Farm Bureau v. Dolly , 910 N.W.2d 196 ( 2018 )


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  • #28273-a-DG
    
    2018 S.D. 28
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    OF THE
    STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
    ****
    FARM BUREAU LIFE INSURANCE
    COMPANY and FARM BUREAU
    PROPERTY & CASUALTY
    INSURANCE COMPANY,                          Plaintiffs and Appellants,
    v.
    RYAN DOLLY,                                 Defendant and Appellee.
    ****
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
    THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
    PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
    ****
    THE HONORABLE MATTHEW M. BROWN
    Judge
    ****
    CASSIDY M. STALLEY of
    Lynn, Jackson, Shultz
    & Lebrun, P.C.
    Rapid City, South Dakota                    Attorneys for plaintiffs
    and appellants.
    SARAH E. BARON HOUY
    KELSEY B. PARKER of
    Bangs, McCullen, Butler,
    Foye & Simmons, LLP
    Rapid City, South Dakota                    Attorneys for defendant
    and appellee.
    ****
    CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
    ON JANUARY 8, 2018
    OPINION FILED 03/21/18
    #28273
    GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
    [¶1.]        Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. and Farm Bureau Property and
    Casualty Insurance Co. appeal the circuit court’s partial denial of their request for
    preliminary injunctive relief against their former agent Ryan Dolly. They argue the
    court erred by enjoining Dolly only from soliciting business from Farm Bureau’s
    existing customers without also enjoining Dolly from selling to those customers. We
    affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [¶2.]        On December 10, 2012, Dolly entered into two agency contracts with
    Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. and Farm Bureau Property and Casualty
    Insurance Co. (collectively, “Farm Bureau”). Under the contracts, Dolly operated as
    a captive agent—an independent contractor limited to selling insurance and
    financial products produced or approved by Farm Bureau. Unlike an independent
    insurance agent, Dolly did not obtain ownership of renewals on the policies he sold;
    Farm Bureau retained ownership. Dolly’s contracts with Farm Bureau were
    terminated on January 12, 2017, after Dolly notified Farm Bureau that he was
    leaving to work for a competing insurer, American National Insurance Co.
    [¶3.]        The contracts at issue contain provisions that expressly restrain
    Dolly’s post-termination conduct. Paragraph 11 of the contracts states, in part:
    It is hereby understood and agreed that upon the termination of
    this . . . [c]ontract for any reason, [Dolly] will neither sell nor
    solicit, directly or indirectly, or initiate replacements or
    exchanges of any insurance or annuity product, with respect to
    any policyholder of [Farm Bureau], its subsidiaries or affiliates
    or any company with which [Farm Bureau] has a marketing
    agreement, within any counties in which [Dolly] sold or serviced
    any products pursuant to this [c]ontract. . . . This provision will
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    be enforceable for a period of eighteen (18) months following the
    termination of this [c]ontract.
    And paragraph 18 states, in part:
    In performing his . . . duties as an [a]gent, [Dolly] will have
    access to and receive certain confidential or proprietary
    information from or on behalf of [Farm Bureau] (hereinafter
    “Confidential Information”). [Dolly] shall take all reasonable
    steps necessary to protect the confidential and proprietary
    nature of all Confidential Information . . . . [Dolly] shall not
    directly or indirectly disclose or make available to any third
    party any Confidential Information. [Dolly] agrees not to
    appropriate any Confidential Information for his . . . own use
    either during the course of or subsequent to termination of this
    [c]ontract. Confidential Information shall include, but not be
    limited to, any information received by [Dolly] from or on behalf
    of [Farm Bureau], including but not limited to customer and
    consumer information.
    Less than three months after leaving Farm Bureau, Dolly sold American National
    insurance policies to clients to whom he had previously sold Farm Bureau policies.
