Knowles v. Mirzayance ( 2009 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2008                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U. S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    KNOWLES, WARDEN v. MIRZAYANCE
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07–1315. Argued January 13, 2009—Decided March 24, 2009
    Respondent Mirzayance entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by
    reason of insanity (NGI) at his state-court murder trial. During the
    guilt phase, he sought to avoid a conviction for first-degree murder
    and instead obtain a second-degree murder verdict by presenting
    medical testimony that he was insane at the time of the crime and
    was, therefore, incapable of the necessary premeditation or delibera
    tion. The jury nevertheless convicted him of first-degree murder. Af
    ter the trial’s NGI phase was scheduled, Mirzayance accepted his
    counsel’s recommendation to abandon the insanity plea. Counsel be
    lieved that a defense verdict was unlikely because the jury had just
    rejected medical testimony similar to that which would be presented
    to establish the NGI defense. Moreover, although counsel had
    planned to supplement the medical evidence with testimony by Mir
    zayance’s parents as to their son’s mental illness, the parents refused
    to testify at the last moment. Following his conviction, Mirzayance
    alleged in state postconviction proceedings that his attorney’s rec
    ommendation to withdraw the NGI plea constituted ineffective assis
    tance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U. S. 668
    . The
    trial court denied relief, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.
    Mirzayance then applied for federal habeas relief, which the Dis
    trict Court denied. The Ninth Circuit reversed, ordering an eviden
    tiary hearing on counsel’s recommendation to withdraw the NGI
    plea. During the hearing, the Magistrate Judge made extensive fact
    findings, including, inter alia, that the NGI phase medical evidence
    essentially would have duplicated the evidence the jury rejected in
    the guilt phase; that counsel doubted the likelihood of prevailing on
    the NGI claim because the jury’s finding of first-degree murder as a
    practical matter would cripple Mirzayance’s chances of convincing
    2                      KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE
    Syllabus
    the jury that he nevertheless was incapable of understanding the na
    ture and quality of his act and of distinguishing right from wrong;
    that Mirzayance’s parents were not simply reluctant, but had effec
    tively refused, to testify; that counsel had made a carefully reasoned
    decision not to proceed with the NGI plea after weighing his options
    and discussing the matter with experienced co-counsel; but that
    counsel’s performance was nevertheless deficient because Mirzayance
    had “nothing to lose” by going forward with the NGI phase of the
    trial. The Magistrate Judge also found prejudice and recommended
    habeas relief. The District Court accepted the recommendation and
    granted the writ. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling, among other
    things, that counsel’s performance had been deficient because Mir
    zayance’s parents had not refused, but had merely expressed reluc
    tance to testify, and because competent counsel would have at
    tempted to persuade them to testify, which Mirzayance’s counsel
    admittedly did not. The court essentially concluded that competent
    counsel would have pursued the insanity defense because counsel
    had nothing to lose by putting on the only defense available. In addi
    tion, the court found prejudice because, in the court’s view, there was
    a reasonable probability the jury would have found Mirzayance in
    sane had counsel pursued the NGI phase. The Ninth Circuit con
    cluded that federal habeas relief was authorized under 
    28 U. S. C. §2254
    (d)(1) because the California Court of Appeal had “unreason
    abl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.”
    Held: Whether the state-court decision is reviewed under §2254(d)(1)’s
    standard or de novo, Mirzayance has failed to establish that his coun
    sel’s performance was ineffective. Pp. 8–16.
    (a) The State Court of Appeal’s denial of Mirzayance’s ineffective
    assistance claim did not violate clearly established federal law. The
    Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result based largely on its applica
    tion of an improper review standard—it blamed counsel for abandon
    ing the NGI claim because there was “nothing to lose” by pursuing it.
    But it is not “an unreasonable application of clearly established Fed
    eral law” for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that
    has not been squarely established by this Court. See, e.g., Wright v.
    Van Patten, 552 U. S. ___, ___. Absent anything akin to the “nothing
    to lose” standard in this Court’s precedent, habeas relief could have
    been granted under §2254(d)(1) only if the state-court decision in this
    case had unreasonably applied Strickland’s more general standard
    for ineffective-assistance claims, whereby a defendant must show
    both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice, 
    466 U. S., at 687
    . The question “is not whether a federal court believes the state
    court’s determination” under Strickland “was incorrect but whether
    [it] was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v.
    Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)                    3
    Syllabus
    Landrigan, 
    550 U. S. 465
    , 473. And, because Strickland’s is a gen
    eral standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably de
    termine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. Under the
    doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim
    evaluated under the §2254(d)(1) standard, Mirzayance’s ineffective
    assistance claim fails. It was not unreasonable for the state court to
    conclude that counsel’s performance was not deficient when he coun
    seled Mirzayance to abandon a claim that stood almost no chance of
    success. Pp. 8–11.
    (b) Even if Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance claim were eligible
    for de novo review, it would still fail because he has not shown inef
    fective assistance at all. Mirzayance can establish neither the defi
    cient performance nor the prejudice required by Strickland. As to
    performance, he has not shown “that counsel’s representation fell be
    low an objective standard of reasonableness.” 
    466 U. S., at
    687–688.
    Rather, counsel merely recommended the withdrawal of what he rea
    sonably believed was a claim doomed because similar medical testi
    mony had already been rejected and the parents’ testimony, which he
    believed to be his strongest evidence, would not be available. The
    Ninth Circuit’s position that competent counsel might have per
    suaded the reluctant parents to testify is in tension with the Magis
    trate Judge’s contrary findings and applies a more demanding stan
    dard than Strickland prescribes. The failure to show ineffective
    assistance is also confirmed by the Magistrate Judge’s finding that
    counsel’s decision was essentially an informed one “made after thor
    ough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,” and
    was therefore “virtually unchallengeable.” 
    Id., at 690
    . The Ninth
    Circuit’s insistence that counsel was required to assert the only de
    fense available, even one almost certain to lose, is not supported by
    any “prevailing professional norms” of which the Court is aware. See
    
    id., at 688
    . Nor has Mirzayance demonstrated that he suffered
    prejudice, which requires a showing of “a reasonable probability that,
    but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
    would have been different.” See 
    id., at 694
    . In fact, it was highly im
    probable that the jury, having just rejected testimony about Mir
    zayance’s mental condition in the guilt phase, would have reached a
    different result based on similar evidence at the NGI phase. Pp. 11–
    16.
    Reversed and remanded.
    THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
    C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in
    which SCALIA, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined as to all but Part II.
    Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 07–1315
    _________________
    MICHAEL A. KNOWLES, WARDEN, PETITIONER
    v. ALEXANDRE MIRZAYANCE
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [March 24, 2009]
    JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.*
    A federal court may grant a habeas corpus application
    arising from a state-court adjudication on the merits if the
    state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
    law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
    States.” 
    28 U. S. C. §2254
    (d)(1). In this case, respondent
    Alexandre Mirzayance claimed ineffective assistance of
    counsel because his attorney recommended withdrawing
    his insanity defense. The California courts rejected this
    claim on state postconviction review. We must decide
    whether this decision was contrary to or an unreasonable
    application of clearly established federal law. We hold
    that it was not. Whether reviewed under the standard of
    review set forth in §2254(d)(1) or de novo, Mirzayance
    failed to establish that his counsel’s performance was
    ineffective, see Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U. S. 668
    (1984).
    ——————
    * JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join all but
    Part II of this opinion.
    2                KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE
    Opinion of the Court
    I
    Mirzayance confessed that he stabbed his 19-year-old
    cousin nine times with a hunting knife and then shot her
    four times. At trial, he entered pleas of not guilty and not
    guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). Under California law,
    when both of these pleas are entered, the court must hold
    a bifurcated trial, with guilt determined during the first
    phase and the viability of the defendant’s NGI plea during
    the second. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1026(a) (West 1985).
    During the guilt phase of Mirzayance’s trial, he sought to
    avoid a conviction for first-degree murder by obtaining a
    verdict on the lesser included offense of second-degree
    murder. To that end, he presented medical testimony that
    he was insane at the time of the crime and was, therefore,
    incapable of the premeditation or deliberation necessary
    for a first-degree murder conviction. The jury neverthe
    less convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder.
    The trial judge set the NGI phase to begin the day after
    the conviction was entered but, on the advice of counsel,
    Mirzayance abandoned his NGI plea before it commenced.
