Fowler v. United States , 131 S. Ct. 2045 ( 2011 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2010                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U. S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10–5443. Argued March 29, 2011—Decided May 26, 2011
    While preparing to rob a bank, petitioner Fowler and others were dis
    covered by a local police officer, whom Fowler killed. Fowler was
    convicted of violating the federal witness tampering statute, which
    makes it a crime “to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent
    the communication by any person to a [Federal] law enforcement offi
    cer” of “information relating to the . . . possible commission of a Fed
    eral offense,” 
    18 U. S. C. §1512
    (a)(1)(C). Rejecting Fowler’s argument
    that the evidence was insufficient to show that he had killed the offi
    cer intending to prevent him from communicating with a federal offi
    cer, the Eleventh Circuit held that a showing of a possible or poten
    tial communication to federal authorities was sufficient.
    Held: In such circumstances, the Government must establish a
    §1512(a)(1)(C) violation by showing there was a reasonable likelihood
    that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal of
    ficer. Pp. 3–10.
    (a) In a §1512(a)(1)(C) prosecution, “no state of mind need be
    proved with respect to the circumstance . . . that the law enforcement
    officer is an . . . employee of the Federal Government,” §1512(g)(2).
    Thus, the Government must prove (1) a killing, (2) committed with a
    particular intent, namely, an intent (a) to “prevent” a “communica
    tion” (b) about “the commission or possible commission of a Federal
    offense” (c) to a federal “law enforcement officer.” P. 3.
    (b) Nothing in §1512(a)(1)(C)’s language limits it to instances in
    which the defendant has some identifiable law enforcement officers
    particularly in mind. Any such limitation would conflict with the
    statute’s basic purpose. Witness tampering may prove more serious
    (and more effective) when the crime takes place before the victim has
    engaged in any communication at all with officers—at a time when
    2                     FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    the precise communication and nature of the officer who may receive
    it are not yet known. Hence, the statute covers a defendant, like pe
    titioner, who kills with intent to prevent communication with any
    and all officers. The Court must consequently decide what, if any
    thing, the Government must show about the likelihood of a hypo
    thetical communication with a federal officer where the defendant did
    not think specifically about any particular communication or its re
    cipient. Pp. 4–7.
    (c) To determine what the Government must prove in such in
    stances, the Court looks to the dictionary definition of the statutory
    word “prevent,” which means rendering an “intended,” “possible,” or
    “likely” event impractical or impossible by anticipatory action. No
    one suggests that the word “intended” sets forth the appropriate
    standard here. The Government and the Eleventh Circuit would rest
    their standard on the word “possible.” But that standard would
    eliminate the independent force of the statutory “federal officer” re
    quirement, and would extend the statute beyond its intended, basi
    cally federal, scope. Fashioning a standard based on the word
    “likely” is consistent with the statute’s language and objectives.
    Thus, where the defendant kills a person with an intent to prevent
    communication with law enforcement officers generally, that intent
    includes an intent to prevent communications with federal officers
    only if there is a reasonable likelihood under the circumstances that,
    in the absence of the killing, at least one of the relevant communica
    tions would have been made to a federal officer. The Government
    need not show that such a communication, had it occurred, would
    have been federal beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even that it is more
    likely than not. But it must show that the likelihood of communica
    tion to a federal officer was more than remote, outlandish, or hypo
    thetical. Pp. 7–10.
    (d) Because Fowler’s argument that the evidence is insufficient to
    satisfy a “reasonable likelihood” standard was not raised at trial, the
    lower courts must determine whether, and how, the standard applies
    in this case. P. 10.
    
    603 F. 3d 883
    , vacated and remanded.
    BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
    C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
    SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed
    a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 10–5443
    _________________
    CHARLES ANDREW FOWLER, AKA MAN, PETITIONER
    v. UNITED STATES
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    [May 26, 2011]
    JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The federal witness tampering statute makes it a crime
    “to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the
    communication by any person to a law enforcement officer
    . . . of the United States” of “information relating to the . . .
    possible commission of a Federal offense.” 
    18 U. S. C. §1512
    (a)(1)(C). We focus on instances where a defendant
    killed a person with an intent to prevent that person from
    communicating with law enforcement officers in general
    but where the defendant did not have federal law en
    forcement officers (or any specific individuals) particularly
    in mind. The question before us concerns what, if any
    thing, the Government must show beyond this broad in
    definite intent in order to show that the defendant more
    particularly intended to prevent communication with
    federal officers as well. We hold that, in such circum
    stances, the Government must show that there was a
    reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication
    would have been made to a federal officer.
    I
    In the early morning hours of March 3, 1998, Charles
    2                FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    Opinion of the Court
    Fowler and several other men prepared to rob a Florida
    bank. They met in a cemetery, put on black clothes and
    gloves, began to drink and use drugs, and discussed the
    proposed crime. Shortly before daybreak a local police
    officer, Todd Horner, came upon the group. He pulled out
    his gun and asked the men to identify themselves. Fowler
    and some of the others managed to overcome Horner and
    take his gun. After Horner spoke to one of the men by
    name, Fowler said, “Now we can’t walk away from this
    thing.” App. 38 (internal quotation marks omitted). And
    he shot and killed Horner.