    [¶4.]        On April 7, 2017, concluding that Dolly had breached paragraphs 11
    and 18 of the agency contracts, Farm Bureau filed an action against Dolly seeking
    damages and injunctive relief. That same day, Farm Bureau also filed a motion
    requesting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. On
    April 11, the circuit court granted Farm Bureau’s request for a temporary
    restraining order and enjoined Dolly from “selling or soliciting, or initiating
    replacements or exchange of any insurance or annuity product, directly or
    indirectly, to [Farm Bureau’s] policyholders within the counties Dolly sold [Farm
    Bureau’s] insurance products for a period of eighteen months from January 12,
    2017.”
    [¶5.]        On April 18, 2017, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing to
    consider Farm Bureau’s request for a preliminary injunction. Dolly testified at the
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    hearing. On cross-examination, he admitted to having direct contact with, and
    selling replacement policies to, Farm Bureau’s existing customers:
    [Farm Bureau’s attorney]: Okay. Since leaving Farm
    Bureau, you’ve been posting to Facebook, signing customers to
    American National, and you’ve had direct contact with Farm
    Bureau policyholders; right?
    [Dolly’s attorney]: I’m going to object. It’s compound.
    [Circuit court]: Sustained.
    [Farm Bureau’s attorney]: You’ve texted, e-mailed, and
    contact—directly contacted Farm Bureau policyholders; right?
    [Dolly’s attorney]: I’m going to object to the extent the
    question is vague and doesn’t seek to clarify who initiated the
    contact.
    [Circuit court]: Well, she said you have. Set a time frame.
    [Farm Bureau’s attorney]: Since leaving Farm Bureau.
    [Dolly]: Yes.
    [Farm Bureau’s attorney]: And you’ve sold and initiated
    replacements of American National policies to Farm Bureau
    policyholders since you’ve left Farm Bureau; right?
    [Dolly]: Yes.
    On direct examination, Dolly clarified that while he sold American National policies
    to Farm Bureau’s existing customers, he had not solicited those sales:
    [Dolly’s attorney]: You left Farm Bureau in January of 2017;
    right?
    [Dolly]: Uh-huh.
    [Dolly’s attorney]: Okay. Since that time have you reached
    out to any Farm Bureau customer and sought to persuade them
    to leave Farm Bureau?
    [Dolly]: No.
    [Dolly’s attorney]: Any contact that you have had with an
    existing Farm Bureau policyholder, who has initiated that
    contact?
    [Dolly]: The customer.
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    After considering the testimony and other evidence presented, the court readopted
    its earlier factual findings and legal conclusions but explicitly struck the word
    selling from its order. Thus, while the temporary restraining order prohibited Dolly
    from selling or soliciting to Farm Bureau’s existing customers, the preliminary
    injunction prohibited Dolly only from soliciting to Farm Bureau’s existing
    customers. In the court’s view, the portions of the agency contracts that prohibited
    Dolly from selling to Farm Bureau’s existing customers was an invalid restraint on
    trade under SDCL chapter 53-9.
    [¶6.]        Farm Bureau appeals, raising the following issue: Whether an
    agreement between an insurance company and its former captive agent that
    precludes the agent from soliciting or selling other insurance products to the
    company’s existing customers for a period of 18 months is valid under SDCL
    chapter 53-9.
    Standard of Review
    [¶7.]        The central issue presented in this appeal is the interpretation of a
    statute. “Questions of statutory interpretation and application are reviewed under
    the de novo standard of review with no deference to the circuit court’s decision.”
    Deadwood Stage Run, LLC v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    2014 S.D. 90
    , ¶ 7, 
    857 N.W.2d 606
    , 609 (quoting Argus Leader v. Hagen, 
    2007 S.D. 96
    , ¶ 7, 
    739 N.W.2d 475
    , 478).
