Board of Public Works v. Columbia College , 21 L. Ed. 687 ( 1873 )

84 U.S. 521 (1873) 17 Wall. 521

BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS
v.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE ET AL.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. W.S. Cox, for the appellant.

Mr. W.D. Davidge, contra, for Columbia College.

Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court as follows:

As preliminary to the inquiry whether any grounds are disclosed in the case for the interposition of a court of equity, the existence of an undisputed debt by the deceased must appear. The existence of such a debt is affirmed upon the admission of the pleadings of the indebtedness, in 1854 and 1855, of the firm of Selden, Withers & Co., and upon the decree of the Circuit Court of Virginia, in June, 1860.

Whether the indebtedness of that firm was merged in the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York, and the personal claim against Withers was thus extinguished, as contended by counsel, it is unnecessary to determine. It is sufficient for the disposition of this case that the judgment is not evidence of any personal liability of Withers outside of New York. It was rendered in that State without service of process upon him, or his appearance in the action. Personal judgments thus rendered have no operation out of the limits of the State where rendered. Their effects are merely local. Out of the State they are nullities, not binding upon the non-resident defendant, nor establishing any claim against him. Such is the settled law of this country, asserted in repeated adjudications of this court and of the State courts.

The judgment in New York, it is true, is a joint judgment against all the partners, against those summoned by publication as well as those who were served with process or appeared, but this joint character cannot affect the question of its validity as respects those not served. The clause of the Federal Constitution which requires full faith and credit to be given in each State to the records and judicial proceedings of every other State, applies to the records and proceedings of courts only so far as they have jurisdiction. Wherever they want jurisdiction the records are not entitled to credit.^[*]

The indebtedness of the firm of Selden, Withers & Co., to the complainant in 1854 is, it is true, admitted by the pleadings, but the admission is accompanied with such statements as to the assignment of the partnership property, and transfer of individual property of Withers for the payment of the indebtedness, and the disposition and use of such property, as to render it a matter of doubt whether, upon an accounting, any amount would remain due to the complainant. The existence of any present indebtedness is denied, and the case was brought to a hearing on the pleadings without any evidence.^[†]

Is the claim of the complainant against Withers established by the decree of the Circuit Court of Virginia so as to authorize the present bill? The suit in this latter court was brought against all the partners, but personal service was made only upon two of them, Withers and Selden, and the case proceeded against the others upon publication of citation. Withers, as already stated, insisted in his answer, among other things, upon the merger of the causes of action in the New York judgment; and that his individual property conveyed to trustees could not be subjected to sale until the trusts in the deed of assignment were executed; but the Circuit Court, without appearing to attach any weight to this defence, immediately rendered its decree against all the partners. Withers desired to appeal from this decree, but the Court of Appeals denied his application for that purpose, on the ground that the decree was merely interlocutory and not final, declaring, in its order, that it deemed it "most proper that the case should be proceeded in further" before an appeal was allowed. One of the principal objects of the suit was to obtain a sale of the property conveyed by him to trustees, and the application of the proceeds to the debt of the firm of Selden, Withers & Co. to the complainant. The amount of individual property thus conveyed exceeded in nominal value, as already stated, $250,000, and this was to be applied only to cover a deficiency remaining after the application to that debt of a portion of the partnership assets assigned in 1854. The Court of Appeals may have considered that the decree of the Circuit Court, as a personal judgment, was not to be treated as final, but only as interlocutory, until the deficiency mentioned was determined, and the property held as security for its payment had been sold and applied. At any rate, the complainant, relying upon the decree of the court as evidence of his demand against Withers, invoking for it full faith and credit under the clause of the Constitution, cannot object to the character which the highest court of Virginia has given to it, or insist that it is entitled to any other consideration or weight. No greater effect can be given to any judgment of a court of one State in another State than is given to it in the State where rendered. Any other rule would contravene the policy of the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States on that subject.^[*]

If the decree was interlocutory, it is to be treated as only fixing provisionally the indebtedness to the complainant of the firm of Selden, Withers & Co., and, of course, the individual liability of Withers. The adjudication did not prevent a re-examination of the question of his liability, if an examination of the merits of his defence were ever made, or any subsequent modification of the terms of the interlocutory decree. The whole subject remained open, under the control of the court, and at the final hearing the provisions of the decree might have been enlarged or restricted, or otherwise modified.

