Kokesh v. SEC , 198 L. Ed. 2d 86 ( 2017 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2016                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U. S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    KOKESH v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
    COMMISSION
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 16–529.      Argued April 18, 2017—Decided June 5, 2017
    The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) pos-
    sesses authority to investigate violations of federal securities laws
    and to commence enforcement actions in federal district court if its
    investigations uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Initially, the Com-
    mission’s statutory authority in enforcement actions was limited to
    seeking an injunction barring future violations. Beginning in the
    1970’s, federal district courts, at the request of the Commission, be-
    gan ordering disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings. Alt-
    hough Congress has since authorized the Commission to seek mone-
    tary civil penalties, the Commission has continued to seek
    disgorgement. This Court has held that 
    28 U. S. C. §2462
    , which es-
    tablishes a 5-year limitations period for “an action, suit or proceeding
    for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,” applies
    when the Commission seeks monetary civil penalties. See Gabelli v.
    SEC, 
    568 U. S. 442
    , 454.
    In 2009, the Commission brought an enforcement action, alleging
    that petitioner Charles Kokesh violated various securities laws by
    concealing the misappropriation of $34.9 million from four business-
    development companies from 1995 to 2009. The Commission sought
    monetary civil penalties, disgorgement, and an injunction barring
    Kokesh from future violations. After a jury found that Kokesh’s ac-
    tions violated several securities laws, the District Court determined
    that §2462’s 5-year limitations period applied to the monetary civil
    penalties. With respect to the $34.9 million disgorgement judgment,
    however, the court concluded that §2462 did not apply because dis-
    gorgement is not a “penalty” within the meaning of the statute. The
    Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that disgorgement was neither a
    2                               KOKESH v. SEC
    Syllabus
    penalty nor a forfeiture.
    Held: Because SEC disgorgement operates as a penalty under §2462,
    any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action must be
    commenced within five years of the date the claim accrued. Pp. 5–11.
    (a) The definition of “penalty” as a “punishment, whether corporal
    or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or of-
    fen[s]e against its laws,” Huntington v. Attrill, 
    146 U. S. 657
    , 667,
    gives rise to two principles. First, whether a sanction represents a
    penalty turns in part on “whether the wrong sought to be redressed is
    a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.” 
    Id., at 668
    . Sec-
    ond, a pecuniary sanction operates as a penalty if it is sought “for the
    purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like
    manner” rather than to compensate victims. 
    Ibid.
     This Court has
    applied these principles in construing the term “penalty,” holding,
    e.g., that a statute providing a compensatory remedy for a private
    wrong did not impose a “penalty,” Brady v. Daly, 
    175 U. S. 148
    , 154.
    Pp. 5–7.
    (b) The application of these principles here readily demonstrates
    that SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty within the meaning of
    §2462. First, SEC disgorgement is imposed by the courts as a conse-
    quence for violating public laws, i.e., a violation committed against
    the United States rather than an aggrieved individual. Second, SEC
    disgorgement is imposed for punitive purposes. Sanctions imposed
    for the purpose of deterring infractions of public laws are inherently
    punitive because “deterrence [is] not [a] legitimate nonpunitive gov-
    ernmental objectiv[e].” Bell v. Wolfish, 
    441 U. S. 520
    , 539, n. 20. Fi-
    nally, SEC disgorgement is often not compensatory. Disgorged prof-
    its are paid to the district courts, which have discretion to determine
    how the money will be distributed. They may distribute the funds to
    victims, but no statute commands them to do so. When an individual
    is made to pay a noncompensatory sanction to the government as a
    consequence of a legal violation, the payment operates as a penalty.
    See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 
    328 U. S. 395
    , 402. Pp. 7–9.
    (c) The Government responds that SEC disgorgement is not puni-
    tive but a remedial sanction that operates to restore the status quo.
    It is not clear, however, that disgorgement simply returns the de-
    fendant to the place he would have occupied had he not broken the
    law. It sometimes exceeds the profits gained as a result of the viola-
    tion. And, as demonstrated here, SEC disgorgement may be ordered
    without consideration of a defendant’s expenses that reduced the
    amount of illegal profit. In such cases, disgorgement does not simply
    restore the status quo; it leaves the defendant worse off and is there-
    fore punitive. Although disgorgement may serve compensatory goals
    in some cases, “sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose.”
    Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)                     3
    Syllabus
    Austin v. United States, 
    509 U. S. 602
    , 610. Because they “go beyond
    compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrong-
    doers” as a consequence of violating public laws, Gabelli, 
    568 U. S., at
    451–452, disgorgement orders represent a penalty and fall within
    §2462’s 5-year limitations period. Pp. 9–11.
    
