Law v. Dorsey ( 2020 )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION Frederick A. Law, ) Civil Action No. 8:19-cv-03586-RMG Plaintiff, V. ORDER Keyunna Dorsey, Sgt. Chris Neal, Cpt. Lanita Patton, Major Jeff Johnson, ) Defendants. CC“? Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 9) recommending the Court dismiss the case. For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the R & R as the Order of the Court and dismisses the case. I. Background Frederick A. Law (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. He filed this action on December 30, 2019 alleging that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a violation of his civil rights occurred. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that on March 2, 2018, he was booked into the Florence County Detention Center with $897 in his possession. (/d. at 4-5.) Upon his arrival, Plaintiff alleges he was searched by Defendant Dorsey, his money was placed on the counter, and he was placed in the detox holding cell. (/d.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dorsey stole $200 of his money. (Id. at 6.) On January 7, 2020, the Magistrate Judge filed an R & R recommending the Court dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state an actionable claim. (Dkt. No. 9.) II. Legal Standard A. Report and Recommendation The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Where the plaintiff objects to the R & R, the Court “makes a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Jd. Where Plaintiff fails to file any specific objections, “a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). In the absence of objections, the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and recommendation. See, e.g., Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983) (“In the absence of objection . . . we do not believe that it requires any explanation.”). The Plaintiff has not filed objections and the R & R is reviewed for clear error. B. Failure to State a Claim Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and must dismiss any complaint, or portions of complaints that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[,]” or seek relief from a defendant immune from such relief. The same standard applies to complaints filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2). To state a claim, the complaint must state “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing a complaint, the Court is obligated to “assume the truth of all facts alleged in the complaint and the existence of any fact that can be proved, consistent with the complaint’s allegations.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). However, while the Court must accept the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, it “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Jd. Cc. Pro Se Pleadings Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys and are accorded liberal construction to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in federal district court, nor can the Court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. See Weller v. Dep’t of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). II. Discussion After thorough review of the R & R, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge comprehensively addressed the issues and correctly concluded that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed. Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support a claim against Defendants Neal, Patton, and Johnson. (Dkt. No. 9 at 4.) Ina § 1983 action, a plaintiff must plead facts indicating that a defendant acted personally in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977). Here, the complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing against Defendants Neal, Patton, and Johnson, and therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these Defendants under § 1983. 2. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Dorsey also fail to state a claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dorsey stole $200 and never returned it. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) The Magistrate Judge liberally construed the claim as a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deprivation of property without due process. (Dkt. No. 9 at 5. However, deprivations of personal property do not support actions for damages under § 1983. Baker v. Stevenson, No. CA 8:13-466-JFA-JDA, 2013 WL 4866337, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2013). Due process is not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss or injury to life, liberty or property. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). In South Carolina, “prisoners may bring a civil action in state court for recovery of personal property against prison officials who deprived them without state authorization. Mosley v. Scarcella, No. CV 1:19-1550-RMG- SVH, 2019 WL 4280129, at *2 (D.S.C. June 19, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-01550-RMG, 2019 WL 3406612 (D.S.C. July 29, 2019). To the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligence relating to his lost property, such a claim may be cognizable under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. However, this claim must be pursued in a court in the State of South Carolina. Further, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available for the loss.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (emphasis added). Even if Defendant Dorsey intentionally took Plaintiff's money, Plaintiff has a remedy under South Carolina law to obtain relief in state court under § 15-69-10, et seg. See McIntyre v. Portee, 784 F.2d 566, 567 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding South Carolina’s post-deprivation remedy under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-69-10, et seq. sufficiently satisfies due process requirements.) Accordingly, because there is no allegation Defendant Dorsey acted _A. pursuant to a state procedure and there is a meaningful post-deprivation remedy available, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim cannot proceed. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R & R of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 9) as the Order of the Court and DISMISSES the Plaintiff's Complaint without issuance and service of process. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. wh oe United States District Court Judge January Mf , 2020 Charleston, South Carolina Ss.