State v. Jones , 2016 S.D. 86 ( 2016 )

#27758-a-DG
2016 S.D. 86
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RYAN G. JONES, Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE HEIDI LINNGREN
Judge
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MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
ANN C. MEYER
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
PAUL EISENBRAUN of
Grey & Eisenbraun
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
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CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
NOVEMBER 7, 2016
OPINION FILED 12/07/16
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
[¶1.] Ryan Jones pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated incest and four
counts of abusing his children. The circuit court sentenced Jones to a total of
47 years imprisonment in consecutive sentences and ordered him to pay $19,555 to
the Department of Social Services for counseling and treatment costs incurred in
caring for the children. Jones appeals the reimbursement order, arguing that the
Department is not statutorily entitled to such payment. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] This case arises out of Jones’s repeated abuse—sexual and otherwise—
of his children from April 27, 2009, to November 17, 2014. 1 On January 7, 2015, a
grand jury indicted Jones on eight counts relating to this abuse. First, the
indictment charged Jones with one count of first-degree rape under SDCL 22-22-
1(1) and one count of second-degree rape under SDCL 22-22-1(2). Alternatively, the
indictment charged Jones with one count of fourth-degree rape under SDCL 22-22-
1(5), one count of aggravated incest under SDCL 22-22A-3(1), and four counts of
abusing a minor under SDCL 26-10-1.
[¶3.] Jones and the State subsequently entered into a plea agreement. The
circuit court held a change-of-plea hearing on September 14, 2015, during which the
State described the agreement:
The plea agreement is Mr. Jones will be pleading . . . guilty to
Count 4, aggravated incest, and, also, Counts 5 through 8, child
abuse, felony level.
1. Neither Jones nor the State delves into the specifics of Jones’s conduct.
Because the issue raised by the parties is one of statutory construction, such
details are not necessary to resolve this appeal.
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The State would agree to dismiss the remaining charges. He
will obtain a sex offender evaluation, be responsible for any and
all costs. At the time of sentencing, both sides would remain
free to comment.
The court canvassed Jones and explained that by pleading guilty, Jones could be
subjected to a total of 55 years imprisonment and fines totaling $110,000. Jones
agreed and signed a written fact statement, which the State supplied, to provide a
basis for his plea.
[¶4.] On January 4, 2016, the circuit court sentenced Jones to 15 years
imprisonment for aggravated incest and 8 years imprisonment for each of the four
counts of abusing a minor—all to be served consecutively—totaling 47 years. The
court gave Jones credit for time served. Finally, it also required Jones to pay court
costs, attorney fees, and transcript costs, and to reimburse the Department for
$19,555 spent on counseling and treating Jones’s victims.
[¶5.] Jones appeals, raising one issue: Whether his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the court’s reimbursement order. 2
Standard of Review
[¶6.] The central issue in this case is a question of statutory construction.
We review such issues de novo. Good Lance v. Black Hills Dialysis, LLC, 2015 S.D.
83, ¶ 9, 871 N.W.2d 639, 643. Thus, we give no deference to the circuit court’s legal
conclusions. Id.
2. In his brief, Jones also directly attacks the court’s reimbursement order,
claiming it was plain error. Because both versions of his argument fail for
the same reason, we do not separately analyze his plain-error argument.
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Analysis and Decision
[¶7.] Jones argues the Department was not entitled to the $19,555
reimbursement order “because it was not a victim of the crimes of Jones.” Jones
argues that this case is governed by SDCL chapter 23A-8. Under this chapter,
“restitution shall be made by each violator of the criminal laws to the victims of the
violator’s criminal activities to the extent that the violator is reasonably able to do
so.” SDCL 23A-28-1. A victim is “any person, as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(31),
who has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal
activities, including any person who has by contract or by statute undertaken to
indemnify another or to pay or provide a specified or determinable amount or
benefit upon determinable contingencies.” SDCL 23A-28-2(5). However, a state
agency is not considered a person for purposes of this statute unless its property is
the subject of the crime or petty offense at issue. SDCL 22-1-2(31).
[¶8.] We need not determine whether the Department qualifies as a victim
under SDCL 23A-28-2(5). As the State correctly points out, the court’s
reimbursement order was actually required by another statute:
Anyone convicted under § 26-10-1 or 22-22-7, or subdivision 22-
22-1(1) or (5), shall be required as part of the sentence imposed
by the court to pay all or part of the cost of any necessary
medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment, or foster care of
the minor resulting from the act or acts for which the defendant
is convicted.
SDCL 23A-28-12. Jones pleaded guilty to violating SDCL 26-10-1 in regard to each
of his four victims. Therefore, under SDCL 23A-28-12, he was explicitly required to
pay their treatment costs. While Jones additionally committed aggravated incest
(which is not enumerated in SDCL 23A-28-12) against one of these four victims, he
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has not argued that the victim’s treatment costs would have been any less had
Jones been convicted solely under SDCL 26-10-1. Therefore, even if the
Department does not qualify as a victim under SDCL 23A-28-2(5), Jones is still
responsible for paying the entirety of his victims’ treatment costs under SDCL 23A-
28-12. Moreover, as noted above, Jones agreed to pay “any and all costs” as part of
the plea agreement. See supra ¶ 3.
Conclusion
[¶9.] Jones pleaded guilty to violating SDCL 26-10-1 in regard to each of his
four victims. Therefore, the circuit court was required to order Jones to pay for
their treatment costs under SDCL 23A-28-12, and Jones’s trial counsel’s failure to
object in no way suggests Jones received deficient assistance of counsel.
[¶10.] We affirm.
[¶11.] ZINTER, SEVERSON, WILBUR, and KERN, Justices, concur.
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