    834 F. 3d 1158
    , reversed.
    SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
    Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 16–529
    _________________
    CHARLES R. KOKESH, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES
    AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    [June 5, 2017]
    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
    A 5-year statute of limitations applies to any “action,
    suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine,
    penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise.” 
    28 U. S. C. §2462
    . This case presents the question whether §2462
    applies to claims for disgorgement imposed as a sanction
    for violating a federal securities law. The Court holds that
    it does. Disgorgement in the securities-enforcement con-
    text is a “penalty” within the meaning of §2462, and so
    disgorgement actions must be commenced within five
    years of the date the claim accrues.
    I
    A
    After rampant abuses in the securities industry led to
    the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression,
    Congress enacted a series of laws to ensure that “the
    highest ethical standards prevail in every facet of the
    securities industry.”1 SEC v. Capital Gains Research
    ——————
    1 Each of these statutes—the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. §77a
    et seq.; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78a et seq.; the
    2                          KOKESH v. SEC
    Opinion of the Court
    Bureau, Inc., 
    375 U. S. 180
    , 186–187 (1963) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). The second in the series—the
    Securities Exchange Act of 1934—established the Securi-
    ties and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) to
    enforce federal securities laws. Congress granted the Com-
    mission power to prescribe “ ‘rules and regulations . . . as
    necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
    protection of investors.’ ” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
    Drug Stores, 
    421 U. S. 723
    , 728 (1975). In addition to
    rulemaking, Congress vested the Commission with “broad
    authority to conduct investigations into possible violations
    of the federal securities laws.” SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien,
    Inc., 
    467 U. S. 735
    , 741 (1984). If an investigation uncov-
    ers evidence of wrongdoing, the Commission may initiate
    enforcement actions in federal district court.
    Initially, the only statutory remedy available to the SEC
    in an enforcement action was an injunction barring future
    violations of securities laws. See 1 T. Hazen, Law of Secu-
    rities Regulation §1:37 (7th ed., rev. 2016). In the absence
    of statutory authorization for monetary remedies, the
    Commission urged courts to order disgorgement as an
    exercise of their “inherent equity power to grant relief
    ancillary to an injunction.” SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
    Co., 
    312 F. Supp. 77
    , 91 (SDNY 1970), aff ’d in part and
    rev’d in part, 
    446 F. 2d 1301
     (CA2 1971). Generally, dis-
    gorgement is a form of “[r]estitution measured by the
    defendant’s wrongful gain.” Restatement (Third) of Resti-
    tution and Unjust Enrichment §51, Comment a, p. 204
    ——————
    Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 
    15 U. S. C. §79
     et seq.; the
    Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U. S. C. §77aaa et seq.; the Investment
    Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §80a–1 et seq.; and the Investment
    Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §80b–1 et seq.—serves the “fundamen-
    tal purpose” of “substitut[ing] a philosophy of full disclosure for the
    philosophy of caveat emptor and thus . . . achiev[ing] a high standard of
    business ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains
    Research Bureau, Inc., 
    375 U. S. 180
    , 186 (1963).
    Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)            3
    Opinion of the Court
    (2010) (Restatement (Third)). Disgorgement requires that
    the defendant give up “those gains . . . properly attribut-
    able to the defendant’s interference with the claimant’s
    legally protected rights.” 
    Ibid.
     Beginning in the 1970’s,
    courts ordered disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceed-
    ings in order to “deprive . . . defendants of their profits in
    order to remove any monetary reward for violating” secu-
    rities laws and to “protect the investing public by provid-
    ing an effective deterrent to future violations.” Texas
    Gulf, 
    312 F. Supp., at 92
    .
    In 1990, as part of the Securities Enforcement Remedies
    and Penny Stock Reform Act, Congress authorized the
    Commission to seek monetary civil penalties. 
    104 Stat. 932
    , codified at 15 U. S. C. §77t(d). The Act left the Com-
    mission with a full panoply of enforcement tools: It may
    promulgate rules, investigate violations of those rules and
    the securities laws generally, and seek monetary penal-
    ties and injunctive relief for those violations. In the
    years since the Act, however, the Commission has con-
    tinued its practice of seeking disgorgement in enforcement
    proceedings.
    This Court has already held that the 5-year statute of
    limitations set forth in 
    28 U. S. C. §2462
     applies when the
    Commission seeks statutory monetary penalties. See
    Gabelli v. SEC, 
    568 U. S. 442
    , 454 (2013). The question
    here is whether §2462, which applies to any “action, suit
    or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty,
    or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,” also applies when
    the SEC seeks disgorgement.
    B
    Charles Kokesh owned two investment-adviser firms
    that provided investment advice to business-development
    companies. In late 2009, the Commission commenced an
    enforcement action in Federal District Court alleging that
    between 1995 and 2009, Kokesh, through his firms, mis-
    4                     KOKESH v. SEC
    Opinion of the Court
    appropriated $34.9 million from four of those development
    companies. The Commission further alleged that, in order
    to conceal the misappropriation, Kokesh caused the filing
    of false and misleading SEC reports and proxy statements.
    The Commission sought civil monetary penalties, dis-
    gorgement, and an injunction barring Kokesh from violat-
    ing securities laws in the future.
    After a 5-day trial, a jury found that Kokesh’s actions
    violated the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C.
    §80a–36; the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C.
    §§80b–5, 80b–6; and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
    15 U. S. C. §§78m, 78n. The District Court then turned to
    the task of imposing penalties sought by the Commission.
    As to the civil monetary penalties, the District Court
    determined that §2462’s 5-year limitations period pre-
    cluded any penalties for misappropriation occurring prior to
    October 27, 2004—that is, five years prior to the date the
    Commission filed the complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert.
    26a. The court ordered Kokesh to pay a civil penalty of
    $2,354,593, which represented “the amount of funds that
    [Kokesh] himself received during the limitations period.”
    Id., at 31a–32a. Regarding the Commission’s request for a
    $34.9 million disgorgement judgment—$29.9 million of
    which resulted from violations outside the limitations
    period—the court agreed with the Commission that be-
    cause disgorgement is not a “penalty” within the meaning
    of §2462, no limitations period applied. The court there-
    fore entered a disgorgement judgment in the amount of
    $34.9 million and ordered Kokesh to pay an additional
    $18.1 million in prejudgment interest.
    The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
    
