Maxwell v. Griswold , 13 L. Ed. 405 ( 1851 )

51 U.S. 242 (____) 10 How. 242

HUGH MAXWELL, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
NATHANIEL L. GRISWOLD, GEORGE GRISWOLD, GEORGE W. GRAY, AND GEORGE GRISWOLD, JUNIOR.

Supreme Court of United States.

It was argued by Mr. Crittenden (Attorney-General), for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. J.S. McCulloh, for the defendants in error.

Mr. Justice WOODBURY delivered the opinion of the court.

This case presents two points, similar to what have just been decided in Greely v. Thompson et al. In respect to the first one, which related to the proper time for fixing the value of goods imported from the country of their growth or manufacture, this court there held it was the time of their procurement when not purchased, and the time of their purchase when they had been actually purchased abroad, rather than the time of their exportation or shipment. The goods in this case were valued at the latter time, though they had been previously purchased, and at a lower price. For the reasons assigned in the other case, the instruction given that this time was wrong, must be considered legal.

Another point decided in Greely v. Thompson et al., and which is a ground of exception here, was, that though the money was collected in obedience to orders from the Treasury Department, which the collector, so far as regards the Department, was bound to follow, yet this did not justify him as to others, or bar a recovery by third persons if not liable in law to pay so high duties. For the reasons there assigned, this exception is likewise one which cannot be sustained.

The other points in that case do not arise here, but one does arise which did not exist there, and which we now proceed to examine.

The importer had put in his invoice the price actually paid for the goods, with charges, and proposed to enter them at the value thus fixed. But the collector concluded in that event to have them appraised, and the value would then, by instructions and usage at New York, be ascertained as at the time of the shipment, which was considerably higher, and would probably subject the importer, not only to pay more duties, but to suffer a penalty.

The importer protested against this, but in order to avoid the penalty, under such a wrong appraisal, adopted the following course.

This being a case of purchase of goods abroad, and not procurement, it came clearly within the eighth section of the act of 1846, and therefore the importer, as that act permits, was allowed to make, and did make, an addition to his invoice, so as to escape the penalty, by means of the addition, and the payment of the consequent increased duties. (Pamphlet Laws for 1846, p. 69.)

This increase of duties, thus obtained, the present action is instituted to recover back, they having been paid under protest and unwillingly. The government, however, insist that this excess of duties was caused and paid voluntarily, and hence, though illegal, cannot be recovered back. If they were paid voluntarily, some precedents would seem to countenance the inability to sustain this suit. Elliot v. Swartwout, 10 Peters, 137.

But the gist of the point is, were these increased duties in truth paid voluntarily, in the meaning of that term as applicable to the present subject? We have already seen, that the importer did not at first propose to enter his goods of such a value as to justify these increased duties. On the contrary, he insisted on entering them at only the price for which he purchased them, with charges, and thus agreeing with his original invoice, while the collector virtually insisted on having them appraised at their increased value as at the time of the shipment, such being the usage in the custom-house at New York, and such the requirement of the circular of the Secretary of the Treasury, November 24th, 1846. The importer, knowing that this would subject him to a severe penalty, in order to avoid it, felt compelled to add to his invoice the amount which the price had risen between the purchase and the shipment.

But this addition and consequent payment of the higher duties were so far from voluntary in him, that he accompanied them with remonstrances against being thus coerced to do the act in order to escape a greater evil, and accompanied the payment with a protest against the legality of the course pursued towards him.

Now, it can hardly be meant in this class of cases, that, to make a payment involuntary, it should be by actual violence, or any physical duress. It suffices, if the payment is caused on the one part by an illegal demand, and made on the other part reluctantly and in consequence of that illegality, and without being able to regain possession of his property except by submitting to the payment. (See cases cited hereafter.)

All these requisites existed here. We have already decided, that the demand for such an increased appraisal was illegal. The appraisal itself, as made, was illegal. The raising of the invoice was thus caused by these illegalities in order to escape a greater burden in the penalty. The payment of the increased duties thus caused was wrongfully imposed on the importer, and was submitted to merely as a choice of evils.

He was unwilling to pay either the excess of duties or the penalty, and must be considered, therefore, as forced into one or the other by the collector, colore officii, through the invalid and illegal course pursued in having the appraisal made of the value at the wrong period, however well meant may have been the views of the collector.

The money was thus obtained by a moral duress, not justified by law, and which was not submitted to by the importer, except to regain possession of his property withheld from him on grounds manifestly wrong. Indeed, it seems sufficient to sustain the action, whether under the act of February 26th, 1845, or under principles of the common law, if the duties exacted were not legal, and were demanded and were paid under protest. 5 Stat. at Large, 727; Clinton v. Strong, 9 Johns. 370; 11 Wheaton; 1 Miller, 536; 1 Bos. & Pul. 139; Irving v. Chitsowdt, 4 D. & E. 485, 553; Cowp. 69, 805.

All these circumstances existed here, and hence the judgment below must be affirmed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs and damages, at the rate of six per centum per annum.