Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission , 133 S. Ct. 3 ( 2012 )


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  •                   Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)           1
    Per Curiam
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    NATALIE E. TENNANT, WEST VIRGINIA SECRETARY
    OF STATE, ET AL. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY
    COMMISSION, ET AL.
    ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
    No. 11–1184. Decided September 25, 2012
    PER CURIAM.
    Plaintiffs in this case claim that West Virginia’s 2011
    congressional redistricting plan violates the “one person,
    one vote” principle that we have held to be embodied in
    Article I, §2, of the United States Constitution. A three-
    judge District Court for the Southern District of West
    Virginia agreed, declaring the plan “null and void” and
    enjoining West Virginia’s Secretary of State from imple-
    menting it. App. to Juris. Statement 4. The state defend-
    ants appealed directly to this Court. See 
    28 U. S. C. §1253
    . Because the District Court misapplied the stand-
    ard for evaluating such challenges set out in Karcher v.
    Daggett, 
    462 U. S. 725
     (1983), and failed to afford appro-
    priate deference to West Virginia’s reasonable exercise of
    its political judgment, we reverse.
    *    *   *
    Article I, §2, of the United States Constitution requires
    that Members of the House of Representatives “be ap-
    portioned among the several States . . . according to their
    respective Numbers” and “chosen every second Year by the
    People of the several States.” In Wesberry v. Sanders, 
    376 U. S. 1
     (1964), we held that these commands require that
    “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congres-
    sional election is to be worth as much as another’s.” 
    Id.,
     at
    7–8. We have since explained that the “as nearly as is
    practicable” standard does not require that congressional
    2      TENNANT v. JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION
    Per Curiam
    districts be drawn with “precise mathematical equality,”
    but instead that the State justify population differences
    between districts that could have been avoided by “a good-
    faith effort to achieve absolute equality.” Karcher, 
    supra, at 730
     (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 
    394 U. S. 526
    , 530–
    531 (1969); internal quotation marks omitted).
    Karcher set out a two-prong test to determine whether a
    State’s congressional redistricting plan meets this stand-
    ard. First, the parties challenging the plan bear the bur-
    den of proving the existence of population differences that
    “could practicably be avoided.” 
    462 U. S., at 734
    . If they
    do so, the burden shifts to the State to “show with some
    specificity” that the population differences “were necessary
    to achieve some legitimate state objective.” 
    Id., at 741, 740
    . This burden is a “flexible” one, which “depend[s] on
    the size of the deviations, the importance of the State’s
    interests, the consistency with which the plan as a whole
    reflects those interests, and the availability of alterna-
    tives that might substantially vindicate those interests
    yet approximate population equality more closely.” 
    Id., at 741
    . As we recently reaffirmed, redistricting “ordinarily
    involves criteria and standards that have been weighed
    and evaluated by the elected branches in the exercise of
    their political judgment.” Perry v. Perez, 565 U. S. ___, ___
    (2012) (per curiam) (slip op., at 4). “[W]e are willing to
    defer to [such] state legislative policies, so long as they are
    consistent with constitutional norms, even if they require
    small differences in the population of congressional dis-
    tricts.” Karcher, 
    supra, at 740
    .
    In this case, plaintiffs claim that West Virginia’s redis-
    tricting plan, adopted following the 2010 decennial United
    States census, violates Article I, §2, of the United States
    Constitution and, separately, the West Virginia Constitu-
    tion. The 2010 census did not alter West Virginia’s alloca-
    tion of three congressional seats. But due to popula-
    tion shifts within the State, West Virginia nonetheless
    Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)           3
    Per Curiam
    began redistricting to comply with the requirements in our
    precedents.
    In August 2011, the West Virginia Legislature convened
    an extraordinary session, and the State Senate formed a
    17-member Select Committee on Redistricting. The com-
    mittee first considered a redistricting plan championed by
    its chair, Majority Leader John Unger, and dubbed “the
    Perfect Plan” because it achieved a population difference
    of a single person between the largest and smallest dis-
    tricts. That appears, however, to have been the only
    perfect aspect of the Perfect Plan. State legislators ex-
    pressed concern that the plan contravened the State’s
    longstanding rule against splitting counties, placed two
    incumbents’ residences in the same district, and moved
    one-third of the State’s population from one district to
    another.
