Feild v. Farrington , 19 L. Ed. 923 ( 1870 )

77 U.S. 141 (1869) 10 Wall. 141

FEILD
v.
FARRINGTON.

Supreme Court of United States.

Messrs. Watkins and Rose, for the plaintiffs in error; Mr. A.H. Garland, contra.

Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.

There is some conflict in the testimony respecting the instructions given to the plaintiffs below by the defendant, at the time when he obtained the advance on his consignment, and at the time when he last saw them, some fifteen days afterwards. It is claimed that he then gave them instructions to sell the cotton before the price should fall any lower, and that this direction was given not later than the 28th of October, 1865. It was upon this theory that his first prayer for instructions to the jury was framed. It is very obvious that no such directions, as that prayer asked for, should have been given to the jury. The prayer was based upon a very imperfect statement of the case. It overlooked material facts, without considering which it could not be determined to what amount of credit he was entitled. There was undisputed evidence that on the 16th of November, 1865, some three weeks after the defendant's alleged directions were given to the plaintiffs, they wrote to him a letter informing him that they had not sold his cotton, as the market had been dull and on the decline every day since he left, that his cotton would not then sell for more than from forty-three to forty-four cents per pound, and that they would be compelled to sell unless he made other shipments, or remitted in cash as a margin, the money market being tight. They wrote farther that they had held on thus far to meet his views, but that the declining tendency of the market induced them to write, and they asked to hear from him on his receipt of their letter. It was also in evidence that the defendant received this letter, and that he purposely declined to answer it. No allusion was made to these facts in the defendant's first prayer for instructions to the jury. Yet it is manifest they ought not to have been overlooked by the court, for they bear directly upon the question whether the defendant was entitled to credit for the sum for which the cotton would have sold if the plaintiffs had sold it before the price fell in the market. The effect of his refusal to reply to their letter within a reasonable time after he received it, was undoubtedly to raise a presumption that he approved of what his factors had done, so far as their letter informed him. In the absence of anything to rebut that presumption, he must be regarded as having consented to whatever delay had occurred in effecting a sale, even though it was contrary to his directions. He could not, therefore, hold his factors responsible for the consequences of acts which he had ratified. Mr. Livermore, in his Treatise on Agency,^[*] says that "when the relation of principal and agent does in fact exist, although in the particular transaction the agent has exceeded his authority, an intention to ratify will always be presumed from the silence of the principal who has received a letter informing him what has been done on his account." And in Story on Agency,^[†] it is said that, "In the ordinary course of business between merchants and their correspondents, it is understood to be the duty of one party receiving a letter from the other to answer the same within a reasonable time, and if he does not, it is presumed he admits the propriety of the acts of his correspondent, and confirms and adopts them." Whatever, then, may have been the instructions given to the plaintiffs by the defendant respecting the time of sale, even though they were disobeyed, and though the cotton was not sold before the price had fallen, his refusal or neglect to reply to the plaintiffs' letter of November 16th, 1865, which notified him of the fall in the market price, and informed him that they had not sold but had held on thus far to meet his views, must be deemed an approval of their delay, and equivalent to an antecedent authority. It has been argued that at most it raised a presumption of fact that should have been submitted to the jury. To this it may be answered there was nothing in the case to repel the presumption, and the jury would, therefore, have been bound by it had it been submitted. But the defendant's prayer for instruction ignored it, and, in effect, called upon the court to withdraw it from the jury.

