Hutto v. Finney , 98 S. Ct. 2565 ( 1979 )

Mr. Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.^†

After finding that conditions in the Arkansas penal system constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the District Court entered a series of detailed remedial orders. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, petitioners¹ challenged two aspects of that relief: (1) an order placing a maximum limit of 30 days on confinement in punitive isolation; and (2) an award of attorney’s fees to be paid out of Department of Correction funds. The Court of Appeals affirmed and assessed an additional attorney’s fee to cover services on appeal. 548 F. 2d 740 (1977). We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 901, and now affirm.

This litigation began in 1969; it is a sequel to two earlier cases holding that conditions in the Arkansas prison system violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.² Only a brief summary of the facts is necessary to explain the basis for the remedial orders.

The routine conditions that the ordinary Arkansas convict had to endure were characterized by the District Court as “a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world.” Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (ED Ark. 1970) (Holt II). That characterization was amply supported by the evidence.³ The punishments for misconduct not serious enough to result in punitive isolation were cruel,⁴ unusual,⁵ and unpredictable.⁶ It is the discipline known as “punitive isolation” that is most relevant for present purposes.

Confinement in punitive isolation was for an indeterminate period of time. An average of 4, and sometimes as many as 10 or 11, prisoners were crowded into windowless 8'xlO' cells containing no furniture other than a source of water and a toilet that could only be flushed from outside the cell. Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 831-832 (ED Ark. 1969) (Holt I). At night the prisoners were given mattresses to spread on the floor. Although some prisoners suffered from infectious diseases such as hepatitis and venereal disease, mattresses were removed and jumbled together each morning, then returned to the cells at random in the evening. Id,, at 832. Prisoners in isolation received fewer than 1,000 calories a day;⁷ their meals consisted primarily of 4-inch squares of “grue,” a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking the mixture in a pan. Ibid.

After finding the conditions of confinement unconstitutional, the District Court did not immediately impose a detailed remedy of its own. Instead, it directed the Department of Correction to “make a substantial start” on improving conditions and to file reports on its progress. Holt I, supra, at 833-834. When the Department’s progress proved unsatisfactory, a second hearing was held. The District Court found some improvements, but concluded that prison conditions remained unconstitutional. Holt II, 309 F. Supp., at 383. Again the court offered prison administrators an opportunity to devise a plan of their own for remedying the constitutional violations, but this time the court issued guidelines, identifying four areas of change that would cure the worst evils: improving conditions in the isolation cells, increasing inmate safety, eliminating the barracks sleeping arrangements, and putting an end to the trusty system. Id., at 385. The Department was ordered to move as rapidly as funds became available. Ibid.

After this order was affirmed on appeal, Holt v. Sarver, 442 F. 2d 304 (CA8 1971), more hearings were held in 1972 and 1973 to review the Department’s progress. Finding substantial improvements, the District Court concluded that continuing supervision was no longer necessary. The court held, however, that its prior decrees would remain in effect and noted that sanctions, as well as an award of costs and attorney’s fees, would be imposed if violations occurred. Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 217 (ED Ark. 1973) (Holt HI).

The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision to withdraw its supervisory jurisdiction, Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correction, 505 F. 2d 194 (CA8 1974), and the District Court held a fourth set of hearings. 410 F. Supp. 251 (ED Ark. 1976). It found that, in some respects, conditions had seriously deteriorated since 1973, when the court had withdrawn its supervisory jurisdiction. Cummins Farm, which the court had condemned as overcrowded in 1970 because it housed 1,000 inmates, now had a population of about 1,500. Id., at 254-255. The situation in the punitive isolation cells was particularly disturbing. The court concluded that either it had misjudged conditions in these cells in 1973 or conditions had become much worse since then. Id., at 275. There were twice as many prisoners as beds in some cells. And because inmates in punitive isolation are often violently antisocial, overcrowding led to persecution of the weaker prisoners. The “grue” diet was still in use, and practically all inmates were losing weight on it. The cells had been vandalized to a “very substantial” extent. Id., at 276. Because of their inadequate numbers, guards assigned to the punitive isolation cells frequently resorted to physical violence, using nightsticks and Mace in their efforts to maintain order. Prisoners were sometimes left in isolation for months, their release depending on “their attitudes as appraised by prison personnel.” Id., at 275.