    Analysis and Decision
    [¶8.]        Farm Bureau argues the circuit court erred by enjoining Dolly only
    from soliciting business from Farm Bureau’s existing customers without also
    enjoining Dolly from selling to those customers. Since before statehood, the general
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    rule in South Dakota is that “[a]ny contract restraining exercise of a lawful
    profession, trade, or business is void to that extent, except as provided by §§ 53-9-9
    to 53-9-12, inclusive.” SDCL 53-9-8 (emphasis added). 1 In 2005, the Legislature
    enacted SDCL 53-9-12, which contains an exception to this general rule for
    contracts between an insurance company and “[a]ny independent contractor who is
    an insurance producer as defined in subdivision 58-1-2(16) and is a captive agent
    who is not an independent agent and who works exclusively for a single insurance
    company or an affiliated group of insurance companies[.]” Under this exception, the
    captive agent may agree
    (1) Not to engage directly or indirectly in the same business or
    profession as that of the insurer for any period not exceeding
    two years from the date of termination of the independent
    contractor’s agreement with the insurer; and
    (2) Not to solicit existing customers of the insurer within a
    specified county, first or second class municipality, or other
    specified area for any period not exceeding two years from
    the date of termination of the agreement, if the insurer
    continues to carry on a like business within the specified
    area.
    Id. Farm Bureau contends that the legislative history of SDCL 53-9-12 suggests
    that a captive agent and an insurance company may enter into an agreement
    prohibiting the agent from soliciting or selling (unsolicited) to existing customers.
    Farm Bureau also contends that a literal reading of SDCL 53-9-12 is absurd
    because it “nullifies” what Farm Bureau perceives to be the legislative intent.
    [¶9.]         Farm Bureau’s reliance on legislative history is misplaced. “This
    [C]ourt assumes that statutes mean what they say and that legislators have said
    1.      This code provision dates back to Dakota Territory’s civil code. See Dak. Rev.
    Codes, Civ. Code § 959 (1877).
    -5-
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    what they meant.” In re Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 
    347 N.W.2d 882
    , 885 (S.D.
    1984). “[R]esorting to legislative history is justified only when legislation is
    ambiguous . . . .” 
    Id.
     “When interpreting a statute, we begin with the plain
    language and structure of the statute.” Magellan Pipeline Co. v. S.D. Dep’t of
    Revenue & Reg., 
    2013 S.D. 68
    , ¶ 9, 
    837 N.W.2d 402
    , 404 (quoting In re Pooled
    Advoc. Tr., 
    2012 S.D. 24
    , ¶ 32, 
    813 N.W.2d 130
    , 141). “When the language in a
    statute is clear, certain[,] and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and
    the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly
    expressed.” Rowley v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 
    2013 S.D. 6
    , ¶ 7, 
    826 N.W.2d 360
    , 363-64 (quoting In re Estate of Hamilton, 
    2012 S.D. 34
    , ¶ 7, 
    814 N.W.2d 141
    ,
    143). Thus, ambiguity is a prerequisite of construction. People ex rel. J.L.,
    
    2011 S.D. 36
    , ¶ 4, 
    800 N.W.2d 720
    , 722. Ambiguity “may exist where the literal
    meaning of a statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion[,]”id. (quoting
    In re Sales Tax Refund Applications of Black Hills Power & Light Co., 
    298 N.W.2d 799
    , 803 (S.D. 1980)), or when a statute “is capable of being understood by
    reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses[,]” Kling v. Stern,
    
    2007 S.D. 51
    , ¶ 6, 
    733 N.W.2d 615
    , 617 (quoting Petition of Famous Brands,
    347 N.W.2d at 886).
    [¶10.]       The circuit court’s conclusion that SDCL 53-9-12 permits an agreement
    not to solicit—rather than not to sell to—an insurer’s existing customers is the only
    reasonable interpretation of that statute. Under the plain language of SDCL 53-9-
    12(1), a captive agent may agree to abstain entirely from the insurance business.
