Michigan v. Bryant , 131 S. Ct. 1143 ( 2011 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2010                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U. S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN
    No. 09–150.      Argued October 5, 2010—Decided February 28, 2011
    Michigan police dispatched to a gas station parking lot found Anthony
    Covington mortally wounded. Covington told them that he had been
    shot by respondent Bryant outside Bryant’s house and had then
    driven himself to the lot. At trial, which occurred before Crawford v.
    Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
    , and Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U. S. 813
    ,
    were decided, the officers testified about what Covington said. Bry
    ant was found guilty of, inter alia, second-degree murder. Ulti
    mately, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding
    that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, as explained in
    Crawford and Davis, rendered Covington’s statements inadmissible
    testimonial hearsay.
    Held: Covington’s identification and description of the shooter and the
    location of the shooting were not testimonial statements because they
    had a “primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an on
    going emergency.” Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 822
    . Therefore, their admis
    sion at Bryant’s trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Pp. 5–
    32.
    (a) In Crawford, this Court held that in order for testimonial evi
    dence to be admissible, the Sixth Amendment “demands . . . unavail
    ability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 
    541 U. S., at 68
    . Crawford did not “spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testi
    monial,’ ” but it noted that testimonial evidence includes, among
    other things, “police interrogations.” 
    Ibid.
     Thus, Sylvia Crawford’s
    statements during a station-house interrogation about a stabbing
    were testimonial, and their admission when her husband, the ac
    cused, had “no opportunity” for cross-examination due to spousal
    privilege made out a Sixth Amendment violation. In Davis and
    Hammon, both domestic violence cases, the Court explained that
    “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
    2                         MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Syllabus
    interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the [in
    terrogation’s] primary purpose . . . is to enable police assistance to
    meet an ongoing emergency,” but they “are testimonial when the cir
    cumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emer
    gency, and that the [interrogation’s] primary purpose is to establish
    or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecu
    tion.” 
    547 U. S., at 822
    . Thus, a recording of a 911 call describing an
    ongoing domestic disturbance was nontestimonial in Davis, where
    the victim’s “elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve
    [the ongoing] emergency,” and the statements were not formal. 
    Id., at 827
    . But the statements in Hammon were testimonial, where the
    victim was interviewed after the event in a room separate from her
    husband and “deliberately recounted, in response to police question
    ing” the past events. 
    Id., at 830
    . Here, the context is a nondomestic
    dispute, with the “ongoing emergency” extending beyond an initial
    victim to a potential threat to the responding police and the public.
    This context requires additional clarification of what Davis meant by
    “the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assis
    tance to meet an ongoing emergency.” 
    Id., at 822
    . Pp. 5–12.
    (b) To make the “primary purpose” determination, the Court must
    objectively evaluate the circumstances in which the encounter be
    tween the individual and the police occurs and the parties’ state
    ments and actions. Pp. 12–23.
    (1) The primary purpose inquiry is objective. The circumstances
    in which an encounter occurs—e.g., at or near a crime scene versus at
    a police station, during an ongoing emergency or afterwards—are
    clearly matters of objective fact. And the relevant inquiry into the
    parties’ statements and actions is not the subjective or actual purpose
    of the particular parties, but the purpose that reasonable partici
    pants would have had, as ascertained from the parties’ statements
    and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred.
    P. 13.
    (2) The existence of an “ongoing emergency” at the time of the
    encounter is among the most important circumstances informing the
    interrogation’s “primary purpose.” See, e.g., Davis, 
    547 U. S., at
    828–
    830. An emergency focuses the participants not on “prov[ing] past
    events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,” 
    id., at 822
    ,
    but on “end[ing] a threatening situation,” 
    id., at 832
    . The Michigan
    Supreme Court failed to appreciate that whether an emergency exists
    and is ongoing is a highly context-dependent inquiry. An assessment
    of whether an emergency threatening the police and public is ongoing
    cannot narrowly focus on whether the threat to the first victim has
    been neutralized because the threat to the first responders and public
    may continue. The State Supreme Court also did not appreciate that
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                    3
    Syllabus
    an emergency’s duration and scope may depend in part on the type of
    weapon involved; the court below relied on Davis and Hammon,
    where the assailants used their fists, as controlling the scope of an
    emergency involving a gun. A victim’s medical condition is important
    to the primary purpose inquiry to the extent that it sheds light on the
    victim’s ability to have any purpose at all in responding to police
    questions and on the likelihood that any such purpose would be a tes
    timonial one. It also provides important context for first responders
    to judge the existence and magnitude of a continuing threat to the
    victim, themselves, and the public. This does not mean that an
    emergency lasts the entire time that a perpetrator is on the loose, but
    trial courts can determine in the first instance when an interrogation
    transitions from nontestimonial to testimonial. Finally, whether an
    ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor informing the ultimate
    inquiry regarding an interrogation’s “primary purpose.” Another is
    the encounter’s informality. Formality suggests the absence of an
    emergency, but informality does not necessarily indicate the presence
    of an emergency or the lack of testimonial intent. The facts here—
    the questioning occurred in an exposed, public area, before emer
    gency medical services arrived, and in a disorganized fashion—
    distinguish this case from Crawford’s formal station-house interroga
    tion. Pp. 14–20.
    (3) The statements and actions of both the declarant and interro
    gators also provide objective evidence of the interrogation’s primary
    purpose. Looking to the contents of both the questions and the an
    swers ameliorates problems that could arise from looking solely to
    one participant, since both interrogators and declarants may have
    mixed motives. Police officers’ dual responsibilities as both first re
    sponders and criminal investigators may lead them to act with differ
    ent motives simultaneously or in quick succession. And during an
    ongoing emergency, victims may want the threat to end, but may not
    envision prosecution. Alternatively, a severely injured victim may
    have no purpose at all in answering questions. Taking into account
    such injuries does not make the inquiry subjective. The inquiry still
    focuses on the understanding and purpose of a reasonable victim in
    the actual victim’s circumstances, which prominently include the vic
    tim’s physical state. Objectively ascertaining the primary purpose of
    the interrogation by examining the statements and actions of all par
    ticipants is also consistent with this Court’s prior holdings. E.g.,
    Davis, 
    547 U. S., at
    822–823, n. 1. Pp. 20–23.
    (c) Here, the circumstances of the encounter as well as the state
    ments and actions of Covington and the police objectively indicate
    that the interrogation’s “primary purpose” was “to enable police as
    sistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” 
    547 U. S., at 822
    . The cir
    4                        MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Syllabus
    cumstances of the interrogation involved an armed shooter, whose
    motive for and location after the shooting were unknown and who
    had mortally wounded Covington within a few blocks and a few min
    utes of the location where police found Covington. Unlike the emer
    gencies in Davis and Hammon, this dispute’s potential scope and
    thus the emergency encompassed a potential threat to the police and
    the public. And since this case involved a gun, the physical separa
    tion that was sufficient to end the emergency in Hammon was not
    necessarily sufficient to end the threat here. Informed by the circum
    stances of the ongoing emergency, the Court now turns to determin
    ing the “primary purpose of the interrogation” as evidenced by the
    statements and actions of Covington and the police. The circum
    stances of the encounter provide important context for understanding
    Covington’s statements to the police. When he responded to their
    questions, he was lying in a gas station parking lot bleeding from a
    mortal gunshot wound, and his answers were punctuated with ques
    tions about when emergency medical services would arrive. Thus,
    this Court cannot say that a person in his situation would have had a
    “primary purpose” “to establish or prove past events potentially rele
    vant to later criminal prosecution.” 
    Ibid.
     For their part, the police
    responded to a call that a man had been shot. They did not know
    why, where, or when the shooting had occurred; the shooter’s loca
    tion; or anything else about the crime. They asked exactly the type of
    questions necessary to enable them “to meet an ongoing emergency.”
    
    Ibid.
     Nothing in Covington’s responses indicated to the police that
    there was no emergency or that the emergency had ended. Finally,
    this situation is more similar to the informal, harried 911 call in
    Davis than to the structured, station-house interview in Crawford.
    The officers all arrived at different times; asked, upon arrival, what
    had happened; and generally did not conduct a structured interroga
    tion. The informality suggests that their primary purpose was to ad
    dress what they considered to be an ongoing emergency, and the cir
    cumstances lacked a formality that would have alerted Covington to
    or focused him on the possible future prosecutorial use of his state
    ments. Pp. 23–32.
    
    483 Mich. 132
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d 65
    , vacated and remanded.
    SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
    C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed
    an opinion concurring in the judgment. SCALIA, J., and GINSBURG, J.,
    filed dissenting opinions. KAGAN, J., took no part in the consideration
    or decision of the case.
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 09–150
    _________________
    MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RICHARD PERRY
    BRYANT
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
    OF MICHIGAN
    [February 28, 2011]
    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
    At respondent Richard Bryant’s trial, the court admitted
    statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to
    police officers who discovered him mortally wounded in a
    gas station parking lot. A jury convicted Bryant of, inter
    alia, second-degree murder. 
    483 Mich. 132
    , 137, 
    768 N. W. 2d 65
    , 67–68 (2009). On appeal, the Supreme Court
    of Michigan held that the Sixth Amendment’s Confronta
    tion Clause, as explained in our decisions in Crawford v.
    Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
     (2004), and Davis v. Washington,
    
    547 U. S. 813
     (2006), rendered Covington’s statements
    inadmissible testimonial hearsay, and the court reversed
    Bryant’s conviction. 
    483 Mich., at 157
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 79
    . We granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari
    to consider whether the Confrontation Clause barred the
    admission at trial of Covington’s statements to the police.
    We hold that the circumstances of the interaction between
    Covington and the police objectively indicate that the
    “primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable
    police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis,
    
    547 U. S., at 822
    . Therefore, Covington’s identification
    2                  MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    and description of the shooter and the location of the
    shooting were not testimonial statements, and their ad
    mission at Bryant’s trial did not violate the Confrontation
    Clause. We vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of
    Michigan and remand.
    I
    Around 3:25 a.m. on April 29, 2001, Detroit, Michigan
    police officers responded to a radio dispatch indicating
    that a man had been shot. At the scene, they found the
    victim, Anthony Covington, lying on the ground next to his
    car in a gas station parking lot. Covington had a gunshot
    wound to his abdomen, appeared to be in great pain, and
    spoke with difficulty.
    The police asked him “what had happened, who had
    shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.” 
    483 Mich., at 143
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 71
    . Covington stated that
    “Rick” shot him at around 3 a.m. 
    Id., at 136
    , and n. 1, 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 67
    , and n. 1. He also indicated that he had a
    conversation with Bryant, whom he recognized based on
    his voice, through the back door of Bryant’s house. Cov
    ington explained that when he turned to leave, he was
    shot through the door and then drove to the gas station,
    where police found him.
    Covington’s conversation with the police ended within 5
    to 10 minutes when emergency medical services arrived.
    Covington was transported to a hospital and died within
    hours. The police left the gas station after speaking with
    Covington, called for backup, and traveled to Bryant’s
    house. They did not find Bryant there but did find blood
    and a bullet on the back porch and an apparent bullet hole
    in the back door. Police also found Covington’s wallet and
    identification outside the house.
    At trial, which occurred prior to our decisions in Craw
    ford, 
    541 U. S. 36
    , and Davis, 
    547 U. S. 813
    , the police
    officers who spoke with Covington at the gas station testi
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)           3
    Opinion of the Court
    fied about what Covington had told them. The jury re
    turned a guilty verdict on charges of second-degree
    murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and pos
    session of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
    Bryant appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals
    affirmed his conviction. No. 247039, 
    2004 WL 1882661
    (Aug. 24, 2004) (per curiam). Bryant then appealed to the
    Supreme Court of Michigan, arguing that the trial court
    erred in admitting Covington’s statements to the police.
    The Supreme Court of Michigan eventually remanded the
    case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of
    our 2006 decision in Davis. 
    477 Mich. 902
    , 
    722 N. W. 2d 797
     (2006). On remand, the Court of Appeals again af
    firmed, holding that Covington’s statements were properly
    admitted because they were not testimonial. No. 247039,
    
