State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. United States Ex Rel. Rigsby , 137 S. Ct. 436 ( 2016 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2016                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U. S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED
    STATES EX REL. RIGSBY ET AL.
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15–513.      Argued November 1, 2016—Decided December 6, 2016
    The False Claims Act (FCA) authorizes private parties (known as rela-
    tors) to seek recovery from persons who make false or fraudulent
    payment claims to the Federal Government, 
    31 U. S. C. §§3729
    –3730,
    and permits the Attorney General to intervene in a relator’s action or
    bring an FCA suit in the first instance, §§3730(a)–(b). This system is
    designed to benefit both the relator and the Government. A relator
    who initiates a meritorious qui tam suit receives, inter alia, a per-
    centage of the ultimate damages award, §3730(d), while “ ‘encour-
    ag[ing] more private enforcement suits’ ” serves “ ‘to strengthen the
    Government’s hand in fighting false claims,’ ” Graham County Soil
    and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 
    559 U. S. 280
    , 298. The FCA establishes specific procedures for relators
    to follow, including the requirement relevant here: “The complaint
    shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days,
    and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.”
    §3730(b)(2).
    In the years before Hurricane Katrina, petitioner State Farm is-
    sued, as pertinent here, both Federal Government-backed flood in-
    surance policies and petitioner’s own general homeowner policies.
    Respondents Cori and Kerri Rigsby, former claims adjusters for one
    of petitioner’s contractors, E. A. Renfroe & Co., filed a complaint un-
    der seal in April 2006, claiming that petitioner instructed them and
    other adjusters to misclassify wind damage as flood damage in order
    to shift petitioner’s insurance liability to the Government. The Dis-
    trict Court extended the length of the seal several times at the Gov-
    ernment’s request, but lifted the seal in part in January 2007, allow-
    ing disclosure of the action to another District Court hearing a suit by
    2    STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES
    EX REL. RIGSBY
    Syllabus
    E. A. Renfroe against respondents. In August 2007, the District
    Court lifted the seal in full. The Government subsequently declined
    to intervene.
    Petitioner moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that respond-
    ents had violated the seal requirement. Specifically, it alleged, re-
    spondents’ former attorney had disclosed the complaint’s existence to
    several news outlets, which issued stories about the fraud allega-
    tions, but did not mention the existence of the FCA complaint; and
    respondents had met with a Congressman who later spoke out
    against the purported fraud. The District Court applied the test for
    dismissal set out in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft
    Co., 
    67 F. 3d 242
    , 245–247. Balancing three factors—actual harm to
    the Government, severity of the violations, and evidence of bad
    faith—the court decided against dismissal. Petitioner did not request
    a lesser sanction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It first concluded that
    a seal violation does not require mandatory dismissal of a relator’s
    complaint. It then considered the same factors weighed by the Dis-
    trict Court and reached a similar conclusion.
    Held:
    1. A seal violation does not mandate dismissal of a relator’s com-
    plaint. Pp. 6–9.
    (a) The FCA does not enact so harsh a rule. Section 3730(b)(2)’s
    requirement that a complaint “shall” be kept under seal is a manda-
    tory rule for relators. But the statute says nothing about the remedy
    for violating that rule; and absent congressional guidance regarding a
    remedy, “the sanction for breach [of a mandatory duty] is not loss of
    all later powers to act.” United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 
    495 U. S. 711
    , 718. The FCA’s structure supports this result. The FCA has a
    number of provisions requiring, in express terms, the dismissal of a
    relator’s action. E.g., §§3730(b)(5), (e)(1)–(2). It is thus proper to in-
    fer that Congress did not intend to require dismissal for a violation of
    the seal requirement. See Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S.
    ___, ___. This result is also consistent with the general purpose of
    §3730(b)(2), which was enacted as part of a set of reforms meant to
    “encourage more private enforcement suits,” S. Rep. No. 99–345,
    pp. 23–24, and which was intended to protect the Government’s in-
    terests, allaying its concern that a relator filing a civil complaint
    would alert defendants to a pending federal criminal investigation. It
    would thus make little sense to adopt a rigid interpretation that
    prejudices the Government by depriving it of needed assistance from
    private parties. Pp. 6–7.
    (b) Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. There
    is no textual indication that Congress conditioned the authority to
    file a private right of action on compliance with the seal requirement
    Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016)                    3
    Syllabus
    or that the relator’s ability to bring suit depends on adherence to the
    seal requirement. And the Senate Committee Report’s recitation of
    the FCA’s general purpose is best understood to support respondents
    rather than a mandatory dismissal rule. Moreover, because the
    FCA’s text and structure are clear, there is no need to accept peti-
    tioner’s invitation to consider a few stray sentences from the legisla-
    tive history. Pp. 8–9.
    2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying peti-
    tioner’s motion to dismiss. The question whether dismissal is appro-
    priate should be left to the sound discretion of the district court.
    While the Hughes Aircraft factors appear to be appropriate, it is un-
    necessary to explore these and other relevant considerations, which
    can be discussed in the course of later cases. Pp. 9–10.
    3. On this record, where petitioner requested no sanction other
    than dismissal, the question whether a lesser sanction—such as
    monetary penalties—is warranted is not preserved. P. 10.
    
