In Re Baiz , 10 S. Ct. 854 ( 1890 )

135 U.S. 403 (1890)

IN RE BAIZ, Petitioner.

No. 11. Original.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued March 31, April 1, 1890. Decided May 5, 1890. ORIGINAL.

Mr. Joseph H. Choate (with whom was Mr. Michael H. Cardozo) for the petitioner.

Mr. Robert D. Benedict opposing.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

The judicial power of the United States extends to "all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." Const. Art. III, sec. 2.

By section 687 of the Revised Statutes, it is provided that the Supreme Court "shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul or a vice-consul is a party." By section 563, it is provided that "the District Courts shall have jurisdiction as follows: ... Seventeenth. Of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls," except for certain offences. The petitioner has been, since July, 1887, the consul general of the Republic of Guatemala, and therefore the District Court had jurisdiction of the action in question, unless he belonged to the class of official personages subject to suits or proceedings only in this court. This he insists was the fact, and avers in his petition, as he did in his plea in the District Court, that at the time of the commencement of the action and until and including the 10th day of July, 1889, which was the eighth day after service of process upon him, he was "the acting minister and sole representative of said republic [of Guatemala] in the United States," and for that reason came within the words of section 687, "other public ministers."

The exemption asserted ceased on the 10th of July, 1889, and on the 17th of July the petitioner gave a general notice of appearance in the action, but did not set up the want of jurisdiction until the 25th of the following September. Suit could have been brought in that court against him on the 11th day of July, but as in his view this could not have been done on the 29th of June or the 2d of July, he contends that the District Court should be ordered to dismiss the suit, though it could at once be recommenced therein. But it is said that the appearance did not waive the right to be sued in this court rather than in the District Court, because that was the privilege of the country or government which he represented. Without pausing to inquire how far this is a correct application of the international privilege of not being sued at all, its assertion, even in this restricted form, serves to emphasize petitioner's contention that he was at that time the minister or diplomatic agent of the republics of Guatemala, Salvador and Honduras in the United States, entrusted by virtue of his office with authority to represent those republics in their negotiations and to vindicate their prerogatives.

Under section 2, Art. II, of the Constitution, the President is vested with power to "appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls," and by section 3 it is provided that "he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers."

These words are descriptive of a class existing by the law of nations, and apply to diplomatic agents whether accredited by the United States to a foreign power or by a foreign power to the United States, and the words are so used in section 2 of Art. III. These agents may be called ambassadors, envoys, ministers, commissioners, chargés d'affaires, agents, or otherwise, but they possess in substance the same functions, rights and privileges as agents of their respective governments for the transaction of its diplomatic business abroad. Their designations are chiefly significant in the relation of rank, precedence or dignity. 7 Opinions Attys. Gen. (Cushing), 186.

Hence, when in subdivision fifth of section 1674 of the Revised Statutes we find "diplomatic officer" defined as including "ambassadors, envoys extraordinary, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident, commissioners, chargés d'affaires, agents and secretaries of legation, and none others," we understand that to express the view of Congress as to what are included within the term "public ministers," although the section relates to diplomatic officers of the United States.

But the scope of the words "public ministers" is defined in the legislation embodied in Title XLVII, "Foreign Relations," Rev. Stat., 2d ed. 783. Section 4062 provides that "every person who violates any safe conduct or passport duly obtained and issued under authority of the United States; or who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons or in any other manner offers violence to the person of a public minister, in violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned for not more than three years, and fined, at the discretion of the court." Section 4063 enacts that whenever any writ or process is sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of the United States, or of a State, or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of any public minister of any foreign prince or state, authorized and received as such by the President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such minister, is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized or attached, such writ or process shall be deemed void. Section 4064 imposes penalties for suing out any writ or process in violation of the preceding section; and section 4065 says that the two preceding sections shall not apply to any case where the person against whom the process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the United States "in the service of a public minister," and process is founded upon a debt contracted before he entered upon such service; nor shall the preceding section apply to any case where the person against whom the process is issued is a "domestic servant of a public minister," unless the name of the servant has been registered and posted as therein prescribed.