    He would have borne the burden of proving his insanity
    during the NGI phase to the same jury that had just con
    victed him of first-degree murder. Counsel had planned to
    meet that burden by presenting medical testimony similar
    to that presented in the guilt phase, including evidence
    that Mirzayance was insane and incapable of premeditat
    ing or deliberating. Because the jury rejected similar
    evidence at the guilt phase (where the State bore the
    burden of proof), counsel believed a defense verdict at the
    NGI phase (where the burden was on the defendant) was
    unlikely. He planned, though, to have Mirzayance’s par
    ents testify and thus provide an emotional account of
    Mirzayance’s struggles with mental illness to supplement
    the medical evidence of insanity. But on the morning that
    the NGI phase was set to begin, Mirzayance’s parents
    refused to testify. After consulting with co-counsel, coun
    Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)            3
    Opinion of the Court
    sel advised Mirzayance that he should withdraw the NGI
    plea. Mirzayance accepted the advice.
    After he was sentenced, Mirzayance challenged his
    conviction in state postconviction proceedings. Among
    other allegations, he claimed that counsel’s recommenda
    tion to withdraw the NGI plea constituted ineffective
    assistance of counsel under Strickland. The California
    trial court denied the petition and the California Court of
    Appeal affirmed without offering any reason for its rejec
    tion of this particular ineffective assistance claim. People
    v. Mirzayance, Nos. B116856, B124764 (Mar. 31, 1999),
    App. to Pet. for Cert. 165–167, 200–201 (hereinafter App.).
    Mirzayance then filed an application for federal habeas
    relief under 
    28 U. S. C. §2254
    , which the District Court
    denied without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of
    Appeals reversed the District Court and ordered an evi
    dentiary hearing on counsel’s recommendation to with
    draw the NGI plea. Mirzayance v. Hickman, 
    66 Fed. Appx. 676
    , 679–681 (CA9 2003). During that evidentiary
    hearing, a Magistrate Judge made factual findings that
    the District Court later adopted. Post-Remand Report and
    Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge in
    No. CV 00–01388 DT (RZ) (CD Cal.), App. 38, 68; Mir
    zayance v. Knowles, No. CV 00–1388 DT (RZ) (CD Cal.,
    Nov. 15, 2004), 
    id.,
     at 35–36.
    According to the Magistrate Judge, counsel’s strategy
    for the two-part trial was to seek a second-degree murder
    verdict in the first stage and to seek an NGI verdict in the
    second stage. This strategy faltered when the jury instead
    convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder. In the cir
    cumstances of this case, the medical evidence that Mir
    zayance planned to adduce at the NGI phase essentially
    would have duplicated evidence that the jury had neces
    sarily rejected in the guilt phase. First-degree murder in
    California includes any killing that is “willful, deliberate,
    and premeditated.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §189 (West
    4                 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE
    Opinion of the Court
    1999). To prove NGI, a defendant must show that he was
    incapable of knowing or understanding the nature of his
    act or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the
    offense. See People v. Lawley, 
    27 Cal. 4th 102
    , 170, 
    38 P. 3d 461
    , 508 (2002). Highlighting this potential contra
    diction, the trial judge instructed the jury during the guilt
    phase that “[t]he word ‘deliberate,’ ” as required for a first
    degree murder conviction, “means formed or arrived at or
    determined upon as a result of careful thought and weigh
    ing of considerations for and against the proposed course
    of action.” App. 48–49.
    When the jury found Mirzayance guilty of first-degree
    murder, counsel doubted the likelihood of prevailing on
    the NGI claim. According to the Magistrate Judge:
    “The defense suspected that a jury’s finding, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that [Mirzayance] had ‘deliberated’
    and ‘premeditated’ his killing of [the victim] as a prac
    tical matter would cripple [Mirzayance’s] chances of
    convincing the jury later, during the sanity phase,
    that [Mirzayance] nevertheless ‘was incapable of
    knowing or understanding the nature and quality of
    his . . . act and of distinguishing right from wrong at
    the time of the commission of the offense,’ 
    Cal. Penal Code §25
    (b), . . . .
    .           .           .          .           .
