State v. Davis ( 2008 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Paul Ray Davis, Appellant.

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Appeal From Spartanburg County
Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-664
Submitted December 1, 2008 – Filed December 8, 2008   

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AFFIRMED

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Christopher D. Brough, of Spartanburg, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Michelle Parsons, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Harold W. Gowdy, III, of Spartanburg, for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM: Paul Ray Davis pled guilty to two counts of unlawful neglect of a child; one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, third offense; one count of distribution of methamphetamine, third offense; one count of possession of methamphetamine, third offense; one count of trafficking in methamphetamine greater than 28 grams, third offense; and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon.  Davis was sentenced to a total of eighteen years’ imprisonment.  He now appeals his sentence, arguing the circuit court erred in sentencing him to eighteen years’ imprisonment because he provided information to law enforcement as agreed in his plea deal. 

We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) (holding in criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only); State v. Gates, 299 S.C. 92, 95, 382 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1989) (holding when the language of a plea agreement “is perfectly plain and capable of legal construction, such language determines the force and effect” of the agreement); State v. Armstrong, 263 S.C. 594, 597, 211 S.E.2d 889, 890 (1975) (“[I]t is the prerogative of any person to waive his rights, confess, and plead guilty, under judicially defined safeguards, which are adequately enforced.”); State v. Compton, 366 S.C. 671, 677, 678, 623 S.E.2d 661, 664, 665 (Ct. App. 2005) (requiring courts to refrain from “read[ing] terms or conditions into the contract that the parties did not intend” and to “enforce an unambiguous contract according to its terms, regardless of the contract’s wisdom or folly, or the parties’ failure to guard their rights carefully”); Reed v. Becka, 333 S.C. 676, 685, 688, 511 S.E.2d 396, 401, 402 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding a plea agreement is subject to contract principles and generally, whether written or oral, a plea agreement becomes binding when a court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea). 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., SHORT and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

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[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.