    794 F. 3d 457
    , affirmed.
    KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
    Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 15–513
    _________________
    STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,
    PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES, EX REL.
    CORI RIGSBY, ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    [December 6, 2016]
    JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
    This case addresses the question of the proper remedy
    when there is a violation of the False Claims Act (FCA)
    requirement that certain complaints must be sealed for a
    limited time period. See 
    31 U. S. C. §3730
    (b)(2). There
    are two questions presented before this Court. First, do
    any and all violations of the seal requirement mandate
    dismissal of a private party’s complaint with prejudice?
    Second, if dismissal is not mandatory, did the District
    Court here abuse its discretion by declining to dismiss
    respondents’ complaint?
    I
    A
    The FCA imposes civil liability on an individual who,
    inter alia, “knowingly presents . . . a false or fraudulent
    claim for payment or approval” to the Federal Govern-
    ment. §3729(a)(1)(A). Almost unique to the FCA are its
    qui tam enforcement provisions, which allow a private
    party known as a “relator” to bring an FCA action on
    behalf of the Government. §3730(b)(1); Vermont Agency of
    2   STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES
    EX REL. RIGSBY
    Opinion of the Court
    Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 
    529 U. S. 765
    , 768, n. 1 (2000) (listing three other qui tam
    statutes). The Attorney General retains the authority to
    intervene in a relator’s ongoing action or to bring an FCA
    suit in the first instance. §§3730(a)–(b).
    This system is designed to benefit both the relator and
    the Government. A relator who initiates a meritorious
    qui tam suit receives a percentage of the ultimate dam-
    ages award, plus attorney’s fees and costs. §3730(d). In
    turn, “ ‘encourag[ing] more private enforcement suits’ ”
    serves “ ‘to strengthen the Government’s hand in fighting
    false claims.’ ” Graham County Soil and Water Conserva-
    tion Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 
    559 U. S. 280
    ,
    298 (2010).
    The FCA places a number of restrictions on suits by
    relators. For example, under the provision known as the
    “first-to-file bar,” a relator may not “ ‘bring a related action
    based on the facts underlying [a] pending action.’ ” Kellogg
    Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter,
    575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 11) (quoting
    §3730(b)(5); emphasis deleted). Other FCA provisions
    require compliance with statutory requirements as ex-
    press conditions on the relators’ ability to bring suit. The
    paragraph known as the “public disclosure bar,” for in-
    stance, provided at the time this suit was filed that “ ‘[n]o
    court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
    section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
    transactions . . . unless the action is brought by the Attor-
    ney General or . . . an original source of the information.’ ”
    Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v.
    United States ex rel. Wilson, 
    supra, at 283, n. 1
    , 285–286
    (quoting 
    31 U. S. C. §3730
    (e)(4)(A) (2006 ed.); footnote
    omitted).
    The FCA also establishes specific procedures for the
    relator to follow when filing the complaint. Among other
    things, the relator must serve on the Government “[a] copy
    Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016)           3
    Opinion of the Court
    of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all
    material evidence and information the [relator] possesses.”
    §3730(b)(2). Most relevant here, the FCA provides: “The
    complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal
    for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defend-
    ant until the court so orders.” Ibid.
    B
    Petitioner State Farm is an insurance company. In the
    years before Hurricane Katrina, petitioner issued two
    types of homeowner-insurance policies that are relevant in
    this case: (1) Federal Government-backed flood insurance
    policies and (2) petitioner’s own general homeowner insur-
    ance policies. The practical effect for homeowners who
    were affected by Hurricane Katrina and who purchased
    both policies was that petitioner would be responsible for
    paying for wind damage, while the Government would pay
    for flood damage. As the Court of Appeals noted, this
    arrangement created a potential conflict of interest: Peti-
    tioner had “an incentive to classify hurricane damage as
    flood-related to limit its economic exposure.” 
    794 F. 3d 457
    , 462 (CA5 2015).
    Respondents Cori and Kerri Rigsby are former claims
    adjusters for one of petitioner’s contractors, E. A. Renfroe