Section 4130, which is the last section of the title, is as follows: "The word ``minister,' when used in this title, shall be understood to mean the person invested with, and exercising, the principal diplomatic functions. The word ``consul' shall be understood to mean any person invested by the United States with, and exercising, the functions of consul general, vice-consul general, consul or vice-consul."

Sections 4062, 4063, 4064 and 4065 were originally sections 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Crimes Act of April 30, 1790, c. 9, 1 Stat. 118; and these were drawn from the statute 7 Anne, c. 12, which was declaratory simply of the law of nations, which Lord Mansfield observed, in Heathfield v. Chilton, 4 Burrow, 2015, 2016, the act did not intend to alter and could not alter.

In that case, involving the discharge of the defendant from custody, as a domestic servant to the minister of the Prince Bishop of Liége, Lord Mansfield said: "I should desire to know in what manner this minister was accredited — certainly, he is not an ambassador, which is the first rank — envoy, indeed, is a second class; but he is not shown to be even an envoy. He is called ``minister,' 'tis true; but minister (alone) is an equivocal term." The statute of Anne was passed in consequence of the arrest of an ambassador of Peter the Great for debt, and the demand by the Czar that the sheriff of Middlesex and all others concerned in the arrest should be punished with instant death, 1 Bl. Com. 254; and it was in reference to this that Lord Ellenborough, in Viveash v. Becker, 3 M. & S. 284, where it was held that a resident merchant of London, who is appointed and acts as consul to a foreign prince, is not exempt from arrest on mesne process, remarked: "I cannot help thinking that the act of Parliament, which mentions only ``ambassadors and public ministers,' and which was passed at a time when it was an object studiously to comprehend all kinds of public ministers entitled to these privileges, must be considered as declaratory, not only of what the law of nations is, but of the extent to which that law is to be carried."

Three cases are cited by counsel for petitioner arising under or involving the act of 1790. In United States v. Liddle, 2 Wash. C.C. 205, in the case of an indictment for an assault and battery on a member of a foreign legation, it was held that the certificate of the Secretary of State, dated subsequently to the assault and battery, is the best evidence to prove the diplomatic character of a person accredited as a minister by the government of the United States. The certificate from the Secretary of State, Mr. Madison, stated that "when Mr. Feronda produced to the President his credentials as chargé des affaires of Spain, he also introduced De Lima, as a gentleman attached to the legation and performing the duties of secretary of legation," and the certificate was held to be the best evidence to prove that Feronda was received and accredited, and that at the same time De Lima was presented and received as secretary attached to the legation. In United States v. Ortega, 4 Wash. C.C. 531; there was produced in court an official letter from the Spanish minister to the Secretary of State, informing him that he had appointed Mr. Salmon chargé d'affaires; a letter from the minister to Mr. Salmon; a letter from the Secretary of State addressed to the Spanish minister, recognizing the character of Mr. Salmon; two letters from the Secretary of State addressed to Mr. Salmon as chargé d'affaires; and the deposition of the chief clerk of the State Department that Mr. Salmon was recognized by the President as chargé d'affaires, and was accredited by the Secretary of State. In United States v. Benner, Baldwin, 234, the court was furnished with a certificate from the Secretary of State that the Danish minister had by letter informed the Department that Mr. Brandis had arrived in this country in the character of attaché to the legation, and that said Brandis had accordingly, since that date, been recognized by the Department as attached to the legation in that character.

These cases clearly indicate the nature of the evidence proper to establish whether a person is a public minister within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws, and that the inquiry before us may be answered by such evidence, if adduced.

Was Consul General Baiz a person "invested with and exercising the principal diplomatic functions," within section 4130, or a "diplomatic officer," within section 1674? His counsel claim in their motion that he was "the acting minister or chargé d'affaires of the Republics of Guatemala, Salvador and Honduras in the United States," and so recognized by the State Department, and that he exercised diplomatic functions as such, and therefore was a public minister, within the statute.

By the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle four distinct kinds of representation were recognized, of which the fourth comprised chargés d'affaires, who are appointed by the minister of foreign affairs, and not as the others, nominally or actually by the sovereign. Under the regulations of this government the representatives of the United States have heretofore been ranked in three grades, the third being chargés d'affaires. Secretaries of legation act ex officio as chargés d'affaires ad interim, and in the absence of the secretary of legation the Secretary of State may designate any competent person to act ad interim, in which case he is specifically accredited by letter to the minister for foreign affairs.