    The following day, members of the Redistricting Com-
    mittee introduced seven additional plans. The committee
    eventually reported to the full Senate the eighth proposal,
    referred to as S. B. 1008. The full Senate rejected a ninth
    proposal offered as an amendment on the floor and adopted
    S. B. 1008 by a vote of 27 to 4. The House of Delegates
    approved the bill without debate by a vote of 90 to 5.
    Governor Earl Tomblin signed the bill into law on August
    18, 2011.
    S. B. 1008, codified at 
    W. Va. Code Ann. §1
    –2–3 (Lexis
    2012 Supp.), does not split county lines, redistrict incum-
    bents into the same district, or require dramatic shifts
    in the population of the current districts. Indeed, S. B.
    1008’s chief selling point was that it required very little
    change to the existing districts: It moved just one county,
    representing 1.5% of the State’s population, from one
    district to another. This was the smallest shift of any plan
    considered by the legislature. S. B. 1008, however, has a
    population variance of 0.79%, the second highest variance
    of the plans the legislature considered. That is, the popu-
    4      TENNANT v. JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION
    Per Curiam
    lation difference between the largest and smallest districts
    in S. B. 1008 equals 0.79% of the population of the average
    district.
    The Jefferson County Commission and two of its county
    commissioners sued to enjoin the State from implementing
    S. B. 1008. At trial, the State conceded that it could have
    adopted a plan with lower population variations. The
    State argued, however, that legitimate state policies justi-
    fied the slightly higher variances in S. B. 1008, citing
    this Court’s statement from Karcher that “[a]ny number
    of consistently applied legislative policies might justify
    some variance, including, for instance, making districts com-
    pact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the
    cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between
    incumbent Representatives.” 
    462 U. S., at 740
    . The State
    noted Karcher’s approving reference to a District Court
    opinion upholding a previous West Virginia redistricting
    plan with a population variance of 0.78%—virtually iden-
    tical to the variance in S. B. 1008. See 
    id.,
     at 740–741
    (citing West Virginia Civil Liberties Union v. Rockefeller,
    
    336 F. Supp. 395
     (SD W. Va. 1972)).
    The District Court nonetheless granted the injunction,
    holding that the State’s asserted objectives did not justify
    the population variance. With respect to the objective of
    not splitting counties, the District Court acknowledged
    that West Virginia had never in its history divided a
    county between two or more congressional districts. The
    court speculated, however, that the practice of other States
    dividing counties between districts “may portend the
    eventual deletion” of respecting such boundaries as a
    potentially legitimate justification for population vari-
    ances. App. to Juris. Statement 15, n. 6. The court also
    faulted the West Virginia Legislature for failing “to create
    a contemporaneous record sufficient to show that S. B.
    1008’s entire 4,871-person variance—or even a discrete,
    numerically precise portion thereof—was attributable” to
    Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)              5
    Per Curiam
    the State’s interest in respecting county boundaries and
    noted that several other plans under consideration also
    did not split counties. Id., at 15, 16.
    The court further questioned the State’s assertion that
    S. B. 1008 best preserved the core of existing districts.
    Preserving the core of a district, the court reasoned, in-
    volved respecting the “ ‘[s]ocial, cultural, racial, ethnic, and
    economic interests common to the population of the area,’ ”
    id., at 17 (quoting Graham v. Thornburgh, 
    207 F. Supp. 2d 1280
    , 1286 (Kan. 2002)), not a “dogged insistence that
    change be minimized for the benefit of the delicate citi-
    zenry,” App. to Juris. Statement 20. The District Court
    concluded that although acclimating to a new congressional
    district and Congressperson “may give rise to a modicum
    of anxiety and inconvenience, avoiding constituent discom-
    fort at the margins is not among those policies recognized
    in Karcher as capable of legitimizing a variance.” 
    Ibid.
    With respect to preventing contests between incum-
    bents, the District Court again faulted the legislature for
    failing to build a record “linking all or a specific part of
    the variance” to that asserted interest. 
    Id., at 22
    . And the
    District Court found that although 0.79% was a minor
    variation when Karcher was decided, the feasibility of
    achieving smaller variances due to improved technology
    meant that the same variance must now be considered
    major. Because the District Court concluded that the
    redistricting plan was unconstitutional under Article I, §2,
    it did not reach plaintiffs’ challenges under the West
    Virginia Constitution.
    Chief Judge Bailey dissented. He argued that the rec-
    ord demonstrated the legitimacy of the State’s concerns,
    and that no other plan satisfied all those concerns as well
    as S. B. 1008. He also took issue with the majority’s dis-
    regard for Karcher’s characterization of 0.78% as an ac-
    ceptable disparity. App. to Juris. Statement 39.
