United States vs. Knight’s Adm’r , 17 L. Ed. 76 ( 1862 )

66 U.S. 227 (____) 1 Black 227

UNITED STATES
vs.
KNIGHT'S ADM'R.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. Shunk, of Pennsylvania, for the United States.

Mr. Stanton, of Washington city, and Mr. Sunderland, of California, for the appellee.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD.

This was a petition for the confirmation of a land claim under the act of the third of March, 1851, and the case comes before the court on appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California, reversing the decree of the commissioners, and confirming the claim. William Knight died in October, 1849, and, of course, never presented any claim under that law for confirmation. Administration on his estate was granted to the appellee on the sixth day of November, 1851, and, on the third day of March following, he, as such administrator, filed a petition before the commissioners, claiming a tract of land, called Carmel, situated on the borders of the Sacramento river, and containing ten square leagues. Said tract, as the petitioner represented, was granted to his intestate on the fourth day of May, 1846, by Governor Pio Pico, in the name of the Mexican nation; and was afterwards, during the lifetime of the decedent, possessed and occupied by him pursuant to the grant under which the claim is made. Copies of certain documentary evidences of title were also presented and filed at the same time, and the petitioner represented in effect that he relied on those documents, and such other evidence as he might be able to obtain, to show that the claim ought to be confirmed. Assuming that the theory of claimant is correct, the title is one, undoubtedly, that ought to be protected; but it is denied by the United States that any such grant was ever made, and that is the principal question in the case. Vacant lands in California belonged to the Supreme Government, and the laws for the disposition of the same emanated from that source. General rules and regulations upon the subject were accordingly ordained, authorizing the Governors of Territories, under certain specified conditions, to grant such lands to such empresarios, families, and single persons as might ask for the same for the purpose of settlement and cultivation; but it was expressly provided that grants made to families or single persons should not be held to be definitively valid, without the previous consent of the territorial deputation. By those rules and regulations, every person soliciting such lands was required, in the first place, to address a petition to the Governor setting forth his name, country, profession, and religion, and also to describe the land asked for as distinctly as possible, by means of a diseño or map, which is usually annexed to the petition. He was not required to prove his representations, but it was made the duty of the Governor to obtain the necessary information to enable him to determine whether the case, as presented in the petition, fell within the conditions specified in the regulations, both as regarded the land and the applicant. Petitions and grants, with the maps of the land granted, were required to be recorded in a book kept for that purpose, and a circumstantial account of the adjudications was directed to be forwarded quarterly to the Supreme Government. To bring the claim within these rules, the claimant introduced the following documents before the commissioners:

1. A petition, in the usual form, signed by his intestate, bearing date at Sonoma, on the first day of February, 1846, and addressed to Governor Pio Pico.

Recurring to the material parts of the instrument, it will be seen, that the petitioner asked the Governor to grant him "the tract set out in the annexed map," meaning the map annexed to the petition, containing ten sitios de gañada mayor, more or less; and after describing the tract, and giving the out-boundaries of the same, stated that, according to the annexed report of the magistrate of Sonoma, "there seems to be no obstacle on the part of any one to its concession." No such map, however, as that referred to was annexed to the petition at the time it was introduced; and the espediente contained no report of the Alcalde of Sonoma, or of any other such magistrate.

2. Two decrees, signed by Governor Pio Pico, both dated Angeles, May 4th, 1846, were also introduced by the claimant. One was written, as usual, in the margin of the petition, and was as follows: "Granted, as prayed by the petitioner. Let the title be issued by the Secretary of the Department." But the other, which is signed also by the Secretary, was appended to the petition, without any intervening informé, or order for the same; and yet the recitals of the decree plainly import that the action of the Governor, in making it, was based not only upon the petition, but also upon a report of the Alcalde of the district, as set forth in the petition. Like the preceding decree, it directs that a proper title be issued to the petitioner; and, also, that the espediente be kept, to be submitted to the Departmental Assembly.

He also introduced another document, which was appended to the last named decree, and which purports to be a copy of the "titulo" or grant on which the claim is based. It is dated at the city of Los Angeles, on the fourth day of May, 1846, and is in the usual form.

Failing to produce the original grant, the administrator introduced his own affidavit, to show that he had made diligent search for the same among the papers of the deceased, and elsewhere, and that he was unable to find it. Three witnesses were examined by the claimant before the commissioners; but the commissioners rejected the claim, and the claimant appealed to the District Court. Testimony was taken on both sides in the District Court, and the claimant also introduced certain additional documentary evidences which it becomes important to notice.

