Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation v. Pegasus, L.L.C ( 2008 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, Respondent,

v.

Pegasus, L.L.C., formerly known as Pegasus, L.L.P., Margaret B. Ebener, Jean B. Seay, Inman Land Company, Inc., Rick Inman, Loise Goforth and Coldwell Banker-Tom Jenkins Realty, Inc., Defendants,

of whom Pegasus, L.L.C., formerly known as Pegasus, L.L.P. is the Appellant.

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Appeal From Richland County
J. Ernest Kinard, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-651
Heard November 5, 2008 – Filed December 3, 2008   

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AFFIRMED

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Edward M. Woodward, Jr., of Cayce; Glenn E. Bowens and Tony S. Catone, both of Blythewood, for Appellant.

Thomas C. Salane, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Pegasus, L.L.C. appeals the amount of the circuit court’s award to it under a title insurance policy issued by Lawyer’s Title Insurance Corporation (Lawyer’s Title).  Pegasus contends the circuit court erred in:  (1) admitting an appraiser’s supplemental appraisal because it asserts the letter was not disclosed to Pegasus prior to trial; (2) failing to exclude the supplemental appraisal because it did not qualify as an appraisal under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, or as expert opinion under either Rule 702 or 703, SCRE; and (3) failing to find that Lawyer’s Title acted in bad faith in processing its claim.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities:  (1) Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 214, 479 S.E.2d 35, 42 (1996) (finding any error in the admission of improper evidence is harmless where it is merely cumulative to other evidence properly admitted); Dixon v. Bresco Eng’g, Inc., 320 S.C. 174, 181, 463 S.E.2d 636, 640 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion in a court’s award that was comparable to the testimony of witnesses, where it was the fact finder’s responsibility to weigh and accept or reject the witnesses’ valuations); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 345 S.C. 88, 101, 545 S.E.2d 531, 538 (Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing in a family court setting, which has a broad scope of review, that the fact finding court may accept one party’s valuations over those of the other party, and the court had acted within its discretion when its valuation was within the range of evidence presented); (2) State v. McCray, 332 S.C. 536, 542, 506 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1998) (finding an argument unpreserved where the contention on appeal differed from the party’s objection at trial); Commercial Credit Loans, Inc. v. Riddle, 334 S.C. 176, 186, 512 S.E.2d 123, 130 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating a party cannot raise an argument for the first time in its motion to reconsider, alter, or amend when that argument could have been raised to the court before the judgment); and (3) Greene v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 287 S.C. 197, 199, 336 S.E.2d 478, 479-80 (1985) (finding when a meritorious issue is in dispute, an insurer’s actions defending its rights under the policy is not without reasonable cause or in bad faith).   

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., and SHORT, J., and KONDUROS, J., concur.