    2007 WL 675471
     (Mar. 6, 2007) (per curiam). Bryant
    again appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which
    reversed his conviction. 
    483 Mich. 132
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d 65
    .
    Before the Supreme Court of Michigan, Bryant argued
    that Covington’s statements to the police were testimonial
    under Crawford and Davis and were therefore inadmissi
    ble. The State, on the other hand, argued that the state
    ments were admissible as “excited utterances” under the
    Michigan Rules of Evidence. 
    483 Mich., at 142
    , and n. 6,
    
    768 N. W. 2d, at 70
    , and n. 6. There was no dispute that
    Covington was unavailable at trial and Bryant had no
    prior opportunity to cross-examine him. The court there
    fore assessed whether Covington’s statements to the police
    identifying and describing the shooter and the time and
    location of the shooting were testimonial hearsay for
    purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The court con
    cluded that the circumstances “clearly indicate that the
    ‘primary purpose’ of the questioning was to establish the
    facts of an event that had already occurred; the ‘primary
    purpose’ was not to enable police assistance to meet an
    ongoing emergency.” 
    Id., at 143
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 71
    . The
    4                      MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    court explained that, in its view, Covington was describing
    past events and as such, his “primary purpose in making
    these statements to the police . . . was . . . to tell the police
    who had committed the crime against him, where the
    crime had been committed, and where the police could find
    the criminal.” 
    Id., at 144
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 71
    . Noting
    that the officers’ actions did not suggest that they per
    ceived an ongoing emergency at the gas station, the court
    held that there was in fact no ongoing emergency. 
    Id.,
     at
    145–147, 
    768 N. W. 2d, at
    71–73. The court distinguished
    the facts of this case from those in Davis, where we held a
    declarant’s statements in a 911 call to be nontestimonial.
    It instead analogized this case to Hammon v. Indiana,
    which we decided jointly with Davis and in which we
    found testimonial a declarant’s statements to police just
    after an assault. See 
    547 U. S., at
    829–832. Based on this
    analysis, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the
    admission of Covington’s statements constituted prejudi
    cial plain error warranting reversal and ordered a new
    trial. 
    483 Mich., at
    151–153, 
    768 N. W. 2d, at
    75–76. The
    court did not address whether, absent a Confrontation
    Clause bar, the statements’ admission would have been
    otherwise consistent with Michigan’s hearsay rules or due
    process.1
    ——————
    1 The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the question whether the
    victim’s statements would have been admissible as “dying declarations”
    was not properly before it because at the preliminary examination, the
    prosecution, after first invoking both the dying declaration and excited
    utterance hearsay exceptions, established the factual foundation only
    for admission of the statements as excited utterances. The trial court
    ruled that the statements were admissible as excited utterances and
    did not address their admissibility as dying declarations. 
    483 Mich., at
    153–154, 
    768 N. W. 2d, at
    76–77. This occurred prior to our 2004
    decision in Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
    , where we first
    suggested that dying declarations, even if testimonial, might be admis
    sible as a historical exception to the Confrontation Clause. 
    Id., at 56, n. 6
    ; see also Giles v. California, 
    554 U. S. 353
    , 358–359 (2008). We
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                   5
    Opinion of the Court
    The majority’s opinion provoked two dissents, both of
    which would have held Covington’s statements admissible
    because they were made in circumstances indicating that
    their “primary purpose” was to assist police in addressing
    an ongoing emergency. Id., at 157, 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 79
    (opinion of Weaver, J.); 
    id.,
     at 157–158, 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 79
     (opinion of Corrigan, J.). Justice Corrigan’s dissent
    explained that the time and space between “the onset of
    an emergency and statements about that emergency
    clearly must be considered in context.” 
    Id., at 161
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 80
    . Justice Corrigan concluded that the
    objective circumstances of Covington’s interaction with
    police rendered this case more similar to the nontestimo
    nial statements in Davis than to the testimonial state
    ments in Crawford. 
    483 Mich., at 164
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 82
    .
    We granted certiorari to determine whether the Con
    frontation Clause barred admission of Covington’s state
    ments. 559 U. S. ___ (2010).
    II
    The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
    states: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
    enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
    against him.” The Fourteenth Amendment renders the
    Clause binding on the States. Pointer v. Texas, 
    380 U. S. 400
    , 403 (1965). In Ohio v. Roberts, 
    448 U. S. 56
    , 66
    (1980), we explained that the confrontation right does not
    bar admission of statements of an unavailable witness if
    the statements “bea[r] adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ”
    ——————
    noted in Crawford that we “need not decide in this case whether the
    Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying
    declarations.” 
    541 U. S., at 56, n. 6
    . Because of the State’s failure to
    preserve its argument with regard to dying declarations, we similarly
    need not decide that question here. See also post, p. __ (GINSBURG, J.,
    dissenting).
    6                   MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    We held that reliability can be established if “the evidence
    falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or if it does
    not fall within such an exception, then if it bears “particu
    larized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 
    Ibid.
    Nearly a quarter century later, we decided Crawford v.
    Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
    . Petitioner Michael Crawford
    was prosecuted for stabbing a man who had allegedly
    attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia. Sylvia witnessed the
    stabbing, and later that night, after she and her husband
    were both arrested, police interrogated her about the
    incident. At trial, Sylvia Crawford claimed spousal privi
    lege and did not testify, but the State introduced a tape
    recording of Sylvia’s statement to the police in an effort to
    prove that the stabbing was not in self-defense, as Michael
    Crawford claimed. The Washington Supreme Court af
    firmed Crawford’s conviction because it found Sylvia’s
    statement to be reliable, as required under Ohio v. Rob
    erts. We reversed, overruling Ohio v. Roberts. 
    541 U. S., at
    60–68; see also Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 825, n. 4
    .
    Crawford examined the common-law history of the
    confrontation right and explained that “the principal evil
    at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
    civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its
    use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the ac
    cused.” 
    541 U. S., at 50
    . We noted that in England, pre
    trial examinations of suspects and witnesses by govern
    ment officials “were sometimes read in court in lieu of live
    testimony.” 
    Id., at 43
    . In light of this history, we empha
    sized the word “witnesses” in the Sixth Amendment, defin
    ing it as “those who ‘bear testimony.’ ” 
    Id., at 51
     (quoting
    2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
    Language (1828)). We defined “testimony” as “ ‘ [a] solemn
    declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of estab
    lishing or proving some fact.’ ” 
    541 U. S., at 51
     (quoting
    Webster). We noted that “[a]n accuser who makes a for
    mal statement to government officers bears testimony in a
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)           7
    Opinion of the Court
    sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
    acquaintance does not.” 
    Ibid.
     We therefore limited the
    Confrontation Clause’s reach to testimonial statements
    and held that in order for testimonial evidence to be ad
    missible, the Sixth Amendment “demands what the com
    mon law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity
    for cross-examination.” 
    Id., at 68
    . Although “leav[ing] for
    another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive defini
    tion of ‘testimonial,’ ” Crawford noted that “at a minimum”
    it includes “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,
    before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police
    interrogations.” 
    Ibid.
     Under this reasoning, we held that
    Sylvia Crawford’s statements in the course of police ques
    tioning were testimonial and that their admission when
    Michael Crawford “had no opportunity to cross-examine
    her” due to spousal privilege was “sufficient to make out a
    violation of the Sixth Amendment.” 
    Ibid.
    In 2006, the Court in Davis v. Washington and Hammon
    v. Indiana, 
    547 U. S. 813
    , took a further step to “deter
    mine more precisely which police interrogations produce
    testimony” and therefore implicate a Confrontation Clause
    bar. 
    Id., at 822
    . We explained that when Crawford said
    that
    “ ‘interrogations by law enforcement officers fall
    squarely within [the] class’ of testimonial hearsay, we
    had immediately in mind (for that was the case before
    us) interrogations solely directed at establishing the
    facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide
    evidence to convict) the perpetrator. The product of
    such interrogation, whether reduced to a writing
    signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory
    (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is tes
    timonial.” Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 826
    .
    We thus made clear in Davis that not all those questioned
    by the police are witnesses and not all “interrogations by
    8                       MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    law enforcement officers,” Crawford, 
    541 U. S., at 53
    , are
    subject to the Confrontation Clause.2
    Davis and Hammon were both domestic violence cases.
    In Davis, Michelle McCottry made the statements at issue
    to a 911 operator during a domestic disturbance with
    Adrian Davis, her former boyfriend. McCottry told the
    operator, “ ‘He’s here jumpin’ on me again,’ ” and, “ ‘He’s
    usin’ his fists.’ ” 
    547 U. S., at 817
    . The operator then
    asked McCottry for Davis’ first and last names and middle
    initial, and at that point in the conversation McCottry
    reported that Davis had fled in a car. 
    Id., at 818
    .
    McCottry did not appear at Davis’ trial, and the State
    introduced the recording of her conversation with the 911
    operator. 
    Id., at 819
    .
    In Hammon, decided along with Davis, police responded
    to a domestic disturbance call at the home of Amy and
    Hershel Hammon, where they found Amy alone on the
    front porch. 
    Ibid.
     She appeared “ ‘somewhat frightened,’ ”
    but told them “ ‘nothing was the matter.’ ” 
    Ibid.
     (quoting
    Hammon v. State, 
    829 N. E. 2d 444
    , 446–447 (Ind. 2005)).
    She gave the police permission to enter the house, where
    they saw a gas heating unit with the glass front shattered
    on the floor. One officer remained in the kitchen with
    Hershel, while another officer talked to Amy in the living
    room about what had happened. Hershel tried several
    times to participate in Amy’s conversation with the police
    and became angry when the police required him to stay
    separated from Amy. 
    547 U. S., at
    819–820. The police
    asked Amy to fill out and sign a battery affidavit. She
    wrote: “ ‘Broke our Furnace & shoved me down on the floor
    ——————
    2 We noted in Crawford that “[w]e use the term ‘interrogation’ in its
    colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense,” and that “[j]ust as
    various definitions of ‘testimonial’ exist, one can imagine various
    definitions of ‘interrogation,’ and we need not select among them in this
    case.” 
    541 U. S., at 53, n. 4
    . Davis did not abandon those qualifica
    tions; nor do we do so here.
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)           9
    Opinion of the Court
    into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest and threw me
    down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up my van where I
    couldn’t leave the house. Attacked my daughter.’ ” Id., at
    820. Amy did not appear at Hershel’s trial, so the police
    officers who spoke with her testified as to her statements
    and authenticated the affidavit. Ibid. The trial court
    admitted the affidavit as a present sense impression and
    admitted the oral statements as excited utterances under
    state hearsay rules. Ibid. The Indiana Supreme Court
    affirmed Hammon’s conviction, holding that Amy’s oral
    statements were not testimonial and that the admission of
    the affidavit, although erroneous because the affidavit was
    testimonial, was harmless. Hammon v. State, 829 N. E.
    2d, at 458–459.
    To address the facts of both cases, we expanded upon
    the meaning of “testimonial” that we first employed in
    Crawford and discussed the concept of an ongoing emer
    gency. We explained:
    “Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
    course of police interrogation under circumstances ob
    jectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
    interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
    ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
    circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
    such ongoing emergency, and that the primary pur
    pose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
    events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecu
    tion.” Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 822
    .
    Examining the Davis and Hammon statements in light of
    those definitions, we held that the statements at issue
    in Davis were nontestimonial and the statements in
    Hammon were testimonial. We distinguished the state
    ments in Davis from the testimonial statements in Craw
    ford on several grounds, including that the victim in Davis
    was “speaking about events as they were actually happen
    10                       MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    ing, rather than ‘describ[ing] past events,’ ” that there was
    an ongoing emergency, that the “elicited statements were
    necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency,”
    and that the statements were not formal. 
    547 U. S., at 827
    . In Hammon, on the other hand, we held that, “[i]t is
    entirely clear from the circumstances that the interroga
    tion was part of an investigation into possibly criminal
    past conduct.” 
    Id., at 829
    . There was “no emergency in
    progress.” 
    Ibid.
     The officer questioning Amy “was not
    seeking to determine . . . ‘what is happening,’ but rather
    ‘what happened.’ ” 
    Id., at 830
    . It was “formal enough”
    that the police interrogated Amy in a room separate from
    her husband where, “some time after the events described
    were over,” she “deliberately recounted, in response to
    police questioning, how potentially criminal past events
    began and progressed.” 
    Ibid.
     Because her statements
    “were neither a cry for help nor the provision of informa
    tion enabling officers immediately to end a threatening
    situation,” 
    id., at 832
    , we held that they were testimonial.
    Davis did not “attemp[t] to produce an exhaustive classi
    fication of all conceivable statements—or even all conceiv
    able statements in response to police interrogation—as
    either testimonial or nontestimonial.” 
    Id., at 822
    .3 The
    ——————
    3 Davis  explained that 911 operators “may at least be agents of
    law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers,” and
    therefore “consider[ed] their acts to be acts of the police” for purposes of
    the opinion. 
    547 U. S., at 823, n. 2
    . Davis explicitly reserved the
    question of “whether and when statements made to someone other than
    law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’ ” 
    Ibid.
     We have no need to
    decide that question in this case either because Covington’s statements
    were made to police officers. The dissent also claims to reserve this
    question, see post, at 3, n. 1 (opinion of SCALIA, J.), but supports one of
    its arguments by relying on King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200, 168 Eng.
    Rep. 202, 202–203 (K. B. 1779), which involved statements made by a
    child to her mother—a private citizen—just after the child had been
    sexually assaulted. See also Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
    , 69–
    70 (2004) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment) (citing King v.
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                     11
    Opinion of the Court
    basic purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to “targe[t]”
    the sort of “abuses” exemplified at the notorious treason
    trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Crawford, 
    541 U. S., at 51
    .
    Thus, the most important instances in which the Clause
    restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are
    those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of
    court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for
    trial.4 See 
    id.,
     at 43–44. Even where such an interroga
    tion is conducted with all good faith, introduction of the
    resulting statements at trial can be unfair to the accused
    if they are untested by cross-examination. Whether for
    mal or informal, out-of-court statements can evade the
    basic objective of the Confrontation Clause, which is to
    prevent the accused from being deprived of the opportu
    nity to cross-examine the declarant about statements
    taken for use at trial. When, as in Davis, the primary
    purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an “ongoing
    emergency,” its purpose is not to create a record for trial
    and thus is not within the scope of the Clause. But there
    may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergen
    cies, when a statement is not procured with a primary
    purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
    testimony. In making the primary purpose determination,
    standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some state
    ——————
    Brasier for the different proposition that “out-of-court statements made
    by someone other than the accused and not taken under oath, unlike ex
    parte depositions or affidavits, were generally not considered substan
    tive evidence upon which a conviction could be based”).
    4 Contrary to the dissent’s excited suggestion, nothing in this opinion
    casts “favorable light,” post, at 11 (opinion of SCALIA, J.), on the conduct
    of Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial or other 16th- and 17th-century English
    treason trials. The dissent is correct that such trials are “unquestiona
    bly infamous,” ibid., and our decision here confirms, rather than un
    dermines, that assessment. See also n. 17, infra. For all of the
    reasons discussed in JUSTICE THOMAS’ opinion concurring in the judg
    ment, the situation presented in this case is nothing like the circum
    stances presented by Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial. See post, p. __.
    12                      MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    ments as reliable, will be relevant. Where no such pri
    mary purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is
    the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the
    Confrontation Clause.5
    Deciding this case also requires further explanation of
    the “ongoing emergency” circumstance addressed in Davis.
    Because Davis and Hammon arose in the domestic vio
    lence context, that was the situation “we had immediately
    in mind (for that was the case before us).” 
    547 U. S., at 826
    . We now face a new context: a nondomestic dispute,
    involving a victim found in a public location, suffering
    from a fatal gunshot wound, and a perpetrator whose
    location was unknown at the time the police located the
    victim. Thus, we confront for the first time circumstances
    in which the “ongoing emergency” discussed in Davis
    extends beyond an initial victim to a potential threat to
    the responding police and the public at large. This new
    context requires us to provide additional clarification with
    regard to what Davis meant by “the primary purpose of
    the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
    ongoing emergency.” 
    Id., at 822
    .
    III
    To determine whether the “primary purpose” of an
    interrogation is “to enable police assistance to meet an
    ongoing emergency,” Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 822
    , which would
    render the resulting statements nontestimonial, we objec
    tively evaluate the circumstances in which the encounter
    occurs and the statements and actions of the parties.
    ——————
    5 See Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U. S. 813
    , 823–824 (2006) (explaining
    the question before the Court as “whether the Confrontation Clause
    applies only to testimonial hearsay” and answering in the affirmative
    because “[a] limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitu
    tional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but
    its perimeter”). See also post, at 2 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)
    13
    Opinion of the Court
    A
    The Michigan Supreme Court correctly understood that
    this inquiry is objective.6 
    483 Mich., at 142
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 70
    . Davis uses the word “objective” or “objectively” no
    fewer than eight times in describing the relevant inquiry.
    See 
    547 U. S., at 822
    , 826–828, 830–831, and n. 5; see, e.g.,
    