The court concluded that the constitutional violations identified earlier had not been cured. It entered an order that placed limits on the number of men that could be confined in one cell, required that each have a bunk, discontinued the “grue” diet, and set 30 days as the maximum isolation sentence. The District Court gave detailed consideration to the matter of fees and expenses, made an express finding that petitioners had acted in bad faith, and awarded counsel “a fee of $20,000.00 to be paid out of Department of Correction funds.” Id,., at 285. The Court of Appeals affirmed and assessed an additional $2,500 to cover fees and expenses on appeal. 548 F. 2d, at 743.

I

The Eighth Amendment’s ban on inflicting cruel and unusual punishments, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, “proscribe[s] more than physically barbarous punishments.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 102. It prohibits penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the offense, Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 367, as well as those that transgress today’s “ ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.’ ” Estelle v. Gamble, supra, at 102, quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571, 579 (CA8 1968). Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards. Petitioners do not challenge this proposition; nor do they disagree with the District Court’s original conclusion that conditions in Arkansas’ prisons, including its punitive isolation cells, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Rather, petitioners single out that portion of the District Court’s most recent order that forbids the Department to sentence inmates to more than 30 days in punitive isolation. Petitioners assume that the District Court held that indeterminate sentences to punitive isolation always constitute cruel and unusual punishment. This assumption misreads the District Court’s holding.

Read in its entirety, the District Court’s opinion makes it abundantly clear that the length of isolation sentences was not considered in a vacuum. In the court’s words, punitive isolation “is not necessarily unconstitutional, but it may be, depending on the duration of the confinement and the conditions thereof.” 410 F. Supp., at 275.⁸ It is perfectly obvious that every decision to remove a particular inmate from the general prison population for an indeterminate period could not be characterized as cruel and unusual. If new conditions of confinement are not materially different from those affecting other prisoners, a transfer for the duration of a prisoner’s sentence might be completely unobjectionable and well within the authority of the prison administrator. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215. It is equally plain, however, that the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of “grue” might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.

The question before the trial court was whether past constitutional violations had been remedied. The court was entitled to consider the severity of those violations in assessing the constitutionality of conditions in the isolation cells. The court took note of the inmates’ diet, the continued overcrowding, the rampant violence, the vandalized cells, and the “lack of professionalism and good judgment on the part of maximum security personnel.” 410 F. Supp., at 277 and 278. The length of time each inmate spent in isolation was simply one consideration among many. We find no error in the court’s conclusion that, taken as a whole, conditions in the isolation cells continued to violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

In fashioning a remedy, the District Court had ample authority to go beyond earlier orders and to address each element contributing to the violation. The District Court had given the Department repeated opportunities to remedy the cruel and unusual conditions in the isolation cells. If petitioners had fully complied with the court’s earlier orders, the present time limit might well have been unnecessary. But taking the long and unhappy history of the litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a comprehensive order to insure against the risk of inadequate compliance.⁹

The order is supported by the interdependence of the conditions producing the violation. The vandalized cells and the atmosphere of violence were attributable, in part, to overcrowding and to deep-seated enmities growing out of months of constant daily friction.¹⁰ The 30-day limit will help to correct these conditions.¹¹ Moreover, the limit presents little danger of interference with prison administration, for the Commissioner of Correction himself stated that prisoners should not ordinarily be held in punitive isolation for more than 14 days. Id., at 278. Finally, the exercise of discretion in this case is entitled to special deference because of the trial judge’s years of experience with the problem at hand and his recognition of the limits on a federal court’s authority in a case of this kind.¹² Like the Court of Appeals, we find no error in the inclusion of a 30-day limitation on sentences to punitive isolation as a part of the District Court’s comprehensive remedy.

