("For an injury to arise out of employment, there
    must be a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is
    required to be performed and the resulting injury."); id. at 394, 768 S.E.2d at 652
    (stating "[w]orkers' compensation law is to be liberally construed in favor of
    coverage to serve the beneficent purpose of the" Act).
    3. As to issue four, we hold the UEF's arguments are not preserved for review
    because it did not raise them to the Appellate Panel. See Smith v. NCCI, Inc., 
    369 S.C. 236
    , 256, 
    631 S.E.2d 268
    , 279 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Only issues raised and ruled
    upon by the [Appellate Panel] are cognizable on appeal.").
    AFFIRMED. 1
    KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-UP-399

Filed Date: 11/2/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024