    id., at 826
     (“The question before us in Davis, then, is
    whether, objectively considered, the interrogation that
    took place in the course of the 911 call produced testimo
    nial statements”). “Objectively” also appears in the defini
    tions of both testimonial and nontestimonial statements
    that Davis established. 
    Id., at 822
    .
    An objective analysis of the circumstances of an encoun
    ter and the statements and actions of the parties to it
    provides the most accurate assessment of the “primary
    purpose of the interrogation.” The circumstances in which
    an encounter occurs—e.g., at or near the scene of the crime
    versus at a police station, during an ongoing emergency
    or afterwards—are clearly matters of objective fact. The
    statements and actions of the parties must also be objec
    tively evaluated. That is, the relevant inquiry is not the
    subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in
    a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that rea
    sonable participants would have had, as ascertained from
    the individuals’ statements and actions and the circum
    stances in which the encounter occurred.7
    ——————
    6 Bryant suggests that Michigan is arguing for “a subjective analysis
    of the intent of the interrogator’s questioning.” Brief for Respondent
    12. We do not read Michigan’s brief to be arguing for a subjective
    inquiry, and any such argument would be in error. We do not under
    stand the dissent to disagree that the inquiry is objective.
    7 This approach is consistent with our rejection of subjective inquiries
    in other areas of criminal law. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 
    517 U. S. 806
    , 813 (1996) (refusing to evaluate Fourth Amendment reason
    ableness subjectively in light of the officers’ actual motivations); New
    York v. Quarles, 
    467 U. S. 649
    , 655–656, and n. 6 (1984) (holding that
    an officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant to determining the
    14                      MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    B
    As our recent Confrontation Clause cases have ex
    plained, the existence of an “ongoing emergency” at the
    time of an encounter between an individual and the police
    is among the most important circumstances informing the
    “primary purpose” of an interrogation. See Davis, 
    547 U. S., at
    828–830; Crawford, 
    541 U. S., at 65
    . The exis
    tence of an ongoing emergency is relevant to determining
    the primary purpose of the interrogation because an
    emergency focuses the participants on something other
    than “prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later
    criminal prosecution.”8 Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 822
    . Rather,
    it focuses them on “end[ing] a threatening situation.” 
    Id., at 832
    . Implicit in Davis is the idea that because the
    prospect of fabrication in statements given for the primary
    purpose of resolving that emergency is presumably signifi
    cantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not
    require such statements to be subject to the crucible of
    cross-examination.
    This logic is not unlike that justifying the excited utter
    ance exception in hearsay law. Statements “relating to a
    startling event or condition made while the declarant was
    under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
    ——————
    applicability of the public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U. S. 436
     (1966)); Rhode Island v. Innis, 
    446 U. S. 291
    , 301–302 (1980)
    (holding that a police officer’s subjective intent to obtain incriminatory
    statements is not relevant to determining whether an interrogation has
    occurred).
    8 The existence of an ongoing emergency must be objectively assessed
    from the perspective of the parties to the interrogation at the time, not
    with the benefit of hindsight. If the information the parties knew at
    the time of the encounter would lead a reasonable person to believe
    that there was an emergency, even if that belief was later proved
    incorrect, that is sufficient for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
    The emergency is relevant to the “primary purpose of the interrogation”
    because of the effect it has on the parties’ purpose, not because of its
    actual existence.
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                   15
    Opinion of the Court
    condition,” Fed. Rule Evid. 803(2); see also Mich. Rule
    Evid. 803(2) (2010), are considered reliable because the
    declarant, in the excitement, presumably cannot form a
    falsehood. See Idaho v. Wright, 
    497 U. S. 805
    , 820 (1990)
    (“The basis for the ‘excited utterance’ exception . . . is that
    such statements are given under circumstances that
    eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or con
    fabulation . . . ”); 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s
    Federal Evidence §803.04[1] (J. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.
    2010) (same); Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule
    Evid. 803(2), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 371 (same). An ongoing
    emergency has a similar effect of focusing an individual’s
    attention on responding to the emergency.9
    Following our precedents, the court below correctly
    began its analysis with the circumstances in which Cov
    ington interacted with the police. 
    483 Mich., at 143
    , 768
    ——————
    9 Many other exceptions to the hearsay rules similarly rest on the
    belief that certain statements are, by their nature, made for a purpose
    other than use in a prosecution and therefore should not be barred by
    hearsay prohibitions. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (statement
    by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy); 803(4)
    (Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment); 803(6)
    (Records of Regularly Conducted Activity); 803(8) (Public Records and
    Reports); 803(9) (Records of Vital Statistics); 803(11) (Records of Reli
    gious Organizations); 803(12) (Marriage, Baptismal, and Similar
    Certificates); 803(13) (Family Records); 804(b)(3) (Statement Against
    Interest); see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. __, __
    (2009) (slip op., at 18) (“Business and public records are generally
    admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an
    exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created for
    the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of
    establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial”);
    Giles v. California, 
    554 U. S., at 376
     (noting in the context of domestic
    violence that “[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and
    intimidation and statements to physicians in the course of receiving
    treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules”); Craw
    ford, 
    541 U. S., at 56
     (“Most of the hearsay exceptions covered state
    ments that by their nature were not testimonial—for example, business
    records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy”).
    16                 MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    N. W. 2d, at 71. But in doing so, the court construed Davis
    to have decided more than it did and thus employed an
    unduly narrow understanding of “ongoing emergency” that
    Davis does not require.
    First, the Michigan Supreme Court repeatedly and
    incorrectly asserted that Davis “defined” “ ‘ongoing emer
    gency.’ ” 
    483 Mich., at 147
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 73
    ; see also
    
    id., at 144
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at
    71–72. In fact, Davis did not
    even define the extent of the emergency in that case. The
    Michigan Supreme Court erroneously read Davis as decid
    ing that “the statements made after the defendant stopped
    assaulting the victim and left the premises did not occur
    during an ‘ongoing emergency.’ ” 
    483 Mich., at 150, n. 15
    ,
    
    768 N. W. 2d, at 75, n. 15
    . We explicitly explained in
    Davis, however, that we were asked to review only the
    testimonial nature of Michelle McCottry’s initial state
    ments during the 911 call; we therefore merely assumed
    the correctness of the Washington Supreme Court’s hold
    ing that admission of her other statements was harmless,
    without deciding whether those subsequent statements
    were also made for the primary purpose of resolving an
    ongoing emergency. 
    547 U. S., at 829
    .
    Second, by assuming that Davis defined the outer
    bounds of “ongoing emergency,” the Michigan Supreme
    Court failed to appreciate that whether an emergency
    exists and is ongoing is a highly context-dependent in
    quiry. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20.
    Davis and Hammon involved domestic violence, a known
    and identified perpetrator, and, in Hammon, a neutralized
    threat. Because Davis and Hammon were domestic vio
    lence cases, we focused only on the threat to the victims
    and assessed the ongoing emergency from the perspective
    of whether there was a continuing threat to them. 
    547 U. S., at 827
    , 829–830.
    Domestic violence cases like Davis and Hammon often
    have a narrower zone of potential victims than cases
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)          17
    Opinion of the Court
    involving threats to public safety. An assessment of
    whether an emergency that threatens the police and pub
    lic is ongoing cannot narrowly focus on whether the threat
    solely to the first victim has been neutralized because the
    threat to the first responders and public may continue.
    See 
    483 Mich., at 164
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 82
     (Corrigan, J.,
    dissenting) (examining the threat to the victim, police, and
    the public); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19–
    20 (“An emergency posed by an unknown shooter who
    remains at large does not automatically abate just because
    the police can provide security to his first victim”).
    The Michigan Supreme Court also did not appreciate
    that the duration and scope of an emergency may depend
    in part on the type of weapon employed. The court relied
    on Davis and Hammon, in which the assailants used their
    fists, as controlling the scope of the emergency here, which
    involved the use of a gun. The problem with that reason
    ing is clear when considered in light of the assault on Amy
    Hammon. Hershel Hammon was armed only with his fists
    when he attacked his wife, so removing Amy to a separate
    room was sufficient to end the emergency. 
    547 U. S., at
    830–832. If Hershel had been reported to be armed with a
    gun, however, separation by a single household wall might
    not have been sufficient to end the emergency. 
    Id., at 819
    .
    The Michigan Supreme Court’s failure to focus on the
    context-dependent nature of our Davis decision also led it
    to conclude that the medical condition of a declarant is
    irrelevant. 
    483 Mich., at 149
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 74
     (“The
    Court said nothing at all that would remotely suggest that
    whether the victim was in need of medical attention was
    in any way relevant to whether there was an ‘ongoing
    emergency’ ”). But Davis and Hammon did not present
    medical emergencies, despite some injuries to the victims.
    