    Federal authorities charged Fowler with violating the
    federal witness tampering statute. He was convicted. On
    appeal, Fowler argued that the evidence was insufficient
    to show that he had killed Horner intending to prevent
    Horner from communicating with a federal officer. The
    Eleventh Circuit disagreed. It held that a showing of a
    “possible or potential communication to federal authori
    ties” was sufficient. 
    603 F. 3d 883
    , 888 (2010).
    Fowler sought certiorari. And because the Circuits have
    disagreed about this last-mentioned matter, we granted
    Fowler’s petition for certiorari. Compare United States v.
    Harris, 
    498 F. 3d 278
    , 286 (CA4 2007) (“So long as the
    information the defendant seeks to suppress actually
    relates to the commission or possible commission of a
    federal offense, the federal nexus requirement is estab
    lished”), with United States v. Lopez, 
    372 F. 3d 86
    , 91–92
    (CA2 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
    544 U. S. 902
     (2005) (requiring Government to show federal
    crime along with “ ‘additional appropriate evidence’ ” that
    “the victim plausibly might have turned to federal offi
    cials”); see also United States v. Bell, 
    113 F. 3d 1345
    , 1349
    (CA3 1997); United States v. Causey, 
    185 F. 3d 407
    , 422–
    423 (CA5 1999); United States v. Wright, 
    536 F. 3d 819
    ,
    824–825 (CA8 2008).
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            3
    Opinion of the Court
    II
    The federal witness tampering statute in relevant part
    forbids the “kill[ing] or attempt[ed] kill[ing]” of “another
    person” with a certain “intent,” namely, an
    “intent to . . . prevent the communication by any per
    son to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United
    States of information relating to the commission or
    possible commission of a Federal offense . . . .” 
    18 U. S. C. §1512
    (a)(1)(C).
    A related subsection says that in a prosecution for this
    offense
    “no state of mind need be proved with respect to
    the circumstance . . . that the judge is a judge of the
    United States or that the law enforcement officer is an
    officer or employee of the Federal Government . . . .”
    §1512(g)(2).
    This language makes clear that in a prosecution the Gov
    ernment must prove (1) a killing or attempted killing, (2)
    committed with a particular intent, namely, an intent (a)
    to “prevent” a “communication” (b) about “the commission
    or possible commission of a Federal offense” (c) to a federal
    “law enforcement officer or judge.”
    The question here is how this language applies when a
    defendant (1) kills a victim, (2) with an intent (a) to pre
    vent a communication (b) about the commission or possi
    ble commission of a federal offense but (c) to law enforce
    ment officers in general rather than to some specific law
    enforcement officer or set of officers which the defendant
    has in mind. This kind of circumstance is not necessarily
    rare, as the facts here illustrate. Fowler (we here assume)
    was not thinking specifically about federal officers, but he
    would nonetheless have wanted to prevent communication
    with federal officers from taking place (had he considered
    the matter).
    4                 FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    Opinion of the Court
    III
    When the defendant has in mind a particular individual
    or a particular set of individuals with whom he fears the
    victim might communicate, the application of the statute
    is relatively clear. For instance, if a defendant kills a
    victim with the intent of preventing the victim from com
    municating with a particular individual, say John Smith,
    who the defendant knows is a federal law enforcement
    officer, the statute fits like a glove. If a defendant kills a
    victim with the intent of preventing the victim from com
    municating with Sam Smith, who is in fact (but who the
    defendant does not know is) a federal law enforcement
    officer, the statute still fits, for it specifically says that “no
    state of mind need be proved” with respect to this last
    mentioned circumstance.
    Nothing in the statutory language, however, limits it to
    these kinds of instances, instances in which the defendant
    has some law enforcement officer or set of officers, or other
    identifiable individuals, particularly in mind. Moreover,
    any such limitation would conflict with the statute’s basic
    purpose. Witness tampering may prove more serious (and
    more effective) when the crime takes place before the
    victim has engaged in any communication at all with law
    enforcement officers—at a time when the precise commu
    nication and nature of the officer who may receive it are
    not yet known. Cf., e.g., S. Rep. No. 97–532, pp. 14, 15
    (1982) (statute applies “to offenses against witnesses,
    victims, or informants which occur before the witness
    testifies or the informant communicates with law en
    forcement officers”); id., at 19 (witness “[i]ntimidation
    offenses are particularly insidious and do violence to
    traditional notions of justice because no one can be con
    victed of a crime which is not reported. [Section 1512]
    reaches intimidation offenses committed before a crime is
    reported to the appropriate authorities”). Hence the stat
    ute covers a defendant who kills with intent to prevent
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            5
    Opinion of the Court
    communication with law enforcement officers generally
    (i.e., with any and all law enforcement officers). And we
    must consequently decide what, if anything, the Govern
    ment must show about the likelihood of a hypothetical
    communication with a federal law enforcement officer in
    circumstances where the defendant did not think specifi
    cally about any particular communication or its recipient.
    In these circumstances, the application of the statute is
    not as simple. We cannot determine whether the individ
    ual the defendant had in mind is in fact a federal officer,
    because the defendant did not have a particular individual
    in mind. And we cannot insist that the defendant have
    had some general thought about federal officers in mind
    because the statute says that “no state of mind need be
    proved” in respect to the federal nature of the communica
    tion’s recipient. §1512(g)(2). What, then, must the Gov
    ernment show to prove that such a defendant intended to
    prevent communications to federal officers?
