Lora v. United States ( 2023 )

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
LORA v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 22–49. Argued March 28, 2023—Decided June 16, 2023
A federal court imposing multiple prison sentences typically has discre-
tion to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. See 18 U. S. C.
§3584. An exception exists in §924(c), which provides that “no term of
imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
Here, the Court considers whether §924(c)’s bar on concurrent sen-
tences extends to a sentence imposed under a different subsection,
§924(j).
Petitioner Efrain Lora was convicted of the federal crime of aiding
and abetting a violation of §924(j)(1), which penalizes “a person who,
in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a per-
son through the use of a firearm,” where “the killing is a murder.” A
violation of subsection (c) occurs when a person “uses or carries a fire-
arm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traffick-
ing crime,” or “possesses a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.”
§924(c)(1)(A). Lora was also convicted of a second federal crime, con-
spiring to distribute drugs.
At sentencing, the District Court concluded that it lacked discretion
to run the sentences for Lora’s two convictions concurrently, because
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s bar on concurrent sentences governs §924(j) sen-
tences. The District Court sentenced Lora to consecutive terms of im-
prisonment for the drug-distribution-conspiracy count and the §924(j)
count. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s bar on concurrent sentences does not gov-
ern a sentence for a §924(j) conviction. A §924(j) sentence therefore
can run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence.
Pp. 3–10.
2 LORA v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
(a) Sections 924(c) and 924(j) criminalize the use, carrying, and pos-
session of firearms in connection with certain crimes. Subsection (c)
lays out a set of offenses and their corresponding penalties. It also
mandates that a “term of imprisonment imposed on a person under
this subsection” must run consecutively with other sentences.
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Subsection (j) likewise lays out offense elements and
corresponding penalties. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) contains
no consecutive-sentence mandate. Pp. 3–4.
(b) Subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate applies only to the
terms of imprisonment prescribed within subsection (c). A sentence
imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify. Subsection (j) is located
outside subsection (c) and does not call for imposing any sentence from
subsection (c). And while subsection (j) references subsection (c), that
reference is limited to offense elements, not penalties. Pp. 4–5.
(c) Congress did not, as the Government maintains, incorporate
§924(c) as a whole into §924(j) such that a §924(j) defendant faces sub-
section (j)’s penalties plus subsection (c)’s penalties. Subsection (j) no-
where mentions—let alone incorporates—subsection (c)’s penalties.
Moreover, as subsections (c) and (j) are written, a sentencing court can-
not always obey both sets of penalties. To avert potential conflict be-
tween subsections (c) and (j), the Government points to another provi-
sion, §924(c)(5), as a model. But assuming without deciding whether
§924(c)(5) operates as the Government says, Congress did not imple-
ment that design in subsection (j). Equally unavailing is the Govern-
ment’s argument that, under double jeopardy principles, a defendant
cannot receive both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the
same conduct. That view of double jeopardy can easily be squared with
the conclusion that subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s
penalties nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate. Pp. 5–8.
(d) It is not “implausible,” as the Government asserts, for Congress
to have imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate under sub-
section (c) but not subsection (j), which covers more serious offense
conduct. That result is consistent with the statute’s design. Unlike
subsection (c), subsection (j) generally eschews mandatory penalties in
favor of sentencing flexibility. Of a piece, subsection (j) permits flexi-
bility to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences. Con-
gress chose a different approach to punishment in subsection (j) than
in subsection (c), and the Court must implement the design Congress
chose. Pp. 8–10.
Vacated and remanded.
JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 1
Opinion of the Court
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 22–49
_________________
EFRAIN LORA, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 16, 2023]
JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
When a federal court imposes multiple prison sentences,
it can typically choose whether to run the sentences concur-
rently or consecutively. See 18 U. S. C. §3584. An excep-
tion exists in subsection (c) of §924, which provides that “no
term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this sub-
section shall run concurrently with any other term of im-
prisonment.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
In this case, we consider whether §924(c)’s bar on concur-
rent sentences extends to a sentence imposed under a dif-
ferent subsection: §924(j). We hold that it does not. A sen-
tence for a §924(j) conviction therefore can run either
concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence.
I
In 2002, members of a drug-dealing group from the Bronx
assassinated a rival drug dealer. The Government accused
petitioner Efrain Lora of being one of the group’s leaders
and acting as a scout during the fatal shooting. After a jury
trial, Lora was convicted of aiding and abetting a violation
of §924(j)(1), which penalizes “[a] person who, in the course
of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person
2 LORA v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
through the use of a firearm,” where “the killing is a mur-
der.” See also §2(a) (an aider and abettor is punishable “as
a principal”). Lora was also convicted of conspiring to dis-
tribute drugs, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846.