    547 U. S., at 818, 820
    . Thus, we have not previously
    considered, much less ruled out, the relevance of a victim’s
    severe injuries to the primary purpose inquiry.
    18                     MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    Taking into account the victim’s medical state does not,
    as the Michigan Supreme Court below thought, “rende[r]
    non-testimonial” “all statements made while the police are
    questioning a seriously injured complainant.” 
    483 Mich., at 149
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 74
    . The medical condition of the
    victim is important to the primary purpose inquiry to the
    extent that it sheds light on the ability of the victim to
    have any purpose at all in responding to police questions
    and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would
    necessarily be a testimonial one. The victim’s medical
    state also provides important context for first responders
    to judge the existence and magnitude of a continuing
    threat to the victim, themselves, and the public.
    As the Solicitor General’s brief observes, Brief for
    United States as Amicus Curiae 20, and contrary to the
    Michigan Supreme Court’s claims, 
    483 Mich., at 147
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 73
    , none of this suggests that an emergency is
    ongoing in every place or even just surrounding the victim
    for the entire time that the perpetrator of a violent crime
    is on the loose. As we recognized in Davis, “a conversation
    which begins as an interrogation to determine the need for
    emergency assistance” can “evolve into testimonial state
    ments.” 
    547 U. S., at 828
     (internal quotation marks omit
    ted). This evolution may occur if, for example, a declarant
    provides police with information that makes clear that
    what appeared to be an emergency is not or is no longer an
    emergency or that what appeared to be a public threat is
    actually a private dispute. It could also occur if a perpe
    trator is disarmed, surrenders, is apprehended, or, as in
    Davis, flees with little prospect of posing a threat to the
    public. Trial courts can determine in the first instance
    when any transition from nontestimonial to testimonial
    occurs,10 and exclude “the portions of any statement that
    ——————
    10 Recognizing the evolutionary potential of a situation in criminal
    law is not unique to the Confrontation Clause context. We noted in
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                    19
    Opinion of the Court
    have become testimonial, as they do, for example, with
    unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evi
    dence.” 
    Id., at 829
    .
    Finally, our discussion of the Michigan Supreme Court’s
    misunderstanding of what Davis meant by “ongoing emer
    gency” should not be taken to imply that the existence vel
    non of an ongoing emergency is dispositive of the testimo
    nial inquiry. As Davis made clear, whether an ongoing
    emergency exists is simply one factor—albeit an important
    factor—that informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the
    “primary purpose” of an interrogation. Another factor the
    Michigan Supreme Court did not sufficiently account for is
    the importance of informality in an encounter between a
    victim and police. Formality is not the sole touchstone of
    our primary purpose inquiry because, although formality
    suggests the absence of an emergency and therefore an
    increased likelihood that the purpose of the interrogation
    is to “establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
    later criminal prosecution,” 
    id., at 822
    , informality does
    not necessarily indicate the presence of an emergency or
    the lack of testimonial intent. Cf. 
    id., at 826
     (explaining
    that Confrontation Clause requirements cannot “readily
    be evaded” by the parties deliberately keeping the written
    product of an interrogation informal “instead of having the
    declarant sign a deposition”). The court below, however,
    too readily dismissed the informality of the circumstances
    in this case in a single brief footnote and in fact seems to
    have suggested that the encounter in this case was formal.
    
    483 Mich., at 150, n. 16
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 75, n. 16
    . As we
    ——————
    Davis that “[j]ust as, for Fifth Amendment purposes, ‘police officers can
    and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary
    to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions
    designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect, . . . trial
    courts will recognize the point at which, for Sixth Amendment pur
    poses, statements in response to interrogations become testimonial.”
    
    547 U. S., at 829
     (quoting New York v. Quarles, 
    467 U. S., at
    658–659).
    20                      MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    explain further below, the questioning in this case oc
    curred in an exposed, public area, prior to the arrival of
    emergency medical services, and in a disorganized fashion.
    All of those facts make this case distinguishable from
    the formal station-house interrogation in Crawford. See
    Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 827
    .
    C
    In addition to the circumstances in which an encounter
    occurs, the statements and actions of both the declarant
    and interrogators provide objective evidence of the pri
    mary purpose of the interrogation. See, e.g., Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 827
     (“[T]he nature of what was asked and an
    swered in Davis, again viewed objectively, was such that
    the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve
    the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in
    Crawford) what had happened in the past” (first emphasis
    added)). The Michigan Supreme Court did, at least
    briefly, conduct this inquiry. 
    483 Mich., at
    144–147, 
    768 N. W. 2d, at
    71–73.
    As the Michigan Supreme Court correctly recognized,
    
    id., at 140, n. 5
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 69, n. 5
    , Davis requires a
    combined inquiry that accounts for both the declarant and
    the interrogator.11 In many instances, the primary pur
    ——————
    11 Some  portions of Davis, however, have caused confusion about
    whether the inquiry prescribes examination of one participant to the
    exclusion of the other. Davis’ language indicating that a statement’s
    testimonial or nontestimonial nature derives from “the primary pur
    pose of the interrogation,” 
    547 U. S., at 822
     (emphasis added), could be
    read to suggest that the relevant purpose is that of the interrogator. In
    contrast, footnote 1 in Davis explains, “it is in the final analysis the
    declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the
    Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” 
    Id.,
     at 822–823, n. 1.
    Bryant draws on the footnote to argue that the primary purpose inquiry
    must be conducted solely from the perspective of the declarant, and
    argues against adoption of a purpose-of-the-interrogator perspective.
    Brief for Respondent 10–13; see also Brief for Richard D. Friedman as
    Amicus Curiae 5–15. But this statement in footnote 1 of Davis merely
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                   21
    Opinion of the Court
    pose of the interrogation will be most accurately ascer
    tained by looking to the contents of both the questions and
    the answers. To give an extreme example, if the police say
    to a victim, “Tell us who did this to you so that we can
    arrest and prosecute them,” the victim’s response that
    “Rick did it,” appears purely accusatory because by virtue
    of the phrasing of the question, the victim necessarily has
    prosecution in mind when she answers.
    The combined approach also ameliorates problems that
    could arise from looking solely to one participant. Pre
    dominant among these is the problem of mixed motives
    on the part of both interrogators and declarants. Police
    officers in our society function as both first responders and
    criminal investigators. Their dual responsibilities may
    mean that they act with different motives simultaneously
    or in quick succession. See New York v. Quarles, 
    467 U. S. 649
    , 656 (1984) (“Undoubtedly most police officers [decid
    ing whether to give Miranda warnings in a possible emer
    gency situation] would act out of a host of different, in
    stinctive, and largely unverifiable motives—their own
    safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire
    to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect”); see
    also Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 839
     (THOMAS, J., concurring in
    judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“In many, if not
    most, cases where police respond to a report of a crime,
    whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or other
    wise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the
    perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emer
    ——————
    acknowledges that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated when
    statements are offered “for purposes other than establishing the truth
    of the matter asserted.” Crawford, 
    541 U. S., at 60, n. 9
    . An interroga
    tor’s questions, unlike a declarant’s answers, do not assert the truth of
    any matter. The language in the footnote was not meant to determine
    how the courts are to assess the nature of the declarant’s purpose, but
    merely to remind readers that it is the statements, and not the ques
    tions, that must be evaluated under the Sixth Amendment.
    22                      MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    gency situation and to gather evidence”).
    Victims are also likely to have mixed motives when they
    make statements to the police. During an ongoing emer
    gency, a victim is most likely to want the threat to her and
    to other potential victims to end, but that does not neces
    sarily mean that the victim wants or envisions prosecution
    of the assailant. A victim may want the attacker to be
    incapacitated temporarily or rehabilitated. Alternatively,
    a severely injured victim may have no purpose at all in
    answering questions posed; the answers may be simply
    reflexive. The victim’s injuries could be so debilitating
    as to prevent her from thinking sufficiently clearly to un
    derstand whether her statements are for the purpose of
    addressing an ongoing emergency or for the purpose of fu
    ture prosecution.12 Taking into account a victim’s injuries
    does not transform this objective inquiry into a subjective
    one. The inquiry is still objective because it focuses on the
    understanding and purpose of a reasonable victim in the
    circumstances of the actual victim—circumstances that
    prominently include the victim’s physical state.
    The dissent suggests, post, at 3–4 (opinion of SCALIA, J.),
    that we intend to give controlling weight to the “intentions
    of the police,” post, at 4. That is a misreading of our opin
    ion. At trial, the declarant’s statements, not the interro
    gator’s questions, will be introduced to “establis[h] the
    truth of the matter asserted,” Crawford, 
    541 U. S., at 60, n. 9
    , and must therefore pass the Sixth Amendment test.
    ——————
    12 In such a situation, the severe injuries of the victim would un
    doubtedly also weigh on the credibility and reliability that the trier of
    fact would afford to the statements. Cf. Advisory Committee’s Notes on
    Fed. Rule Evid. 803(2), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 371 (noting that although
    the “theory” of the excited utterance exception “has been criticized on
    the ground that excitement impairs [the] accuracy of observation as
    well as eliminating conscious fabrication,” it “finds support in cases
    without number” (citing 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1750 (J. Chadbourn
    rev. 1976))).
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)           23
    Opinion of the Court
    See n. 11, supra. In determining whether a declarant’s
    statements are testimonial, courts should look to all of the
    relevant circumstances. Even JUSTICE SCALIA concedes
    that the interrogator is relevant to this evaluation, post,
    at 3, and we agree that “[t]he identity of an interrogator,
    and the content and tenor of his questions,” ibid., can illu
    minate the “primary purpose of the interrogation.” The
    dissent, see post, at 3–5 (opinion of SCALIA, J.), criticizes
    the complexity of our approach, but we, at least, are un
    willing to sacrifice accuracy for simplicity. Simpler is not
    always better, and courts making a “primary purpose”
    assessment should not be unjustifiably restrained from
    consulting all relevant information, including the state
    ments and actions of interrogators.
    Objectively ascertaining the primary purpose of the
    interrogation by examining the statements and actions of
    all participants is also the approach most consistent with
    our past holdings. E.g., Davis, 
    547 U. S., at
    822–823, n. 1
    (noting that “volunteered testimony” is still testimony and
    remains subject to the requirements of the Confrontation
    Clause).
    IV
    As we suggested in Davis, when a court must determine
    whether the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of a
    statement at trial, it should determine the “primary pur
    pose of the interrogation” by objectively evaluating the
    statements and actions of the parties to the encounter, in
    light of the circumstances in which the interrogation
    occurs. The existence of an emergency or the parties’
    perception that an emergency is ongoing is among the
    most important circumstances that courts must take into
    account in determining whether an interrogation is tes
    timonial because statements made to assist police in
    addressing an ongoing emergency presumably lack the
    testimonial purpose that would subject them to the
    24                      MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    requirement of confrontation.13 As the context of this case
    brings into sharp relief, the existence and duration of an
    emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed
    to the victim, the police, and the public.
    Applying this analysis to the facts of this case is more
    difficult than in Davis because we do not have the luxury
    of reviewing a transcript of the conversation between the
    victim and the police officers. Further complicating our
    task is the fact that the trial in this case occurred before
    our decisions in Crawford and Davis. We therefore review
    a record that was not developed to ascertain the “primary
    purpose of the interrogation.”
    We first examine the circumstances in which the inter
    rogation occurred. The parties disagree over whether
    there was an emergency when the police arrived at the gas
    station. Bryant argues, and the Michigan Supreme Court
    accepted, 
    483 Mich., at 147
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 73
    , that there
    was no ongoing emergency because “there . . . was no
    criminal conduct occurring. No shots were being fired, no
    one was seen in possession of a firearm, nor were any
    witnesses seen cowering in fear or running from the
    scene.” Brief for Respondent 27. Bryant, while conceding
    that “a serious or life-threatening injury creates a medical
    emergency for a victim,” id., at 30, further argues that a
    declarant’s medical emergency is not relevant to the ongo
    ——————
    13 Of course the Confrontation Clause is not the only bar to admissi
    bility of hearsay statements at trial. State and federal rules of evidence
    prohibit the introduction of hearsay, subject to exceptions. Consistent
    with those rules, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
    Amendments may constitute a further bar to admission of, for example,
    unreliable evidence. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 
    518 U. S. 37
    , 53 (1996)
    (plurality opinion) (“[E]rroneous evidentiary rulings can, in combina
    tion, rise to the level of a due process violation”); Dutton v. Evans, 
    400 U. S. 74
    , 96–97 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (“[T]he Fifth
    and Fourteenth Amendments’ commands that federal and state trials,
    respectively, must be conducted in accordance with due process of law”
    are the “standard” by which to “test federal and state rules of evidence”).
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                    25
    Opinion of the Court
    ing emergency determination.
    In contrast, Michigan and the Solicitor General explain
    that when the police responded to the call that a man had
    been shot and found Covington bleeding on the gas station
    parking lot, “they did not know who Covington was,
    whether the shooting had occurred at the gas station or at
    a different location, who the assailant was, or whether the
    assailant posed a continuing threat to Covington or oth
    ers.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15; Brief
    for Petitioner 16; see also id., at 15 (“[W]hen an officer
    arrives on the scene and does not know where the perpe
    trator is, whether he is armed, whether he might have
    other targets, and whether the violence might continue
    at the scene or elsewhere, interrogation that has the pri
    mary purpose of establishing those facts to assess the situ
    ation is designed to meet the ongoing emergency and is
    nontestimonial”).
    The Michigan Supreme Court stated that the police
    asked Covington, “what had happened, who had shot him,
    and where the shooting had occurred.” 
    483 Mich., at 143
    ,
    