    & Co. Together with other adjusters, they were responsi-
    ble for visiting the damaged homes of petitioner’s custom-
    ers to determine the extent to which a homeowner was
    entitled to an insurance payout. According to respond-
    ents, petitioner instructed them and other adjusters to
    misclassify wind damage as flood damage in order to shift
    petitioner’s insurance liability to the Government. See 
    id.,
    at 463–464 (summarizing trial evidence).
    In April 2006, respondents filed their qui tam complaint
    under seal. At the Government’s request, the District
    Court extended the length of the seal a number of times.
    In January 2007, the court lifted the seal in part, allowing
    4   STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES
    EX REL. RIGSBY
    Opinion of the Court
    disclosure of the qui tam action to another District Court
    hearing a suit by E. A. Renfroe against respondents for
    purported misappropriation of documents related to peti-
    tioner’s alleged fraud. See E. A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran,
    No. 2:06–cv–1752 (ND Ala.). In August 2007, the District
    Court lifted the seal in full. In January 2008, the Gov-
    ernment declined to intervene.
    In January 2011, petitioner moved to dismiss respond-
    ents’ suit on the grounds that they had violated the seal
    requirement. The parties do not dispute the essential
    background. In the months before the seal was lifted in
    part, respondents’ then-attorney, one Dickie Scruggs, e-
    mailed a sealed evidentiary filing that disclosed the com-
    plaint’s existence to journalists at ABC, the Associated
    Press, and the New York Times. All three outlets issued
    stories discussing the fraud allegations, but none revealed
    the existence of the FCA complaint. Respondents them-
    selves met with Mississippi Congressman Gene Taylor,
    who later spoke out in public against petitioner’s purported
    fraud, although he did not mention the existence of the
    FCA suit at that time. After the seal was lifted in part,
    Scruggs disclosed the existence of the suit to various oth-
    ers, including a public relations firm and CBS News.
    At the time of the motion to dismiss in 2011, respond-
    ents were represented neither by Scruggs nor by any of
    the attorneys who had worked with him. In March 2008,
    Scruggs withdrew from respondents’ case after he was
    indicted for attempting to bribe a state-court judge. Two
    months later, the District Court removed the remaining
    Scruggs-affiliated attorneys from the case, based on their
    alleged involvement in improper payments made from
    Scruggs to respondents. The District Court did not punish
    respondents themselves for the payments because they
    were not made “aware of the ethical implications” and, as
    laypersons, “are not bound by the rules of professional
    conduct that apply to” attorneys. App. 21.
    Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016)           5
    Opinion of the Court
    In deciding petitioner’s motion the District Court con-
    sidered only the seal violations that occurred before the
    seal was lifted in part, reasoning the partial lifting in
    effect had mooted the seal. Applying the test for dismissal
    set out in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft
    Co., 
    67 F. 3d 242
    , 245–247 (CA9 1995), the District Court
    balanced three factors: (1) the actual harm to the Govern-
    ment, (2) the severity of the violations, and (3) the evi-
    dence of bad faith. The court decided against dismissal.
    Petitioner did not request some lesser sanction. The case
    went to trial, resulting in a victory for respondents on
    what the Court of Appeals referred to as a “bellwether”
    claim regarding a single damaged home. 794 F. 3d, at
    462.
    The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
    denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The court recog-
    nized that the case presented two related issues of the
    first impression under its case law: (1) whether a seal
    violation requires mandatory dismissal of a relator’s com-
    plaint and, if not, (2) what standard governs a district
    court’s decision to dismiss. The court noted that the
    Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits had
    held that the FCA does not require automatic dismissal
    for a seal violation, while the Court of Appeals for the
    Sixth Circuit had held that dismissal is mandatory. See
    United States ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 
    60 F. 3d 995
    , 998 (CA2 1995); United States ex rel. Lujan v.
    Hughes Aircraft Co., supra, at 245; United States ex rel.
    Summers v. LHC Group Inc., 
    623 F. 3d 287
    , 296 (CA6
    2010); see also United States ex rel. Smith v.
    Clark/Smoot/Russell, 
    796 F. 3d 424
    , 430 (CA4 2015)
    (following Pilon).
    After a careful analysis, the Court of Appeals for the
    Fifth Circuit held automatic dismissal is not required by
