1st Franklin Financial v. Estate of Roby A. Adams ( 2023 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
1st Franklin Financial Corporation, Respondent,
v.
Estate of Roby A. Adams, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2020-001127
Appeal From Dorchester County
James E. Chellis, Master-in-Equity
Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-024
Submitted November 1, 2022 – Filed January 25, 2023
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
John R Cantrell, Jr., of Cantrell Legal, PC, of St.
Matthews, for Appellant.
Robert Hope Jordan and Robert Crum Osborne, III, both
of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, of Charleston,
for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Roby A. Adams appeals an order of the master-in-equity
granting partial summary judgment in favor of 1st Franklin Financial Corporation
(1st Franklin). On appeal, Adams argues the master erred by (1) ruling as a matter
of law that the South Carolina legislature did not intend to impose strict liability
for a violation of section 37-5-108 of the South Carolina Code (2015); (2) granting
summary judgment on Adams's counterclaims that 1st Franklin falsely represented
the amount of the debt that was owed; and (3) denying Adams's Rule 59, SCRCP,
motion in regards to those issues. We affirm as modified.
1. We hold the master did not err by determining the South Carolina legislature
did not intend to impose strict liability for a violation of section 37-5-108. See
Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("The cardinal rule
of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature."); id. ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the [appellate] court's
place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 37-5-108(2) (2015) ("With respect to a consumer credit transaction, if the court
as a matter of law finds that a person has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to
engage in unconscionable conduct in collecting a debt arising from that
transaction, the court may grant an injunction."); S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5-108(5)(c)
(2015) ("In applying subsection (2), consideration shall be given to each of the
following factors, among others, as applicable: . . . using fraudulent, deceptive, or
misleading representations in connection with the collection of a consumer credit
transaction." (emphasis added)); White v. State, 375 S.C. 1, 7, 649 S.E.2d 172, 175
(Ct. App. 2007) ("In construing a statute, this [c]ourt should not consider the
particular clause being construed in isolation, but we should read the clause in
conjunction with the purpose of the whole statute and the policy of the law."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 37-5-108(3) (2015) ("If it is claimed or appears to the court . . . that a
person has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to engage in unconscionable
conduct in collecting a debt, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence . . . to aid the court in making the determination." (emphasis
added)).
2. We hold the master did not err by granting 1st Franklin partial summary
judgment on Adams's counterclaim alleging 1st Franklin acted unconscionably by
falsely representing the amount of debt Adams owed by $9.08. See Woodson v.
DLI Props., LLC, 406 S.C. 517, 528, 753 S.E.2d 428, 434 (2014) ("In reviewing a
grant of summary judgment, our appellate court applies the same standard as the
[master] under Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); Rule 56(c) (explaining a trial court may
properly grant a motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"); Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354
S.C. 648, 660, 582 S.E.2d 432, 438 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Once the party moving for
summary judgment meets the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary
support for the opponent's case, the opponent cannot simply rest on mere
allegations or denials contained in the pleadings."); id. ("[T]he nonmoving party
must come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.");
§ 37-5-108(2) ("With respect to a consumer credit transaction, if the court as a
matter of law finds that a person has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to
engage in unconscionable conduct in collecting a debt arising from that
transaction, the court may grant an injunction."). However, to the extent the
master's order prevents Adams from presenting additional evidence in future
proceedings, we modify the order and hold Adams cannot present additional
evidence on the specific claim on which the master granted summary judgment.
3. We hold the master did not err by denying Adams's Rule 59 motion. See
Pollard v. Cnty. of Florence, 314 S.C. 397, 402, 444 S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ct. App.
1994) (reviewing the circuit court's ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion pursuant to an
abuse of discretion standard); BB & T v. Taylor, 369 S.C. 548, 551, 633 S.E.2d
501, 503 (2006) ("An abuse of discretion arises where the judge issuing the order
was controlled by an error of law or where the order is based on factual
conclusions that are without evidentiary support."); Rule 52(a), SCRCP ("Findings
of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under
Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b).").
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 1
WILLIAMS, C.J., THOMAS, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.