Arellano v. McDonough ( 2023 )

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ARELLANO v. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 21–432. Argued October 4, 2022—Decided January 23, 2023
This case concerns the effective date of an award of disability compensa-
tion to a veteran of the United States military. Approximately 30 years
after Adolfo Arellano’s honorable discharge from the Navy, Arellano
applied to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for disability com-
pensation based on his psychiatric disorders. A VA regional office
granted Arellano service-connected disability benefits after finding
that his disorders resulted from trauma that he suffered while serving
on an aircraft carrier. Applying the default rule in 38 U. S. C.
§5110(a)(1), the VA assigned an effective date of June 3, 2011—the day
that the agency received his claim—to Arellano’s disability award.
Arellano appealed, arguing that his award’s effective date should be
governed by an exception in §5110(b)(1), which makes “[t]he effective
date of an award of disability compensation . . . the day following the
date of the veteran’s discharge or release if application therefor is re-
ceived within one year from such date of discharge or release.” Alleg-
ing that he had been too ill to know that he could apply for disability
benefits, Arellano maintained that this exception’s 1-year grace period
should be equitably tolled to make his award effective on or about the
day after his discharge from military service in 1981. The VA’s Board
of Veterans’ Appeals denied Arellano’s request, and the Court of Ap-
peals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed the
judgment.
Held: Section 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. Pp. 3–11.
(a) Equitable tolling “effectively extends an otherwise discrete limi-
tations period set by Congress” when a litigant diligently pursues his
rights but extraordinary circumstances prevent him from bringing a
timely action. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10. The Court
2 ARELLANO v. MCDONOUGH
Syllabus
presumes that federal statutes of limitations are subject to equitable
tolling. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95–
96. But this presumption is rebutted if equitable tolling is inconsistent
with the statutory scheme. Here, the Secretary of the VA argues that
§5110(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations and that, even if it were, any
applicable presumption in favor of equitable tolling is rebutted by the
statutory text and structure. The Court need not decide whether
§5110(b)(1) is a statute of limitations. Even assuming that the excep-
tion sets a limitations period, there exists “good reason to believe that
Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” United
States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350.
Section 5110(b)(1) operates as a limited exception to §5110(a)(1)’s
default rule, which states that “the effective date of an award . . . shall
be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier
than the date of receipt of application therefor.” The default rule ap-
plies “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise in this chapter”—a
clause indicating that Congress enumerated an exhaustive list of ex-
ceptions, with each confined to its specific terms. According to the
terms of the exception in §5110(b)(1), “[t]he effective date of an award
of disability compensation to a veteran shall be the day following the
date of the veteran’s discharge or release if application therefor is re-
ceived within one year from such date of discharge or release.” Equi-
tably tolling this provision would depart from the terms that Congress
“specifically provided.” §5110(a)(1).
The structure of §5110—which sets out 16 exceptions that explain
when various types of benefits qualify for an effective date earlier than
the default—reinforces Congress’s choice to set effective dates solely
as prescribed in the text. These exceptions do not operate simply as
time constraints, but also as substantive limitations on the amount of
recovery due, a structure strongly indicating that “Congress did not
intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ ex-
ceptions into the statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352.
That many of the specific exceptions reflect equitable considerations
heightens the structural inference, as does the fact that Congress gen-
erally capped retroactive benefits at roughly one year. When, as here,
Congress has already considered equitable concerns and limited the
relief available, “additional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.”