It does not appear from the bill, or the record annexed, whether any proceedings for the enforcement of the interlocutory decree were subsequently taken; whether the property in Virginia or in Missouri, or any part of such property, was ever sold; or, if a sale was made, whether any of the proceeds were applied to the extinguishment of the amount adjudged due. If any inference upon this head can be drawn from the allegation of the bill that the amount remains wholly unsatisfied, it is that no such proceedings were ever taken.

The jurisdiction of a court of equity to reach the property of a debtor justly applicable to the payment of his debts, even when there is no specific lien on the property, is undoubted. It is a very ancient jurisdiction, but for its exercise the debt must be clear and undisputed and there must exist some special circumstances requiring the interposition of the court to obtain possession of, and apply the property. Unless the suit relate to the estate of a deceased person, the debt must be established by some judicial proceeding, and it must generally be shown that legal means for its collection have been exhausted. In all cases, we believe property pledged or conveyed for the payment of the debt must be first applied.

The rule requiring the existence of special circumstances bringing the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction, should not only be insisted upon with rigor whenever the property sought to be reached constitutes, as here, assets of a deceased debtor, which have already been subjected to administration and distribution; but some satisfactory excuse should be given for the failure of the creditor to present his claim, in the mode prescribed by law, to the representative of the estate, before distribution.^[*]

In England, courts of chancery took jurisdiction of bills against executors and administrators, for discovery and account of assets, and to reach property applicable to the payment of the debts of deceased persons, not merely from their general authority over trustees and trusts, but from the imperfect and defective power of the ecclesiastical courts. It was sufficient that a debt existed against the estate of a decedent, and that there was property which should be applied to its payment, to justify the interposition of the court; but when a distribution of the fund had been made, another creditor could not ask for a return of the moneys from the distributees or for a proportional part, if he had received notice of the original proceeding, and had been guilty of laches or unreasonable neglect.^[†]

In this country, there are special courts established in all the States, having jurisdiction over estates of deceased persons, called probate courts, orphans' courts, or surrogate courts, possessing, with respect to personal assets, nearly all the powers formerly exercised by the court of chancery and the ecclesiastical courts in England. They are authorized to collect the assets of the deceased, to allow claims, to direct their payment and the distribution of the property to legatees or other parties entitled, and generally to do everything essential to the final settlement of the affairs of the deceased, and the claims of creditors against his estate. There is a special court of this kind in this District, called the Orphans' Court, which was competent to allow the complainants' demand, but the demand was never presented to it for allowance. That court could have directed the application of the assets of the estate, if the demand had been allowed, or, if rejected, had been established by legal proceedings. No application was made for its aid, nor was the demand brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of the District when the estate was before it for settlement, although publication was made by the auditor for the presentation of claims. No explanation is made or attempted of this neglect, and the only grounds disclosed by the bill for relief are fully met by the answers, and are not sustained by any proof.

We are of opinion, for the reasons stated, that the decree of the court below, dismissing the bill, was correct; and it is unnecessary to consider the objections to it founded upon the non-joinder of the surviving partners of Withers, and the statute of limitations.

DECREE AFFIRMED.

NOTES

[*] D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 Howard, 174; Bates v. Delavan, 5 Paige, 305; Story on Conflict of Laws, § 546.

[†] Young v. Grundy, 6 Cranch, 51.

[*] Suydam v. Barber, 18 New York, 468.

[*] Williams v. Gibbes, 17 Howard, 239, 254, 255; Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Alabama, 662.

[†] Sawyer v. Birchmore, 1 Keen, 391.