II

The Attorney General of Arkansas, whose office has represented petitioners throughout this litigation, contends that any award of fees is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. He also argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that fees were authorized by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976. We hold that the District Court’s award is adequately supported by its finding of bad faith and that the Act supports the additional award by the Court of Appeals.

A. The District Court Award

Although the Attorney General argues that the finding of bad faith does not overcome the State’s Eleventh Amendment protection, he does not question the accuracy of the finding made by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals.¹³ Nor does he question the settled rule that a losing litigant’s bad faith may justify an allowance of fees to the prevailing party.¹⁴ He merely argues that the order requiring that the fees be paid from public funds violates the Eleventh Amendment.

In the landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, the Court held that, although prohibited from giving, orders directly to a State, federal courts could enjoin state officials in their official capacities. And in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, when the Court held that the Amendment grants the States an immunity from retroactive monetary relief, it reaffirmed the principle that state officers are not immune from prospective injunctive relief. Aware that the difference between retroactive and prospective relief “will not in many instances be that between day and night,” id., at 667, the Court emphasized in Edélman that the distinction did not immunize the States from their obligation to obey costly federal-court orders. The cost of compliance is “ancillary” to the prospective order enforcing federal law. Id., at 668.¹⁵ The line between retroactive and prospective relief cannot be so rigid that it defeats the effective enforcement of prospective relief.

The present case requires application of that principle. In exercising their prospective powers under Ex parte Young and Edelman v. Jordan, federal courts are not reduced to issuing injunctions against state officers and hoping'for compliance. Once issued, an injunction may be enforced. Many of the court’s most effective enforcement weapons involve financial penalties. A criminal contempt prosecution for “resistance to [the court’s] lawful .’ . . order” may result in a jail term or a fine. 18 U. S. C. § .401 (1976 ed.). Civil contempt proceedings may yield a conditional jail term or fine. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 305. Civil contempt may also be punished by a remedial fine, which compensates the party who won the injunction for the effects of his opponent’s noncompliance. Id., at 304; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418. If a state agency refuses to adhere to a court order, a financial penalty may be the most effective means of insuring compliance. The principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to enforce their decrees only by sending high state officials to jail.¹⁶ The less intrusive power to impose a fine is properly treated as ancillary to the federal court’s power to impose injunctive relief.

In this case, the award of attorney’s fees for bad faith served the same purpose as a remedial fine imposed for civil contempt. It vindicated the District Court’s authority over a recalcitrant litigant. Compensation was not the sole motive for the award; in setting the amount of the fee, the court said that it would “make no effort to adequately compensate counsel for the work that they have done or for the time that they have spent on the case.” 410 F. Supp., at 285. The court did allow a “substantial” fee, however, because “the allowance thereof may incline the Department to act in such a manner that further protracted litigation about the prisons will not be necessary.” Ibid.¹⁷ We see no reason to distinguish this award from any other penalty imposed to enforce a prospective injunction.¹⁸ Hence the substantive protections of the Eleventh Amendment do not prevent an award of attorney’s fees against the Department’s officers in their official capacities.

Instead of assessing the award against the defendants in their official capacities, the District Court directed that the fees are “to be paid out of Department of Correction funds.” Ibid. Although the Attorney General objects to the form of the order,¹⁹ no useful purpose would be served by requiring that it be recast in different language. We have previously approved directives that were comparable in their actual impact on the State without pausing to attach significance to the language used by the District Court.²⁰ Even if it might have been better form to omit the reference to the Department of Correction, the use of that language is surely not reversible error.

B. The Court of Appeals Award

Petitioners, as the losing litigants in the Court of Appeals, were ordered to pay an additional $2,500 to counsel for the prevailing parties “for their services on this appeal.” 548 F. 2d, at 743. The order does not expressly direct the Department of Correction to pay the award, but since petitioners are sued in their official capacities, and since they are represented by the Attorney General, it is obvious that the award will be paid with state funds. It is also clear that this order is not supported by any finding of bad faith. It is founded instead on the provisions of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Pees Awards Act of 1976. Pub.. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1976 ed.). The Act declares that, in suits under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and certain other statutes, federal courts may award prevailing parties reasonable attorney’s fees “as part of the costs.”'²¹

As this Court made clear in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, Congress has plenary power to set aside the States’ immunity from retroactive relief in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. When it passed the Act, Congress undoubtedly intended to exercise that power and to authorize fee awards payable by the States when their officials are sued in their official capacities. The Act itself could not be broader. It applies to “any” action brought to enforce certain civil rights laws. It contains no hint of an exception for States defending injunction actions; indeed, the Act primarily applies to laws passed specifically to restrain state action. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. 1 1983.