    834 F. 3d 1158
     (2016). It agreed with the District Court
    that disgorgement is not a penalty, and further found that
    disgorgement is not a forfeiture. 
    Id.,
     at 1164–1167. The
    court thus concluded that the statute of limitations in
    §2462 does not apply to SEC disgorgement claims.
    Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)                  5
    Opinion of the Court
    This Court granted certiorari, 580 U. S. ___ (2017), to
    resolve disagreement among the Circuits over whether
    disgorgement claims in SEC proceedings are subject to the
    5-year limitations period of §2462.2
    II
    Statutes of limitations “se[t] a fixed date when exposure
    to the specified Government enforcement efforts en[d].”
    Gabelli, 
    568 U. S., at 448
    . Such limits are “ ‘vital to the
    welfare of society’ ” and rest on the principle that “ ‘even
    wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be
    forgotten.’ ” 
    Id., at 449
    . The statute of limitations at issue
    here—
    28 U. S. C. §2462
    —finds its roots in a law enacted
    nearly two centuries ago. 
    568 U. S., at 445
    . In its current
    form, §2462 establishes a 5-year limitations period for “an
    action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil
    fine, penalty, or forfeiture.” This limitations period ap-
    plies here if SEC disgorgement qualifies as either a fine,
    penalty, or forfeiture. We hold that SEC disgorgement
    constitutes a penalty.3
    A
    A “penalty” is a “punishment, whether corporal or pecu-
    niary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or
    offen[s]e against its laws.” Huntington v. Attrill, 
    146 U. S. 657
    , 667 (1892). This definition gives rise to two princi-
    ples. First, whether a sanction represents a penalty turns
    ——————
    2 Compare SEC v. Graham, 
    823 F. 3d 1357
    , 1363 (CA11 2016) (hold-
    ing that §2462 applies to SEC disgorgement claims), with Riordan v.
    SEC, 
    627 F. 3d 1230
    , 1234 (CADC 2010) (holding that §2462 does not
    apply to SEC disgorgement claims).
    3 Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on
    whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC en-
    forcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly applied
    disgorgement principles in this context The sole question presented in
    this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement
    actions, is subject to §2462’s limitations period.
    6                      KOKESH v. SEC
    Opinion of the Court
    in part on “whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a
    wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.” Id., at
    668. Although statutes creating private causes of action
    against wrongdoers may appear—or even be labeled—
    penal, in many cases “neither the liability imposed nor the
    remedy given is strictly penal.” Id., at 667. This is be-
    cause “[p]enal laws, strictly and properly, are those impos-
    ing punishment for an offense committed against the
    State.” Ibid. Second, a pecuniary sanction operates as a
    penalty only if it is sought “for the purpose of punishment,
    and to deter others from offending in like manner”—as
    opposed to compensating a victim for his loss. Id., at 668.
    The Court has applied these principles in construing the
    term “penalty.” In Brady v. Daly, 
    175 U. S. 148
     (1899), for
    example, a playwright sued a defendant in Federal Circuit
    Court under a statute providing that copyright infringers
    “ ‘shall be liable for damages . . . not less than one hundred
    dollars for the first [act of infringement], and fifty dollars
    for every subsequent performance, as to the court shall
    appear to be just.’ ” 
    Id., at 153
    . The defendant argued
    that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction on the ground
    that a separate statute vested district courts with exclu-
    sive jurisdiction over actions “to recover a penalty.” 
    Id., at 152
    . To determine whether the statutory damages repre-
    sented a penalty, this Court noted first that the statute
    provided “for a recovery of damages for an act which vio-
    lates the rights of the plaintiff, and gives the right of
    action solely to him” rather than the public generally, and
    second, that “the whole recovery is given to the proprietor,
    and the statute does not provide for a recovery by any
    other person.” 
    Id., at 154, 156
    . By providing a compensa-
    tory remedy for a private wrong, the Court held, the stat-
    ute did not impose a “penalty.” 
    Id., at 154
    .
    Similarly, in construing the statutory ancestor of §2462,
    the Court utilized the same principles. In Meeker v.
    Lehigh Valley R. Co., 
    236 U. S. 412
    , 421–422 (1915), the
    Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)           7
    Opinion of the Court
    Interstate Commerce Commission, a now-defunct federal
    agency charged with regulating railroads, ordered a rail-
    road company to refund and pay damages to a shipping
    company for excessive shipping rates. The railroad com-
    pany argued that the action was barred by Rev. Stat.
    §1047, Comp. Stat. 1913, §1712 (now 
    28 U. S. C. §2462
    ),
    which imposed a 5-year limitations period upon any “ ‘suit
    or prosecution for a penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or
    otherwise, accruing under the laws of the United States.’ ”
    