    But when the agent does not agree to abstain entirely from the insurance
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    business—as is the case here—SDCL 53-9-12(2) permits the agent to agree “[n]ot to
    solicit existing customers of the insurer[.]” (Emphasis added.) The word solicit is
    not defined in SDCL Title 53, which addresses the topic of contracts, but it is
    defined in SDCL Title 58, which addresses the topic of insurance. Under Title 58,
    the word solicit is defined as “attempting to sell insurance or asking or urging a
    person to apply for a particular kind of insurance from a particular company[.]”
    SDCL 58-30-142(10) (emphasis added). The Legislature has declared that
    “[w]henever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined in any statute such
    definition is applicable to the same word or phrase wherever it occurs except where
    a contrary intention plainly appears.” SDCL 2-14-4. No such contrary intention is
    apparent here. Thus, while SDCL 53-9-12(2) permits a captive agent to agree not
    to, e.g., ask or urge an insurance company’s existing customers to purchase new
    policies from the agent, that statute contains no provision for permitting an agent
    who continues to sell insurance to agree not to sell policies to existing customers
    who—unsolicited—request such policies.
    [¶11.]       Even so, Farm Bureau contends the plain meaning of SDCL 53-9-12 is
    absurd. In Farm Bureau’s view, that statute is meant to protect an insurance
    company from having a captive agent “resign and immediately start selling
    insurance products of a competitor to former customers[.]” Yet, permitting an agent
    to agree not to ask or urge an insurance company’s existing customers to buy new
    policies does protect that company. An agent who does not actively seek out a
    company’s existing customers to try to convince them to buy new policies will
    naturally draw less business away from that company than an agent who does.
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    While adding the words or sell to to SDCL 53-9-12 would broaden the protection
    available to an insurance company under that statute, this increased protection
    would be achieved by curtailing the options available to the company’s existing
    customers. The plain language of SDCL 53-9-12, as discussed above, balances the
    interests of an insurance company with the consumer’s interest in deciding whether
    he or she would rather purchase a new policy from a familiar agent or renew a
    familiar policy with a new agent. This balanced approach is not absurd simply
    because the Legislature could have broadened SDCL 53-9-12’s exception to
    SDCL 53-9-8. 2
    2.    As does Farm Bureau, the special writing argues our reading of SDCL 53-9-
    12 is “absurd.” Infra ¶ 21. The special writing reasons that because
    SDCL 53-9-12(1) permits a captive agent to agree not to sell insurance to any
    consumer, and because SDCL 53-9-12(2) permits the agent to agree not to
    solicit from only some consumers, this Court should infer that the Legislature
    intended to permit an agent to agree not to sell to only some consumers as
    well. Infra ¶ 22.
    But the special writing’s view of SDCL 53-9-12 presents a scenario altogether
    different from those presented by the plain text of SDCL 53-9-12(1)
    and -12(2). Regardless of whether Dolly agreed to leave the insurance
    business altogether under SDCL 53-9-12(1) or whether he agreed only to
    refrain from soliciting business from previous customers under SDCL 53-9-
    12(2), in neither case would those customers be prohibited from buying
    insurance policies from American National. But under the special writing’s
    view of SDCL 53-9-12, Dolly and Farm Bureau could essentially agree to
    prohibit Dolly’s previous customers from entering into business transactions
    with American National. This Court has previously rejected agreements that
    attempt to limit a third party’s power to contract. See Commc’n Tech. Sys.,
    Inc. v. Densmore, 
    1998 S.D. 87
    , ¶¶ 11-20, 
    583 N.W.2d 125
    , 127-30.
    More importantly, the special writing’s argument overlooks that SDCL 53-9-
    12 is an exception to SDCL 53-9-8’s general prohibition against contracts that
    restrain trade. Thus, any expansion of SDCL 53-9-12 necessarily diminishes
    SDCL 53-9-8. As such, SDCL 53-9-12 “must be construed narrowly so as to
    promote the prohibition against contracts in restraint of trade.” Commc’n
    Tech. Sys., 
    1998 S.D. 87
    , ¶ 15, 
    583 N.W.2d at 128
     (emphasis added) (quoting
    (continued . . .)