    We begin with two basic propositions. First, in our
    view, the Government need not show beyond a reasonable
    doubt (or even that it is more likely than not) that the
    hypothetical communication would have been to a federal
    officer. No Circuit has adopted this interpretation, and no
    party argues for it here. But see post, at 1–2 (SCALIA, J.,
    concurring in judgment). And for good reason: The rele
    vant question concerns the defendant’s intent. The Gov
    ernment will already have shown beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the defendant possessed the relevant broad
    indefinite intent, namely, the intent to prevent the victim
    from communicating with (unspecified) law enforcement
    officers. And one can possess an intent (i.e., one can act in
    order to bring about a certain state of affairs) even if there
    is considerable doubt whether the event that the intent
    contemplates will in fact occur. One can, for example, put
    up shutters with the intent of protecting the furniture
    from hurricane damage even if there is considerable doubt
    6               FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    Opinion of the Court
    that any hurricane will actually occur. One can drive to
    Fenway Park with the intent of seeing the Red Sox play
    that afternoon even if a mistake about the date means the
    stadium is empty. One can blow up a bridge with the
    intent of stopping an advancing army, even if the army
    advances regardless, along a different route. And, simi
    larly, a defendant can kill a victim with an intent to
    prevent the victim from communicating with federal law
    enforcement officers even if there is some considerable
    doubt that any such communication would otherwise have
    taken place.
    But, second, the Government must show more than
    the broad indefinite intent we have described, the intent
    to prevent communications to law enforcement officers in
    general. That is so for two separate reasons. For one
    thing, the statute speaks of an “intent to prevent” some
    thing. But (apart from mistakes, as in our Red Sox exam
    ple) one cannot act with an “intent to prevent” something
    that could not possibly have taken place regardless. We
    can speak of a Colorado trout fisherman who tries to
    prevent his trout stream from being invaded by pike or
    carp, but in ordinary circumstances we cannot speak
    about trying to prevent the stream’s invasion by whales.
    Indeed, the dictionary defines “prevent” as “to render (an
    intended, possible, or likely action or event) impractical
    or impossible by anticipatory action.” OED Online (Mar.
    2011) (emphasis added), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
    151073?rskey=QWN6QB&result=2&isAdvanced=false (all
    Internet materials as visited May 23, 2011, and available
    in Clerk of Court’s case file).
    For another thing, to allow the Government to show no
    more than the broad indefinite intent we have described
    (the intent to prevent communications to law enforcement
    officers in general) would bring within the scope of this
    statute many instances of witness tampering in purely
    state investigations and proceedings, thus extending the
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            7
    Opinion of the Court
    scope of this federal statute well beyond the primarily
    federal area that Congress had in mind. See infra, at 8–9.
    For both these reasons, unlike the dissent, we cannot read
    the statute as intending to excuse the Government from
    proving something about the hypothetical communication
    with federal officers. The question remains, what is that
    something?
    IV
    We find possible answers to this question in the diction
    ary definition of the word “prevent.” As we have said, that
    word applies where a defendant, by “anticipatory action,”
    (here, killing a victim) intended “to render . . . impractical
    or impossible” an “action or event” (here, the victim’s
    communication with a federal law enforcement officer)
    which (1) was “intended,” (2) was “possible,” or (3) was
    “likely” to have otherwise occurred.
    No one suggests that the first word, the word “in
    tended,” sets forth the appropriate standard. That word in
    this context refers to the victim’s intent. That intent is
    often difficult to discern. Moreover, to require the Gov
    ernment to prove it would prevent the statute from apply
    ing where it is plain that federal officers would have
    been involved in investigating and prosecuting the offense
    (for instance, robbing the United States Bullion Depository
    at Fort Knox), but where the defendant killed the victim
    before the victim had decided to communicate to law
    enforcement officers. Congress, however, intended the
    statute to apply in these last-mentioned circumstances.
    See supra, at 4.
    The Government (and the Eleventh Circuit) would rest
    their standard on the second word, the word “possible.”
    See Brief for United States 10 (standard is “whether it
    was reasonably possible that at least one of the communi
    cations that the murder . . . was intended to prevent would
    have been with a federal law enforcement official”); 603
    8                FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    Opinion of the Court
    F. 3d, at 888 (requiring showing of a “possible or potential
    communication to federal authorities”). But, in our view,
    that standard is difficult to reconcile with the statute’s
    language and its intended, basically federal, scope. Cf.
    supra, at 6–7.
    Often, when a defendant acts in ways that violate state
    criminal law, some or all of those acts will violate federal
    criminal law as well. And where a federal crime is at
    issue, communication with federal law enforcement offi
    cers is almost always a possibility. Thus, to allow the
    Government to show only a mere possibility that a com
    munication would have been with federal officials is to
    permit the Government to show little more than the possi
    ble commission of a federal offense. (That is to say, the
    latter showing by itself would almost automatically show
    the statutorily necessary connection with a federal law
    enforcement officer.) The “possibility” standard would
    thereby weaken or eliminate the independent force of the
    separate statutory requirement that the defendant, in
    killing the victim, must intend to prevent communication
    with one who is “a law enforcement officer or judge of
    the United States.” 