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48–49. Although hard and fast
limits on retroactive benefits can create harsh results, Congress has
the power to choose between rules, which prioritize efficiency and pre-
dictability, and standards, which prioritize optimal results in individ-
ual cases. Cf. Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352–353. Congress opted for
rules in this statutory scheme, and an equitable extension of
§5110(b)(1)’s 1-year grace period would disrupt that choice. Pp. 3–9.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
Syllabus
(b) Arellano sees §5110(b)(1) as a simple time limit and therefore a
classic case for equitable tolling. But §5110(b)(1) cannot be understood
independently of §5110(a)(1), which makes the date of claim receipt
the effective date “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise in this chap-
ter.” This language is an instruction to attend to specifically enacted
language to the exclusion of general, unenacted carveouts. Arellano
relies on a separate exception in §5110(b)(4)—which makes disability
pension benefits retroactive in certain cases where permanent and to-
tal disability prevents a veteran from applying for an award at the
time of disability onset—to argue that Congress wanted traditional
principles of equitable tolling to apply to §5110(b)(1). To the contrary,
§5110(b)(4) demonstrates that Congress had on its radar the possibil-
ity that disability could delay an application for benefits and still Con-
gress did not explicitly account for that possibility in §5110(b)(1).
Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43, distinguished. Finally, Arellano
contends that the nature of the subject matter—veterans’ benefits—
counsels in favor of tolling because providing benefits to veterans is a
context in which individualized equities are paramount. But the na-
ture of the subject matter cannot overcome statutory text and struc-
ture that foreclose equitable tolling. Pp. 9–11.
1 F. 4th 1059, affirmed.
BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 1
Opinion of the Court
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–432
_________________
ADOLFO R. ARELLANO, PETITIONER v. DENIS
R. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
[January 23, 2023]
JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the effective date of an award of disa-
bility compensation to a veteran of the United States mili-
tary. The governing statute provides that the effective date
of the award “shall not be earlier” than the day on which
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) receives the vet-
eran’s application for benefits. But the statute specifies 16
exceptions, one of which is relevant here: If the VA receives
the application within a year of the veteran’s discharge, the
effective date is the day after the veteran’s discharge. We
must decide whether this exception is subject to equitable
tolling, a doctrine that would allow some applications filed
outside the 1-year period to qualify for the “day after dis-
charge” effective date. We hold that the provision cannot
be equitably tolled.
I
A
The United States offers benefits to any veteran who suf-
fers a service-connected disability. 38 U. S. C. §§1110,
1131. A veteran seeking these benefits must file a claim
2 ARELLANO v. MCDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
with the VA. §5101(a)(1)(A). “A regional office of the VA
then determines whether the veteran satisfies all legal pre-
requisites, including the requirement that military service
caused or aggravated the disability.” George v. McDonough,
596 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 1–2). If the re-
gional office grants the application, it assigns an “effective
date” to the award, and payments begin the month after
that date. §§5110(a)(1), 5111(a)(1). If the effective date pre-
cedes the date on which the VA received the claim, the vet-
eran receives retroactive benefits.
Section 5110 dictates how this date is calculated. The de-
fault rule is that “the effective date of an award . . . shall be
fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be
earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.”
§5110(a)(1). This rule applies “[u]nless specifically pro-
vided otherwise in this chapter.” Ibid. Sixteen exceptions
in §5110 “provid[e] otherwise,” including one specifying
that “[t]he effective date of an award of disability compen-
sation to a veteran shall be the day following the date of the
veteran’s discharge or release if application therefor is re-
ceived within one year from such date of discharge or re-
lease.” §5110(b)(1). On its face, this exception allows up to
one year of retroactive benefits. But if the VA can treat an
application filed more than one year after discharge as if it
had been filed within the statutory window, a veteran could
potentially recover decades’ worth of retroactive payments.
B
Adolfo Arellano served in the Navy from 1977 until his
honorable discharge in 1981. Approximately 30 years later,
the VA received Arellano’s application for disability com-
pensation based on his psychiatric disorders. A VA regional
office found that Arellano’s disorders resulted from trauma
that he suffered while serving on an aircraft carrier that
collided with another ship. So the regional office granted
Arellano benefits for his service-connected disabilities—
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
Opinion of the Court
schizoaffective disorder bipolar type with posttraumatic
stress disorder. It assigned an effective date of June 3,
2011, the day that the VA received his claim.
Arellano appealed the regional office’s decision to the
VA’s Board of Veterans’ Appeals. He acknowledged that he
did not submit an application for benefits until June 2011.