    “Any remaining chance of securing an NGI verdict . . .
    now depended (in [counsel’s] view) on presenting some
    ‘emotional [im]pact’ testimony by [Mirzayance’s] par
    ents, which [counsel] had viewed as key even if
    the defense had secured a second-degree murder ver
    dict at the guilt phase.” 
    Id.,
     at 50–51 (emphasis in
    original; capitalization omitted).
    But, as the Magistrate Judge found, on the morning
    that the NGI phase was set to begin, Mirzayance’s parents
    effectively refused to testify:
    Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)                 5
    Opinion of the Court
    “[T]he parents at least expressed clear reluctance to
    testify, which, in context, conveyed the same sense as
    a refusal.” 
    Id., at 72
     (emphasis in original).
    Although the parties disputed this point, the parents’ later
    actions supported the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the
    parents’ reluctance to testify amounted to refusal:
    “Corroborating the Court’s finding that [Mir
    zayance’s] parents indicated a strong disinclination to
    testify at the NGI phase are the facts that (1) they did
    not testify later at his sentencing hearing, and (2) the
    reason for their choosing not to do so . . . is that . . . [it]
    would have been ‘too emotional’ for them. . . . If weeks
    after the guilty verdict and the withdrawal of their
    son’s NGI plea, [Mirzayance’s] parents’ emotions still
    prevented them from testifying at the sentencing
    hearing, then surely those emotional obstacles to their
    testifying in the NGI phase would have been at least
    as potent, and probably more so.” 
    Id., at 73
     (emphasis
    in original).
    The Magistrate Judge found that counsel made a care
    fully reasoned decision not to go forward with the NGI
    plea:
    “[Counsel] carefully weighed his options before mak
    ing his decision final; he did not make it rashly. . . .
    [Counsel’s] strategy at the NGI phase . . . depended
    entirely on the heartfelt participation of [Mir
    zayance’s] parents as witnesses. . . . Moreover, [coun
    sel] knew that, although he had experts lined up to
    testify, their testimony had significant weak
    nesses. . . . [Counsel’s] NGI-phase strategy became
    impossible to attempt once [Mirzayance’s] parents . . .
    expressed . . . their reluctance to [testify] . . . . All
    [counsel] was left with were four experts, all of whom
    reached a conclusion—that [Mirzayance] did not pre
    6                KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE
    Opinion of the Court
    meditate and deliberate his crime—that the same jury
    about to hear the NGI evidence already had rejected
    under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof.
    The experts were subject to other impeachment as
    well. . . . [Counsel] discussed the situation with his
    experienced co-counsel . . . who concurred in [coun
    sel’s] proposal that he recommend to [Mirzayance] the
    withdrawal of the NGI plea.” 
    Id.,
     at 69–71.
    Based on these factual findings, the Magistrate Judge
    stated that, in his view, counsel’s performance was not
    deficient.
    Despite this determination, the Magistrate Judge con
    cluded that the court was bound by the Court of Appeals’
    remand order to determine only whether “ ‘there were
    tactical reasons for abandoning the insanity defense.’ ” 
    Id., at 98
     (quoting Hickman, 66 Fed. Appx., at 680). Even
    though the Magistrate Judge thought that counsel was
    reasonable in recommending that a very weak claim be
    dropped, the Magistrate Judge understood the remand
    order to mean that counsel’s performance was deficient if
    withdrawing the NGI plea would achieve no tactical ad
    vantage. The Magistrate Judge found that “[Mirzayance]
    had nothing to lose” by going forward with the NGI phase
    of the trial, App. 100, and thus held, under the remand
    order, that counsel’s performance was deficient, ibid. As
    to prejudice, the Magistrate Judge concluded the court
    was similarly bound by the remand order because the
    Court of Appeals described the NGI defense as remaining
    “ ‘viable and strong.’ ” Id., at 98 (quoting Hickman, supra,
    at 681). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge found preju
    dice and recommended granting the writ of habeas corpus.
    The District Court accepted this recommendation and
    granted the writ.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed. Mirzayance v. Knowles,
    
    175 Fed. Appx. 142
    , 143 (CA9 2006). It first stated that
    Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)                     7
    Opinion of the Court
    the lower court had misunderstood its remand order,
    which it described as requiring an examination of “coun
    sel’s reason for abandoning the insanity defense,” rather
    than as mandating that the District Court must find
    deficient performance if it found counsel had “nothing to
    lose” by pursuing the insanity defense. Ibid.; App. 98–99.
    Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of
    deficient performance. According to the court, Mir
    zayance’s “parents did not refuse, but merely expressed
    reluctance to testify.” Knowles, 175 Fed. Appx., at 144.
    And because they may have been willing, “[c]ompetent
    counsel would have attempted to persuade them to testify,
    which counsel here admits he did not.” Ibid.1 The Court
    of Appeals also “disagree[d] that counsel’s decision was
    carefully weighed and not made rashly.” Ibid.
    Furthermore, even though it had suggested that the
    District Court unnecessarily evaluated counsel’s strategy
    under a “nothing to lose” standard, the Court of Appeals
    affirmed the District Court in large part because Mir
    zayance’s “counsel did not make a true tactical choice”
    based on its view that counsel had nothing to gain by
    dropping the NGI defense. Ibid. The court held that
    “[r]easonably effective assistance would put on the only
    defense available, especially in a case such as this where
    there was significant potential for success.” Id., at 145
    (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals
    also found prejudice because, in its view, “[i]f counsel had
    ——————
    1 At best, the Court of Appeals’ characterization of counsel’s efforts to
    persuade the parents to testify is misleading. According to the Magis
    trate Judge, counsel testified that he did attempt to persuade the
    parents to testify but that their response “ ‘was kind of flat, and I had
    no influence over them.’ ” App. 54 (quoting testimony from evidentiary
    hearing). In his efforts to convince the parents to testify, counsel told
    them that Mirzayance “had no chance of securing an NGI verdict
    without the ‘emotional quality from nonprofessional witnesses’ that Mr.
    and Mrs. Mirzayance’s testimony could provide; and ‘that they were
    abandoning their son.’ ” Id., at 53–54 (same).
    8                    KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE
    Opinion of the Court
    pursued the insanity phase of the trial, there is a reason
    able probability . . . that the jury would have found Mir
    zayance insane.” Ibid.
    We granted the petition for writ of certiorari, vacated
    the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded for further
    consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin, 
    549 U. S. 70
    (2006), which held that a state court had not “ ‘unreason
    abl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law’ ” when it
    declined to apply our precedent concerning state
    sponsored courtroom practices to a case involving specta
    tor conduct at trial, 
    id.,
     at 76–77. Knowles v. Mirzayance,
    
    549 U. S. 1199
     (2007). On remand, the Court of Appeals
    concluded that its decision was unaffected by Musladin
    and again affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas
    corpus. App. 4. The Court of Appeals reiterated the same
    analysis on which it had relied prior to this Court’s re
    mand, again finding that the California court had unrea
    sonably applied clearly established federal law because
    defense counsel’s failure to pursue the insanity defense
    constituted deficient performance as it “secured . . . [n]o
    actual tactical advantage.” 
    Id., at 8
    . We granted certio
    rari, 554 U. S. ___ (2008).
    II
    Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
    Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 
    28 U. S. C. §2254
    (d)(1), a federal
    court may not grant a state prisoner’s habeas application
    unless the relevant state-court decision “was contrary to,
    or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab
    lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
    of the United States.”2 Here, the relevant state-court
    ——————
    2 Before the Court of Appeals, Mirzayance contended that the stan
    dard of review set forth in §2254(d)(1) should not apply to his case. See
    Brief for Appellee in No. 04–57102 (CA9), pp. 28–29, 33. Before this
    Court, however, Mirzayance contends that the Court of Appeals cor
    rectly applied §2254(d) to his claim. See Brief for Respondent 27, 32.
    Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)                     9
    Opinion of the Court
    decision is the California Court of Appeal’s decision deny
    ing state habeas relief.