    236 U. S., at 423
    . The Court rejected that argument,
    reasoning that “the words ‘penalty or forfeiture’ in [the
    statute] refer to something imposed in a punitive way for
    an infraction of a public law.” 
    Ibid.
     A penalty, the Court
    held, does “not include a liability imposed [solely] for the
    purpose of redressing a private injury.” 
    Ibid.
     Because the
    liability imposed was compensatory and paid entirely to a
    private plaintiff, it was not a “penalty” within the meaning
    of the statute of limitations. Ibid.; see also Gabelli, 
    568 U. S., at
    451–452 (“[P]enalties” in the context of §2462 “go
    beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label
    defendants wrongdoers”).
    B
    Application of the foregoing principles readily demon-
    strates that SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty
    within the meaning of §2462.
    First, SEC disgorgement is imposed by the courts as a
    consequence for violating what we described in Meeker as
    public laws. The violation for which the remedy is sought
    is committed against the United States rather than an
    aggrieved individual—this is why, for example, a securities-
    enforcement action may proceed even if victims do not
    support or are not parties to the prosecution. As the Gov-
    ernment concedes, “[w]hen the SEC seeks disgorgement, it
    acts in the public interest, to remedy harm to the public at
    large, rather than standing in the shoes of particular
    8                      KOKESH v. SEC
    Opinion of the Court
    injured parties.” Brief for United States 22. Courts agree.
    See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 
    991 F. 2d 1486
    , 1491 (CA9 1993)
    (“[D]isgorgement actions further the Commission’s public
    policy mission of protecting investors and safeguarding the
    integrity of the markets”); SEC v. Teo, 
    746 F. 3d 90
    , 102
    (CA3 2014) (“[T]he SEC pursues [disgorgement] ‘inde-
    pendent of the claims of individual investors’ ” in order to
    “ ‘promot[e] economic and social policies’ ”).
    Second, SEC disgorgement is imposed for punitive
    purposes. In Texas Gulf—one of the first cases requiring
    disgorgement in SEC proceedings—the court emphasized
    the need “to deprive the defendants of their profits in
    order to . . . protect the investing public by providing an
    effective deterrent to future violations.” 
    312 F. Supp., at 92
    . In the years since, it has become clear that deterrence
    is not simply an incidental effect of disgorgement. Rather,
    courts have consistently held that “[t]he primary purpose
    of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securi-
    ties laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.”
    SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 
    133 F. 3d 170
    , 175 (CA2 1997);
    see also SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 
    101 F. 3d 1450
    , 1474 (CA2 1996) (“The primary purpose of dis-
    gorgement as a remedy for violation of the securities laws
    is to deprive violators of their ill-gotten gains, thereby
    effectuating the deterrence objectives of those laws”);
    Rind, 
    991 F. 2d, at 1491
     (“ ‘The deterrent effect of [an SEC]
    enforcement action would be greatly undermined if securi-
    ties law violators were not required to disgorge illicit
    profits’ ”). Sanctions imposed for the purpose of deterring
    infractions of public laws are inherently punitive because
    “deterrence [is] not [a] legitimate nonpunitive governmen-
    tal objectiv[e].” Bell v. Wolfish, 
    441 U. S. 520
    , 539, n. 20
    (1979); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 
    524 U. S. 321
    ,
    329 (1998) (“Deterrence . . . has traditionally been viewed
    as a goal of punishment”).
    Finally, in many cases, SEC disgorgement is not com-
    Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)            9
    Opinion of the Court
    pensatory. As courts and the Government have employed
    the remedy, disgorged profits are paid to the district court,
    and it is “within the court’s discretion to determine how
    and to whom the money will be distributed.” Fischbach
    Corp., 
    133 F. 3d, at 175
    . Courts have required disgorge-
    ment “regardless of whether the disgorged funds will be
    paid to such investors as restitution.” 
    Id., at 176
    ; see 
    id., at 175
     (“Although disgorged funds may often go to com-
    pensate securities fraud victims for their losses, such
    compensation is a distinctly secondary goal”). Some dis-
    gorged funds are paid to victims; other funds are dispersed
    to the United States Treasury. See, e.g., 
    id., at 171
     (af-
    firming distribution of disgorged funds to Treasury where
    “no party before the court was entitled to the funds and
    . . . the persons who might have equitable claims were too
    dispersed for feasible identification and payment”); SEC v.
    Lund, 
    570 F. Supp. 1397
    , 1404–1405 (CD Cal. 1983) (or-