Wheaton says: "Chargés d'affaires, accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs of the court at which they reside, are either chargés d'affaires ad hoc, who are originally sent and accredited by their governments, or chargés d'affaires per interim, substituted in the place of the minister of their respective nations during his absence." Elements Int. Law (8th ed.), § 215.

Ch. de Martens explains that "^[1]chargés d'affaires ad hoc on permanent mission are accredited by letters transmitted to the minister of foreign affairs. Chargés d'affaires ad interim are presented as such by the minister of the first or second class when he is about to leave his position temporarily or permanently." Guide Diplomatique, Vol. 1, p. 61, § 16.

"They," observes Twiss in his Law of Nations, § 192, "are orally invested with the charge of the embassy or legation by the ambassador or minister himself, to be exercised during his absence from the seat of his mission. They are accordingly announced in this character by him before his departure to the minister of foreign affairs of the court to which he is accredited."

Diplomatic duties are sometimes imposed upon consuls, but only in virtue of the right of a government to designate those who shall represent it in the conduct of international affairs, 1 Calvo, Droit Int. 586, 2d ed. Paris 1870, and among the numerous authorities on international laws, cited and quoted from by petitioner's counsel, the attitude of consuls, on whom this function is occasionally conferred, is perhaps as well put by De Clercq and De Vallat as by any, as follows:

"There^[2] remains a last consideration to notice, that of a consul who is charged for the time being with the management of the affairs of the diplomatic post; he is accredited in this case in his diplomatic capacity, either by a letter of the minister of foreign affairs of France to the minister of foreign affairs of the country where he is about to reside, or by a letter of the diplomatic agent whose place he is about to fill, or finally by a personal presentation of this agent to the minister of foreign affairs of the country." Guide Pratique des Consulats, Vol. 1, p. 93.

That it may sometimes happen that consuls are so charged is recognized by section 1738 of the Revised Statutes, which provides:

"No consular officer shall exercise diplomatic functions, or hold any diplomatic correspondence or relation on the part of the United States, in, with, or to the government or country to which he is appointed, or any other country or government. when there is in such country any officer of the United States authorized to perform diplomatic functions therein; nor in any case, unless expressly authorized by the President so to do."

But in such case their consular character is necessarily subordinated to their superior diplomatic character. "A consul," observed Mr. Justice Story, in The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435, 445, "though a public agent, is supposed to be clothed with authority only for commercial purposes. He has an undoubted right to interpose claims for the restitution of property belonging to the subjects of his own country; but he is not considered as a minister, or diplomatic agent of his sovereign, intrusted, by virtue of his office, with authority to represent him in his negotiations with foreign states, or to vindicate his prerogatives. There is no doubt that his sovereign may specially intrust him with such authority; but in such case his diplomatic character is superadded to his ordinary powers, and ought to be recognized by the government within whose dominions he assumes to exercise it."

When a consul is appointed chargé d'affaires, he has a double political capacity; but though invested with full diplomatic privileges, he becomes so invested as chargé d'affaires and not as consul, and though authorized as consul to communicate directly with the government in which he resides, he does not thereby obtain the diplomatic privileges of a minister. Atty. Gen. Cushing, 7 Opinions, 342, 345.

This is illustrated by the ruling of Mr. Secretary Blaine, April 12, 1881, that the Consul General of a foreign government was not to be regarded as entitled to the immunities accompanying the possession of diplomatic character, because he was also accredited as the "political agent" so-called of that government, since he was not recognized as performing any acts as such, which he was not equally competent to perform as Consul General. 1 Whart. Dig. Int. Law, 2d ed. c. 4, § 88, p. 624.

We are of opinion that Mr. Baiz was not, at the time of the commencement of the suit in question, chargé d'affaires ad interim of Guatemala, or invested with and exercising the principal diplomatic functions, or in any view a "diplomatic officer." He was not a public minister within the intent and meaning of § 687; and the District Court had jurisdiction.