But he argued that the regional office should have equitably
tolled §5110(b)(1)’s 1-year timeline to make his award effec-
tive as of the day after his discharge from service in 1981
or, at the latest, January 1, 1982. In support of equitable
tolling, Arellano alleged that he had been too ill to know
that he could apply for service-connected disability benefits.
The Board denied Arellano’s request for equitable tolling,
and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed.
The en banc Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment unan-
imously but divided equally on the supporting rationale.
Half the court, adhering to Circuit precedent, maintained
that §5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. 1 F. 4th
1059, 1086 (2021) (Chen, J., concurring in judgment); see
Andrews v. Principi, 351 F. 3d 1134 (2003). The other half,
rejecting Circuit precedent, reasoned that §5110(b)(1) is
subject to equitable tolling but that tolling was unwar-
ranted on the facts of Arellano’s case. 1 F. 4th, at 1099
(Dyk, J., concurring in judgment).
We granted certiorari to resolve which side had the better
interpretation of the statute. 595 U. S. ___ (2022).
II
Equitable tolling “effectively extends an otherwise dis-
crete limitations period set by Congress.” Lozano v. Mon-
toya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10 (2014). In practice, it “pauses
the running of, or ‘tolls,’ a statute of limitations when a lit-
igant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordi-
nary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely ac-
tion.” Ibid. The doctrine “is a traditional feature of
American jurisprudence and a background principle
4 ARELLANO v. MCDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
against which Congress drafts limitations periods.”
Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op.,
at 8). Consistent with this jurisprudential backdrop, we
presume that federal statutes of limitations are subject to
equitable tolling. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
498 U. S. 89, 95–96 (1990). The Irwin presumption, how-
ever, is just that—a presumption. It can be rebutted, and
if equitable tolling is inconsistent with the statutory
scheme, courts cannot stop the clock for even the most de-
serving plaintiff. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 552 U. S. 130, 137–138 (2008); United States v.
Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48–49 (1998).
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs advances two reasons
why §5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. The first
would head tolling off at the pass: He argues that
§5110(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations, so the presump-
tion is wholly inapplicable. See Lozano, 572 U. S., at 13–14
(“[W]e have only applied” Irwin’s presumption “to statutes
of limitations”). Rather than extinguishing a tardy claim
(the function of a statute of limitations), §5110(b)(1) caps
the award for a successful claim (a different function). Brief
for Respondent 18–22. That it does so with reference to the
time of filing, the Secretary says, does not convert it into a
statute of limitations. Id., at 21. In any event, the Secre-
tary adds, equitable tolling is at odds with the statutory
text and structure—so even assuming that §5110(b)(1) sets
a limitations period, the presumption is rebutted.
We need not address the Secretary’s first argument be-
cause the second is straightforward. The presumption is
rebutted if “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress
did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” United
States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350 (1997). In this case,
there is very good reason to draw that conclusion. Section
5110 contains detailed instructions for when a veteran’s
claim for benefits may enjoy an effective date earlier than
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
Opinion of the Court
the one provided by the default rule. It would be incon-
sistent with this comprehensive scheme for an adjudicator
to extend effective dates still further through the doctrine
of equitable tolling.1
A
Start with the text. Section 5110(b)(1) operates as a lim-
ited exception to §5110(a)(1)’s default rule, which states
that “the effective date of an award . . . shall be fixed in ac-
cordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than
the date of receipt of application therefor.” The default ap-
plies “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise in this chap-
ter”—a clause indicating that Congress enumerated an ex-
haustive list of exceptions, with each confined to its specific
terms. §5110(a)(1). According to the terms of the exception
in §5110(b)(1), “[t]he effective date of an award of disability
compensation to a veteran shall be the day following the
date of the veteran’s discharge or release if application
therefor is received within one year from such date of dis-
charge or release.” Equitably tolling this provision would
depart from the terms that Congress “specifically provided.”
