In the Matter of Wiley L. Chapman ( 2024 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Wiley L.
Chapman, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2022-000956
Appeal From Chester County
Michael S. Holt, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-390
Submitted November 1, 2024 – Filed November 27, 2024
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe,
both of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Wiley L. Chapman appeals his civil commitment to the
Department of Mental Health pursuant to the South Carolina Sexually Violent
Predator Act.1 On appeal, Chapman argues the trial court erred in prohibiting him
from cross-examining the State's expert about the outpatient treatment for sex
offenders that she provided. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
1
See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2018 & Supp. 2024).
We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Chapman from
cross-examining the expert about the outpatient treatment program she provided
through her clinic because the testimony was not relevant and the State did not
open the door for the testimony to be introduced. See In re Campbell, 427 S.C.
183, 190, 830 S.E.2d 14, 18 (2019) ("In general, the admission or exclusion of
evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will
not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."); id. ("Likewise, the
scope of cross-examination is largely within the trial court's discretion."); Rule
402, SCRE ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."); § 44-48-30(1)
(stating a sexually violent predator is defined as a person who: "(a) has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) suffers from a mental abnormality
or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and
treatment"). During direct examination, the expert stated before the jury that she
offered an intensive outpatient treatment program. Chapman proffered the
testimony he intended to elicit on cross-examination, including that it was a
ten-week long program, utilized behavioral techniques such as aversion, and was
mostly voluntary. Although the jury did not hear the details of the program, both
the State's expert and Chapman's expert testified before the jury as to outpatient
treatment being available. Therefore, to the extent that the availability of
outpatient treatment was relevant to the jury's determination of whether Chapman
needed to be confined, any details within the proffered testimony were redundant
or unnecessary to the testimony already before the jury. See In re Ettel, 377 S.C.
558, 561, 660 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Evidence is relevant if it tends to
establish or make more or less probable the matter in controversy."); State v.
Jenkins, 322 S.C. 360, 364, 474 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]rial [courts]
may impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns
about . . . interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant."). Moreover,
the State did not open the door to the expert testifying about the outpatient
treatment program. The expert stated only that she offered an outpatient treatment
program and did not discuss the efficacy of the program; thus, her testimony did
not place a fact in issue. See State v. Simmons, 430 S.C. 1, 14, 841 S.E.2d 845,
852 (2020) ("A party may introduce inadmissible evidence in rebuttal when the
opponent places a fact at issue."). Accordingly, under the facts of this case, the
details of outpatient treatment were not relevant to the determination of whether
Chapman was a sexually violent predator and the State did not open the door for
the testimony to be introduced.
AFFIRMED. 2
KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and TURNER, JJ., concur.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.