Nearly three years before the petition was presented to Governor Pio Pico, the same party, as appears by these documents, had presented a similar petition to Manuel Micheltorena, then holding the office of Governor of California, asking for a grant of the same tract of land. This petition, as then presented, was dated at Monterey on the eighth day of May, 1843, and on the same day the Governor referred it to the Prefect of the district for a report. John A. Sutter was at that time the principal civil officer in that section of the department, and the Prefect accordingly referred the petition to him, directing him to furnish the necessary information; but he referred it to the Alcalde or justice of the peace of Sonoma, for the reason, as stated, that the land was in that district. On the twenty-sixth day of January, 1844, the last named officer reported, to the effect that the land solicited was occupied by virtue of a concession from the Governor in favor of another individual.

That report was duly transmitted to the Governor; and, on the twenty-seventh day of March following, he referred the whole case to Manuel Jimeno, who, on the same day, made a report, recommending that the petition in question, and all similar cases, should be suspended, until the Governor could visit that frontier. Here the matter dropped; and, for reasons which will presently appear, the petition was never again considered.

Certain prominent persons belonging to the department, of whom Pio Pico was one, in the fall of 1844, revolted against the authority of Micheltorena; but John A. Sutter supported the constitutional governor, and was sent by him to collect the militia of the northern frontier, to put down the rebellion. Some of the adherents of the latter had certain claims to lands, and he suggested to the Governor, in the emergency, that grants should be made to them, probably as the most available means to secure their services. Pursuant to that suggestion, the Governor sent to that officer the document known as the "Sutter general title," promising grants to all such claimants as had previously obtained from him a favorable report. According to the testimony of Sutter, the claimant's intestate was properly included in that category; and he accordingly, on the fifteenth day of April, 1845, gave him the copy of that document, which is exhibited in this record.

Such is the substance of the documentary evidences of title introduced by the claimant. All those relating to the proceedings on the petition presented to Micheltorena, together with the copy of the Sutter general title, were found among the papers of the deceased; but those appertaining to the Pio Pico espediente, except the alleged copy of the grant, are traced copies of originals, now on file in the office of the Surveyor General of California.

It is not pretended that the Sutter general title has any validity, or that the claim in this case can be upheld by the proceedings that took place on the first named petition. Such pretensions, if made, could not be supported, as this court has determined, on several occasions, that the former was invalid; and it is quite obvious that nothing was done by Governor Micheltorena to give any pretence of title whatever to the claimant's intestate.

But it is insisted that the parol proofs, taken in connection with the espediente of 1846, clearly show that Pio Pico, on the fourth day of May in that year, actually issued the grant to William Knight; and that, having proved its execution, delivery, and loss, the claimant is entitled to introduce secondary evidence, to show its contents. Great reliance is placed upon the espediente, as furnishing a ground of presumption that the grant was issued; and, indeed, it is contended, that if it appears that the espediente is genuine, then the grant must be confirmed. Whether the proposition, as stated, be correct or not, it may properly be admitted that the question, as to the bona fides of the espediente, is one of very considerable importance in the case. When complete, an espediente usually consists of the petition, with the diseño annexed; a marginal decree, approving the petition; the order of reference to the proper officer, for information; the report of that officer, in conformity to the order, the decree of concession, and the copy or a duplicate of the grant. These several papers — that is, the petition, with the diseño annexed, the order of reference, the informé, the decree of concession, and the copy of the grant, appended together in the order mentioned — constitute a complete espediente, within the meaning of the Mexican law.

Three defects are obvious in the document exhibited in the record. There is no map annexed to the petition, and there is neither an order of reference nor an informé; and the inference from the fact that the decree of concession immediately follows the petition is a reasonable one, that no order of reference or report were ever made.

Those defects, however, are by no means the principal circumstances that tend to create distrust as to its genuineness. Much graver difficulties than any suggested by the defects of the document arise, from what appears affirmatively, on its face. Both the petition and the decree of concession refer to the report of the Alcalde of Sonoma; and the language of the latter plainly imports that it was founded, in part at least, upon a report of that magistrate. No such report, so far as appears, was made by that officer, in connection with the espediente under consideration. He never made but one report, and that, as clearly appears, was adverse to the application, and was made to Micheltorena on the twenty-sixth day of January, 1844, in which he stated that the land solicited was occupied by virtue of a concession from the Governor in favor of another individual.