    We stayed the District Court’s order pending appeal to
    6      TENNANT v. JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION
    Per Curiam
    this Court, 565 U. S. ___ (2012), and now reverse.
    Given the State’s concession that it could achieve smaller
    population variations, the remaining question under Kar-
    cher is whether the State can demonstrate that “the
    population deviations in its plan were necessary to achieve
    some legitimate state objective.” 
    462 U. S., at 740
    . Con-
    sidering, as Karcher instructs, “the size of the deviations,
    the importance of the State’s interests, the consistency
    with which the plan as a whole reflects those interests,
    and the availability of alternatives that might substan-
    tially vindicate those interests,” 
    id., at 741
    , it is clear
    that West Virginia has carried its burden.
    As an initial matter, the District Court erred in conclud-
    ing that improved technology has converted a “minor”
    variation in Karcher into a “major” variation today. Noth-
    ing about technological advances in redistricting and
    mapping software has, for example, decreased population
    variations between a State’s counties. See 
    id., at 733, n. 5
    .
    Thus, if a State wishes to maintain whole counties, it will
    inevitably have population variations between districts
    reflecting the fact that its districts are composed of un-
    evenly populated counties. Despite technological advances,
    a variance of 0.79% results in no more (or less) vote dilu-
    tion today than in 1983, when this Court said that such
    a minor harm could be justified by legitimate state
    objectives.
    Moreover, our cases leave little doubt that avoiding
    contests between incumbents and not splitting political
    subdivisions are valid, neutral state districting policies.
    See, e.g., 
    id., at 740
    . The majority cited no precedent for
    requiring legislative findings on the “discrete, numerically
    precise portion” of the variance attributable to each factor,
    and we are aware of none.
    The District Court dismissed the State’s interest in
    limiting the shift of population between old and new dis-
    tricts as “ham-handed,” id., at 19, because the State con-
    Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)            7
    Per Curiam
    sidered only “discrete bounds of geography,” rather than
    “ ‘[s]ocial, cultural, racial, ethnic, and economic interests
    common to the population of the area.’ ” Id., at 17 (quoting
    Graham v. Thornburgh, supra, at 1286). According to the
    District Court, that did not qualify as “preserving the
    cores of prior districts” under Karcher, 
    462 U. S., at
    740–
    741.
    Regardless of how to read that language from Karcher,
    however, our opinion made clear that its list of possible
    justifications for population variations was not exclusive.
    See 
    id., at 740
     (“Any number of consistently applied legis-
    lative policies might justify some variance, including, for
    instance, . . .”). The desire to minimize population shifts
    between districts is clearly a valid, neutral state policy.
    See, e.g., Turner v. Arkansas, 
    784 F. Supp. 585
    , 588–589
    (ED Ark. 1991), summarily aff ’d, 
    504 U. S. 952
     (1992).
    S. B. 1008 achieves significantly lower population shifts
    than the alternative plans—more than four times lower
    than the closest alternative, and more than 25 times lower
    than others.
    None of the alternative plans came close to vindicating
    all three of the State’s legitimate objectives while achiev-
    ing a lower variance. All other plans failed to serve at
    least one objective as well as S. B. 1008 does; several were
    worse with respect to two objectives; and the Perfect Plan
    failed as to all three of the State’s objectives. See App. to
    Juris. Statement 43–45. This is not to say that anytime
    a State must choose between serving an additional le-
    gitimate objective and achieving a lower variance, it may
    choose the former. But here, given the small “size of the
    deviations,” as balanced against “the importance of the
    State’s interests, the consistency with which the plan as a
    whole reflects those interests,” and the lack of available
    “alternatives that might substantially vindicate those in-
    terests yet approximate population equality more closely,”
    Karcher, supra, at 741, S. B. 1008 is justified by the
    8      TENNANT v. JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION
    Per Curiam
    State’s legitimate objectives.
    Because the District Court did not reach plaintiffs’
    claims under the West Virginia Constitution and the issue
    has not been briefed by the parties, we leave it to the
    District Court to address the remaining claims in the first
    instance. The judgment of the United States District
    Court for the Southern District of West Virginia is re-
    versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1184

Citation Numbers: 567 U.S. 758, 133 S. Ct. 3, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 525, 82 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 655, 81 U.S.L.W. 4001, 183 L. Ed. 2d 660, 2012 WL 4343861, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 5281

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 9/25/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024