    18 U. S. C. §1512
    (a)(1)(C) (emphasis
    added); see §1515(a)(4) (defining “law enforcement officer”
    as “an officer or employee of the Federal Government”
    (emphasis added)). Cf. Duncan v. Walker, 
    533 U. S. 167
    ,
    174 (2001) (normally we must give effect “to every clause
    and word of a statute” (internal quotation marks omit
    ted)); Ratzlaf v. United States, 
    510 U. S. 135
    , 140–141
    (1994) (expressing particular reluctance to “treat statutory
    terms” as “surplusage” “when the words describe an ele
    ment of a criminal offense”).
    Moreover, because of the frequent overlap between state
    and federal crimes, the use of a standard based on the
    word “possible” would transform a federally oriented
    statute into a statute that would deal with crimes, investi
    gations, and witness tampering that, as a practical mat
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)             9
    Opinion of the Court
    ter, are purely state in nature. See, e.g., Dept. of Justice,
    Bureau of Justice Statistics, (FY 2008 Persons arrested
    and booked, Drug offense: Marijuana), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
    fjsrc; Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
    2008 Crime in the United States (Arrests), http://
    www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/arrests/index.html; (Table 29),
    http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_29.html         (In
    2008, 0.7% of arrests for marijuana offenses were made
    by federal law enforcement officers); see also Jones v.
    United States, 
    529 U. S. 848
    , 858 (2000) (“[U]nless Con
    gress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed
    to have significantly changed the federal-state balance
    in the prosecution of crimes” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    The defendant argues that we should fashion a standard
    based on the third word, the word “likely.” And we agree
    that doing so is consistent with the statute’s language and
    objectives. We consequently hold that (in a case such as
    this one where the defendant does not have particular
    federal law enforcement officers in mind) the Government
    must show a reasonable likelihood that, had, e.g., the
    victim communicated with law enforcement officers, at
    least one relevant communication would have been made
    to a federal law enforcement officer. That is to say, where
    the defendant kills a person with an intent to prevent
    communication with law enforcement officers generally,
    that intent includes an intent to prevent communications
    with federal law enforcement officers only if it is reasona
    bly likely under the circumstances that (in the absence of
    the killing) at least one of the relevant communications
    would have been made to a federal officer.
    The Government need not show that such a communica
    tion, had it occurred, would have been federal beyond a
    reasonable doubt, nor even that it is more likely than not.
    For, as we have said, one can act with an intent to prevent
    an event from occurring without it being true beyond a
    10               FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    Opinion of the Court
    reasonable doubt (or even more likely than not) that the
    event would otherwise occur. (Recall the homeowner who
    closes his shutters in order to prevent damage from a
    hurricane that may not happen. Supra, at 5–6.) But the
    Government must show that the likelihood of communica
    tion to a federal officer was more than remote, outlandish,
    or simply hypothetical. Jones, who kills Smith to prevent
    his communicating with law enforcement officers in gen
    eral, does not kill Smith to prevent his communicating
    with Lithuanian law enforcement officers, for there is no
    reasonable likelihood that any Lithuanian officers would
    become involved.
    V
    Fowler argues that the evidence in this case is insuf
    ficient to satisfy a “reasonable likelihood” standard. He
    concedes, however, that he did not raise this question
    specifically at trial. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21–22. We leave it to
    the lower courts to determine whether, and how, the
    standard applies in this particular case.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
    Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            1
    SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 10–5443
    _________________
    CHARLES ANDREW FOWLER, AKA MAN, PETITIONER
    v. UNITED STATES
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    [May 26, 2011]
    JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
    I disagree with the Court’s interpretation of 
    18 U. S. C. §1512
    (a)(1)(C). In my view, the Government must prove
    that the defendant intended to prevent a communication
    which, had it been made, would beyond a reasonable doubt
    have been made to a federal law enforcement officer. The
    Court’s vague “reasonable likelihood” standard has no
    basis in the statutory text and will serve only to confuse
    judges and juries. Accordingly, although I agree the case
    should be remanded for the Eleventh Circuit to consider
    whether the objection to sufficiency of the evidence was
    preserved or whether the District Court committed plain
    error, I would hold that there was insufficient evidence to
    support Fowler’s conviction.
    I
    Section 1512(a)(1)(C) of Title 18 makes it a federal crime
    “to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the
    communication by any person to a law enforcement officer
    . . . of the United States of information relating to the
    commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.”
    Viewed in isolation, this provision contains an ambiguity:
    Does the mens rea of the statute include a specific intent
    to prevent communication to a law enforcement officer of
    the United States; or is it satisfied by the mere intent to
    2               FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
    prevent communication to a law enforcement officer who
    happens to be a law enforcement officer of the United
    States?