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    [¶12.]       Even if resorting to legislative history were appropriate, the history
    Farm Bureau relies on is not persuasive. To support its view of the Legislature’s
    intent in passing SDCL 53-9-12, Farm Bureau primarily relies on statements made
    by lobbyists at a hearing before the South Dakota House of Representatives’
    Commerce Committee. Farm Bureau also quotes the commentary of a single
    legislator. This Court has “consistently held that statements of individual
    legislators are not persuasive to establish the intent of the Legislature for a
    particular statute. There are 105 legislators and there may be 105 different[,]
    individual reasons they vote for or against a bill.” Benson v. State, 
    2006 S.D. 8
    , ¶ 72
    n.15, 
    710 N.W.2d 131
    , 159 n.15 (citation omitted). And while a lobbyist’s
    statements may be evidence of a statute’s legislative history, they are not evidence
    of the Legislature’s intent. As noted above, this Court’s rule of statutory
    interpretation “is that the Legislature said what it meant and meant what it said
    from the text of the statute.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    Conclusion
    [¶13.]       In light of the foregoing, the plain meaning of SDCL 53-9-12 supports
    the circuit court’s decision to adhere to that statute’s language. And even if
    SDCL 53-9-12 were ambiguous, Farm Bureau’s legislative-history analysis is not
    persuasive. The general rule against contracts in restraint of a lawful profession,
    ________________
    (. . . continued)
    Cent. Monitoring Serv. v. Zakinski, 
    1996 S.D. 116
    , ¶ 9, 
    553 N.W.2d 513
    , 516).
    The special writing’s suggestion that this Court should infer an exception not
    reflected in the plain text of SDCL 53-9-12 is not a narrow construction of
    that statute. If SDCL 53-9-12 is to be expanded, it should be done
    legislatively and not judicially.
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    trade, or business is a legislative expression of public policy, Kidder Equity Exch. v.
    Norman, 
    42 S.D. 229
    , 232, 
    173 N.W. 728
    , 729 (1919), and exceptions like SDCL 53-
    9-12 “must be construed narrowly so as to promote the prohibition against contracts
    in restraint of trade[,]” Commc’n Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Densmore, 
    1998 S.D. 87
    , ¶ 15,
    
    583 N.W.2d 125
    , 128 (quoting Cent. Monitoring Serv. v. Zakinski, 
    1996 S.D. 116
    ,
    ¶ 9, 
    553 N.W.2d 513
    , 516). Therefore, we affirm.
    [¶14.]       ZINTER, SEVERSON, and KERN, Justices, concur.
    [¶15.]       JENSEN, Justice, concurs in result.
    JENSEN, Justice (concurring in result).
    [¶16.]       I concur in result but disagree with the majority’s statement that “[t]he
    circuit court’s conclusion that SDCL 53-9-12 permits an agreement not to solicit—
    rather than not to sell to—an insurer’s existing customers is the only reasonable
    interpretation of that statute.” Supra ¶ 10.
    [¶17.]       SDCL 53-9-12 is one of the statutorily created exceptions to SDCL 53-
    9-8, which declares contracts that restrain trade to be void against public policy.
    SDCL 53-9-12 authorizes contracts between an insurer and an independent, captive
    agent that restrain the agent. Under the statute, a captive agent may agree:
    (1)    Not to engage directly or indirectly in the same business
    or profession as that of the insurer for any period not
    exceeding two years from the date of termination of the
    independent contractor’s agreement with the insurer; and
    (2)    Not to solicit existing customers of the insurer within a
    specified county, first or second class municipality, or
    other specified area for any period not exceeding two
    years from the date of termination of the agreement, if
    the insurer continues to carry on a like business within
    the specified area.
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    SDCL 53-9-12.