    the FCA. 794 F. 3d, at 470–471. It then considered the
    same factors the District Court had weighed and came to a
    6   STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES
    EX REL. RIGSBY
    Opinion of the Court
    similar conclusion. Id., at 471–472. First, the Court of
    Appeals held the Government was in all likelihood not
    harmed by the disclosures because none of them led to the
    publication of the pendency of the suit before the seal was
    lifted in part. Second, the Court of Appeals determined
    the violations were not severe in their repercussions be-
    cause respondents had complied with the seal requirement
    when they first filed their suit. Third, the Court of Ap-
    peals assumed, without deciding, that the bad behavior of
    respondents’ then-attorney could be imputed to respond-
    ents; but it held that, even presuming the attribution of
    bad faith, the other factors favored respondents.
    This Court granted certiorari, 578 U. S. ___ (2016), and
    now affirms.
    II
    A
    Petitioner’s primary contention is that a violation of the
    seal provision necessarily requires a relator’s complaint to
    be dismissed. The FCA does not enact so harsh a rule.
    Section 3730(b)(2)’s text provides that a complaint
    “shall” be kept under seal. True, this language creates a
    mandatory rule the relator must follow. See Rockwell Int’l
    Corp. v. United States, 
    549 U. S. 457
    , 464 (2007) (“As
    required under the Act, [the relator] filed his complaint
    under seal . . . ”); see also Kingdomware Technologies, Inc.
    v. United States, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9)
    (“[T]he word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement”). The
    statute says nothing, however, about the remedy for a
    violation of that rule. In the absence of congressional
    guidance regarding a remedy, “[a]lthough the duty is
    mandatory, the sanction for breach is not loss of all later
    powers to act.” United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 
    495 U. S. 711
    , 718 (1990).
    The FCA’s structure is itself an indication that violating
    the seal requirement does not mandate dismissal. This
    Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016)              7
    Opinion of the Court
    Court adheres to the general principle that Congress’ use
    of “explicit language” in one provision “cautions against
    inferring” the same limitation in another provision. Marx
    v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013)
    (slip op., at 12). And the FCA has a number of provisions
    that do require, in express terms, the dismissal of a re-
    lator’s action. Supra, at 2 (citing §3730(b)(5)); see also
    §§3730(e)(1)–(2) (“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction” over
    certain FCA claims by relators against a member of the
    military or of the judicial, legislative, or executive branches).
    It is proper to infer that, had Congress intended to require
    dismissal for a violation of the seal requirement, it would
    have said so.
    The Court’s conclusion is consistent with the general
    purpose of §3730(b)(2). The seal provision was enacted in
    the 1980’s as part of a set of reforms that were meant to
    “encourage more private enforcement suits.” S. Rep. No.
    99–345, pp. 23–24 (1986). At the time, “perhaps the most
    serious problem plaguing effective enforcement” of the
    FCA was “a lack of resources on the part of Federal en-
    forcement agencies.” Id., at 7. The Senate Committee
    Report indicates that the seal provision was meant to
    allay the Government’s concern that a relator filing a civil
    complaint would alert defendants to a pending federal
    criminal investigation. Id., at 24. Because the seal re-
    quirement was intended in main to protect the Govern-
    ment’s interests, it would make little sense to adopt a rigid
    interpretation of the seal provision that prejudices the
    Government by depriving it of needed assistance from
    private parties. The Federal Government agrees with this
    interpretation. It informs the Court that petitioner’s test
    “would undermine the very governmental interests that
    the seal provision is meant to protect.” Brief for United
    States as Amicus Curiae 10.
    8   STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES
    EX REL. RIGSBY
    Opinion of the Court
    B
    Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
    First, petitioner urges that because the seal provision
    appears in the subsection of the FCA creating the relator’s
    private right of action, Congress intended to condition the
    right to bring suit on compliance with the seal require-
    ment. It is true that, as discussed further below, the
    Court sometimes has concluded that Congress conditioned
    the authority to file a private right of action on compliance
    with a statutory mandate. E.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook
    County, 
    493 U. S. 20
    , 25–26 (1989). There is no textual