    dering disgorgement and directing trustee to disperse
    funds to victims if “feasible” and to disperse any remain-
    ing money to the Treasury). Even though district courts
    may distribute the funds to the victims, they have not
    identified any statutory command that they do so. When
    an individual is made to pay a noncompensatory sanction
    to the Government as a consequence of a legal violation,
    the payment operates as a penalty. See Porter v. Warner
    Holding Co., 
    328 U. S. 395
    , 402 (1946) (distinguishing
    between restitution paid to an aggrieved party and penal-
    ties paid to the Government).
    SEC disgorgement thus bears all the hallmarks of a
    penalty: It is imposed as a consequence of violating a
    public law and it is intended to deter, not to compensate.
    The 5-year statute of limitations in §2462 therefore ap-
    plies when the SEC seeks disgorgement.
    C
    The Government’s primary response to all of this is that
    10                     KOKESH v. SEC
    Opinion of the Court
    SEC disgorgement is not punitive but “remedial” in that it
    “lessen[s] the effects of a violation” by “ ‘restor[ing] the
    status quo.’ ” Brief for Respondent 17. As an initial mat-
    ter, it is not clear that disgorgement, as courts have ap-
    plied it in the SEC enforcement context, simply returns
    the defendant to the place he would have occupied had he
    not broken the law. SEC disgorgement sometimes exceeds
    the profits gained as a result of the violation. Thus, for
    example, “an insider trader may be ordered to disgorge not
    only the unlawful gains that accrue to the wrongdoer
    directly, but also the benefit that accrues to third parties
    whose gains can be attributed to the wrongdoer’s conduct.”
    SEC v. Contorinis, 
    743 F. 3d 296
    , 302 (CA2 2014). Indi-
    viduals who illegally provide confidential trading infor-
    mation have been forced to disgorge profits gained by
    individuals who received and traded based on that infor-
    mation—even though they never received any profits.
    Ibid; see also SEC v. Warde, 
    151 F. 3d 42
    , 49 (CA2 1998)
    (“A tippee’s gains are attributable to the tipper, regardless
    whether benefit accrues to the tipper”); SEC v. Clark, 
    915 F. 2d 439
    , 454 (CA9 1990) (“[I]t is well settled that a tipper
    can be required to disgorge his tippees’ profits”). And, as
    demonstrated by this case, SEC disgorgement sometimes
    is ordered without consideration of a defendant’s expenses
    that reduced the amount of illegal profit. App. to Pet. for
    Cert. 43a; see Restatement (Third) §51, Comment h, at
    216 (“As a general rule, the defendant is entitled to a
    deduction for all marginal costs incurred in producing the
    revenues that are subject to disgorgement. Denial of an
    otherwise appropriate deduction, by making the defendant
    liable in excess of net gains, results in a punitive sanction
    that the law of restitution normally attempts to avoid”).
    In such cases, disgorgement does not simply restore the
    status quo; it leaves the defendant worse off. The justifi-
    cation for this practice given by the court below demon-
    strates that disgorgement in this context is a punitive,
    Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)           11
    Opinion of the Court
    rather than a remedial, sanction: Disgorgement, that court
    explained, is intended not only to “prevent the wrongdoer’s
    unjust enrichment” but also “to deter others’ violations of
    the securities laws.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a.
    True, disgorgement serves compensatory goals in some
    cases; however, we have emphasized “the fact that sanc-
    tions frequently serve more than one purpose.” Austin v.
    United States, 
    509 U. S. 602
    , 610 (1993). “ ‘A civil sanction
    that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial pur-
    pose, but rather can only be explained as also serving
    either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as
    we have come to understand the term.’ ” 
    Id., at 621
    ; cf.
    Bajakajian, 
    524 U. S., at 331, n. 6
     (“[A] modern statutory
    forfeiture is a ‘fine’ for Eighth Amendment purposes if it
    constitutes punishment even in part”). Because disgorge-
    ment orders “go beyond compensation, are intended to
    punish, and label defendants wrongdoers” as a conse-
    quence of violating public laws, Gabelli, 
    568 U. S., at
    451–
    452, they represent a penalty and thus fall within the 5-
    year statute of limitations of §2462.
    III
    Disgorgement, as it is applied in SEC enforcement
    proceedings, operates as a penalty under §2462. Accord-
    ingly, any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement
    action must be commenced within five years of the date
    the claim accrued.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
    Circuit is reversed.
    It is so ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-529

