Caine Henry v. MUSC ( 2024 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Caine Henry, Appellant,
v.
Medical University of South Carolina, Medical
University of South Carolina Department of Public
Safety, and Kevin Kerley, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2023-000227
Appeal From Charleston County
Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-386
Submitted November 1, 2024 – Filed November 20, 2024
AFFIRMED
Caine Henry, of North Charleston, pro se.
Brian Edward Johnson, of Hood Law Firm, LLC, and
Lisa Brennan Bisso, both of Charleston, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Caine Henry appeals the circuit court's grant of summary
judgment in his action for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
civil conspiracy, and negligence against the Medical University of South Carolina,
Medical University of South Carolina Department of Public Safety, and Kevin
Kerley (collectively, MUSC). On appeal, he argues the circuit court erred in
granting MUSC's motion for summary judgment because (1) he did not have a full
and fair opportunity to complete discovery, and (2) there were genuine issues of
material fact. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
1. We hold the circuit court did not err in granting MUSC's motion for summary
judgment despite Henry's motion to compel the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division (SLED) to provide information because Henry failed to demonstrate the
likelihood that further discovery would uncover additional relevant evidence. See
Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440 S.C. 456, 459, 892 S.E.2d 297, 299
(2023) ("[T]he moving party is entitled to summary judgment 'if the [evidence
before the court] show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP)); Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567
S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002) ("When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the
appellate court applies the same standard applied by the [circuit] court pursuant to
Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); id. at 493-94, 567 S.E.2d at 860 ("When determining if any
triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."); Kitchen Planners,
440 S.C. at 463, 892 S.E.2d at 301 ("[I]t is not sufficient for a party to create an
inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine." (quoting
Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2013))).
Henry asserts that MUSC participated in a phone call with SLED, which ultimately
resulted in SLED requesting a welfare check with false assertions that he would
shoot anyone on scene; however, Henry did not provide any indication that such a
conversation occurred between SLED and MUSC and merely asserted it happened.
To the contrary, the record reflects the SLED agent who ultimately requested the
welfare check on Henry was included in each email Henry sent to MUSC, and
nothing suggested MUSC conveyed any false information to SLED other than
Henry's assertion. Accordingly, we hold Henry failed to demonstrate the
likelihood that further discovery would uncover additional evidence. See Dawkins
v. Fields, 354 S.C. 58, 69, 580 S.E.2d 433, 439 (2003) ("Summary judgment is a
drastic remedy and must not be granted until the opposing party has had a full and
fair opportunity to complete discovery."); id. ("Nonetheless, the nonmoving party
must demonstrate the likelihood that further discovery will uncover additional
relevant evidence and that the party is 'not merely engaged in a "fishing
expedition."'" (quoting Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 112, 410
S.E.2d 537, 544 (1991))); id. at 70-71, 580 S.E.2d at 439 (holding the party "[is]
not permitted simply to rest on the allegations in their complaint, especially
where . . . the majority of the factual allegations are conclusory in nature").
2. Initially, we hold Henry's arguments as to his claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and negligence are abandoned because Henry
did not argue there were any genuine issues of material fact as to any cause of
action except defamation. See First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444
S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (holding issues not argued in the brief are deemed
abandoned and will not be considered on appeal).
Next, we hold the circuit court did not err in granting MUSC's motion for summary
judgment on Henry's defamation claim because he failed to demonstrate there were
any genuine issues of material fact. See Kitchen Planners, 440 S.C. at 459, 892
S.E.2d at 299 ("[T]he moving party is entitled to summary judgment 'if the
[evidence before the court] show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"
(alteration in original) (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP)); Fleming, 350 S.C. at 493,
567 S.E.2d at 860 ("When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the appellate
court applies the same standard applied by the [circuit] court pursuant to Rule
56(c), SCRCP."); id. at 493-94, 567 S.E.2d at 860 ("When determining if any
triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."); Kitchen Planners,
440 S.C. at 463, 892 S.E.2d at 301 ("[I]t is not sufficient for a party to create an
inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine." (quoting
Town of Hollywood, 403 S.C. at 477, 744 S.E.2d at 166)). Specifically, Henry
failed to demonstrate MUSC made any false and defamatory statements about him
or that any were published to a third party because the record indicated the welfare
check at issue was requested by a SLED agent, not MUSC, and there was no
evidence MUSC made any defamatory statements to SLED. See Murray v.
Holnam, Inc., 344 S.C. 129, 139, 542 S.E.2d 743, 748 (Ct. App. 2001) (explaining
the elements of defamation are: "(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning
another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault on the part of the
publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm
or the existence of special harm caused by the publication").
AFFIRMED. 1
WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.