    We conclude that the state court’s decision to deny
    Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim did
    not violate clearly established federal law. The Court of
    Appeals reached a contrary result based, in large measure,
    on its application of an improper standard of review—it
    blamed counsel for abandoning the NGI claim because
    there was nothing to lose by pursuing it.3 But this Court
    has held on numerous occasions that it is not “ ‘an unrea
    sonable application of clearly established Federal law’ ” for
    a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that
    ——————
    Mirzayance did question whether the California Court of Appeal’s
    denial of his claim should receive as much deference as the “prototypi
    cal” state-court adjudication “involv[ing] both a reasoned, written
    opinion and an adequate development of the factual record in support
    of the claims.” Id., at 33. Mirzayance thus contends that “the usual
    §2254(d) deferential approach must be modified and adapted” in
    evaluating his claim. Id., at 34. Nonetheless, because Mirzayance has
    not argued that §2254(d) is entirely inapplicable to his claim or that the
    state court failed to reach an adjudication on the merits, we initially
    evaluate his claim through the deferential lens of §2254(d). See United
    States v. International Business Machines Corp., 
    517 U. S. 843
    , 855,
    n. 3 (1996) (finding that party abandoned issue by failing to address it
    in the party’s brief on the merits); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United
    States, 
    511 U. S. 513
    , 527 (1994) (same).
    In addition, we do not decide whether the Court of Appeals was
    correct in finding that an evidentiary hearing on Mirzayance’s claim
    was required. See Mirzayance v. Hickman, 
    66 Fed. Appx. 676
    , 679–681
    (CA9 2003). Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails
    even under the facts presented at the evidentiary hearing.
    3 Although the Court of Appeals implicitly disavowed the “nothing to
    lose” standard applied by the District Court and Magistrate Judge, see
    App. 5; Mirzayance v. Knowles, 
    175 Fed. Appx. 142
    , 143 (CA9 2006), it
    nevertheless concluded that “[n]o actual tactical advantage was to be
    gained” by counsel’s withdrawal of the insanity defense, App. 8;
    Knowles, supra, at 144. Finding that counsel is deficient by abandon
    ing a defense where there is nothing to gain from that abandonment is
    equivalent to finding that counsel is deficient by declining to pursue a
    strategy where there is nothing to lose from pursuit of that strategy.
    10               KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE
    Opinion of the Court
    has not been squarely established by this Court. See
    Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at
    5–6 (per curiam); Schriro v. Landrigan, 
    550 U. S. 465
    , 478
    (2007); Musladin, 
    supra,
     at 76–77. This Court has never
    established anything akin to the Court of Appeals’ “noth
    ing to lose” standard for evaluating Strickland claims.
    Indeed, Mirzayance himself acknowledges that a “nothing
    to lose” rule is “unrecognized by this Court.” Brief for
    Respondent 28. And the Court of Appeals did not cite any
    Supreme Court decision establishing a “nothing to lose”
    standard in any of its three opinions in this case. See App.
    3–12; Knowles, 
    175 Fed. Appx. 142
    ; Hickman, 
    66 Fed. Appx. 676
    .
    With no Supreme Court precedent establishing a “noth
    ing to lose” standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    claims, habeas relief cannot be granted pursuant to
    §2254(d)(1) based on such a standard. Instead, such relief
    may be granted only if the state-court decision unreasona
    bly applied the more general standard for ineffective
    assistance-of-counsel claims established by Strickland, in
    which this Court held that a defendant must show both
    deficient performance and prejudice in order to prove that
    he has received ineffective assistance of counsel, 
    466 U. S., at 687
    . Indeed, this Court has repeatedly applied that
    standard to evaluate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    claims where there is no other Supreme Court precedent
    directly on point. See, e.g., Van Patten, supra, at ___ (slip
    op., at 5) (evaluating claim under Strickland where no
    Supreme Court precedent established that any other
    standard applied to the “novel factual context” before the
    Court); Schriro, 
    supra, at 478
     (evaluating claim under
    general Strickland standard where no Supreme Court
    precedent addressed the particular “situation in which a
    client interferes with counsel’s efforts to present mitigat
    ing evidence to a sentencing court”).
    The question “is not whether a federal court believes the
    Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)          11
    Opinion of the Court
    state court’s determination” under the Strickland stan
    dard “was incorrect but whether that determination was
    unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro,
    
    supra, at 473
    . And, because the Strickland standard is a
    general standard, a state court has even more latitude to
    reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied
    that standard. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 
    541 U. S. 652
    , 664 (2004) (“[E]valuating whether a rule applica-
    tion was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s
    specificity. The more general the rule, the more lee-
    way courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
    determinations”).