§5110(a)(1).
The structure of §5110 reinforces Congress’s choice to set
effective dates solely as prescribed in the text. The statute
sets out detailed instructions that explain when various
types of benefits qualify for an effective date earlier than
the default. There are 16 such exceptions—and equitable
——————
1 Equitable tolling, a judicial doctrine, is typically applied by courts.
See Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 158–159
(2013). In this case, Arellano posits that the VA would apply the doctrine
in the first instance. Reply Brief 18–19; Tr. of Oral Arg. 16–17. The
Secretary counters that the doctrine is not presumptively available to
agencies because they possess no equitable power unless Congress
grants it to them—which, he says, Congress has not done here. Brief for
Respondent 32–35. We need not settle this dispute. Our conclusion that
the presumption is rebutted means that no adjudicator, whether an
agency or a court, may equitably toll the effective date.
6 ARELLANO v. MCDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
tolling is not on the list. See §§5110(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3),
(b)(4)(A), (c), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (f ), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (n).
Notably, these exceptions do not operate simply as time
constraints, but also as substantive limitations on the
amount of recovery due. See, e.g., §5110(g) (“In no event
shall [an] award or increase [under this paragraph] be ret-
roactive for more than one year from the date of application
therefor or the date of administrative determination of en-
titlement, whichever is earlier”). We stated in Brockamp
that an “explicit listing of exceptions” in a statute contain-
ing “detail” and describing “not only procedural limitations,
but also substantive limitations on the amount of recovery”
strongly indicated that “Congress did not intend courts to
read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions
into the statute that it wrote.” 519 U. S., at 352. So too
here. If Congress wanted the VA to adjust a claimant’s en-
titlement to retroactive benefits based on unmentioned eq-
uitable factors, it is difficult to see why it spelled out a long
list of situations in which a claimant is entitled to adjust-
ment—and instructed the VA to stick to the exceptions
“specifically provided.” §5110(a)(1).
That many of the specific exceptions reflect equitable con-
siderations heightens the structural inference. Several, in-
cluding §5110(b)(1), apply when the event triggering the en-
titlement to benefits is disability or death—both
circumstances in which prompt filing could be challenging
for a veteran or her survivors. See §§5110(b)(1), (b)(3),
(b)(4)(A), (d); cf. Lozano, 572 U. S., at 10 (noting that equi-
table tolling may be appropriate when a person diligently
pursues her rights but an “extraordinary circumstance pre-
vents [her] from bringing a timely action”). One permits an
earlier effective date for the award of benefits to a veteran’s
child, a claimant typically dependent on others for prompt
filing. §5110(e)(1). Still others permit retroactive benefits
when facts change or new evidence emerges. See §5110(h)