At sentencing, the District Court rejected two of Lora’s
arguments about his §924(j) conviction. Most pertinent
here, Lora argued that the District Court had discretion to
run the §924(j) sentence concurrently with the drug-
distribution-conspiracy sentence. The District Court held
it lacked such discretion. Applying Circuit precedent, it
held that §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s bar on concurrent sentences
governs §924(j) sentences, such that Lora’s two sentences
had to run consecutively. See United States v. Barrett, 937
F. 3d 126, 129, n. 2 (CA2 2019). Lora also argued that a
§924(j) conviction is not subject to the mandatory minimum
sentences specified in §924(c). Disagreeing once again, the
District Court applied the five-year mandatory minimum
under §924(c)(1)(A) to Lora’s sentencing calculation.
The District Court ultimately sentenced Lora to 30 years
of imprisonment: 25 years on the drug-distribution-
conspiracy count and—consecutively—five years on the
§924(j) count. Lora also received five years of supervised
release.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, adhering to its precedent
barring §924(j) sentences from running concurrently with
other sentences. That decision reinforced a conflict among
the Courts of Appeals over whether §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s
concurrent-sentence bar governs §924(j) sentences.1 We
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 598 U. S. ___(2022).
——————
1 Compare, e.g., Barrett, 937 F. 3d, at 129, n. 2 (§924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s
concurrent-sentence bar governs §924(j) sentences); United States v. Ber-
rios, 676 F. 3d 118, 140–144 (CA3 2012); United States v. Bran, 776 F. 3d
276, 280–282 (CA4 2015); and United States v. Dinwiddie, 618 F. 3d 821,
837 (CA8 2010), with United States v. Julian, 633 F. 3d 1250, 1252–1257
(CA11 2011) (it does not).
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
Opinion of the Court
II
A
This case concerns federal laws that criminalize the use,
carrying, and possession of firearms in connection with cer-
tain crimes. The relevant parts of that scheme are spread
across two subsections of 18 U. S. C. §924.
Subsection (c) lays out a set of offenses and their corre-
sponding penalties. It begins by making it a crime either to
“us[e] or carr[y] a firearm” “during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or to “posses[s]
a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.” §924(c)(1)(A).
The provision then prescribes “a term of imprisonment” for
that offense: a minimum of five years. §924(c)(1)(A)(i).
Other (more serious) offense elements and “term[s] of im-
prisonment” follow within subsection (c). If the firearm is
“brandished,” the “term of imprisonment” jumps to a mini-
mum of seven years. §924(c)(1)(A)(ii). If the firearm is “dis-
charged,” the minimum becomes 10 years; if the firearm is
a “machinegun,” 30 years; and so on. §§924(c)(1)(A)–(C),
(c)(5).
Subsection (c) also provides that “no term of imprison-
ment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed
on the person.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). In other words, the sen-
tence must run consecutively, not concurrently, in relation
to other sentences. This concurrent-sentence bar (or
consecutive-sentence mandate) is at issue in this case.
Subsection (j) was added decades after subsection (c) and
its consecutive-sentence mandate.2 Subsection (j) likewise
lays out offense elements and corresponding penalties. It
provides:
——————
2 See 82 Stat. 1224 (enacting subsection (c) in 1968); 84 Stat. 1889–
1890 (adding subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate in 1971); 108
Stat. 1973 (enacting subsection (j), originally designated as subsection
(i), in 1994); 110 Stat. 3505 (redesignating as subsection (j) in 1996).
4 LORA v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
“A person who, in the course of a violation of subsec-
tion (c), causes the death of a person through the use of
a firearm, shall—
“(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section
1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for
any term of years or for life; and
“(2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in sec-
tion 1112), be punished as provided in that section.”
§924(j).
Subsection (j) contains no consecutive-sentence mandate.
B
Here, Lora was convicted of a subsection (j) offense. The
parties dispute whether the sentence for that offense can
run concurrently with another sentence, or whether it is
subject to subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate.
We hold the former.
Subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence requirement ap-
plies to a “term of imprisonment imposed on a person under
this subsection”—i.e., subsection (c). §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (em-
phasis added). By those plain terms, Congress applied the
consecutive-sentence mandate only to terms of imprison-
ment imposed under that subsection. And Congress put
subsection (j) in a different subsection of the statute.
Drilling into the details confirms that straightforward
reasoning. To begin, subsection (c) sets forth a host of of-
fenses and the corresponding “term[s] of imprisonment” to
be imposed. §§924(c)(1), (5); supra, at 3. Those are the
“term[s] of imprisonment imposed . . . under this subsec-
tion” that the consecutive-sentence mandate references.
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii). That is, by echoing the phrase “term of
imprisonment” and referring inwards to “this subsection,”
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii) points to the terms of imprisonment pre-
scribed within subsection (c).