    [¶18.]       Subsection (1) authorizes a noncompete agreement that prohibits a
    captive agent from engaging directly or indirectly in the same business as the
    insurer for a period of two years from the date of termination of the captive agent’s
    employment with the insurance company. Subsection (2) authorizes a
    nonsolicitation agreement that prohibits an agent from soliciting customers of the
    insurance company for a period of two years within a defined geographical area.
    The two subsections in SDCL 53-9-12 are separated by the conjunction “and,” so
    that an insurance company and captive agent may include both a noncompete and
    nonsolicitation provision in an agreement.
    [¶19.]       I agree with the majority that subsection (2) sanctions nonsolicitation
    agreements, and that an agreement preventing a former captive agent from selling
    to a customer is not included in the term solicit under subsection (2). However, I
    part company with the majority’s reading of subsection (1). The majority
    acknowledges under subsection (1) that a captive agent “may agree to abstain
    entirely from the insurance business[.]” Supra ¶ 10. But the majority then
    concludes that “when the agent does not agree to abstain entirely from the
    insurance business,” SDCL 53-9-12 limits the insurance company to the
    nonsolicitation language of SDCL 53-9-12(2). Supra ¶ 10. This incorrectly suggests
    an either/or reading of the two subsections and misreads subsection (1) of the
    statute.
    [¶20.]       “We begin our interpretation of a statute with an analysis of its plain
    language and structure.” Puetz Corp. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    2015 S.D. 82
    , ¶ 16,
    
    871 N.W.2d 632
    , 637. The language of SDCL 53-9-12(1) provides that an insurer
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    and a captive agent may agree that the agent will not “engage directly or indirectly
    in the same business or profession as that of the insurer.” (Emphasis added.) The
    statutory exception does not define or further modify the language “same business
    or profession.” I agree with the majority that the language of the statute is broad
    enough to allow a noncompete agreement that completely forecloses a captive agent
    from engaging in the insurance industry to whatever extent that is the same
    business as the insurer. However, that same language also encompasses a
    noncompete agreement that restricts an agent from selling insurance products to
    policyholders of the insurer since that is the same business of the insurer.
    [¶21.]         The majority’s reading of SDCL 53-9-12(1) suggests the Legislature
    only intended to authorize a noncompete agreement that mimics the full breadth of
    the exception created in the statute. Adopting this reading of the statute leads to
    an absurd conclusion. The majority’s reading suggests that the Legislature
    intended to create a broad exception to the public policy against restraints on trade
    for a noncompete agreement that completely prevents a captive agent from
    engaging in the business of the insurer, including selling insurance to the insurer’s
    policyholders. But the majority’s reading also suggests that the Legislature did not
    intend to authorize a more narrowly tailored noncompete agreement that only
    restricts the agent from selling insurance to the insurer’s policyholders. Such a
    narrower noncompete agreement falls well within the breadth of the exception
    created by the Legislature in SDCL 53-9-12(1). 3 When construing statutes, we
    3.       The majority states that its interpretation is a “balanced approach [that] is
    not absurd simply because the Legislature could have broadened SDCL 53-9-
    (continued . . .)
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    “presume[] that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.”
    Argus Leader Media v. Hogstad, 
    2017 S.D. 57
    , ¶ 9, 
    902 N.W.2d 778
    , 782 (quoting
    Hayes v. Rosenbaum Signs & Outdoor Advert., Inc., 
    2014 S.D. 64
    , ¶ 28, 
    853 N.W.2d 878
    , 885). This Court has stated that “ambiguity is a condition of construction, and
    may exist where the literal meaning of a statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable
    conclusion.” People ex rel. J.L., 
    2011 S.D. 36
    , ¶ 4, 
    800 N.W.2d 720
    , 722 (quoting In
    re Sales Tax Refund Applications of Black Hills Power & Light Co., 
    298 N.W.2d 799
    ,
    803 (S.D. 1980)).