The legislative history is equally plain: “[I]t is intended that the attorneys’ fees, like other items of costs, will be collected either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or local government (whether or not the agency or government is a named party).” S. Rep. No. 94^1011, p. 5 (1976) (footnotes omitted). The House Report is in accord: “The greater resources available to governments provide an ample base from which fees can be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in suits against governmental officials or entities.” H. R. Rep. No. 94U1558, p. 7 (1976). The Report adds in a footnote that: “Of course, the 11th Amendment is not a bar to the awarding of counsel fees against state governments. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.” Id., at 7 n. 14. Congress’ intent was expressed in deeds as well as words.- It rejected at least two attempts to amend the Act and immunize state and local governments from awards.²²

The Attorney General does not quarrel with the rule established in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra. Rather, he argues that these plain indications of legislative intent are not enough. In his view, Congress must enact express statutory language making the States liable if it wishes to abrogate their immunity.²³ The Attorney General points out that this Court has sometimes refused to impose retroactive liability on the States in the absence of an extraordinarily explicit statutory mandate. See Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651. But these eases concern retroactive liability for preliti-gation conduct rather than expenses incurred in litigation seeking only prospective relief.

The Act imposes attorney’s fees “as part of the costs.” Costs have traditionally been awarded without regard for the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. The practice of awarding costs against the States goes back to 1849 in this Court. See Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660, 681; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 583 (collecting cases). The Court has never viewed the Eleventh Amendment as barring such awards, even in suits between States and individual litigants.²⁴

In Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U. S. 70, the State challenged this Court’s award of costs, but we squarely-rejected the State’s claim of immunity. Far from requiring an explicit abrogation of state immunity, we relied on a statutory mandate that was entirely silent on the question of state liability.²⁵ The power to make the award was supported by “the inherent authority of the Court in the orderly administration of justice as between all parties litigant.” Id., at 74. A federal court’s interest in orderly, expeditious proceedings “justifies [it] in treating the state just as any other litigant and in imposing costs upon it” when an award is called for. Id., at 77.²⁶

Just as a federal court may treat a State like any other litigant when it assesses costs, so also may Congress amend its definition of taxable costs and have the amended class of costs apply to the States, as it does to all other litigants, without expressly stating that it intends to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. For it would be absurd to require an express reference to state litigants whenever a filing fee, or a new item, such as an expert witness’ fee, is added to the category of taxable costs.²⁷

There is ample precedent for Congress’ decision to authorize an award of attorney’s fees as an item of costs. In England, costs “as between solicitor and client,” Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 167, are routinely taxed today, and have been awarded since 1278. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 n. 18. In America, although fees are not routinely awarded, there are a large number of statutory and common-law situations in which allowable costs include counsel fees.²⁸ Indeed, the federal statutory definition of costs, which was enacted before the Civil War and which remains in effect today, includes certain fixed attorney’s fees as recoverable costs.²⁹ In Fairmont Creamery itself, the Court awarded these statutory attorney’s fees against the State of Minnesota along with other taxable costs,³⁰ even though the governing statute said nothing about state liability. It is much too late to single out attorney’s fees as the one kind of litigation cost whose recovery may not be authorized by Congress without an express statutory waiver of the States’ immunity.³¹

Finally, the Attorney General argues that, even if attorney’s fees may be awarded against a State, they should not be awarded in this case, because neither the State nor the Department is expressly named as a defendant. Although the Eleventh Amendment prevented respondents from suing the State by name, their injunctive suit against prison officials was, for all practical purposes, brought against the State. The actions of the Attorney General himself show that. His office has defended this action since it began. See Holt I, 300 F. Supp., at 826. The State apparently paid earlier fee awards; and it was the State’s lawyers who decided to bring this appeal, thereby risking another award.³²