    indication, however, that Congress did so here.
    Section 3730(b)(2) does not tie the seal requirement to
    the right to bring the qui tam suit in conditional terms.
    As noted above, the statute just provides: “The complaint
    shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at
    least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant
    until the court so orders.”
    The text at issue in Hallstrom, by contrast, was quite
    different than the statutory language that controls here.
    The Hallstrom statute, part of the Resource Conservation
    and Recovery Act of 1976, provided: “ ‘No action may be
    commenced . . . prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has
    given notice of the violation’ ” to the Government. 493
    U. S., at 25.
    Petitioner cites two additional cases to support its ar-
    gument, but those decisions concerned statutes that used
    even clearer conditional words, like “if ” and “unless.” See
    United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v.
    McCord, 
    233 U. S. 157
    , 161 (1914) (statute allowed credi-
    tors of Government contractors to bring suit “ ‘if no suit
    should be brought by the United States within six months
    from the completion and final settlement of said con-
    tract’ ”); McNeil v. United States, 
    508 U. S. 106
    , 107, n. 1
    (1993) (statute provided that “ ‘[a]n action shall not be
    instituted upon a claim against the United States for
    Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016)             9
    Opinion of the Court
    money damages . . . unless the claimant shall have first
    presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency’ ”).
    Again, the FCA’s structure shows that Congress knew
    how to draft the kind of statutory language that petitioner
    seeks to read into §3730(b)(2). The applicable version of
    the public disclosure bar, for example, requires a district
    court to dismiss an action when the underlying infor-
    mation has already been made available to the public,
    “ ‘unless’ ” the plaintiff is the Attorney General or an origi-
    nal source. Graham County Soil and Water Conservation
    Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 
    559 U. S., at 286
    .
    Second, petitioner contends that because this Court has
    described the FCA’s qui tam provisions as “effecting a
    partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim,”
    Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
    rel. Stevens, 
    529 U. S., at 773
    , adherence to all of the
    FCA’s mandatory requirements—no matter how small—is
    a condition of the assignment. This argument fails for the
    same reason as the one discussed above: Petitioner can
    show no textual indication in the statute suggesting that
    the relator’s ability to bring suit depends on adherence to
    the seal requirement.
    Third, petitioner points to a few stray sentences in the
    Senate Committee Report that it claims support the man-
    datory dismissal rule. As explained above, however, the
    Report’s recitation of the general purpose of the statute is
    best understood to support respondents. Supra, at 7.
    And, furthermore, because the meaning of the FCA’s text
    and structure is “plain and unambiguous, we need not
    accept petitioner[’s] invitation to consider the legislative
    history.” Whitfield v. United States, 
    543 U. S. 209
    , 215
    (2005).
    III
    Petitioner’s secondary argument is that the District
    Court did not consider the proper factors when declining
    10   STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES
    EX REL. RIGSBY
    Opinion of the Court
    to dismiss respondents’ complaint or, at a minimum, that
    it was plain error not to consider respondents’ conduct
    after the seal was lifted in part. This Court holds the
    District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying
    petitioner’s motion, much less commit plain error. In light
    of the questionable conduct of respondents’ prior attorney,
    it well may not have been reversible error had the District
    Court granted the motion; that possibility, however, need
    not be considered here.
    In general, the question whether dismissal is appropri-
    ate should be left to the sound discretion of the district
    court. While the factors articulated in United States
    ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co. appear to be appropri-
    ate, it is unnecessary to explore these and other relevant
    considerations. These standards can be discussed in the
    course of later cases.
    IV
    Petitioner and its amici place great emphasis on the
    reputational harm FCA defendants may suffer when the
    seal requirement is violated. But even if every seal viola-
    tion does not mandate dismissal, that sanction remains a
    possible form of relief. District courts have inherent
    power, moreover, to impose sanctions short of dismissal for
    violations of court orders. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
    