    Under the doubly deferential judicial review that ap
    plies to a Strickland claim evaluated under the
    §2254(d)(1) standard, see Yarborough v. Gentry, 
    540 U. S. 1
    , 5–6 (2003) (per curiam), Mirzayance’s ineffective
    assistance claim fails. It was not unreasonable for the
    state court to conclude that his defense counsel’s perform
    ance was not deficient when he counseled Mirzayance to
    abandon a claim that stood almost no chance of success.
    As explained more fully below, this Court has never re
    quired defense counsel to pursue every claim or defense,
    regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic chance for
    success. See also infra, at 14–15.
    III
    Even if Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    claim were eligible for de novo review, it would still fail.
    Strickland requires a defendant to establish deficient
    performance and prejudice. 
    466 U. S., at 687
    . Mirzayance
    can establish neither.
    Mirzayance has not shown “that counsel’s representa
    tion fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
    
    Id.,
     at 687–688. “The proper measure of attorney per
    formance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
    professional norms.” 
    Id., at 688
    . “Judicial scrutiny of
    12               KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE
    Opinion of the Court
    counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and “a
    court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
    conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes
    sional assistance.” 
    Id., at 689
    . “[S]trategic choices made
    after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
    plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” 
    Id., at 690
    .
    Here, Mirzayance has not shown that his counsel vio
    lated these standards. Rather, his counsel merely recom
    mended the withdrawal of what he reasonably believed
    was a claim doomed to fail. The jury had already rejected
    medical testimony about Mirzayance’s mental state in the
    guilt phase, during which the State carried its burden of
    proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Magistrate
    Judge explained this point:
    “All [counsel] was left with were four experts, all of
    whom reached a conclusion—that [Mirzayance] did
    not premeditate and deliberate his crime—that the
    same jury about to hear the NGI evidence already had
    rejected under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
    of proof. The experts were subject to other impeach
    ment as well.” App. 71.
    In fact, the Magistrate Judge found that counsel “convinc
    ingly detailed ways in which [the experts] could have been
    impeached, for overlooking or minimizing facts which
    showcased [Mirzayance’s] clearly goal-directed behavior.”
    Id., at 70.
    In the NGI phase, the burden would have switched to
    Mirzayance to prove insanity by a preponderance of the
    evidence. Mirzayance’s counsel reasonably believed that
    there was almost no chance that the same jury would have
    reached a different result when considering similar evi
    dence, especially with Mirzayance bearing the burden of
    proof. Furthermore, counsel knew he would have had to
    present this defense without the benefit of the parents’
    Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)            13
    Opinion of the Court
    testimony, which he believed to be his strongest evidence.
    See ibid. (“[Counsel’s] strategy at the NGI phase had been
    to appeal to the jury in one or both of two ways that de
    pended entirely on the heartfelt participation of [Mir
    zayance’s] parents as witnesses”). Counsel reasonably
    concluded that this defense was almost certain to lose.
    The Court of Appeals took the position that the situation
    was not quite so dire because the parents “merely ex
    pressed reluctance to testify.” Id., at 7; Knowles, 175 Fed.
    Appx., at 144. It explained that “[c]ompetent counsel
    would have attempted to persuade them to testify.” App.
    7; Knowles, supra, at 144. But that holding is in tension
    with the Magistrate Judge’s findings and applies a more
    demanding standard than Strickland prescribes. The
    Magistrate Judge noted that the parents “conveyed the
    same sense as a refusal.” App. 72. Indeed, the Magistrate
    Judge found that the parents “did not testify later at
    [Mirzayance’s] sentencing hearing” because it “would have
    been ‘too emotional’ for them.” Id., at 73 (quoting testi
    mony from evidentiary hearing). Competence does not
    require an attorney to browbeat a reluctant witness into
    testifying, especially when the facts suggest that no
    amount of persuasion would have succeeded. Counsel’s
    acceptance of the parents’ “convey[ance] [of] . . . a refusal,”
    id., at 72, does not rise to the high bar for deficient per
    formance set by Strickland.
    Mirzayance’s failure to show ineffective assistance of
    counsel is confirmed by the Magistrate Judge’s finding
    that “[counsel] carefully weighed his options before mak
    ing his decision final; he did not make it rashly.” App. 69.