(permitting retroactive benefits when actual income would
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 7
Opinion of the Court
increase a pension that had been awarded based on antici-
pated income); §5110(i) (permitting retroactive benefits
when “any disallowed claim is readjudicated and thereafter
allowed on the basis of new and relevant evidence resulting
from the correction of ” certain military records). Yet de-
spite its attention to fairness, Congress did not throw the
door wide open in these circumstances or any other. In all
but one instance, Congress capped retroactive benefits at
roughly one year.2
This pattern matters. That Congress accounted for equi-
table factors in setting effective dates strongly suggests
that it did not expect an adjudicator to add a broader range
of equitable factors to the mix. And its decision to consist-
ently cap retroactive benefits strongly suggests that it did
not expect open-ended tolling to dramatically increase the
size of an award. When Congress has already considered
equitable concerns and limited the relief available, “addi-
tional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.” Beggerly,
524 U. S., at 48–49.
Section 5110(b)(4), another disability-related exception to
——————
2 Thirteen of the exceptions, including §5110(b)(1), allow an effective
date up to one year before the application-receipt date. See, e.g.,
§5110(b)(3) (“The effective date of an award of increased compensation
shall be the earliest date as of which it is ascertainable that an increase
in disability had occurred, if application is received within one year from
such date” (emphasis added)). Two exceptions contemplate the possibil-
ity that the effective date of an award might stretch up to one day short
of 13 months before the application-receipt date. See §§5110(d) (“The
effective date of an award of death compensation, dependency and in-
demnity compensation, or death pension for which application is received
within one year from the date of death shall be the first day of the month
in which the death occurred”), (e)(1). The only one offering more than 13
months of retroactive benefits concerns the death of an active-duty ser-
vicemember. This provision permits an award of death compensation to
be effective as of the month of death, no matter how long ago the death
occurred—but still, retroactive benefits are permitted only if the VA re-
ceives the application within one year of the military’s entry of a report
or finding of the servicemember’s death. §5110( j).
8 ARELLANO v. MCDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
the default rule, illustrates the point. Recall that
§5110(b)(1), the exception at issue here, adjusts the effec-
tive date of disability compensation to the day after a vet-
eran’s discharge from the military, so long as the VA re-
ceives the claim within one year of discharge. Arellano
contends that his claim, filed 30 years after discharge,
should relate back to the date of discharge because his dis-
ability prevented him from filing earlier than he did. But
§5110(b)(4), which applies to disability pensions rather
than disability compensation, expressly accounts for this
very concern: It makes pension benefits retroactive to the
date of permanent and total disability if the disability pre-
vented the veteran from applying for an award at the time
of onset. §§5110(b)(4)(A), (B). The possibility that disabil-
ity could cause delay was therefore on Congress’s radar;
still, Congress did not explicitly account for it in
§5110(b)(1). Moreover, while Arellano posits an open-ended
grace period for §5110(b)(1), §5110(b)(4)(A) imposes a re-
strictive one: It applies only “if the veteran applies for a ret-
roactive award within one year” of “the date on which the
veteran became permanently and totally disabled.” Why
would Congress allow an unlimited grace period for an eq-
uitable concern unmentioned in §5110(b)(1) when it estab-
lished a limited grace period for the same concern explicitly
mentioned in §5110(b)(4)? Tolling §5110(b)(1) would single
it out for special treatment; enforcing its terms keeps it con-
sistent with the statutory scheme.
The most compelling argument for equitable tolling is
that hard and fast limits on retroactive benefits can create
harsh results. The statutory default ties the start of bene-
fits to the application-receipt date, a choice that incentiv-
izes promptness and disfavors retroactive awards. The ex-
ceptions granting a 1-year grace period soften that choice in
specified circumstances, yet there are situations in which
equity’s flexible, open-ended approach would be more gen-
erous to a deserving claimant. With this in mind, Congress
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 9
Opinion of the Court
could have designed a scheme that allowed adjudicators to
maximize fairness in every case. But Congress has the
power to choose between rules, which prioritize efficiency
and predictability, and standards, which prioritize optimal
results in individual cases. Cf. Brockamp, 519 U. S., at352–353 (observing that “Congress decided to pay the price
of occasional unfairness in individual cases . . . in order to
maintain a more workable tax enforcement system”). Con-
gress opted for rules in this statutory scheme, and an equi-
table extension of §5110(b)(1)’s 1-year grace period would
disrupt that choice.
B
Arellano contests all of this. Laser focused on
§5110(b)(1), he argues that the provision’s unadorned text
contains none of the specific, technical language that might
otherwise rebut the presumption of equitable tolling. In ad-
dition, he emphasizes that there are “zero express excep-
tions to §5110(b)(1)’s one-year clock,” which he describes as
“fatal” to the Secretary’s position. Reply Brief 14. As Arel-
lano sees it, §5110(b)(1) is a simple time limit and therefore
a classic case for equitable tolling.