    Happily, a different statutory provision resolves this
    ambiguity. It states that “no state of mind need be proved
    with respect to the circumstance . . . that the law enforce
    ment officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Gov
    ernment.” §1512(g)(2). This makes clear that the first
    possibility is wrong, and the second right. But removing
    the “federal officer” requirement as an element of the
    statute’s mens rea does not remove it as an element of the
    actus reus—that is, as an element of the facts that must be
    proved for conviction. It must be proved, and proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that the communication in
    tended to be prevented was communication to a federal
    officer. Thus, if a suspect in an investigation murders an
    informant to prevent him from talking to authorities, but
    is unaware that the informant was working for the FBI,
    the suspect would be guilty: He would have committed a
    murder with the intention of preventing the informant’s
    communication to authorities about his criminal activities,
    and the communication he sought to prevent would neces
    sarily have been to federal law enforcement. Likewise, a
    suspect would be guilty if he committed a murder to pre
    vent a witness from informing law enforcement that he
    lied on his federal income tax return: He sought to pre
    vent a communication that would have been made to
    federal officials, because they alone prosecute federal tax
    violations. But a suspect who commits a murder with the
    general intent of preventing law enforcement from learn
    ing about activities that violate both state and federal
    law would not be guilty, because the Government would
    be unable to prove that the communication he sought to
    prevent necessarily would have been to a federal official.
    Applying that standard, this is an easy case. There was
    evidence that Fowler murdered Officer Horner in order
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            3
    SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
    to prevent him from communicating information about
    Fowler’s criminal activities. But the only evidence prof
    fered by the Government to establish that the communica
    tion would have been to a federal law enforcement agent
    was the fact that a different state police officer, four years
    later, contacted federal law enforcement about a robbery
    by Fowler’s confederate—and that only because the state
    law statute of limitations for the robbery had expired.
    That is not nearly enough to demonstrate Fowler’s guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt.
    II
    The Court gives the statute a broader reading than the
    one I ascribe. The Government can obtain a conviction, it
    says, so long as it can prove a “reasonable likelihood” that
    the communication would have been made to a federal
    law enforcement officer. I know of no precedent for using
    a “likelihood” standard rather than the “beyond a rea
    sonable doubt” standard for a finding of fact essential
    to a criminal conviction; and the justifications the Court
    presents for that course in the present case are not
    convincing.
    The Court maintains that the Government need not
    show beyond a reasonable doubt that the communication
    would have been to a federal officer because “[t]he relevant
    question concerns the defendant’s intent.” Ante, at 5. But
    that reasoning is directly contrary to §1512(g)(2), which
    expressly states that the defendant’s intent is not the
    relevant question with respect to the federal character of
    law enforcement officer meant to be deprived of the infor
    mation. The Court’s observation that “a defendant can kill
    a victim with an intent to prevent the victim from commu
    nicating with federal law enforcement officers even if
    there is some considerable doubt that any such communi
    cation would otherwise have taken place,” ante, at 6, is
    completely irrelevant to the question presented.
    4                FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
    The Court also proclaims that a narrower view “would
    conflict with the statute’s basic purpose,” which is to
    prevent witness tampering “at a time when the precise
    communication and nature of the officer who may receive
    it are not yet known.” Ante, at 4. It cites no basis for
    attributing that purpose, and there is none—other than
    the fact that it supports the Court’s outcome. Another
    purpose is just as likely—and indeed more likely, since it
    can be achieved without abandonment of the ancient rule
    that in criminal prosecutions facts must be found beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Murder, after all, is a crime, and often
    a capital crime, under all state laws. There is no reason to
    ascribe to Congress the “purpose” of transferring murder
    prosecutions that would ordinarily be brought in state
    court to federal court based on only a tangential federal
    interest. Congress was concerned with preserving the
    integrity and effectiveness of federal prosecutions, and
    where they are not clearly involved (as the ordinary be
    yond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would require) a federal
    murder prosecution has no proper place. Limited as I
    have suggested, the federal law would still have ample
    scope, reaching what were surely the principal cases Con
    gress had in mind—the killing of prospective witnesses in
    federal trials or in ongoing federal investigations. Here,
    as would be the case in many situations involving a
    merely hypothetical link to a federal investigation, Fowler
    murdered a state police officer. The natural place to have
    prosecuted him would have been state court.
    The Court’s analysis is even less persuasive in light of
    the rule of lenity, under which we must construe ambigu
    ous criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. Here, the
    Court adopts a kind of rule of harshness, discarding the
    most straightforward construction of the text in favor of
    textually implausible one, based on vague intuitions about
    the statute’s purpose. The Court’s opinion never cites the
    rule of lenity, probably because it cannot honestly say that
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            5
    SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
    the statute is so clear that “there is no ambiguity for the
    rule of lenity to resolve.” Burgess v. United States, 
    553 U. S. 124
    , 136 (2008).
    To make matters worse, the Court’s standard is hope
    lessly indeterminate. The Government must show that a
    communication to a federal officer is “reasonably likely,”
    which is less likely than “more likely than not,” but more
    likely than “reasonably possible.” Ante, at 7–9. I doubt
    that any jury can grasp the distinction between “you must
    find that a communication to a federal officer was rea
    sonably likely” and “you must find that a communication
    to a federal officer was reasonably possible.” Under
    standably, the Court refuses to give any examples of what
    “reasonably likely” means, except for an absurd example
    involving communications with Lithuanian police officers,
    ante, at 10—which obviously would not be “reasonably
    possible” either. Indeed, the Court refuses to apply its
    standard to the facts of this case, leaving that precarious
    task to the lower court.