Like the Attorney General, Congress recognized that suits brought against individual officers for injunctive relief are for all practical purposes suits against the State itself. The legislative history makes it clear that in such suits attorney’s fee awards should generally be obtained “either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or local government (whether or not the agency or government is a named party) S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5 (1976). Awards against the official in his individual capacity, in contrast, were not to be affected by the statute; in injunctive suits they would continue to be awarded only “under the traditional bad faith standard recognized by the Supreme Court in Alyeska,.” Id., at 5 n. 7. There is no indication in this case that the named defendants litigated in bad faith before the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the Department of Correction is the entity intended by Congress to bear the burden of the counsel-fees award.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly affirmed.

It is so ordered.

† Mr. Justice White joins only Part I of this opinion.

1 Petitioners are the Commissioner of Correction and members of the Arkansas Board of Correction.

2 This case began as Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 826 (ED Ark. 1969) [Holt I). The two earlier cases were Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (ED Ark. 1965), and Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (ED Ark. 1967), vacated, 404 F. 2d 571 (CA8 1968). Judge Henley decided the first of these cases in 1965, when he was Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Arkansas. Although appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1975, he was specially designated to continue to hear this case as a District Judge.

3 The administrators of Arkansas’ prison system evidently tried to operate their prisons at a profit. See Talley v. Stephens, supra, at 688. Cummins Farm, the institution at the center of this litigation, required its 1,000 inmates to work in the fields 10 hours a day, six days a week, using mule-drawn tools and tending crops by hand. 247 F. Supp., at 688. The inmates were sometimes required to run to and from the fields, with a gua,rd in an automobile or on horseback driving them on. Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 213 (ED Ark. 1973) (Holt III). They worked in all sorts of weather, so long as the temperature was above freezing, sometimes in unsuitably light clothing or without shoes. Holt II, 309 F. Supp., at 370.

The inmates slept together in large, 100-man barracks, and some convicts, known as “creepers,” would slip from their beds to crawl along the floor, stalking their sleeping enemies. In one 18-month period, there were 17 stabbings, all but 1 occurring in the barracks. Holt I, supra, at 830-831. Homosexual rape was so common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep; instead they would leave their beds and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guards’ station. Holt II, supra, at 377.

4 Inmates were lashed with a wooden-handled leather strap five feet long and four inches wide. Talley v. Stephens, supra, at 687. Although it was not oificial policy to do so, some inmates were apparently whipped for mmor offenses until their skin was bloody and bruised. Jackson v. Bishop, supra, at 810-811.

5 The “Tucker telephone,” a hand-cranked device, was used to administer electrical shocks to various sensitive parts of an inmate’s body. Jackson v. Bishop, supra, at 812.

6 Most of the guards were simply inmates who had been issued guns. Holt II, supra, at 373. Although it had 1,000 prisoners, Cummins employed only eight guards who were not themselves convicts. Only two noneonvict guards kept watch over the 1,000 men at night. 309 F. Supp., at 373. While the “trusties” maintained an appearance of order, they took a high toll from the other prisoners. Inmates could obtain access to medical treatment only if they bribed the trusty in charge of sick call. As the District Court found, it was “within the power of a trusty guard to murder another inmate with practical impunity,” because trusties with weapons were authorized to use deadly force against escapees. Id., at 374. “Accidental shootings” also occurred; and one trusty fired his shotgun into a crowded barracks because the inmates would not turn off their TV. Ibid. Another trusty beat an inmaté so badly the victim required partial dentures. Talley v. Stephens, supra, at 689.

7 A daily allowance of 2,700 calories is recommended for the average male between 23 and 50. National Academy of Sciences, Recommended Dietary Allowances, Appendix (8th rev. ed. 1974). Prisoners in punitive isolation are less active than the average person; but a mature man who spends 12 hours a day lying down and 12 hours a day simply sitting or standing consumes approximately 2,000 calories a day. Id., at 27.