A sentence imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify.
To state the obvious again, subsection (j) is not located
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
Opinion of the Court
within subsection (c). Nor does subsection (j) call for impos-
ing any sentence from subsection (c). Instead, subsection
(j) provides its own set of penalties. See §§924(j)(1)–(2).
To be sure, subsection (j) references subsection (c). But it
does so only with respect to offense elements, not penalties.
Subsection (j)’s offense elements include causing death “in
the course of a violation of subsection (c).” §924(j). And to
define that phrase, one must consult subsection (c)’s offense
elements (i.e., what it takes to violate that subsection). But
that is where subsection (c)’s role in subsection (j) stops.
One need not consult subsection (c)’s sentences in order to
sentence a subsection (j) defendant.
Thus, a defendant who is sentenced under subsection (j)
does not receive a “term of imprisonment imposed . . . under
[subsection (c)].” Consequently, §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s consecu-
tive-sentence mandate does not apply.
III
A
The Government tries to deflect this conclusion by blend-
ing subsections (c) and (j) together. It claims that “Congress
incorporated Section 924(c) as a whole into Section 924(j).”
Brief for United States 15. Under that view, a subsection
(j) defendant faces subsection (j)’s penalties plus subsection
(c)’s penalties—including subsection (c)’s mandatory mini-
mum sentences and its consecutive-sentence mandate.
The actual statute bears no resemblance to the Govern-
ment’s vision. Subsection (j) nowhere mentions—let alone
incorporates—subsection (c)’s penalties. Instead, as just
explained, subsection (j)’s only reference to subsection (c) is
limited to offense elements. Supra this page.
Moreover, a sentencing court cannot follow both subsec-
tion (c) and subsection (j) as written. Combining the two
subsections would set them on a collision course; indeed, in
some cases, the maximum sentence would be lower than the
minimum sentence. Take voluntary manslaughter using a
6 LORA v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
machinegun in the course of a subsection (c)(1) violation, for
example. Subsection (c), because of the machinegun, would
command that “the person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 30 years.” §924(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Subsection (j), because of the voluntary manslaughter,
would command that, per §1112, the person “shall be . . .
imprisoned not more than 15 years.” §§924(j)(2), 1112(b).
To fashion a sentence “not less than 30 years” and “not more
than 15 years”—that is, to obey both subsections (c) and
(j)—is impossible. And Congress has not required that
unachievable result. Instead, subsection (j) supplies its
own comprehensive set of penalties that apply instead of
subsection (c)’s.
To avert potential conflict between subsections (c) and (j),
the Government tries to knit the two provisions together in
a very particular way. In the Government’s view, a court
sentencing a subsection (j) defendant should jump to sub-
section (c), apply the penalties listed there, then jump back
to subsection (j) and add the penalties listed there, then
jump back to subsection (c) and impose the consecutive-
sentence mandate listed in that subsection. But nothing in
subsection (j) calls for such calisthenics.
To assuage that concern, the Government maintains that
Congress has done this elsewhere; it says that another pro-
vision, §924(c)(5), operates this way. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, 31.
Even if §924(c)(5) does work in that fashion—which we do
not decide—the Government’s argument only underscores
that subsection (j) does not.
Under §924(c)(5), a person who, inter alia, uses armor
piercing ammunition during and in relation to a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime:
“shall . . .
“(A) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
less than 15 years; and
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 7
Opinion of the Court
“(B) if death results from the use of such ammuni-
tion—
“(i) if the killing is murder (as defined in section
1111), be punished by death or sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and
“(ii) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in sec-
tion 1112), be punished as provided in section 1112.”
(Emphasis added.)
According to the Government, §924(c)(5) adds two penalties
together when death results: Someone convicted of murder
resulting from the use of such ammunition faces a 15-year
mandatory minimum sentence under §924(c)(5)(A) plus an
additional sentence for murder under §924(c)(5)(B)(i). Tr.
of Oral Arg. 27, 31.
But subsection (j) is cast from a different mold. Section
924(c)(5) groups the two penalties together and joins them
with the word “and.” In contrast, several unrelated subsec-
tions separate subsections (c) and (j) structurally, and noth-
ing joins their penalties textually. So even if those features
of §924(c)(5) make it operate as the Government contends,
those aspects of §924(c)(5) are missing from subsection (j).
In the Government’s own telling, then, §924(c)(5) shows
how Congress could have constructed penalties that might
ultimately add together. Yet Congress did not implement
that design in subsection (j).
Equally unavailing is the Government’s invocation of
double jeopardy principles. According to the Government’s
brief, “Section 924(j) amounts to the ‘same offense’ as Sec-
tion 924(c) for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause,” so
“a defendant may be punished for either a Section 924(c)
offense or a Section 924(j) offense, but not both.” Brief for
United States 22–26 (emphasis added; alterations and
some internal quotation marks omitted). The Government
argues that this conception of double jeopardy confirms sub-
section (j) incorporates all of subsection (c). Ibid.