    III
    The dissent adopts a view of the statute that is even
    broader than the Government’s. It effectively contends
    that the Government need not prove anything with respect
    to the fact that the communication sought to be prevented
    was “to a law enforcement officer . . . of the United States.”
    As long as the Government can prove that the defendant
    sought to prevent the communication of information about
    a federal crime (including a federal crime that is also a
    state crime) it will necessarily have proved that the “set of
    law enforcement officers (whose identities were unknown
    to him)” he had in mind “included law enforcement officers
    who were employed by the United States.” Post, at 3
    (opinion of ALITO, J.). Conviction requires neither any
    specific intent regarding the federal status of the officer,
    nor even any likelihood that a communication to a federal
    6                FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
    officer would have occurred.
    The principal defect in this interpretation is that it
    makes the words “of the United States” superfluous.
    Section 1512(a)(1)(C) specifically requires that the in
    formation the defendant seeks to prevent from being com
    municated be “information relating to the commission or
    possible commission of a Federal offense.” If the phrase
    “to a law enforcement officer . . . of the United States”
    requires nothing more than this it is utterly without effect.
    The implication of this view is that Congress enacted
    §1512(a)(1)(C)’s reference to “a law enforcement officer . . .
    of the United States,” only to immediately nullify it by
    §1512(g)(2)’s “no state of mind” provision. Not likely—and
    not sound statutory interpretation.
    The dissent claims that my analysis “confuses what the
    prosecution must prove with what a rational jury may
    choose to infer in a particular case.” Post, at 6. I find this
    contention difficult to understand. In the dissent’s view, a
    properly instructed jury should be required to find neither
    that the defendant’s mens rea had any connection to a
    federal officer, nor that the defendant’s actus reus had any
    connection to a federal officer. It therefore follows that
    under the dissent’s view, a properly instructed jury should
    be required to find nothing about a connection to a federal
    officer beyond the fact that the information related to a
    federal offense, which means that, unless the jury is acting
    irrationally or is engaging in jury nullification, the “of the
    United States” provision is indeed superfluous. The dis
    sent is correct that the proof of one element of a crime
    (such as an overt act) can sometimes be used to prove that
    a different element (such as a conspiratorial agreement) is
    satisfied, post, at 6–7, n. 2; but in such cases, the jury is
    instructed that it is required to make a separate finding to
    convict (e.g., that a conspiratorial agreement actually
    occurred). Here, the dissent identifies no separate finding
    the jury must make beyond the fact of a federal offense.
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            7
    SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
    The dissent also observes that when a defendant murders
    a federal officer to prevent him from communicating in
    formation about a nonfederal crime, he does not violate
    the statute. Post, at 7. This observation convincingly
    establishes that the statutory words “Federal offense” are
    not superfluous under the dissent’s view, an observation
    irrelevant to my point that the dissent makes the statu
    tory words “of the United States” superfluous.
    The dissent contends that my interpretation “has no
    grounding in the language of the statute.” Post, at 4. It
    asserts that “the text of the statute makes it perfectly
    clear that the federal officer requirement is exclusively an
    element of the defendant’s mens rea.” Post, at 5 (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Perhaps the only thing “per
    fectly clear” about this statute is that it states the precise
    opposite of that proposition: “[N]o state of mind need be
    proved with respect to the circumstance . . . that the law
    enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal
    Government.” §1512(g)(2).
    The dissent’s interpretation would federalize crimes
    that have no connection to any federal investigation. A
    person caught by a state police officer with marijuana who
    murders the state police officer to cover it up could be
    prosecuted in federal court. That would approach the
    outer limits of Congress’s enumerated powers. We have
    adopted a federalism principle that applies when a statute
    would render “traditionally local criminal conduct . . . a
    matter for federal enforcement”: “[U]nless Congress con
    veys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have
    significantly changed the federal-state balance in the
    prosecution of crimes.” Jones v. United States, 
    529 U. S. 848
    , 858 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
    the dissent adds to the Court’s “rule of harshness” a rule of
    antifederalism, under which a court must actually ignore
    a federal connection that Congress prescribed so as to
    avoid intrusion into traditionally local law enforcement.
    8               FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
    *     *    *
    Because the Government did not establish that Fowler
    intended to prevent a communication that, if made, would
    have been made to a federal law enforcement officer, there
    was insufficient evidence to convict him of violating
    §1512(a)(1)(C). Since there remains, however, the ques
    tion whether Fowler preserved this issue at trial or
    whether the inadequacy of the evidence constituted plain
    error, I concur in the Court’s order vacating the judgment
    and remanding for resolution of that question.
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            1
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 10–5443
    _________________
    CHARLES ANDREW FOWLER, AKA MAN, PETITIONER
    v. UNITED STATES
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    [May 26, 2011]
    JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
    dissenting.
    The decision of the Court fails to follow the clear lan
    guage of 
    18 U. S. C. §1512
    (a)(1)(C). Instead of heeding
    the statutory text, the Court has effectively amended the
    statute by adding a new element.
    I
    As relevant here, §1512(a)(1)(C) makes it a federal crime
    “to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the
    communication by any person to a law enforcement officer
    . . . of the United States of information relating to the
    commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.”
    Also important for present purposes is §1512(g)(2), which
    provides, among other things, that “[i]n a prosecution for
    an offense under this section, no state of mind need be
    proved with respect to the circumstance . . . that the law
    enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal
    Government.”