    768 N. W. 2d, at 71
    . The joint appendix contains the
    transcripts of the preliminary examination, suppression
    hearing, and trial testimony of five officers who responded
    to the scene and found Covington. The officers’ testimony
    is essentially consistent but, at the same time, not specific.
    The officers basically agree on what information they
    learned from Covington, but not on the order in which
    they learned it or on whether Covington’s statements were
    in response to general or detailed questions. They all
    agree that the first question was “what happened?” The
    answer was either “I was shot” or “Rick shot me.”14
    ——————
    14 See App. 76 (testimony of Officer McCallister); id., at 101, 113–114
    (testimony of Sgt. Wenturine); id., at 127, 131–133 (testimony of Officer
    Stuglin). Covington told them that Rick had shot him through the back
    door of Rick’s house, id., at 127–128 (testimony of Officer Stuglin),
    located at the corner of Pennsylvania and Laura, id., at 102 (testimony
    26                       MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    As explained above, the scope of an emergency in terms
    of its threat to individuals other than the initial assailant
    and victim will often depend on the type of dispute in
    volved. Nothing Covington said to the police indicated
    that the cause of the shooting was a purely private dispute
    or that the threat from the shooter had ended. The record
    reveals little about the motive for the shooting. The police
    officers who spoke with Covington at the gas station testi
    fied that Covington did not tell them what words Coving
    ton and Rick had exchanged prior to the shooting.15 What
    Covington did tell the officers was that he fled Bryant’s
    back porch, indicating that he perceived an ongoing
    threat.16 The police did not know, and Covington did not
    tell them, whether the threat was limited to him. The
    ——————
    of Sgt. Wenturine), and that Covington recognized Rick by his voice, id.,
    at 128 (testimony of Officer Stuglin). Covington also gave them a
    physical description of Rick. Id., at 84–85, 93–94 (testimony of Officer
    McAllister); id., at 103, 115 (testimony of Sgt. Wenturine); id., at 134
    (testimony of Officer Stuglin).
    15 See id., at 114 (“Q Did he tell you what Rick said? A He said they
    were having a conversation. Q Did he tell you what Rick said? A He
    did not” (testimony of Sgt. Wenturine) (paragraph breaks omitted)); see
    also id., at 79 (testimony of Officer McAllister); id., at 128 (testimony of
    Officer Stuglin).
    16 See id., at 127–128 (“A He said he’d went up, he went up to the
    back door of a house; that a person he said he knew, and he was knock
    ing and he was knocking on the door he said he’d talked to somebody
    through the door. He said he recognized the voice. Q Did he say who it
    was that he recognized the voice of? A That’s when he told me it was,
    he said it was Rick a/k/a Buster. Q And did he say what the conversa
    tion was about at the door? A I don’t, I don’t believe so. Q All right.
    And did he say what happened there, whether or not they had a con
    versation or not, did he say what ended up happening? A He said what
    happened was that he heard a shot and then he started to turn to get
    off the porch and then another one and then that’s when he was hit by
    a gunshot” (testimony of Officer Stuglin) (paragraph breaks omitted)).
    Unlike the dissent’s apparent ability to read Covington’s mind, post, at
    6 (opinion of SCALIA, J.), we rely on the available evidence, which
    suggests that Covington perceived an ongoing threat.
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                   27
    Opinion of the Court
    potential scope of the dispute and therefore the emergency
    in this case thus stretches more broadly than those at
    issue in Davis and Hammon and encompasses a threat
    potentially to the police and the public.
    This is also the first of our post-Crawford Confrontation
    Clause cases to involve a gun. The physical separation
    that was sufficient to end the emergency in Hammon was
    not necessarily sufficient to end the threat in this case;
    Covington was shot through the back door of Bryant’s
    house. Bryant’s argument that there was no ongoing
    emergency because “[n]o shots were being fired,” Brief for
    Respondent 27, surely construes ongoing emergency too
    narrowly. An emergency does not last only for the time
    between when the assailant pulls the trigger and the
    bullet hits the victim. If an out-of-sight sniper pauses
    between shots, no one would say that the emergency
    ceases during the pause. That is an extreme example and
    not the situation here, but it serves to highlight the im
    plausibility, at least as to certain weapons, of construing
    the emergency to last only precisely as long as the violent
    act itself, as some have construed our opinion in Davis.
    See Brief for Respondent 23–25.
    At no point during the questioning did either Covington
    or the police know the location of the shooter. In fact,
    Bryant was not at home by the time the police searched
    his house at approximately 5:30 a.m. 
    483 Mich., at 136
    ,
    