Looking at the terms of the report, it is clear that it is not to that report, as originally framed, that reference is made, either in the petition or the decree of concession. On the contrary, it is evident that they both refer to a favorable report, and not to one that was adverse, which entirely negatives the theory that the informé previously made and on file was carried into this espediente. To suppose that the Governor referred to an informé that never had any existence, is a theory that cannot be adopted, as it would impute to him an inconsistency little better than a fraud upon the Government. Some other theory, therefore, must be adopted, to explain the transaction. Referring to the record, it appears that Jacob P. Leese was the Alcalde who made that report, and he was examined as a witness in behalf of the United States. He testified that the words una parte de ello, translated, a part of it, now appearing at the close of the report, were inserted by him on the eighth day of October, 1847, at the solicitation of the claimant's intestate. That alteration in the informé was made, as he states, in the presence of the individual who, according to his original report, was in the occupation of the land by virtue of a concession from the Governor. Two certificates were also introduced by the claimant, which go very far to confirm the statements of the witness, both as to the time when the addition was made to the informé, and the attending circumstances. One of those certificates is signed by the witness himself, in which, after referring to the informé, he states, in effect, that he has discovered, since he made that report, that the statement therein made, that the land was occupied by another individual, was erroneous; and the other certificate is signed by the person referred to in the informé as the occupant of the land; and he certifies that the land solicited, if "regulated to the plan," would not interfere with his possession. These certificates bear date on the eighth day of October, 1847, and the witness testifies that he made the alteration in the informé at the time he gave that certificate. Micheltorena was driven from power in 1845, and on the tenth day of August, 1846, Pio Pico fled from the city of Los Angeles, and never afterwards had possession of the archives or records of the department. Before his flight, he placed them in boxes, and deposited them with Luis Vignes for safe-keeping. On the thirteenth of that month, Commodore Stockton entered the city of Los Angeles, and on the next day Colonel Fremont took possession of the archives, and kept them until the eighth day of September following, and then took them to Sutter's fort, on the American river, where they remained until 1847, when they were sent to Monterey. They remained at Monterey until February, 1850, when they were sent to Benicia, and thence to the office of the Surveyor General. Whatever might have been the motive for making the alteration in the informé, it is clear that it could not have been done to influence the official action of the Governor, for he had long before gone out of office; and yet the circumstances strongly support the hypothesis that it was to that same report, as altered on the eighth day of October, 1847, that the reference is made, both in the petition and the decree of concession embraced in the espediente. Assuming that to be so, then it is clear that the espediente is ante-dated and fraudulent; and the circumstances, when taken together, tend so strongly in that direction, that we think the espediente is not entitled to much weight. When the jurisdiction of that department was transferred to the United States, the motive to fabricate titles to real property became strong and active, and the evidence in this case is abundantly sufficient to show that opportunities occurred to enable the unscrupulous to foist simulated evidences of such titles into the depositories of the archives, after they were seized at Los Angeles, in spite of any vigilance that those intrusted with their safe-keeping could possibly employ to preserve them from such fraudulent practices. Interested parties were necessarily allowed to consult the contents of the packages while they yet remained in very considerable disorder, and without any permanent custodian. Among those who had such opportunities was one of the witnesses of the claimant, and the evidence tends to show that he had an interest in the claim, and that he had stated that when he took hold of it there were no papers in the case, but that he had procured a set as good as any that could be found in the State. True it is that he denies ever having made that statement; but he admits that he went to Benicia in 1850, and that he examined the archives for the purpose of ascertaining whether any grant had been made to the claimant's intestate. He says he saw papers there with the name of William Knight on them, but neither he nor the clerks in charge of them could translate them. Whether the espediente in this case was in the boxes that fell into the possession of Colonel Fremont at Los Angeles, or was among the loose papers subsequently found in the custom-house at Monterey, or when or by what means the espediente was deposited in the archives, does not appear, except that it was there in 1847, or the first part of the year 1848, when an officer of the United States, in charge of the archives, made and completed an index of certain espedientes, not previously indexed, numbered, or filed, by Mexican authority. Sixty-seven, including all those found in the custom-house at Monterey, were then added to the previous list. Mexican numbering stopped at five hundred and twelve, and the author of the new index commenced to number where the other closed. That index includes the espediente in this case as number five hundred and fifty, and it shows that the espediente was in the archives when that index was made; but it shows nothing more, and cannot in any sense be regarded as a Mexican record. Evidence to show that the grant was recorded is entirely wanting; and there is no pretence that the espediente was ever submitted to the Departmental Assembly for its approval. Absence of such approval, under the circumstances of this case, is entitled to very considerable weight. More than forty espedientes were presented to that assembly on the third and tenth days of June, 1846, and received its approval. Several of the grants were dated in April, 1846, and one was dated on the first day of May of that year, and the inference is a reasonable one, that if the espediente in this case had really been completed, and the grant actually issued, the former would have been included in that list. Taken together, these various considerations throw great distrust upon this document, and justify the conclusion that it is entitled to little or no weight. Rejecting the espediente as unsatisfactory and wholly insufficient, under the circumstances, nothing remains to support the claim in this case except the parol proof. Claimant's theory is, that the grant was issued by Governor Pio Pico at Los Angeles on the fourth day of May, 1846, and was then and there delivered to his intestate. At that time William Knight lived in the valley of the Sacramento, some seven hundred miles distant from the seat of Government, where it is assumed that the grant was issued; but it is insisted that he visited that place the last of April or early in May of that year, and that the grant was delivered to him in person by the Secretary of the Department. José M. Moreno was the Secretary at that time, and he testifies that the grant was issued by the Governor on that day, and that he, the Secretary, delivered the same to the claimant's intestate. But it is a sufficient answer to the testimony of that witness to say, that it is conceded by the claimant, that his character for truth is worthless.