    Putting these two provisions together, what had to be
    shown in the present case was as follows:
    (1) Fowler killed Officer Horner,
    (2) with the intent to prevent any person (i.e., either Offi
    cer Horner or someone else) from communicating,
    (3) to a person who (whether or not known as such to
    2                FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    Fowler) was a federal law enforcement officer,
    (4) information concerning the possible commission of a
    federal crime.
    The question before us is whether there was sufficient
    evidence to support Fowler’s conviction, and thus we must
    ask whether any rational jury could find that all of the
    elements noted above were adequately established. See
    United States v. Powell, 
    469 U. S. 57
    , 67 (1984).
    There can be no dispute that there was sufficient evi
    dence to establish elements (1), (2), and (4). That is, there
    was ample evidence to show (1) that Fowler killed Officer
    Horner, (2) that he did so with the intent to prevent the
    communication of information about what Officer Horner
    had seen, and (4) that this information concerned the
    possible commission of at least one federal crime—for
    example, conspiracy to rob a bank in violation of 
    18 U. S. C. §§371
    , 2113.
    Thus, the only remaining question is whether there was
    enough evidence to permit a rational jury to infer that
    element (3) had been satisfied. And in connection with
    this question, it is important to keep in mind three things
    that element (3) does not require.
    First, element (3) does not demand proof that Officer
    Horner, had he not been killed, would have reported—or
    even might have reported—what he saw to anyone, much
    less to a federal officer. Element (3) is solely concerned
    with a defendant’s intent.
    Second, while element (3) requires proof that Fowler
    intended to prevent some law enforcement officer from
    learning what Officer Horner had seen, element (3) does
    not require proof that Fowler had any particular law
    enforcement officer in mind. Section 1512(a)(1)(C) simply
    demands that the recipient of the information be “a law
    enforcement officer.” Thus, it would be enough if Fowler’s
    intent was to prevent Officer Horner’s information from
    reaching any federal law enforcement officer.
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            3
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    Third, element (3) does not demand proof that Fowler
    knew that the generic officer noted above was a federal,
    as opposed to a state or local, law enforcement officer. Sec
    tion 1512(g)(2) specifically rules out any such requirement.
    It is enough that our generic officer was in fact a federal
    officer.
    When the meaning of element (3) is understood, it is
    clear that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case
    must be affirmed. A rational jury could infer that Fowler’s
    intent was to prevent information about what Officer
    Horner had seen from reaching any person who could
    bring about his arrest and conviction. In other words, a
    rational jury could infer that Fowler, in effect, had in mind
    a set of law enforcement officers (whose identities were
    unknown to him) who could set in motion a chain of events
    that would land him in prison. And since the information
    that Officer Horner possessed related to, among other
    things, the possible commission of a federal crime, a ra
    tional jury could infer that this group included law en
    forcement officers who were employed by the United
    States. The question presented in this case is as simple as
    that.
    II
    The Court begins on the right track, observing that the
    “relevant question concerns the defendant’s intent” and
    that therefore “the Government need not show beyond a
    reasonable doubt (or even that it is more likely than not)
    that the hypothetical communication would have been to a
    federal officer.” Ante, at 5 (emphasis in original). But the
    Court veers off course when it goes on to hold that the
    prosecution was required to show that, if Officer Horner
    had not been killed, there was a “reasonable likelihood”
    that his information would have reached a federal officer.
    Ante, at 9 (emphasis in original).
    The Court reaches this conclusion based on the meaning
    4                FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    of the word “prevent.” See ante, at 6–10. The Court starts
    with the proposition that “apart from mistakes . . . one
    cannot act with an ‘intent to prevent’ something that could
    not possibly have taken place regardless.” Ante, at 6
    (emphasis in original). I understand this to mean that a
    rational person will not take action to prevent something
    that the person knows is not possible. This is true, but it
    does not follow that a rational person will not take action
    to prevent an undesirable event unless the event is “rea
    sonably likely.” Risk-averse people do this all the time.
    They refrain from flying to avoid dying in a plane crash.
    They shun rooms on the upper floors of hotels to prevent
    being trapped in the event of a fire.
    What matters under §1512(a)(1)(C) is not the likelihood
    that information about a possible federal crime will be
    conveyed to a federal officer. What matters is the intent
    of the person who kills or attempts to kill in order to pre
    vent that information from reaching such an officer. The
    Court’s “reasonable likelihood” test has no basis in the text
    of §1512(a)(1)(C).
    The Court’s test also makes little sense. Under this test,
    the application of §1512(a)(1)(C) depends on a witness
    killer’s toleration of risk.     According to the Court,
    §1512(a)(1)(C) does not reach a killer who has so little
    regard for human life that he or she is willing to murder in
    order to prevent even a remote possibility that a witness
    will inform the authorities. It is hard to imagine why
    Congress would have wanted to draw this line.
    III
    JUSTICE SCALIA’s interpretation of §1512(a)(1)(C) also
    has no grounding in the language of the statute. He
    makes the fundamental mistake of confusing §1512(a)
    (1)(C)’s mens rea and actus reus elements. JUSTICE
    SCALIA states that what he terms “the ‘federal officer’
    requirement” is “an element of the actus reus,” ante, at 2
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)            5
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    (opinion concurring in judgment), but the text of the
    statute makes it perfectly clear that “the ‘federal officer’
    requirement” is exclusively an element of the defendant’s
    mens rea.