The letter of Señor Lainfiesta of January 16, 1889, was neither an appointment of Mr. Baiz as chargé d'affaires ad interim, nor equivalent to such an appointment. It was a request in terms that the Secretary of State would "please allow that the Consul General of Guatemala and Honduras, in New York, Mr. Jacob Baiz," should communicate to the office of the Secretary of State any matters relating to the peace of Central America of which that department ought to be informed without delay. This is not the language of designation to a representative position, and is the language designating a mere medium of communication; and the reply of Mr. Secretary Bayard so treats it, in declaring that the department would be pleased to receive any communication in relation to Central America of which Consul General Baiz might be made the channel. This reply is addressed to Mr. Baiz as "Consul General of Guatemala and Honduras," and not as chargé d'affaires ad interim. The mere fact that the usual note conveying the information to the legations of Mr. Secretary Blaine's accession chanced to be addressed to "Señor Don Jacob Baiz, in charge of the legations of Guatemala, Salvador and Honduras," was not a recognition that he was chargé d'affaires ad interim, or exercising diplomatic functions; and Mr. Baiz in acknowledging the receipt of that announcement properly signs his letter "Consul General." It may be that such announcements are not sent to any but those exercising diplomatic functions; but this courtesy could not operate as in itself a deliberate recognition of the right to exercise such functions, nor that the person to whom the communication was addressed was in such exercise as a matter of fact. It was entirely proper, since Consul General Baiz was the channel of communication between Guatemala, Honduras and Salvador and the State Department, that the notification should be sent to him, and even if that course had not been usual, the courtesy could not be availed of to impart a character which the recipient did not otherwise possess.

The proofs show that of ten letters from the State Department to Mr. Baiz, between January 16 and July 10, 1889, two were addressed to him as in charge of the legations, or the business of the legations, of Guatemala, Salvador and Honduras; two were addressed to him as Consul of Honduras; and six as Consul General of Guatemala, or Guatemala and Honduras. Of seven letters from Mr. Baiz to the department, one was signed Jacob Baiz, and six, Jacob Baiz, Consul General. The acknowledgment of notice of the accession of the Secretary of State, and of the appointment of Mr. Mizner, and the transmission of a letter from the President of Guatemala, and the announcement of the appointment of Minister Cruz, by the Consul General, can hardly be regarded as the performance of diplomatic functions as such.

The official circular issued by the Department of State, corrected to June 13, 1889, gives the names and description of the chargés d'affaires ad interim, in the case of countries represented by ministers who were absent and of countries having no minister, and the date of their presentation. In the instance of Portugal, the name is given of "Consul and acting Consul General, in charge of business of legation," and the fact of the presentation with the date appears in the list; while in the instance of Guatemala, Salvador and Honduras, the name of Mr. Baiz is referred to in a foot-note, with the title of Consul General only; nor does it appear, nor is it claimed to be the fact, that he was ever presented. As stated by counsel, Mr. Webster took the ground, in the case of M. Hülsemann, that as chargé d'affaires he was not, as matter of strict right, entitled to be presented to the President; and this is in accordance with the regulations of the State Department. Cons. Reg. 13. But such presentation is undeniably evidence of the possession of diplomatic character, and so would be the formal reception of a chargé d'affaires ad interim by the Secretary of State. The inference is obvious, that if the Department of State had regarded Mr. Baiz as chargé d'affaires ad interim, or as "invested with and exercising the principal diplomatic functions," his name would have been placed in the list, with some indication of the fact, as the title of chargé, or, if he had been presented, the date of his presentation. Nor can a reason be suggested why the petitioner has not produced in this case a certificate from the Secretary of State that he had been recognized by the Department of State as chargé d'affaires ad interim of Guatemala, or as intrusted with diplomatic functions, if there had been such recognition. A certificate of his status was requested by the Guatemalan minister, and if the State Department had understood that Mr. Baiz was in any sense or in any way a "diplomatic representative," no reason is perceived why the Department would not have furnished a certificate to that effect; but instead of that, it contented itself with a courteous reply, giving what was in its judgment a sufficient résumé of the facts, the letter being in effect a polite declination to give the particular certificate desired, because that could not properly be done.