Another witness, James M. Harbin, testifies, that he saw William Knight in Los Angeles about that time, and that he said he was there for the purpose of getting a grant for ten leagues of land on the Sacramento river; that Governor Pio Pico told him that he had issued the grant, and that he, the witness, saw papers in the possession of Knight when he started to return, but did not know what they were. Proof was also introduced by the claimant to show that the signatures to the marginal decree and the decree of concession were genuine; and he also introduced an affidavit of J.C. Davis, in which the affiant states that, on the 5th day of June, 1846, he heard Knight say, in the camp of Colonel Fremont, that he had just returned from the lower country, where he had procured his title papers; and the affiant also stated that he exhibited certain papers, calling them title papers, but the witness did not examine them, because he could not read the language. Other declarations of Knight were also introduced without objection — such as, that he, at one time, said he was going to Los Angeles, concerning the title to his land, and that, on his return, he said he had received it; and that, in March, 1847, he said he had lost his grant, and expressed his fears that he should lose his land in consequence of the loss of the grant. It was denied by the United States that he made any such visit to Los Angeles as is alleged; and they also insisted that he never claimed to have any other title to the land than the copy of the general title, which was furnished him on the fifteenth day of April, 1845; and a large number of witnesses were examined to establish these points. They prove that, whenever he spoke of having a title to the land, he uniformly spoke either in vague terms, or else referred directly to the general title, and never, in a single instance, declared that he had a grant of the land from the last-named Governor. They also prove that he was at home during the winter and spring of that year, and that in the month of April he was engaged, to some extent, in agricultural pursuits. One witness states, that he saw him on his ranch about the eighteenth or twentieth of that month; and another, that he saw him at his house about the first of May of the same year, and states the circumstances that enable him to fix the time with certainty. Two other witnesses, one a boarder in his house, and the other a neighbor, state, with great positiveness, that he was at home in the early part of May, sometimes hunting and sometimes farming, until he joined Colonel Fremont on the twenty-sixth day of that month. Testimony was also introduced by the United States, showing that great difficulties would have attended such a journey at that season of the year, on account of the swollen state of the streams and the condition of the roads; and some of the witnesses, who were well acquainted with the usual route, express the opinion that the journey, in the ordinary course of travelling, could not have been accomplished short of a month. These and many other facts were given in evidence to show that he did not visit Los Angeles at the time alleged; and clearly the weight of the evidence, to say nothing of the improbability that the Governor would bestow such a bounty upon one so recently in arms against him, is clearly against the theory set up by the claimant. Suppose it were competent for the appellee to prove his claim without record evidence, still the burden is upon him to show that the grant was issued; and surely he must first show its existence and loss before he can be allowed to give secondary evidence of its contents. Applying that elementary rule to the facts of this case, and it is clear that the claimant has no standing in court. But a more decisive answer to the claim remains to be stated, and that is, that there is no record evidence that the grant was ever issued, and without such evidence the claim cannot be confirmed. That rule is founded upon the Mexican law, and has been so repeatedly announced by this court that it seems unnecessary to adduce any argument in its support. To maintain a title by secondary evidence, say the court, in United States vs. Castro et al., (24 How., 350,) the claimant must show that the grant was obtained and made in the manner the law required, at some former time, and that it was recorded in the proper public office; to which it may be added, that such was undoubtedly the Mexican law, and that the rule there laid down is plainly applicable to the present case. Similar views have been expressed by this court on so many occasions that it would be a work of supererogation to do more than to refer to the decided cases. United States vs. Teschmaker, (22 How., 392;) United States vs. Fuentes, (22 How., 443;) United States vs. Cambuston, (20 How., 59;) United States vs. Osio, (23 How., 279, 280.)

Evidence was also introduced by the claimant tending to prove that a book of records appertaining to land titles in California, for the year 1846, was lost; but no attempt was made to show that the grant in question was ever recorded in that book. All we think it necessary to say upon that subject at the present time is, that proof of such a loss cannot avail a party in a case like the present, unless it also be shown, at least by circumstances which will justify the court in finding the fact, that the grant was duly and properly entered in the lost record. In view of the whole case, we are of the opinion that the District Court erred in confirming the claim. The decree must accordingly be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the petition.

Mr. Justice WAYNE.

I content myself now with saying that I do not concur with the court in its conclusion in this case. I think it a severer exclusion of a right of property in land secured by treaty than has been hitherto adjudged by this court in any case from California.

Decree of the Circuit Court reversed and cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the petition.