    The statute provides:
    “(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another
    person, with intent to—
    .          .           .            .          .
    “(C) prevent the communication by any person to a
    law enforcement officer or judge of the United States
    of information relating to the commission or possible
    commission of a Federal offense or a violation of con
    ditions of probation, parole, or release pending judicial
    proceedings;
    “shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).”
    §1512(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
    The actus reus of this provision is set out in its first
    eight words (“Whoever kills or attempts to kill another
    person”). Everything else—that is, everything that follows
    the phrase “with intent to”—concerns the defendant’s
    mens rea.
    JUSTICE SCALIA interprets §1512(g)(2) as transforming
    “the ‘federal officer’ requirement” from an element of the
    mens rea into an element of the actus reus, see ante, at
    2–3, but this reading is plainly wrong. Section 1512(g)(2)
    provides in relevant part:
    “In a prosecution for an offense under [
    18 U. S. C. §1512
    ], no state of mind need be proved with re-
    spect to the circumstance . . . that the law enforcement
    officer is an officer or employee of the Federal
    Government.”
    What this clearly means, as the Court recognizes, see
    ante, at 4, is simply that a defendant need not intend to
    prevent a qualifying communication from reaching an
    6                       FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    officer whom the defendant knows to be a federal, as op
    posed to a state or local law enforcement officer. But noth
    ing in this provision adds to the actus reus elements in
    §1512(a)(1)(C).
    JUSTICE SCALIA’s principal criticism of my interpreta
    tion of the statute is that “it makes the words ‘of the
    United States’ superfluous.” Ante, at 6.1 He incorrectly
    states that under my interpretation “the Government need
    not prove anything with respect to the fact that the com
    munication sought to be prevented was ‘to a law enforce
    ment officer . . . of the United States’ ” and that “[a]s long
    as the Government can prove that the defendant sought to
    prevent the communication of information about a federal
    crime (including a federal crime that is also a state crime)
    it will necessarily have proved that [the set of officers
    whom the defendant had in mind] ‘included law enforce
    ment officers who were employed by the United States.’ ”
    Ante, at 5 (emphasis in original). This description of my
    interpretation confuses what the prosecution must prove
    with what a rational jury may choose to infer in a particu
    lar case.
    In order to violate §1512(a)(1)(C), a defendant must
    have an intent regarding two things: first, the substance of
    the communication that the defendant wishes to prevent
    (information concerning, among other things, the commis
    sion or possible commission of a federal crime) and, sec
    ond, the recipient of the communication (a law enforce
    ment officer or judge who turns out to be a federal officer
    or judge).
    It is true that evidence regarding the federal character
    of an offense may lead a rational jury to infer that the
    officers whom the defendant had in mind included federal
    officers.2 But those two elements remain distinct; both
    ——————
    1 The   Court makes a related argument. See ante, at 8.
    2 There   is nothing unusual about the proposition that the proof of one
    Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)                   7
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and it is en
    tirely possible for a defendant to satisfy one without also
    satisfying the other. For example, if a uniformed federal
    officer came upon a defendant during the commission of a
    purely state offense (for example, a murder, assault, or
    rape not committed in a federal enclave), the defendant
    might kill or attempt to kill the officer to prevent the
    officer from radioing in that information to the officer’s
    superiors. This defendant would have the intent to pre
    vent a communication to a federal officer, but there would
    be no violation of the statute because the information
    would not concern a federal crime. Thus, contrary to
    JUSTICE SCALIA’s suggestion, under my interpretation,
    the two intent elements—relating to the substance of the
    feared communication and the identity of the feared re
    cipient—are not redundant.
    JUSTICE SCALIA invokes a rule that disfavors the inter
    pretation of a federal criminal statute in a way that
    “ ‘significantly change[s] the federal-state balance in the
    prosecution of crimes.’ ”3 Ante, at 7 (quoting Jones v.
    United States, 
    529 U. S. 848
    , 858 (2000)). This rule, how
    ever, does not justify ignoring the plain terms of the
    statute.
    *     *    *
    The Court has effectively amended §1512(a)(1)(C) by
    adding an element that is nowhere to be found in the text
    of the statute. And the Court’s new element makes little
    sense and will create confusion for trial judges and juries.
    ——————
    element of a crime may provide a sufficient basis for inferring that
    another element may be satisfied. To take a common example, overt
    acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy may be sufficient to
    permit a jury to infer that a conspiratorial agreement was reached. But
    that does not alter the need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    such an agreement was reached.
    3 The Court again makes a related argument. See ante, at 8–9.
    8                FOWLER v. UNITED STATES
    ALITO, J., dissenting
    Following the language of §1512(a)(1)(C), I would hold
    that the evidence in this case was sufficient to establish all
    of the elements that Congress saw fit to include. I there
    fore respectfully dissent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-5443

Citation Numbers: 179 L. Ed. 2d 1099, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 563 U.S. 668, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4019

Judges: Breyer, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Scalia, Alito, Ginsburg

Filed Date: 5/26/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2024

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