Vaughan v. Hicks ( 2023 )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA Lem Douglas Vaughan III, ) C/A No.: 1:23-4577-DCN-SVH ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ORDER AND NOTICE Chief J. Hicks; Medical Mrs. Bell; ) Officials K. Hornberger; Official C. ) Hughes; York County Detention ) Center, ) ) Defendants. ) ) Lem Douglas Vaughan III (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this case alleging violations of his constitutional rights. He sues Chief J. Hicks, Medical Mrs. Bell, Official K. Hornberger, Official C. Hughes, and York County Detention Center (“YCDC”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. I. Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff alleges Hughes gave him the wrong medication on July 26, 2023, and Hornberger gave him the wrong medication on August 9, 2023. [ECF No. 1 at 5]. He claims he asked for the nurse and was told he would be fine and to lie down. . at 9. He alleges he suffered emotional distress and pain and could not sleep because he believed someone was trying to hurt him. . at 6. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. , 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. , 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true. ., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. ., 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. , 556 U.S. 662, 677‒78 (2009); , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. , 556 U.S. at 678‒79. B. Analysis 1. YCDC is Not a Person To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. , 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In this case, Plaintiff sues YCDC as a defendant. However, YCDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. A sheriff’s department, detention center, or task force is a group of officers or buildings that is not considered a legal entity subject to suit , 27 F. App’x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); , 750 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not “person” under the statute); , 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Accordingly, YCDC is subject to summary dismissal. 2. No personal allegations against Hicks and Bell Plaintiff’s complaint contains no factual allegations against Hicks and Bell. To the extent Hicks and Bell are sued in their supervisory capacities, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983. The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); , 690 F.2d 1133, 1142–43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” , 556 U.S. at 676; , 737 F.2d 368, 372–74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). Accordingly, Hicks and Bell are subject to summary dismissal. 3. Claims Against Hughes and Hornberger Plaintiff alleges Hughes and Hornberger each gave him the wrong medication on one occasion. Plaintiff’s claims are construed as alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. In the case of , 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court reviewed the Eighth Amendment prohibition of punishments that “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” at 103 (quoting , 428 U.S. 153, 169–73 (1976)). The court stated: An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. . . . We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. , 429 U.S. at 103–105 (citations and footnotes omitted). Despite finding that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” was unconstitutional, the court was careful to note that “an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care” does not meet the standard necessary to allege an Eighth Amendment violation. at 105–06. The Fourth Circuit also considered this issue in the case of , 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1990). In that case, the court noted that treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness, . . . nevertheless, mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment.” at 851 (citations omitted). Unless medical needs were serious or life threatening, and the defendant was deliberately and intentionally indifferent to those needs of which he was aware at the time, the plaintiff may not prevail. , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); , 797 F.2d 179, 182–83 (4th Cir. 1986). The “negligent administration of the wrong medication does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation or constitute deliberate indifference.” , No. 2:13-CV-199-RMG, 2014 WL 272238, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 23, 2014) (citing , 414 F. App’x 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2011). As stated in .: The present complaint provides no facts to indicate that [the defendant] had knowledge that she was giving Plaintiff the wrong medication, or that she disregarded any known risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Instead, Plaintiff allegations are based on this Defendant's erroneous and inadvertent actions, which do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. No. 3:10-cv-200, 2010 WL 1052213 at *3 (D.S.C. Feb.12, 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 1052207 (D.S.C. Mar.19, 2010). Plaintiff has failed to show that the defendants’ providing of medical care during his confinement at YCDC constitutes deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs based on receiving the wrong medication on two occasions. Therefore, the undersigned recommends the amended complaint be summarily dismissed. NOTICE CONCERNING AMENDMENT Plaintiff may attempt to correct the defects in his complaint by filing an amended complaint by October 6, 2023, along with any appropriate service documents. Plaintiff is reminded an amended complaint replaces the original complaint and should be complete in itself. , 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the undersigned will conduct screening of the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to cure the deficiencies identified above, the undersigned will recommend to the district court that the claims be dismissed without leave for further amendment. IT IS SO ORDERED. PP Ut Slalger September 15, 2023 Shiva V. Hodges Columbia, South Carolina United States Magistrate Judge