    [¶22.]       I submit that a proper reading of SDCL 53-9-12 harmonizes both
    subsections together. An insurance company and captive agent may agree to both a
    noncompete and a nonsolicitation agreement that is no broader than the exception
    created in each subsection of the statute. If the insurer determines that it
    adequately protects itself to limit the definition of business in the noncompete
    agreement to restricting the agent from selling insurance to its policyholders, that is
    well within the parameters of the exception set by the legislature and is not void
    under SDCL 53-9-8. This reading is consistent with the plain language of the
    statute and this Court’s requirement that the statutory exceptions to restraints on
    trade “must be construed narrowly so as to promote the prohibition against
    ________________
    (. . . continued)
    12’s exception to SDCL 53-9-8.” Supra ¶ 11. This statement highlights the
    focus of this special writing: the Legislature did, in fact, create a broad
    exception in SDCL 53-9-12 by sanctioning a noncompete agreement that
    restricts a captive agent from engaging in the same business as the insurer.
    As long as the noncompete agreement only restricts the agent from engaging
    in the same business as the insurer, such as selling insurance, the agreement
    is not void under the broad exception in SDCL 53-9-12.
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    contracts in restraint of trade.” Commc’n Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Densmore, 
    1998 S.D. 87
    ,
    ¶ 15, 
    583 N.W.2d 125
    , 128 (quoting Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski,
    
    1996 S.D. 116
    , ¶ 9, 
    553 N.W.2d 513
    , 516). This reading also accomplishes the
    Legislature’s apparent intent in SDCL 53-9-12 to protect the business interests of
    the insurer. It also furthers the Legislature’s stated public policy against restraints
    on trade in SDCL 53-9-8 by lessening the noncompete agreement’s burden on the
    agent.
    [¶23.]       Although I believe the agreement here is not a restraint on trade under
    the legislatively created exception in SDCL 53-9-12(1), I concur in result because
    Farm Bureau claimed before the circuit court that the agreement was solely a
    nonsolicitation agreement under SDCL 53-9-12(2). Farm Bureau’s senior in-house
    counsel testified as follows at the hearing on the preliminary injunction:
    [Dolly’s counsel]: You’re referring to 53-9-12?
    [In-house counsel]: Yes. If that’s the one with the two
    subsections.
    [Dolly’s counsel]: Okay.
    [In-house counsel]: In the first subsection of that, it allows for
    a two-year non-compete, which says we would be within our
    rights, written into our contract that Mr. Dolly be not allowed to
    sell insurance for two years.
    [Dolly’s counsel]: And you didn’t do that, did you?
    [In-house counsel]: No. But we do ask that he not solicit his
    contract, his former agents, for 18 months, which seems to me to
    be a much more reasonable provision than the first subsection of
    that statute.
    [¶24.]       As a result, the circuit court focused only on SDCL 53-9-12(2) in
    determining whether the contractual provision that prohibited Dolly from selling
    insurance to any Farm Bureau policyholders was void as a restraint on trade. The
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    court stated, “I find that under the statutes and the plain reading of the statutes in
    53-9-8, which is the statute in which essentially voids restraints on trade and then
    gives exceptions, one of those being 53-9-12 and specifically 53-9-12 Subsection 2,
    only exempts solicitation and not sales.” Farm Bureau is critical of the circuit court
    for failing to address subsection (1) of SDCL 53-9-12 in its ruling. But Farm Bureau
    affirmatively claimed before the circuit court that it did not ask Dolly to sign a
    noncompete agreement, but only a nonsolicitation agreement under subsection (2).
    When a party fails to argue or object to an issue below, thereby denying the circuit
    court an opportunity to correct its mistakes, the party waives its right to argue the
    issue on appeal. See Veith v. O’Brien, 
    2007 S.D. 88
    , ¶ 35, 
    739 N.W.2d 15
    , 26.
    Because Farm Bureau failed to assert below that the agreement with Dolly was also
    a valid noncompete agreement under SDCL 53-9-12(1), I concur in result with the
    majority opinion.
    -15-