    768 N. W. 2d, at 67
    . At some point between 3 a.m. and
    5:30 a.m., Bryant left his house. At bottom, there was an
    ongoing emergency here where an armed shooter, whose
    motive for and location after the shooting were unknown,
    had mortally wounded Covington within a few blocks
    and a few minutes of the location where the police found
    Covington.17
    ——————
    17 It hardly bears mention that the emergency situation in this case is
    readily distinguishable from the “treasonous conspiracies of unknown
    28                       MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    This is not to suggest that the emergency continued
    until Bryant was arrested in California a year after the
    shooting. 
    Id., at 137
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at 67
    . We need not
    decide precisely when the emergency ended because Cov
    ington’s encounter with the police and all of the state
    ments he made during that interaction occurred within
    the first few minutes of the police officers’ arrival and
    well before they secured the scene of the shooting—the
    shooter’s last known location.
    We reiterate, moreover, that the existence vel non of an
    ongoing emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial
    inquiry; rather, the ultimate inquiry is whether the “pri
    mary purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police
    assistance to meet [the] ongoing emergency.” Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 822
    . We turn now to that inquiry, as informed by
    the circumstances of the ongoing emergency just de
    scribed. The circumstances of the encounter provide im
    portant context for understanding Covington’s statements
    to the police. When the police arrived at Covington’s side,
    their first question to him was “What happened?”18 Cov
    ington’s response was either “Rick shot me” or “I was
    shot,” followed very quickly by an identification of “Rick”
    ——————
    scope, aimed at killing or overthrowing the king,” post, at 11, about
    which JUSTICE SCALIA’s dissent is quite concerned.
    18 Although the dissent claims otherwise, post, at 7 (opinion of
    SCALIA, J.), at least one officer asked Covington something akin to “how
    was he doing.” App. 131 (testimony of Officer Stuglin) (“A I approached
    the subject, the victim, Mr. Covington, on the ground and had asked
    something like what happened or are you okay, something to that
    line. . . . Q So you asked this man how are you, how are you doing? A
    Well, basically it’s, you know, what’s wrong, you know” (paragraph
    breaks omitted)). The officers also testified about their assessment of
    Covington’s wounds. See id., at 35 (suppression hearing testimony of
    Officer Brown) (“[H]e had blood . . . on the front of his body”); id., at 75
    (testimony of Officer McCallister) (“It appeared he had a stomach
    wound of a gunshot”); id., at 132 (testimony of Officer Stuglin) (“Q Did
    you see the wound? A Yes, I did. Q You had to move some clothing to
    do that? A Yes” (paragraph breaks omitted)).
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                    29
    Opinion of the Court
    as the shooter. App. 76. In response to further questions,
    Covington explained that the shooting occurred through
    the back door of Bryant’s house and provided a physical
    description of the shooter. When he made the statements,
    Covington was lying in a gas station parking lot bleeding
    from a mortal gunshot wound to his abdomen. His an
    swers to the police officers’ questions were punctuated
    with questions about when emergency medical services
    would arrive. Id., at 56–57 (suppression hearing testi
    mony of Officer Brown). He was obviously in considerable
    pain and had difficulty breathing and talking. Id., at 75,
    83–84 (testimony of Officer McCallister); id., at 101, 110–
    111 (testimony of Sgt. Wenturine); id., at 126, 137 (testi
    mony of Officer Stuglin). From this description of his
    condition and report of his statements, we cannot say that
    a person in Covington’s situation would have had a “pri
    mary purpose” “to establish or prove past events poten
    tially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 822
    .
    For their part, the police responded to a call that a man
    had been shot. As discussed above, they did not know
    why, where, or when the shooting had occurred. Nor did
    they know the location of the shooter or anything else
    about the circumstances in which the crime occurred.19
    ——————
    19 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 8 (opinion of SCALIA,
    J.), and despite the fact that the record was developed prior to Davis’
    focus on the existence of an “ongoing emergency,” the record contains
    some testimony to support the idea that the police officers were con
    cerned about the location of the shooter when they arrived on the scene
    and thus to suggest that the purpose of the questioning of Covington
    was to determine the shooter’s location. See App. 136 (testimony of
    Officer Stuglin) (stating that upon arrival officers questioned the gas
    station clerk about whether the shooting occurred in the gas station
    parking lot and about concern for safety); see also 
    ibid.
     (testimony of
    Officer Stuglin) (“Q . . . So you have some concern, there may be a
    person with a gun or somebody, a shooter right there in the immediate
    area? A Sure, yes. Q And you want to see that that area gets secured?
    30                      MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    The questions they asked—“what had happened, who had
    shot him, and where the shooting occurred,” 
    483 Mich., at 143
    , 
    768 N. W. 2d, at
    71—were the exact type of questions
    necessary to allow the police to “ ‘assess the situation, the
    threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the
    potential victim’ ” and to the public, Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 832
     (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.,
    Humboldt Cty., 
    542 U. S. 177
    , 186 (2004)), including to
    allow them to ascertain “whether they would be encoun
    tering a violent felon,”20 Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 827
    . In other
    words, they solicited the information necessary to enable
    them “to meet an ongoing emergency.” 
    Id., at 822
    .
    Nothing in Covington’s responses indicated to the police
    that, contrary to their expectation upon responding to a
    call reporting a shooting, there was no emergency or that
    a prior emergency had ended. Covington did indicate that
    he had been shot at another location about 25 minutes
    earlier, but he did not know the location of the shooter at
    the time the police arrived and, as far as we can tell from
    the record, he gave no indication that the shooter, having
    shot at him twice, would be satisfied that Covington was
    only wounded. In fact, Covington did not indicate any
    possible motive for the shooting, and thereby gave no
    reason to think that the shooter would not shoot again if
    he arrived on the scene. As we noted in Davis, “initial
    inquiries” may “often . . . produce nontestimonial state
    ——————
    A Correct. Q For your safety as well as everyone else? A Correct”
    (paragraph breaks omitted)); id., at 82 (testimony of Officer McCallis
    ter). But see id., at 83 (cross-examination of Officer McAllister) (“Q You
    didn’t, you didn’t look around and say, gee, there might be a shooter
    around here, I better keep an eye open? A I did not, no. That could
    have been my partner I don’t know” (paragraph breaks omitted)).
    20 Hiibel, like our post-Crawford Confrontation Clause cases, involved
    domestic violence, which explains the Court’s focus on the security of
    the victim and the police: they were the only parties potentially threat
    ened by the assailant. 
    542 U. S., at 186
     (noting that the case involved a
    “domestic assault”).
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)           31
    Opinion of the Court
    ments.” Id., at 832. The initial inquiries in this case
    resulted in the type of nontestimonial statements we
    contemplated in Davis.
    Finally, we consider the informality of the situation and
    the interrogation. This situation is more similar, though
    not identical, to the informal, harried 911 call in Davis
    than to the structured, station-house interview in Craw
    ford. As the officers’ trial testimony reflects, the situation
    was fluid and somewhat confused: the officers arrived at
    different times; apparently each, upon arrival, asked
    Covington “what happened?”; and, contrary to the dis
    sent’s portrayal, post, at 7–9 (opinion of SCALIA, J.), they
    did not conduct a structured interrogation. App. 84 (tes
    timony of Officer McCallister) (explaining duplicate ques
    tioning, especially as to “what happened?”); id., at 101–102
    (testimony of Sgt. Wenturine) (same); id., at 126–127
    (testimony of Officer Stuglin) (same). The informality
    suggests that the interrogators’ primary purpose was
    simply to address what they perceived to be an ongoing
    emergency, and the circumstances lacked any formality
    that would have alerted Covington to or focused him on
    the possible future prosecutorial use of his statements.
    Because the circumstances of the encounter as well as
    the statements and actions of Covington and the police
    objectively indicate that the “primary purpose of the inter
    rogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an
    ongoing emergency,” Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 822
    , Covington’s
    identification and description of the shooter and the lo
    cation of the shooting were not testimonial hearsay.
    The Confrontation Clause did not bar their admission at
    Bryant’s trial.
    *      *     *
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Covington’s
    statements were not testimonial and that their admission
    32                 MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    Opinion of the Court
    at Bryant’s trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
    We leave for the Michigan courts to decide on remand
    whether the statements’ admission was otherwise permit
    ted by state hearsay rules. The judgment of the Supreme
    Court of Michigan is vacated, and the case is remanded for
    further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or
    decision of this case.
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)           1
    THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 09–150
    _________________
    MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RICHARD PERRY
    BRYANT
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
    OF MICHIGAN
    [February 28, 2011]
    JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
    I agree with the Court that the admission of Covington’s
    out-of-court statements did not violate the Confrontation
    Clause, but I reach this conclusion because Covington’s
    questioning by police lacked sufficient formality and so
    lemnity for his statements to be considered “testimonial.”
    See Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
    , 68 (2004).
    In determining whether Covington’s statements to
    police implicate the Confrontation Clause, the Court
    evaluates the “ ‘primary purpose’ ” of the interrogation.
    Ante, at 12. The majority’s analysis⎯which relies on,
    inter alia, what the police knew when they arrived at the
    scene, the specific questions they asked, the particular
    information Covington conveyed, the weapon involved,
    and Covington’s medical condition⎯illustrates the uncer
    tainty that this test creates for law enforcement and the
    lower courts. Ante, at 25–31. I have criticized the
    primary-purpose test as “an exercise in fiction” that is
    “disconnected from history” and “yields no predictable
    results.” Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U. S. 813
    , 839, 838
    (2006) (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dis
    senting in part).
    Rather than attempting to reconstruct the “primary
    purpose” of the participants, I would consider the extent to
    which the interrogation resembles those historical prac
    2                   MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment
    tices that the Confrontation Clause addressed. See, e.g.,
    