8 The Department reads the following sentence in the District Court’s 76-page opinion as an unqualified holding that any indeterminate sentence to solitary confinement is unconstitutional: “The court holds that the policy of sentencing inmates to indeterminate periods of confinement in punitive isolation is unreasonable and unconstitutional.” 410 F. Supp., at 278. But in the context of its full opinion, we think it quite clear that the court was describing the specific conditions found in the Arkansas penal system. Indeed, in the same paragraph it noted that “segregated confinement under maximum security conditions is one thing; segregated confinement under the punitive conditions that have been described is quite another thing.” Ibid, (emphasis in original).

The Department also suggests that the District Court made rehabilitation a constitutional requirement. The court did note its agreement with an expert witness who testified “that punitive isolation as it exists at Cummins today serves no rehabilitative purpose, and that it is counterproductive.” Id., at 277. The court went on to say that punitive isolation “makes bad men worse. It must be changed.” Ibid. We agree with the Department’s contention that the Constitution does not require that every aspect of prison discipline serve a rehabilitative purpose. Novak v. Beto, 453 F. 2d 661, 670-671 (CA5 1971); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F. 2d 411, 415-416 (CA1 1977). But the District Court did not impose a new legal test. Its remarks form the transition from a detailed description of conditions in the isolation cells to a traditional legal analysis of those conditions. The quoted passage simply summarized the facts and presaged the legal conclusion to come.

9 As we' explained in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 281, state and local authorities have primary responsibility for curing constitutional violations. “If, however ‘[those] authorities fad in their affirmative obligations . . . judicial authority may be invoked.’ Swann [v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1,] 15. Once invoked, ‘the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.’ ” Ibid. In this case, the District Court was not remedying the present effects of a violation in the past. It was seeking to bring an ongoing violation to an immediate halt. Cooperation on the part of Department officials and compliance with other aspects of the decree may justify elimination of this added safeguard in the future, but it is entirely appropriate for the District Court to postpone any such determination until the Department's progress can be evaluated.

10 The District Court noted “that as a class the inmates of the punitive cells hate those in charge of them, and that they may harbor particular hatreds against prison employees who have been in charge of the same inmates for a substantial period of time.” 410 F. Supp., at 277.

11 As early as 1969, the District Court had identified shorter sentences as a possible remedy for overcrowding in the isolation cells. Holt I, 300 F. Supp., at 834. The limit imposed in 1976 was a mechanical — and therefore an easily enforced — method of minimizing overcrowding, with its attendant vandalism and unsanitary conditions.

12 See, e. g., Holt II, 309 F. Supp., at 369:

“The Court, however, is limited in its inquiry to the question of whether or not the constitutional rights of inmates are being invaded and with whether the Penitentiary itself is unconstitutional. The Court is not judicially concerned with questions which in the last analysis are addressed to legislative and administrative judgment. A practice that may be bad from the standpoint of penology may not necessarily be forbidden by the Constitution.”

13 In affirming the award, the Court of Appeals relied chiefly on the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, but it also noted expressly that “the record fully supports the finding of the district court that the conduct of the state officials justified the award under the bad faith exception enumerated in Alyeska [Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240].” 648 F. 2d 740, 742 n. 6.

14 An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney’s fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 258-269; Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412; Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F. 2d 591, 598-600 (CA3 1976); cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 (g) (attorney’s fees to be awarded against party filing summary judgment affidavits “in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay”); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37 (a) (4) (motions to compel discovery; prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees). The award vindicates judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court and makes the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent’s obstinacy. Cf. First Nat. Bank v. Dunham, 471 F. 2d 712 (CA8 1973). Of course, fees can also be awarded as part of a civil contempt penalty. See, e. g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399; Signal Delivery Service, Inc. v. Highway Truck Drivers, 68 F. R. D. 318 (ED Pa. 1975).

15 “Ancillary” costs may be very large indeed. Last Term, for example, this Court rejected an Eleventh Amendment defense and approved an injunction ordering a State to pay almost $6 million to help defray the costs of desegregating the Detroit school system. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S., at 293 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).