    501 U. S. 32
    , 43–46 (1991). Remedial tools like monetary
    penalties or attorney discipline remain available to punish
    and deter seal violations even when dismissal is not
    appropriate.
    Of note in this case, petitioner did not request any
    sanction other than dismissal. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3–4, 17.
    Had petitioner sought some lesser sanctions, the District
    Court might have taken a different course. Yet petitioner
    failed to do so. On this record, the question whether a
    lesser sanction is warranted is not preserved.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
    Circuit is
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15–513.

Citation Numbers: 196 L. Ed. 2d 340, 137 S. Ct. 436, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 7420, 85 U.S.L.W. 4011, 46 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20185, 26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 397, 2016 WL 7078622

Judges: Anthony Kennedy

Filed Date: 12/6/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (11)

Whitfield v. United States , 125 S. Ct. 687 ( 2005 )

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States Ex Rel.... , 120 S. Ct. 1858 ( 2000 )

United States Ex Rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord , 34 S. Ct. 550 ( 1914 )

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 26 S. Ct. 282 ( 1906 )

United States Ex Rel. Summers v. LHC Group, Inc. , 623 F.3d 287 ( 2010 )

Rockwell International Corp. v. United States , 127 S. Ct. 1397 ( 2007 )

McNeil v. United States , 113 S. Ct. 1980 ( 1993 )

Chambers v. Nasco, Inc. , 111 S. Ct. 2123 ( 1991 )

United States of America, Ex Rel. James Pilon and Jill ... , 60 F.3d 995 ( 1995 )

United States of America, Ex Rel., and Linda A. Lujan v. ... , 67 F.3d 242 ( 1995 )

United States v. Montalvo-Murillo , 110 S. Ct. 2072 ( 1990 )

View All Authorities »

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