    id.,
     at 835–836 (describing “practices that occurred under
    the English bail and committal statutes passed during the
    reign of Queen Mary”). As the majority notes, Covington
    interacted with the police under highly informal circum
    stances, while he bled from a fatal gunshot wound. Ante,
    at 19–20, 31. The police questioning was not “a formalized
    dialogue,” did not result in “formalized testimonial ma
    terials” such as a deposition or affidavit, and bore no “in-
    dicia of solemnity.” Davis, supra, at 840, 837 (opinion of
    THOMAS, J.); see also Giles v. California, 
    554 U. S. 353
    ,
    377–378 (2008) (THOMAS, J., concurring). Nor is there any
    indication that the statements were offered at trial “in
    order to evade confrontation.” Davis, 
    supra, at 840
    . This
    interrogation bears little if any resemblance to the histori
    cal practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to elimi
    nate. Covington thus did not “bea[r] testimony” against
    Bryant, Crawford, 
    supra, at 51
    , and the introduction of his
    statements at trial did not implicate the Confrontation
    Clause. I concur in the judgment.
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)            1
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 09–150
    _________________
    MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RICHARD PERRY
    BRYANT
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
    OF MICHIGAN
    [February 28, 2011]
    JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting.
    Today’s tale—a story of five officers conducting suc
    cessive examinations of a dying man with the primary
    purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his testimony
    regarding his killer, but of protecting him, them, and
    others from a murderer somewhere on the loose—is so
    transparently false that professing to believe it demeans
    this institution. But reaching a patently incorrect conclu
    sion on the facts is a relatively benign judicial mischief; it
    affects, after all, only the case at hand. In its vain attempt
    to make the incredible plausible, however—or perhaps as
    an intended second goal—today’s opinion distorts our
    Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a
    shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the Court makes
    itself the obfuscator of last resort. Because I continue to
    adhere to the Confrontation Clause that the People
    adopted, as described in Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
     (2004), I dissent.
    I
    A
    The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
    made binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amend
    ment, Pointer v. Texas, 
    380 U. S. 400
    , 403 (1965), provides
    that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
    2                   MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
    him.” In Crawford, we held that this provision guarantees
    a defendant his common-law right to confront those “who
    ‘bear testimony’ ” against him. 
    541 U. S., at 51
    . A witness
    must deliver his testimony against the defendant in per
    son, or the prosecution must prove that the witness is
    unavailable to appear at trial and that the defendant
    has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 
    Id.,
     at
    53–54.
    Not all hearsay falls within the Confrontation Clause’s
    grasp. At trial a witness “bears testimony” by providing
    “ ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation . . . for the purpose
    of establishing or proving some fact.’ ” 
    Id., at 51
     (quoting 2
    N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Lan
    guage (1828)). The Confrontation Clause protects defen
    dants only from hearsay statements that do the same.
    Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U. S. 813
    , 823–824 (2006). In
    Davis, we explained how to identify testimonial hearsay
    prompted by police questioning in the field. A statement
    is testimonial “when the circumstances objectively indi
    cate . . . that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
    establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
    criminal prosecution.” 
    Id., at 822
    . When, however, the
    circumstances objectively indicate that the declarant’s
    statements were “a cry for help [o]r the provision of infor
    mation enabling officers immediately to end a threatening
    situation,” 
    id., at 832
    , they bear little resemblance to in
    court testimony. “No ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim
    an emergency and seek help.” 
    Id., at 828
    .
    Crawford and Davis did not address whose perspective
    matters—the declarant’s, the interrogator’s, or both—
    when assessing “the primary purpose of [an] interroga
    tion.” In those cases the statements were testimonial from
    any perspective. I think the same is true here, but be
    cause the Court picks a perspective so will I: The decla
    rant’s intent is what counts. In-court testimony is more
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                 3
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    than a narrative of past events; it is a solemn declaration
    made in the course of a criminal trial. For an out-of-court
    statement to qualify as testimonial, the declarant must
    intend the statement to be a solemn declaration rather
    than an unconsidered or offhand remark; and he must
    make the statement with the understanding that it may
    be used to invoke the coercive machinery of the State
    against the accused.1 See Friedman, Grappling with the
    Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 Brooklyn L. Rev. 241, 259
    (2005). That is what distinguishes a narrative told to a
    friend over dinner from a statement to the police. See
    Crawford, 
    supra, at 51
    . The hidden purpose of an interro
    gator cannot substitute for the declarant’s intentional
    solemnity or his understanding of how his words may be
    used.
    A declarant-focused inquiry is also the only inquiry that
    would work in every fact pattern implicating the Confron
    tation Clause. The Clause applies to volunteered testi
    mony as well as statements solicited through police inter
    rogation. See Davis, 
    supra,
     at 822–823, n. 1. An inquiry
    into an officer’s purposes would make no sense when a
    declarant blurts out “Rick shot me” as soon as the officer
    arrives on the scene. I see no reason to adopt a different
    test—one that accounts for an officer’s intent—when the
    officer asks “what happened” before the declarant makes
    his accusation. (This does not mean the interrogator is
    irrelevant. The identity of an interrogator, and the con
    tent and tenor of his questions, can bear upon whether a
    declarant intends to make a solemn statement, and envi
    sions its use at a criminal trial. But none of this means
    that the interrogator’s purpose matters.)
    In an unsuccessful attempt to make its finding of emer
    ——————
    1 I remain agnostic about whether and when statements to nonstate
    actors are testimonial. See Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U. S. 813
    , 823,
    n. 2 (2006).
    4                  MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    gency plausible, the Court instead adopts a test that looks
    to the purposes of both the police and the declarant. It
    claims that this is demanded by necessity, fretting that a
    domestic-violence victim may want her abuser briefly
    arrested—presumably to teach him a lesson—but not
    desire prosecution. See ante, at 22. I do not need to probe
    the purposes of the police to solve that problem. Even if a
    victim speaks to the police “to establish or prove past
    events” solely for the purpose of getting her abuser ar
    rested, she surely knows her account is “potentially rel
    evant to later criminal prosecution” should one ensue.
    Davis, 
    supra, at 822
    .
    The Court also wrings its hands over the possibility that
    “a severely injured victim” may lack the capacity to form a
    purpose, and instead answer questions “reflexive[ly].”
    Ante, at 22. How to assess whether a declarant with
    diminished capacity bore testimony is a difficult question,
    and one I do not need to answer today. But the Court’s
    proposed answer—to substitute the intentions of the police
    for the missing intentions of the declarant—cannot be the
    correct one. When the declarant has diminished capacity,
    focusing on the interrogators make less sense, not more.
    The inquiry under Crawford turns in part on the actions
    and statements of a declarant’s audience only because
    they shape the declarant’s perception of why his audience
    is listening and therefore influence his purpose in making
    the declaration. See 
    541 U. S., at 51
    . But a person who
    cannot perceive his own purposes certainly cannot per
    ceive why a listener might be interested in what he has to
    say. As far as I can tell, the Court’s substituted-intent
    theory “has nothing to be said for it except that it can
    sometimes make our job easier,” Jerman v. Carlisle,
    McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L. P. A., 559 U. S. ___,
    ___ (2010) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring
    in judgment) (slip op., at 2).
    The Court claims one affirmative virtue for its focus on
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)            5
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    the purposes of both the declarant and the police: It “ame
    liorates problems that . . . arise” when declarants have
    “mixed motives.” Ante, at 21. I am at a loss to know how.
    Sorting out the primary purpose of a declarant with mixed
    motives is sometimes difficult. But adding in the mixed
    motives of the police only compounds the problem. Now
    courts will have to sort through two sets of mixed motives
    to determine the primary purpose of an interrogation.
    And the Court’s solution creates a mixed-motive problem
    where (under the proper theory) it does not exist—viz.,
    where the police and the declarant each have one motive,
    but those motives conflict. The Court does not provide an
    answer to this glaringly obvious problem, probably be
    cause it does not have one.
    The only virtue of the Court’s approach (if it can be
    misnamed a virtue) is that it leaves judges free to reach
    the “fairest” result under the totality of the circumstances.
    If the dastardly police trick a declarant into giving an
    incriminating statement against a sympathetic defendant,
    a court can focus on the police’s intent and declare the
    statement testimonial. If the defendant “deserves” to go to
    jail, then a court can focus on whatever perspective is
    necessary to declare damning hearsay nontestimonial.
    And when all else fails, a court can mix-and-match per
    spectives to reach its desired outcome. Unfortunately,
    under this malleable approach “the guarantee of confron
    tation is no guarantee at all.” Giles v. California, 
    554 U. S. 353
    , 375 (2008) (plurality).
    B
    Looking to the declarant’s purpose (as we should), this is
    an absurdly easy case. Roughly 25 minutes after Anthony
    Covington had been shot, Detroit police responded to a 911
    call reporting that a gunshot victim had appeared at a
    neighborhood gas station. They quickly arrived at the
    scene, and in less than 10 minutes five different Detroit
    6                   MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    police officers questioned Covington about the shooting.
    Each asked him a similar battery of questions: “what
    happened” and when, App. 39, 126, “who shot” the victim,”
    id., at 22, and “where” did the shooting take place, id., at
    132. See also id., at 113. After Covington would answer,
    they would ask follow-up questions, such as “how tall is”
    the shooter, id., at 134, “[h]ow much does he weigh,” ibid.
    what is the exact address or physical description of the
    house where the shooting took place, and what chain
    of events led to the shooting. The battery relented when
    the paramedics arrived and began tending to Covington’s
    wounds.
    From Covington’s perspective, his statements had little
    value except to ensure the arrest and eventual prosecution
    of Richard Bryant. He knew the “threatening situation,”
    Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 832
    , had ended six blocks away and 25
    minutes earlier when he fled from Bryant’s back porch.
    See 
    483 Mich. 132
    , 135–136, 
    768 N.W. 2d 65
    , 67 (2009);
    App. 105. Bryant had not confronted him face-to-face
    before he was mortally wounded, instead shooting him
    through a door. See 
    483 Mich., at
    136–137, 
    768 N.W. 2d, at 67
    . Even if Bryant had pursued him (unlikely), and
    after seeing that Covington had ended up at the gas sta
    tion was unable to confront him there before the police
    arrived (doubly unlikely), it was entirely beyond imagina
    tion that Bryant would again open fire while Covington
    was surrounded by five armed police officers. And Coving
    ton knew the shooting was the work of a drug dealer, not a
    spree killer who might randomly threaten others. 
    Id., at 135, 137
    , 
    768 N.W. 2d, at 67
    .
    Covington’s knowledge that he had nothing to fear
    differs significantly from Michelle McCottry’s state of
    mind during her “frantic” statements to a 911 operator at
    issue in Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 827
    . Her “call was plainly a
    call for help against a bona fide physical threat” describing
    “events as they were actually happening.” 
    Ibid.
     She did
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)                     7
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    not have the luxuries of police protection and of time and
    space separating her from immediate danger that Coving
    ton enjoyed when he made his statements. See 
    id., at 831
    .
    Covington’s pressing medical needs do not suggest that
    he was responding to an emergency, but to the contrary
    reinforce the testimonial character of his statements. He
    understood the police were focused on investigating a past
    crime, not his medical needs. None of the officers asked
    Covington how he was doing, attempted more than super
    ficially to assess the severity of his wounds, or attempted
    to administer first aid.2 They instead primarily asked
    questions with little, if any, relevance to Covington’s dire
    situation. Police, paramedics, and doctors do not need to
    know the address where a shooting took place, the name of
    the shooter, or the shooter’s height and weight to provide
    proper medical care. Underscoring that Covington under
    stood the officers’ investigative role, he interrupted their
    interrogation to ask “when is EMS coming?” App. 57.
    When, in other words, would the focus shift to his medical
    needs rather than Bryant’s crime?
    Neither Covington’s statements nor the colloquy be
    tween him and the officers would have been out of place at
    a trial; it would have been a routine direct examination.
    See Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 830
    . Like a witness, Covington
    recounted in detail how a past criminal event began and
    progressed, and like a prosecutor, the police elicited that
    account through structured questioning. Preventing the
    ——————
    2 Officer Stuglin’s testimony does not undermine my assessment of
    the officers’ behavior, although the Court suggests otherwise. See ante,
    at 28, n. 18. Officer Stuglin first testified that he “asked something like
    what happened or are you okay, something to that line.” App., 131.
    When pressed on whether he asked “how are you doing?,” he responded,
    “Well, basically . . . what’s wrong.” 
    Ibid.
     Other officers were not so
    equivocal: They admitted they had no need to “ask him how he was
    doing. . . . It was very obvious how he was doing.” Id., at 110; see also
    id., at 19.
    8                       MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    admission of “weaker substitute[s] for live testimony at
    trial” such as this, id., at 828 (internal quotation marks
    omitted), is precisely what motivated the Framers to adopt
    the Confrontation Clause and what motivated our deci
    sions in Crawford and in Hammon v. Indiana, decided
    with Davis. Ex parte examinations raise the same consti
    tutional concerns whether they take place in a gas-station
    parking lot or in a police interrogation room.
    C
    Worse still for the repute of today’s opinion, this is an
    absurdly easy case even if one (erroneously) takes the
    interrogating officers’ purpose into account. The five
    officers interrogated Covington primarily to investigate
    past criminal events. None—absolutely none—of their
    actions indicated that they perceived an imminent threat.
    They did not draw their weapons, and indeed did not
    immediately search the gas station for potential shooters.3
    To the contrary, all five testified that they questioned
    Covington before conducting any investigation at the scene.
    Would this have made any sense if they feared the pres
    ence of a shooter? Most tellingly, none of the officers
    started his interrogation by asking what would have been
    the obvious first question if any hint of such a fear existed:
    Where is the shooter?
    But do not rely solely on my word about the officers’
    primary purpose. Listen to Sergeant Wenturine, who
    candidly admitted that he interrogated Covington because
    he “ha[d] a man here that [he] believe[d] [was] dying [so
    ——————
    3 The
    Court cites Officer Stuglin’s testimony that “I think [Brown and
    Pellerito] did a little bit of both” joining the interrogation and helping
    to secure the scene. Id., at 135–136. But the point is not whether they
    did both; it is whether they moved to secure the area first. No officer’s
    testimony suggests this. Pellerito testified that he, Stuglin, and Brown
    arrived at the scene at roughly the same time and all three immedi
    ately went to Covington. See id., at 17–18. The testimony of Brown
    and McCallister corroborate that account. See id., at 34–36, 79–82.
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)            9
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    he was] gonna find out who did this, period.” App. 112. In
    short, he needed to interrogate Covington to solve a crime.
    Wenturine never mentioned an interest in ending an
    ongoing emergency.
    At the very least, the officers’ intentions turned investi
    gative during their 10-minute encounter with Covington,
    and the conversation “evolve[d] into testimonial state
    ments.” Davis, 
    547 U. S., at 828
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted). The fifth officer to arrive at the scene did
    not need to run straight to Covington and ask a battery of
    questions “to determine the need for emergency assis
    tance,” 
    Ibid.
     He could have asked his fellow officers, who
    presumably had a better sense of that than Covington—
    and a better sense of what he could do to assist. No, the
    value of asking the same battery of questions a fifth time
    was to ensure that Covington told a consistent story and
    to see if any new details helpful to the investigation and
    eventual prosecution would emerge. Having the testimony
    of five officers to recount Covington’s consistent story
    undoubtedly helped obtain Bryant’s conviction. (Which
    came, I may note, after the first jury could not reach a
    verdict. See 
    483 Mich., at 137