16 See Note, Attorneys’ Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1875,1892 (1975).

17 That the award had a compensatory effect does not in any event distinguish it from a fine for civil contempt, which also compensates a private party for the consequences of a contemnor’s disobedience. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418. Moreover, the Court has approved federal rulings requiring a State to support programs that compensate for past misdeeds, saying: “That the programs are also ‘compensatory’ in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore hold that such prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Milliken v. Bradley, supra, at 290 (emphasis in original). The award of attorney’s fees against a State disregarding a federal order stands on the same footing; like other enforcement powers, it is integral to the court’s grant of prospective relief.

18 The Attorney General has not argued that this award was so large or so unexpected that it interfered with the State’s budgeting process. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit attorney’s fees awards for bad faith, it may counsel moderation in determining the size of the award or in giving the State time to adjust its budget before paying the full amount of the fee. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 666 n. 11. In this case, however, the timing of the award has not been put in issue; nor has the State claimed that the award was larger than necessary to enforce the court’s prior orders.

19 We do not understand the Attorney General to urge that the fees should have been awarded against the officers personally; that would be a remarkable way to treat individuals who have relied on the Attorney General to represent their interests throughout this litigation.

20 In Milliken v. Bradley, supra, we affirmed an order requiring a state treasurer to pay a substantial sum to another litigant, even though the District Court’s opinion explicitly recognized that “this remedial decree will be paid for by the taxpayers of the City of Detroit and the State of Michigan,” App. to Pet. for Cert, in Milliken v. Bradley, O. T. 1976, No. 76-447, pp. 116a-117a, and even though the Court of Appeals, in affirming, stated that “the District Court ordered that the State and Detroit Board each pay one-half the costs” of relief. Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F. 2d 229, 245 (CA6 1976).

21 This Act declares:

“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of §§ 1977, 1978,1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 U. S. C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986], title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. (1976 ed.)], or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code [26 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 90 Stat. 2641.

22 See 122 Cong. Rec. 31832-31835 (1976) (amendment of Sen. Helms); id., at 32296 and 32396-32397 (amendment of Sen. Allen). See aso id., at 32931 (amendment of Sen. William Seo-tt).

23 The Attorney General also contends that the fee award should not apply to cases, such as this one, that were pending when the Act was passed in 1976. But the legislative history of the Act, as well as this Court’s general practice, defeats this argument. The House Report declared: “In accordance with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, the bill is intended to apply to all cases pending on the date of enactment . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 9A-1558, p. 4 n. 6 (1976). See also Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U. S. 696.

24 While the decisions allowing the award of costs against States antedate the line drawn between retroactive and prospective relief in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, such awards do not seriously strain that distinction. Unlike ordinary “retroactive” relief such as damages or restitution, an award of costs does not compensate the plaintiff for the injury that first brought him into court. Instead, the award reimburses him for a portion of the expenses he incurred in seeking prospective relief. (An award of costs will almost invariably be incidental to an award of prospective relief, for costs are generally awarded only to prevailing parties, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proe. 54 (d), and only prospective relief can be successfully pursued by an individual in a suit against a State.) Moreover, like the power to award attorney’s fees for litigating in bad faith, the power to assess costs is an important and well-recognized tool used to restrain the behavior of parties during litigation. See, e. g., Rule 37 (b) (costs may be awarded for failure to obey discovery order); Rule 30 (g) (costs may be awarded for failure to attend deposition or for failure to serve subpoena). When a State defends a suit for prospective relief, it is not exempt from the ordinary discipline of the courtroom.

25 “If specific statutory authority [for an award of costs] is needed, it is found in § 254 of the Judicial Code .... It provides that there shall be 'taxed against the losing party in each and every cause pending in the Supreme Court’ the cost of printing the record, except when the judgment is against the United States. This exception of the United States in the section with its emphatic inclusion of every other litigant shows that a state as litigant must pay the costs of printing, if it loses, in every case, civil or criminal. These costs constitute a large part of all the costs. The section certainly constitutes pro tanto statutory authority to impose costs generally against a state if defeated.” 275 U. S., at 77.