Mr. Baiz was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the city of New York. In many countries it is a state maxim that one of its own subjects or citizens is not to be received as a foreign diplomatic agent, and a refusal to receive, based on that objection, is always regarded as reasonable. The expediency of avoiding a possible conflict between his privileges as such and his obligations as a subject or citizen, is considered reason enough in itself. Wheaton, 8th ed. § 210; 2 Twiss, Law of Nations, 276, § 186; 2 Phill. Int. Law, 171. Even an appointment as consul of a native of the place where consular service is required, is, according to Phillimore "perhaps, rightfully pronounced, by a considerable authority, to be objectionable in principle." Vol. II. p. 291, citing De Martens & De Cussey, Recueil des Traités, Index explicatif, p. XXX, tit. "Consuls."

"Other^[1] powers," says Calvo, vol. 1, p. 559, 2d ed., "admit without difficulty their own citizens as representatives of foreign States, but imposing on them the obligation of amenability to the local laws as to their persons and property. These conditions, which, nevertheless, ought never to go so far as to modify or alter the representative character, ought always to be defined before or at the time of receiving the agent; for otherwise, the latter might find it impossible to claim the honors, rights and prerogatives attached to his employment." See also Heffter, 3d Fr. ed. 387.^[2]

In the United States, the rule is expressed by Mr. Secretary Evarts, under date of September 19, 1879, thus: "This government objects to receiving a citizen of the United States as a diplomatic representative of a foreign power. Such citizens, however, are frequently recognized as consular officers of other nations, and this policy is not known to have hitherto occasioned any inconvenience." And again, April 20, 1880, while waiving the obstacle in the particular instance, he says: "The usage of diplomatic intercourse between nations is averse to the acceptance, in the representative capacity, of a person who, while native born in the country which sends him, has yet acquired lawful status as a citizen by naturalization of the country to which he is sent." 1 Wharton Dig. Int. Law 2d ed. § 88a, p. 628. Of course the objection would not exist to the same extent in the case of designation for special purposes or temporarily, but it is one purely for the receiving government to insist upon or waive at its pleasure. The presumption, therefore, would ordinarily be against Mr. Baiz's contention, and, as matter of fact, we find that when in 1886, he was appointed chargé d'affaires of the Republic of Honduras to the government of the United States, Mr. Secretary Bayard declined receiving him as the diplomatic representative of the government of that country, because of his being a citizen of the United States, and advised him that: "It has long been the almost uniform practice of this government to decline to recognize American citizens as the accredited diplomatic representatives of foreign powers. The statutory and jurisdictional immunities and the customary privileges of right attaching to the office of a foreign minister make it not only inconsistent, but at times even inconvenient, that a citizen of this country should enjoy so anomalous a position." And in a subsequent communication rendered necessary by a direct question of Mr. Baiz, the Secretary informs him "that it is not the purpose of the department to regard the substitutionary agency, which it cheerfully admits in your case, as conferring upon you personally any diplomatic status whatever." This correspondence disposes of the question before us. The objection which existed in 1886 to the reception of Mr. Baiz as chargé d'affaires ad hoc or ad interim, or according to him any diplomatic status whatever, whether temporary or otherwise, existed in 1889; and it is out of the question to assume that the State Department intended to concede the diplomatic status between January 16 and July 10, 1889, upon the request of Señor Lainfiesta that Consul General Baiz might be allowed to be a medium of communication during his absence, which it had refused to accord to the Republic of Honduras itself. It is evident that the statement of the Assistant Secretary, October 4, 1889, was quite correct, that "the business of the legation [of Guatemala] was conducted by Consul General Baiz, but without diplomatic character."

It is objected that we ought not to have allowed these official papers to come before us, but should have prohibited the District Court from exercising jurisdiction, because the evidence that established it had not all been before that court when the question was raised; but the rule governing this class of cases involves no such consequences. The district judge was of opinion that inasmuch as there were two kinds of direct evidence which would show that the defendant was a "public minister," to wit: (1) A certificate of the Secretary of State that he was such, was received as such and was exercising such functions; or (2) proof of the exercise by the defendant of "the principal diplomatic functions," under some one of the titles of diplomatic office, as recognized by our statutes and the law of nations; and as such direct evidence had not been furnished, and the plaintiff was not required to produce his counter evidence on a motion like that under consideration instead of at the trial, he was justified in retaining jurisdiction until the issue raised by the pleadings was regularly determined. But to this latter suggestion, counsel for petitioner answered in argument: "At any rate, in this court, exercising its appropriate jurisdiction to entertain an application for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, the respondent here is called upon to produce any evidence that exists to countervail the petitioner's proof of his privilege." This is undoubtedly the correct view. The question here is whether the District Court had jurisdiction, and not whether its order refusing to set aside the service of summons and the subsequent proceedings in the action, and dismissing the same, should be reversed.