8 LORA v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
We express no position on the Government’s view of dou-
ble jeopardy, because even assuming it, arguendo, the Gov-
ernment’s view does not refute our holding on the question
presented. The Government says someone cannot receive
both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the same
conduct. But that aligns with our conclusion here: If a de-
fendant receives a sentence under subsection (j), he does not
receive a sentence “imposed . . . under [subsection (c)]” that
would trigger the consecutive-sentence mandate.
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Accordingly, the Government’s view of
double jeopardy can easily be squared with our view that
subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s penalties
nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate.
B
The Government protests that it is “implausible” that
Congress imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate
under subsection (c) but not subsection (j), which covers
more serious offense conduct. Brief for United States 9, 28–
35. Yet that result is consistent with other design features
of the statute.
Congress plainly chose a different approach to punish-
ment in subsection (j) than in subsection (c). Subsection (c),
first enacted in 1968, is full of mandatory penalties. It con-
tains mandatory minimum years of imprisonment and
mandatory consecutive sentences. In fact, when subsection
(j) was enacted in 1994, subsection (c) specified not just
mandatory minimums, but exact mandatory terms of im-
prisonment. 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1) (1994 ed.) (e.g., exactly
five years of imprisonment for the base subsection (c) of-
fense).
Subsection (j), by contrast, generally eschews mandatory
penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility. Unlike subsec-
tion (c), subsection (j) contains no mandatory minimums.
Even for murder, subsection (j) expressly permits a sen-
tence of “any term of years.” §924(j)(1) (emphasis added).
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 9
Opinion of the Court
This follows the same pattern as several other provisions
enacted alongside subsection (j) in the Federal Death Pen-
alty Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1959. In those provisions, as in
§924(j)(1), Congress authorized the death penalty, but also
a flexible range of lesser sentences for “any term of years,”
with no mandatory minimum or consecutive-sentence man-
date.3 In the same law, Congress also enacted a provision
allowing judges to go below the otherwise-mandatory mini-
mum sentence in certain cases.4 Given those choices to fa-
vor sentencing flexibility over mandatory penalties, it is not
“implausible,” as the Government asserts, that subsection
(j) permits flexibility to choose between concurrent and con-
secutive sentences.
Nor is that flexibility incompatible with the seriousness
of subsection (j) offenses. Subsection (j) merely reflects the
seriousness of the offense using a different approach than
subsection (c)’s mandatory penalties. For murder, subsec-
tion (j) authorizes the harshest maximum penalty possible:
death. §924(j)(1). And for manslaughter, subsection (j) im-
poses the same harsh punishment that the Federal Crimi-
nal Code prescribes for other manslaughters. See §924(j)(2)
(aligning penalties with §1112).5
Congress could certainly have designed the penalty
——————
3 108 Stat. 1971–1973, 1976, 1978–1982 (Pub. L. 103–322, §§60008,
60010, 60011, 60019–60024).
4 Id., at 1985–1986 (Pub. L. 103–322, §80001) (enacting 18 U. S. C.
§3553(f )).
5 When Congress enacted subsection (j), it actually imposed higher
maximum penalties for manslaughter under subsection (j) than what
subsection (c) had authorized for the base offense. A base subsection (c)
violation triggered a fixed five-year sentence, while subsection (j)(2) au-
thorized more: up to 10 years for voluntary manslaughter and six years
for involuntary manslaughter. 18 U. S. C. §§924(c)(1), (i)(2), 1112 (1994
ed.); see 110 Stat. 3505 (redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (j)).
This reinforces that Congress designed subsection (j)’s penalties to ac-
count for the seriousness of the offense by themselves, without incorpo-
rating penalties from subsection (c).
10 LORA v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
scheme at issue here differently. It could have mandated
harsher punishment under subsection (j) than under sub-
section (c). It could have added a consecutive-sentence
mandate to subsection (j). It could have written subsection
(c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate more broadly. It could
have placed subsection (j) within subsection (c).6
But Congress did not do any of these things. And we
must implement the design Congress chose.
* * *
Because the consecutive-sentence mandate in
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not govern §924(j) sentences, the Dis-
trict Court had discretion to impose Lora’s §924(j) sentence
concurrently with another sentence. We vacate the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
——————
6 Congress specifically considered and rejected that last possibility.
The 1994 Congress had before it a proposal to add, within subsection (c),
a provision authorizing the death penalty when a subsection (c) violation
results in homicide. See 140 Cong. Rec. 11165, 24066. Congress rejected
that option and enacted a different version of that crime bill—which cre-
ated subsection (j).