    The Magistrate Judge explained all of the factors that
    counsel considered—many of which are discussed above—
    and noted that counsel “discussed the situation with his
    experienced co-counsel” before making it. Id., at 71. In
    making this finding, the Magistrate Judge identified
    counsel’s decision as essentially an informed decision
    14                   KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE
    Opinion of the Court
    “made after thorough investigation of law and facts rele
    vant to plausible options.” Strickland, 
    466 U. S., at 690
    .
    As we stated in Strickland, such a decision is “virtually
    unchallengeable.” 
    Ibid.
    Without even referring to the Magistrate Judge’s find
    ing, the Court of Appeals “disagree[d] that counsel’s deci
    sion was carefully weighed and not made rashly.” App. 7;
    Knowles, supra, at 144. In its view, “counsel acted on his
    subjective feelings of hopelessness without even consider
    ing the potential benefit to be gained in persisting with
    the plea.” App. 8; Knowles, supra, at 144–145. But courts
    of appeals may not set aside a district court’s factual
    findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Fed.
    Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 
    470 U. S. 564
    , 573–574 (1985). Here, the Court of Appeals failed
    even to mention the clearly-erroneous standard, let alone
    apply it, before effectively overturning the lower court’s
    factual findings related to counsel’s behavior.
    In light of the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings, the
    state court’s rejection of Mirzayance’s ineffective
    assistance-of-counsel claim was consistent with Strick
    land. The Court of Appeals insisted, however, that
    “ ‘[r]easonably effective assistance’ required here that
    counsel assert the only defense available . . . .” App. 8; see
    also Knowles, supra, at 145. But we are aware of no “pre
    vailing professional norms” that prevent counsel from
    recommending that a plea be withdrawn when it is almost
    certain to lose. See Strickland, 
    supra, at 688
    . And in this
    case, counsel did not give up “the only defense available.”
    Counsel put on a defense to first-degree murder during the
    guilt phase. Counsel also defended his client at the sen
    tencing phase.4 The law does not require counsel to raise
    ——————
    4 Mirzayance has no complaints about the sentencing phase since he
    received the lowest possible sentence for his first-degree murder convic
    tion. California authorizes three possible sentences for murder: death,
    Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)                   15
    Opinion of the Court
    every available nonfrivolous defense. See Jones v. Barnes,
    
    463 U. S. 745
    , 751 (1983); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 
    539 U. S. 510
    , 533 (2003) (explaining, in case involving similar issue
    of counsel’s responsibility to present mitigating evidence
    at sentencing, that “Strickland does not require counsel to
    investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence
    no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the
    defendant . . . [or even to] present mitigating evidence at
    sentencing in every case”). Counsel also is not required to
    have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable
    appraisal of a claim’s dismal prospects for success—for
    recommending that a weak claim be dropped altogether.
    Mirzayance has thus failed to demonstrate that his coun
    sel’s performance was deficient.
    In addition, Mirzayance has not demonstrated that he
    suffered prejudice from his counsel’s performance. See
    Strickland, 
    466 U. S., at 691
     (“An error by counsel, even if
    professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting
    aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error
    had no effect on the judgment”). To establish prejudice,
    “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
    probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
    the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
    reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to under
    mine confidence in the outcome.” 
    Id., at 694
    . To prevail
    on his ineffective-assistance claim, Mirzayance must show,
    therefore, that there is a “reasonable probability” that he
    would have prevailed on his insanity defense had he pur
    sued it. This Mirzayance cannot do. It was highly im
    probable that a jury, which had just rejected testimony
    about Mirzayance’s mental condition when the State bore
    the burden of proof, would have reached a different result
    ——————
    life imprisonment without parole, and imprisonment for 25 years to life.
    Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190(a) (West 1999). Mirzayance was sentenced
    to 25 years to life plus 4 years for a weapons enhancement.
    16              KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE
    Opinion of the Court
    when Mirzayance presented similar evidence at the NGI
    phase. See supra, at 12–13.
    IV
    Mirzayance has not shown that the state court’s conclu
    sion that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel
    “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
    of, clearly established Federal law” under §2254. In fact,
    he has not shown ineffective assistance at all. The judg
    ment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
    remanded with instructions to deny the petition.
    It is so ordered.