If §5110(b)(1) stood alone, there might be something to
Arellano’s argument. (Again, assuming that §5110(b)(1) is
a limitations period to which the Irwin presumption ap-
plies.) But §5110(b)(1) cannot be understood independently
of §5110(a)(1), which makes the date of receipt the effective
date “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise in this chap-
ter.” Arellano insists that the Secretary overreads “unless”
by treating it as a signal that the enacted exceptions are
exclusive. Brief for Petitioner 31–32. But the clause says
more than “unless”—it says that the default applies
“[u]nless specifically provided otherwise.” §5110(a)(1) (em-
phasis added). That is an instruction to attend to specifi-
cally enacted language to the exclusion of general, unen-
acted carveouts. While Arellano claims to seek an equitable
10 ARELLANO v. MCDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
exception to a general rule, he actually seeks an equitable
exception to an exception to a general rule. Structurally,
that is a heavy lift. Moreover, §5110(b)(1) is nestled within
a list of 15 other exceptions to §5110(a)(1)’s default rule,
and, as we have already explained, the presence of this de-
tailed, lengthy list raises the inference that the enumerated
exceptions are exclusive.
Arellano also resists the proposition that the express ac-
counting for disability-caused delay in §5110(b)(4) hurts his
case. On the contrary, he insists that it works in his favor.
Citing Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43 (2002), he main-
tains that an express tolling provision does not displace the
presumption of tolling but rather demonstrates that a stat-
ute incorporates traditional equitable principles. Brief for
Petitioner 37–38. According to Arellano, Congress’s silence
in §5110(b)(1) merely shows that it wanted those tradi-
tional principles to apply at full strength. Ibid.; Reply Brief
19–20.
We disagree. Section 5110(b)(4) does not help Arellano;
for the reasons we have already explained, it illustrates
why equitably tolling §5110(b)(1) is incongruent with the
statutory scheme. Young is inapposite. There, we con-
cluded that an “express tolling provision” for a time limit in
a bankruptcy statute supported equitable tolling of a differ-
ent time limit in the same statute. 535 U. S., at 53. But
that was largely because the express tolling provision au-
thorized tolling where equity would not otherwise have per-
mitted it. Ibid. As a result, we interpreted the express toll-
ing provision to “supplemen[t] rather than displac[e]
principles of equitable tolling.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted).
Here, however, §5110(b)(4) does not authorize tolling that
equity would not otherwise have allowed. If anything, its
conditional and narrow applicability limits tolling that
might otherwise have occurred. Though Arellano makes a
valiant effort to turn a negative into a positive, §5110(b)(4)
remains an obstacle to his interpretation.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 11
Opinion of the Court
Finally, Arellano contends that “the ‘nature of the under-
lying subject matter’ ”—veterans’ benefits—counsels in fa-
vor of tolling here. Brief for Petitioner 33–34. To support
this proposition, he invokes Brockamp, which considered
whether courts can equitably toll time limits for filing tax-
refund claims. 519 U. S., at 348. After holding that the
statute’s text and structure rebutted the Irwin presump-
tion, we observed that the “nature of the underlying subject
matter—tax collection—underscore[d] the linguistic point.”
Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. “Tax law, after all, is not nor-
mally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting
individualized equities.” Ibid. By contrast, Arellano ar-
gues, providing benefits to veterans is a context in which
individualized equities are paramount. See King v. St. Vin-
cent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 220, n. 9 (1991) (“[P]rovisions
for benefits to members of the Armed Services are to be con-
strued in the beneficiaries’ favor”).
If the text and structure favored Arellano, the nature of
the subject matter would garnish an already solid argu-
ment. But the nature of the subject matter cannot over-
come text and structure that foreclose equitable tolling.
Brockamp turned to the “nature of the underlying subject
matter” only to “underscor[e] the linguistic point.” 519
U. S., at 352. Arellano, however, lacks the linguistic point.
This is not a case in which competing interpretations are
equally plausible; it is one in which Congress’s choice is ev-
ident.3
* * *
We hold that §5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling
and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
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3 We resolve only the applicability of equitable tolling to §5110(b)(1).
We do not address the applicability of other equitable doctrines, such as
waiver, forfeiture, and estoppel.