Citation Numbers: 198 L. Ed. 2d 86, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3557

Judges: Sonia Sotomayor

Filed Date: 6/5/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/7/2020

Authorities (19)

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. , 312 F. Supp. 77 ( 1970 )

Bell v. Wolfish , 99 S. Ct. 1861 ( 1979 )

United States v. Bajakajian , 118 S. Ct. 2028 ( 1998 )

Brady v. Daly , 20 S. Ct. 62 ( 1899 )

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 90,239 Securities and Exchange ... , 151 F.3d 42 ( 1998 )

fed-sec-l-rep-p-90101-securities-and-exchange-commission-v-fischbach , 133 F.3d 170 ( 1997 )

Gabelli v. Securities & Exchange Commission , 133 S. Ct. 1216 ( 2013 )

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 26 S. Ct. 282 ( 1906 )

Securities and Exchange Commission v. John Naylor Clark, ... , 915 F.2d 439 ( 1990 )

Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley RR , 35 S. Ct. 328 ( 1915 )

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,072 Securities and Exchange ... , 446 F.2d 1301 ( 1971 )

Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Jersey ... , 101 F.3d 1450 ( 1996 )

Porter v. Warner Holding Co. , 66 S. Ct. 1086 ( 1946 )

Austin v. United States , 113 S. Ct. 2801 ( 1993 )

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research ... , 84 S. Ct. 275 ( 1963 )

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores , 95 S. Ct. 1917 ( 1975 )

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Maurice Rind , 991 F.2d 1486 ( 1993 )

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Lund , 570 F. Supp. 1397 ( 1983 )

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. , 104 S. Ct. 2720 ( 1984 )

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