In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Gilbert Gonzalez ( 2012 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

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In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Gilbert Gonzalez, Appellant.

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Appeal from Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No.  2012-UP-003
Heard October 31, 2011 – Filed January 4, 2012 

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AFFIRMED

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Appellate Defender Lanelle C. Durant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Gilbert Gonzalez appeals his civil commitment to the South Carolina Department of Mental Health for long-term control, care, and treatment, pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), South Carolina Code sections 44-48-10 to -170 (2002 & Supp. 2010).  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.    As to whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Gonzalez's requested jury charges, the record demonstrates that the trial court's extensive jury charge accurately and fairly stated the applicable law: In re Care & Treatment of Canupp, 380 S.C. 611, 616, 671 S.E.2d 614, 616 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted) ("A jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the law. To warrant reversal, a circuit court[']s refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."); Davis v. Tripp, 338 S.C. 226, 237, 525 S.E.2d 528, 534 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction and stating: "We have examined the court's charge to the jury and conclude that, when viewed in its entirety, it fairly and sufficiently sets forth the applicable law in this case.").

2.    As to whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to contend in its closing argument that the jury could draw an inference from the absence of Gonzalez's expert at trial, we find no abuse of discretion: Von Dohlen v. State, 360 S.C. 598, 609-10, 602 S.E.2d 738, 744 (2004) (citation omitted) ("The [closing] argument must not be calculated to arouse the jurors' passions or prejudices, and its content should stay within the record and reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom."); Johnson v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 227 S.C. 351, 369, 88 S.E.2d 260, 269 (1955) (citations omitted) ("Control of the arguments of counsel rests in the discretion of the trial judge, and considerable latitude is generally allowed in the matter of drawing and arguing inferences and deductions from the evidence.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.