The practice in prohibition was formerly to file a suggestion, an affidavit in support of which was required where the prohibition was moved for upon anything not appearing upon the face of the proceedings. Upon a rule to show cause, if it appeared to the court, on cause shown, that the surmise was not true, or not clearly sufficient to ground the prohibition upon it would be denied, otherwise the rule would be made absolute: or, if the matter were doubtful, the party was ordered to declare, and issue joined on such declaration was regularly tried, being in the nature of an issue to inform the conscience of the court. 2 Sellon's Practice, 313, 321, 325. And in mandamus, if the case were not governed by the return to the alternative writ, but a traverse of the return was allowed, issues were made up and a trial had. If the matter can be disposed of upon the rule to show cause, that course may be pursued, but the applicable principles are the same. The alleged want of jurisdiction depends upon questions of fact. It was purely discretionary whether this evidence should be admitted at the time it was presented; and in a proceeding involving the inquiry under consideration, it was plainly our duty to permit it to come in, the petitioner being afforded, as he was, the opportunity for explanation and the introduction of such other evidence as he chose to produce.

In Ex parte Hitz, Petitioner, 111 U.S. 766, which was an application for a writ of certiorari, commanding the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to certify to this court an indictment and the proceedings thereunder, on the ground that, when the indictment was filed and when the offences therein charged were committed, he was the diplomatic representative of the Swiss Confederation, the court directed a preliminary inquiry, and, in doing so, Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: "As it is conceded that the petitioner is not now in the diplomatic service of Switzerland, and was not when all the proceedings in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia subsequent to the indictment were had, counsel are directed to request the Secretary of State to certify whether John Hitz was at any time accredited to and recognized by the government of the United States as public or political agent or chargé d'affaires of the Republic of Switzerland, and if so, for what period of time, and up to and including what date." The counsel having complied with that request, the court upon receiving the information as to what the records of the department showed, dismissed the petition.

Regarding the matter in hand as in its general nature, one of delicacy and importance, we have not thought it desirable to discuss the suggestions of counsel in relation to the remedy, but have preferred to examine into and pass upon the merits.

We ought to add that while we have not cared to dispose of this case upon the mere absence of technical evidence, we do not assume to sit in judgment upon the decision of the executive in reference to the public character of a person claiming to be a foreign minister, and therefore have the right to accept the certificate of the State Department that a party is or is not a privileged person, and cannot properly be asked to proceed upon argumentative or collateral proof.

Our conclusion is, as already stated, that the District Court had jurisdiction, and we accordingly discharge the rule and

Deny the writs.

NOTES

[1] Les Chargés d'affaires ad hoc, en mission permanente, sont accrédités par des lettres remises au ministre des affaires étrangères. Les chargés d'affaires ad interim sont présentés comme tels par le ministre de première ou 2de Classe lorsqu'il se dispose à quitter son poste temporairemen ou définitivement.

[2] Il reste une dernière supposition à prévoir: celle où un consul est chargé provisoirement de la gestion des affaires d'un poste diplomatique; il est accrédité, dans ce cas, en sa qualité diplomatique, soit par une lettre du ministre des affaires étrangères de France au ministre des affaires étrangères du pays où il doit résider, soit par une lettre de l'agent diplomatique qu'il doit remplacer, soit enfin par la présentation personelle de cet agent au ministre des affaires étrangerès du pays.

[1] D'autres puissances admettent sans difficulté leurs nationaux comme représentants d'États étrangers, mais, en leur imposant l'obligation de rester soumis aux lois territoriales pour leurs personnes et pour leurs biens. Ces conditions, qui cependant ne sauraient jamais aller jusqu'à modifier ou à altérer le caractàre représentatif, doivent toujours être exprimées avant ou au moment de reçevoir l'agent; car autrement celui-ci se trouverait dans l'impossibilité de revendiquer les honneurs, les droits, et les prérogatives attachés à son emploi.

[2] En pareil cas le consentement du gouvernement étranger est indispensable, et ce consentement peut être conditionel et limité.