26 Because the interest in orderly and evenhanded justice is equally pressing in lower courts, Fairmont Creamery has been widely understood as foreclosing any Eleventh Amendment objection to assessing costs against a State in all federal courts. See, e. g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F. 2d 53, 58 (CA3 1976) (en banc); Utah v. United States, 304 F. 2d 23 (CA10 1962); United States ex rel. Griffin v. McMann, 310 F. Supp. 72 (EDNY 1970).

27 This conclusion is consistent with the reasons for requiring a formal indication of Congress’ intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. The requirement insures that Congress has not imposed “enormous fiscal burdens on the States” without careful thought. Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 284. See Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 695 (1976). But an award of costs — limited as it is to partially compensating a successful litigant for the expense of his suit — could hardly create any such hardship for a State. Thus we do not suggest that our analysis would be the same if Congress were to1 expand the concept of costs beyond the traditional category of litigation expenses.

28 In 1975, we listed 29 statutes allowing federal courts to award attorney’s fees in certain suits. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S., at 260-261, n. 33. Some of these statutes define attorney’s fees as an element of costs, while others separate fees from other taxable costs. Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3 (b) with 29 U. S. C. § 216(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V).

29 See 28 U. S. C. § 1923 (a) ($100 in fees for admiralty appeals involving more than $5,000). Inflation has now made the awards merely nominal, but the principle of allowing such awards against all parties has undiminished force.

30 File of the Clerk of this Court in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, O. T. 1926, No. 725.

31 The Attorney General argues that the statute itself must expressly abrogate the States’ immunity from retroactive liability, relying on Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., supra. Even if we were not dealing with an item such as costs, this reliance would be misplaced. In Employees, the Court refused to permit individual backpay suits against state institutions because the Court “found not a word in the history of the [statute] to indicate a purpose of Congress to make it possible for a citizen of that State or another State to sue the State in the federal courts.” 411 U. S., at 285. The Court was careful to add, moreover, that its reading of the law did not make the statute’s inclusion of state institutions meaningless. Because the Secretary of Labor was empowered to bring suit against violators, the amendment covering state institutions gave him authority to enforce the statute against them. Id., at 285-286.

The present Act, in contrast, has a history focusing directly on the question of state liability; Congress considered and firmly rejected the suggestion that States should be immune from fee awards. Moreover, the Act is not part of an intricate regulatory scheme offering alternative methods of obtaining relief. If the Act does not impose liability for attorney’s fees on the States, it has no meaning with respect to them. Finally, the claims asserted in Employees and in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, were based on a statute rooted in Congress’ Art. I power.' See Employees, supra, at 281 (claim based on Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq.); Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 674 (underlying claim based on Social Security Act provisions dealing with aid to aged, blind, and disabled, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1381-1385). In this case, as in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, the claim is based on a statute enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. As we pointed out in Fitzpatrick: “[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies ... are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.” Id., at 456.

Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 852 n. 17. Applying the standard appropriate in a case brought to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, we have no doubt that the Act is clear enough to authorize the award of attorney’s fees payable by the State.

32 The Attorney General is hardly in a position to argue that the fee awards should be borne not by the State, but by individual officers who have relied on his office to protect their interests throughout the litigation. Nonetheless, our dissenting Brethren would apparently force these officers to bear the award alone. The Act authorizes an attorney’s fee award even though the appeal was not taken in bad faith; no one denies that. The Court of Appeals’ award is thus proper, and the only question is who will pay it. In the dissenters’ view, the Eleventh Amendment protects the State from liability. But the State’s immunity does not extend to the individual officers. The dissenters would apparently leave the officers to pay the award; whether the officials would be reimbursed is a decision that “may . . . safely be left to the State involved.” Post, at 716 (RehNQUISt, J., dissenting). This is manifestly unfair when, as here, the individual officers have no personal interest in the conduct of the State’s litigation, and it defies this Court’s insistence in a related context that imposing personal liability in the absence of bad faith may cause state officers to “exercise their discretion with undue timidity.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 321.