There is still another reason why the court should not have affirmed the defendant's first proposition. The plaintiffs had made large advances on the cotton consigned to them, advances very nearly, if not quite, equal to its value, and much more than its market value at any time after their letter to the defendant was written. They had, therefore, acquired a special property in the cotton, and they held it for their own indemnity as well as for the benefit of the defendant. Now, though it is true that factors are generally bound to obey all orders of their principals respecting the time and mode of sale, yet when they have made large advances or incurred expenses on account of the consignment, the principal cannot by any subsequent orders control their right to sell at such a time as in the exercise of a sound discretion, and in accordance with the usage of trade, they may deem best to secure indemnity to themselves, and to promote the interests of the consignor. Of course they must act in good faith and with reasonable skill. This is the rule as laid down in Brown v. McGran,^[*] in which it was said that "where a consignment has been made generally without any specific orders as to the time or mode of sale, and the factor makes advances or incurs liabilities on the footing of such consignment, then the legal presumption is, that the factor is intended to be clothed with the ordinary rights of factors to sell, in the exercise of a sound discretion, at such time and in such mode as the usage of trade and his general duty require, and to reimburse himself for his advances and liabilities out of the proceeds of sale, and the consignor has no right, by any subsequent orders given after advances have been made or liabilities incurred by the factor, to suspend or control this right of sale, except so far as respects the surplus of the consignment not necessary to the reimbursement of such advances or liabilities." In view of this it is apparent that the jury had more to find than the fact that Feild gave instructions to sell the cotton before any fall in the price, in order to justify a credit to him for the amount the cotton would have brought if sold at the time the instructions were given. There was, therefore, no error in denying the defendant's first prayer for instructions to the jury.

And the second prayer was correctly refused for the reason that it allowed no effect to the letter of November 16, 1865, and the defendant's refusal to reply.

But we think there was error in refusing to affirm the defendant's third proposition, and the instruction which was given.

The instruction given, we think, was not sufficiently qualified. It gave undue effect to the plaintiff's letter and to the defendant's neglect, or refusal, to reply to it. Surely it cannot be maintained that, by leaving their letter unanswered, the defendant relieved the plaintiffs from the consequences of subsequent neglect, or want of good faith. His silence, at most, was an assent to what they had done up to the time when they informed him of their breach of his orders. It was a condonation of past neglect, not a permission given for future negligence or faithlessness. It did not relieve the plaintiffs from their continuing obligation to sell the cotton within a reasonable time, all the circumstances of the case being considered, and to sell at the best price that could be obtained. They were still his factors, and under the obligations of factors. Though the order to sell before a fall in the price had expired, they were still agents to sell, and without any particular instructions. It cannot be said that the letter of the plaintiffs proposed, or that the defendant by his silence assented to an indefinite or unreasonable postponement of a sale of the cotton. On the contrary, the letter threatened an immediate sale, unless other shipments were made or cash was remitted, and the silence of the defendant can be deemed no more than an assent to what his correspondents had done, and to what they proposed to do. Yet the charge of the court shielded them against all responsibility for good faith and diligence after the defendant neglected to reply to their letter, and threw upon him all loss sustained after that time, though it may have been occasioned in whole or in part by their failure to sell when they should have sold. The plaintiffs held the cotton, without making a sale, nearly ten months after their letter of November 16, 1865, in which they notified the defendant that they would be compelled to sell unless he made other shipments or remittances. During this period the price of cotton was constantly falling in the market, until at last they sold what they said was worth in November, 1865, forty-three to forty-four cents, for thirty, twenty-five, and twenty cents. Whether this long delay, in view of a falling market, was in the exercise of a sound discretion, good faith, and reasonable diligence, was a question that should have been submitted to the jury. If the delay was unreasonable, if it was in violation of the plaintiffs' duty as factors, they, rather than the defendant, should bear the loss that resulted from it. Such was the instruction the defendant sought to obtain by his third prayer; but it was denied, and the jury were charged that he must bear all losses sustained after his refusal to answer the plaintiffs' letter, without excepting such portion of the loss as may have been caused by the fault of the plaintiffs. Herein we think was error.

It is true the court also charged that, as a general principle, the plaintiffs, as factors, were bound to use due diligence, care, and skill in the sale of the cotton, and to obey instructions given them by the defendant in regard to the sale. But this was not said as a qualification of the specific instructions previously given, and the jury must have understood that if they found the facts as stated by the court, they must charge the defendant with all the loss which accrued after his failure to answer the plaintiffs' letter.

The judgment must, therefore, be

REVERSED, AND A NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

NOTES

[*] Vol. 1, p. 50.

[†] § 259; see also Abbe v. Rood, 6 McLean, 106, and Norris v. Cook, 1 Curtis, 464.

[*] 14 Peters, 479.