    , 
    768 N.W. 2d, at 67
    .)
    D
    A final word about the Court’s active imagination. The
    Court invents a world where an ongoing emergency exists
    whenever “an armed shooter, whose motive for and lo
    cation after the shooting [are] unknown, . . . mortally
    wound[s]” one individual “within a few blocks and [25]
    minutes of the location where the police” ultimately find
    that victim. Ante, at 27. Breathlessly, it worries that a
    shooter could leave the scene armed and ready to pull the
    trigger again. See ante, at 17–18, 27, 30. Nothing sug
    gests the five officers in this case shared the Court’s
    10                     MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    dystopian4 view of Detroit, where drug dealers hunt their
    shooting victim down and fire into a crowd of police offi
    cers to finish him off, see ante, at 30, or where spree kill
    ers shoot through a door and then roam the streets leaving
    a trail of bodies behind. Because almost 90 percent of
    murders involve a single victim,5 it is much more likely—
    indeed, I think it certain—that the officers viewed their
    encounter with Covington for what it was: an investi
    gation into a past crime with no ongoing or immediate
    consequences.
    The Court’s distorted view creates an expansive excep
    tion to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes. Be
    cause Bryant posed a continuing threat to public safety in
    the Court’s imagination, the emergency persisted for
    confrontation purposes at least until the police learned his
    “motive for and location after the shooting.” Ante, at 27.
    It may have persisted in this case until the police “secured
    the scene of the shooting” two-and-a-half hours later.
    Ante, at 28. (The relevance of securing the scene is un
    clear so long as the killer is still at large—especially if, as
    the Court speculates, he may be a spree-killer.) This is a
    dangerous definition of emergency. Many individuals who
    testify against a defendant at trial first offer their ac
    counts to police in the hours after a violent act. If the
    police can plausibly claim that a “potential threat to . . .
    the public” persisted through those first few hours, ante,
    at 12 (and if the claim is plausible here it is always plau
    ——————
    4 The opposite of utopian. The word was coined by John Stuart Mill
    as a caustic description of British policy. See 190 Hansard’s Parlia
    mentary Debates, Third Series 1517 (3d Ser. 1868); 5 Oxford English
    Dictionary 13 (2d ed. 1989).
    5 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States,
    2009: Expanded Homicide Data Table 4, Murder by Victim/Offender
    Situations, 2009 (Sept. 2010), online at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/
    cius2009/offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_04.html (as visited
    Feb. 25, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)          11
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    sible) a defendant will have no constitutionally protected
    right to exclude the uncross-examined testimony of such
    witnesses. His conviction could rest (as perhaps it did
    here) solely on the officers’ recollection at trial of the
    witnesses’ accusations.
    The Framers could not have envisioned such a hollow
    constitutional guarantee. No framing-era confrontation
    case that I know of, neither here nor in England, took such
    an enfeebled view of the right to confrontation. For exam
    ple, King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200, 168 Eng. Rep. 202,
    202–203 (K. B. 1779), held inadmissible a mother’s ac
    count of her young daughter’s statements “immediately on
    her coming home” after being sexually assaulted. The
    daughter needed to testify herself. But today’s majority
    presumably would hold the daughter’s account to her
    mother a nontestimonial statement made during an ongo
    ing emergency. She could not have known whether her
    attacker might reappear to attack again or attempt to
    silence the lone witness against him. Her mother likely
    listened to the account to assess the threat to her own
    safety and to decide whether the rapist posed a threat
    to the community that required the immediate interven
    tion of the local authorities. Cf. ante, at 29–30. Utter
    nonsense.
    The 16th- and 17th-century English treason trials that
    helped inspire the Confrontation Clause show that today’s
    decision is a mistake. The Court’s expansive definition of
    an “ongoing emergency” and its willingness to consider the
    perspective of the interrogator and the declarant cast a
    more favorable light on those trials than history or our
    past decisions suggest they deserve. Royal officials con
    ducted many of the ex parte examinations introduced
    against Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir John Fenwick while
    investigating alleged treasonous conspiracies of unknown
    scope, aimed at killing or overthrowing the King. See
    Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Law
    12                 MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    yers as Amicus Curiae 21–22, and n. 11. Social stability in
    16th- and 17th-century England depended mainly on the
    continuity of the ruling monarch, cf. 1 J. Stephen, A His
    tory of the Criminal Law of England 354 (1883), so such a
    conspiracy posed the most pressing emergency imaginable.
    Presumably, the royal officials investigating it would have
    understood the gravity of the situation and would have
    focused their interrogations primarily on ending the
    threat, not on generating testimony for trial. I therefore
    doubt that under the Court’s test English officials acted
    improperly by denying Raleigh and Fenwick the opportu
    nity to confront their accusers “face to face,” id., at 326.
    Under my approach, in contrast, those English trials
    remain unquestionably infamous. Lord Cobham did not
    speak with royal officials to end an ongoing emergency.
    He was a traitor! He spoke, as Raleigh correctly observed,
    to establish Raleigh’s guilt and to save his own life. See 1
    D. Jardine, Criminal Trials 435 (1832). Cobham’s state
    ments, when assessed from his perspective, had only a
    testimonial purpose. The same is true of Covington’s
    statements here.
    II
    A
    But today’s decision is not only a gross distortion of the
    facts. It is a gross distortion of the law—a revisionist
    narrative in which reliability continues to guide our Con
    frontation Clause jurisprudence, at least where emergen
    cies and faux emergencies are concerned.
    According to today’s opinion, the Davis inquiry into
    whether a declarant spoke to end an ongoing emergency or
    rather to “prove past events potentially relevant to later
    criminal prosecution,” 
    547 U. S., at 822
    , is not aimed at
    answering whether the declarant acted as a witness.
    Instead, the Davis inquiry probes the reliability of a decla
    rant’s statements, “[i]mplicit[ly]” importing the excited
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)           13
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    utterances hearsay exception into the Constitution. Ante,
    at 14–15. A statement during an ongoing emergency is
    sufficiently reliable, the Court says, “because the prospect
    of fabrication . . . is presumably significantly diminished,”
    so it “does not [need] to be subject to the crucible of cross
    examination.” Id., at 14.
    Compare that with the holding of Crawford: “Where
    testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
    reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is
    the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confronta
    tion.” 
    541 U. S., at
    68–69. Today’s opinion adopts, for
    emergencies and faux emergencies at least, the discredited
    logic of White v. Illinois, 
    502 U. S. 346
    , 355–356, and n. 8
    (1992), and Idaho v. Wright, 
    497 U. S. 805
    , 819–820
    (1990). White is, of course, the decision that both Craw
    ford and Davis found most incompatible with the text and
    history of the Confrontation Clause. See Davis, 
    supra, at 825
    ; Crawford, 
    supra, at 58, n. 8
    . (This is not to say that
    that “reliability” logic can actually justify today’s result:
    Twenty-five minutes is plenty of time for a shooting victim
    to reflect and fabricate a false story.)
    The Court announces that in future cases it will look to
    “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some
    statements as reliable,” when deciding whether a state
    ment is testimonial. Ante, at 11–12. Ohio v. Roberts, 
    448 U. S. 56
     (1980) said something remarkably similar: An
    out-of-court statement is admissible if it “falls within a
    firmly rooted hearsay exception” or otherwise “bears ade
    quate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” 
    Id., at 66
    . We tried that
    approach to the Confrontation Clause for nearly 25 years
    before Crawford rejected it as an unworkable standard
    unmoored from the text and the historical roots of the
    Confrontation Clause. See 
    541 U. S., at 54, 60
    , 63–65, 67–
    68. The arguments in Raleigh’s infamous 17th-century
    treason trial contained full debate about the reliability of
    Lord Cobham’s ex parte accusations, see Raleigh’s Case,
    14                  MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    2 How. St. Tr. 1, 14, 17, 19–20, 22–23, 29 (1603); that
    case remains the canonical example of a Confrontation
    Clause violation, not because Raleigh should have won the
    debate but because he should have been allowed
    cross-examination.
    The Court attempts to fit its resurrected interest in
    reliability into the Crawford framework, but the result is
    incoherent. Reliability, the Court tells us, is a good indi
    cator of whether “a statement is . . . an out-of-court substi
    tute for trial testimony.” Ante, at 11. That is patently
    false. Reliability tells us nothing about whether a state
    ment is testimonial. Testimonial and nontestimonial
    statements alike come in varying degrees of reliability.
    An eyewitness’s statements to the police after a fender
    bender, for example, are both reliable and testimonial.
    Statements to the police from one driver attempting to
    blame the other would be similarly testimonial but rarely
    reliable.
    The Court suggests otherwise because it “misunder
    stands the relationship” between qualification for one of
    the standard hearsay exceptions and exemption from the
    confrontation requirement. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu
    setts, 557 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 18). That rela
    tionship is not a causal one. Hearsay law exempts busi
    ness records, for example, because businesses have a
    financial incentive to keep reliable records. See Fed. Rule
    Evid. 803(6). The Sixth Amendment also generally admits
    business records into evidence, but not because the records
    are reliable or because hearsay law says so. It admits
    them “because—having been created for the administra
    tion of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of estab
    lishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not” weaker
    substitutes for live testimony. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U. S.,
    at ___ (slip op., at 18). Moreover, the scope of the exemp
    tion from confrontation and that of the hearsay exceptions
    also are not always coextensive. The reliability logic of the
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)          15
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    business-record exception would extend to records main
    tained by neutral parties providing litigation-support
    services, such as evidence testing. The Confrontation
    Clause is not so forgiving. Business records prepared
    specifically for use at a criminal trial are testimonial and
    require confrontation. See 
    ibid.
    Is it possible that the Court does not recognize the
    contradiction between its focus on reliable statements and
    Crawford’s focus on testimonial ones? Does it not realize
    that the two cannot coexist? Or does it intend, by follow
    ing today’s illogical roadmap, to resurrect Roberts by a
    thousand unprincipled distinctions without ever explicitly
    overruling Crawford? After all, honestly overruling Craw
    ford would destroy the illusion of judicial minimalism and
    restraint. And it would force the Court to explain how
    the Justices’ preference comports with the meaning of the
    Confrontation Clause that the People adopted—or to
    confess that only the Justices’ preference really matters.
    B
    The Court recedes from Crawford in a second significant
    way. It requires judges to conduct “open-ended balancing
    tests” and “amorphous, if not entirely subjective,” inquir
    ies into the totality of the circumstances bearing upon
    reliability. 
    541 U. S., at 63, 68
    . Where the prosecution
    cries “emergency,” the admissibility of a statement now
    turns on “a highly context-dependent inquiry,” ante, at 16,
    into the type of weapon the defendant wielded, see ante, at
    17; the type of crime the defendant committed, see ante, at
    12, 16–17; the medical condition of the declarant, see ante,
    at 17–18; if the declarant is injured, whether paramedics
    have arrived on the scene, see ante, at 20; whether the
    encounter takes place in an “exposed public area,” ibid.;
    whether the encounter appears disorganized, see ibid.;
    whether the declarant is capable of forming a purpose, see
    ante, at 22; whether the police have secured the scene of
    16                 MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    the crime, see ante, at 28; the formality of the statement,
    see ante, at 19; and finally, whether the statement strikes
    us as reliable, see ante, at 11–12, 14–15. This is no better
    than the nine-factor balancing test we rejected in Craw
    ford, 
    541 U. S., at 63
    . I do not look forward to resolving
    conflicts in the future over whether knives and poison are
    more like guns or fists for Confrontation Clause purposes,
    or whether rape and armed robbery are more like murder
    or domestic violence.
    It can be said, of course, that under Crawford analysis
    of whether a statement is testimonial requires considera
    tion of all the circumstances, and so is also something of a
    multifactor balancing test. But the “reliability” test does
    not replace that analysis; it supplements it. As I under
    stand the Court’s opinion, even when it is determined that
    no emergency exists (or perhaps before that determination
    is made) the statement would be found admissible as far
    as the Confrontation Clause is concerned if it is not
    testimonial.
    In any case, we did not disavow multifactor balancing
    for reliability in Crawford out of a preference for rules
    over standards. We did so because it “d[id] violence to” the
    Framers’ design. 
    Id., at 68
    . It was judges’ open-ended
    determination of what was reliable that violated the trial
    rights of Englishmen in the political trials of the 16th and
    17th centuries. See, e.g., Throckmorton’s Case, 1 How. St.
    Tr. 869, 875–876 (1554); Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr., at
    15–16, 24. The Framers placed the Confrontation Clause
    in the Bill of Rights to ensure that those abuses (and the
    abuses by the Admiralty courts in colonial America) would
    not be repeated in this country. Not even the least dan
    gerous branch can be trusted to assess the reliability of
    uncross-examined testimony in politically charged trials or
    trials implicating threats to national security. See Craw
    ford, 
    supra,
     at 67–68; cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
    542 U. S. 507
    , 576–578 (2004) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)           17
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    *    *     *
    Judicial decisions, like the Constitution itself, are noth
    ing more than “parchment barriers,” 5 Writings of James
    Madison 269, 272 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). Both depend on a
    judicial culture that understands its constitutionally
    assigned role, has the courage to persist in that role when
    it means announcing unpopular decisions, and has the
    modesty to persist when it produces results that go
    against the judges’ policy preferences. Today’s opinion
    falls far short of living up to that obligation—short on the
    facts, and short on the law.
    For all I know, Bryant has received his just deserts. But
    he surely has not received them pursuant to the proce
    dures that our Constitution requires. And what has been
    taken away from him has been taken away from us all.
    Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)            1
    GINSBURG, J., dissenting
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 09–150
    _________________
    MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. RICHARD PERRY
    BRYANT
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
    OF MICHIGAN
    [February 28, 2011]
    JUSTICE GINSBURG, dissenting.
    I agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that Covington’s state
    ments were testimonial and that “[t]he declarant’s intent
    is what counts.” Ante, at 2 (dissenting opinion). Even if
    the interrogators’ intent were what counts, I further
    agree, Covington’s statements would still be testimonial.
    Ante, at 8. It is most likely that “the officers viewed their
    encounter with Covington [as] an investigation into a past
    crime with no ongoing or immediate consequences.” Ante,
    at 10. Today’s decision, JUSTICE SCALIA rightly notes,
    “creates an expansive exception to the Confrontation
    Clause for violent crimes.” 
    Ibid.
     In so doing, the decision
    confounds our recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,
    ante, at 12, which made it plain that “[r]eliability tells us
    nothing about whether a statement is testimonial,” ante,
    at 14 (emphasis deleted).
    I would add, however, this observation. In Crawford v.
    Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
    , 56, n. 6 (2004), this Court noted
    that, in the law we inherited from England, there was a
    well-established exception to the confrontation require
    ment: The cloak protecting the accused against admission
    of out-of-court testimonial statements was removed for
    dying declarations. This historic exception, we recalled in
    Giles v. California, 
    554 U. S. 353
    , 358 (2008); see 
    id.,
     at
    361–362, 368, applied to statements made by a person
    2                  MICHIGAN v. BRYANT
    GINSBURG, J., dissenting
    about to die and aware that death was imminent. Were
    the issue properly tendered here, I would take up the
    question whether the exception for dying declarations
    survives our recent Confrontation Clause decisions. The
    Michigan Supreme Court, however, held, as a matter of
    state law, that the prosecutor had abandoned the issue.
    See 
    483 Mich. 132
    , 156–157, 
    768 N. W. 2d 65
    , 78 (2009).
    The matter, therefore, is not one the Court can address in
    this case.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-150

Citation Numbers: 179 L. Ed. 2d 93, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 562 U.S. 344, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1713

Judges: Sotomayor, Thomas, Scalia, Ginsburg, Kagan

Filed Date: 2/28/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2024

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