State v. Coleman ( 2015 )

#27079-a-JMK
2015 S.D. 48
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RACHEL LEE COLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LINCOLN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE JOSEPH NEILES
Judge
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MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
ELLIE J. BAILEY
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
JASON R. ADAMS of
Nicholson, Tschetter,
Adams & Nicholson
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON MARCH 23, 2015
OPINION FILED 06/17/15
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KERN, Justice
[¶1.] In the early morning hours of October 17, 2012, Rachel Lee Coleman,
age 26, was involved in a high-speed pursuit in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Law
enforcement eventually apprehended Coleman, but not before she crashed into a
storefront, was shot by officers, and inflicted life-threatening injuries on a highway
patrolman. Coleman pleaded guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) and
aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer and admitted to the part II
informations filed for both offenses. For the aggravated assault conviction,
Coleman received a sentence of 50 years with 10 years suspended and 5 years for
the DUI-fourth offense with 2.5 years suspended to be served consecutively for a
total term of 42.5 years. On appeal, Coleman contends her sentence is grossly
disproportionate to her crime in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.
Background
[¶2.] At approximately 2:30 a.m. on October 17, 2012, in Sioux Falls, a
Chevy Malibu drew the attention of Highway Patrolman Andrew Steen. The driver
of the Malibu stopped at an intersection during a green light, sat through a red
light cycle, and then began moving once the light turned green. Trooper Steen
attempted to stop the vehicle, but the driver, later identified as Coleman, refused to
heed the officer, and a high speed pursuit ensued throughout the city. Trooper
Steen and other law enforcement officers pursued Coleman for about 20 minutes
with lights and sirens activated. Eventually, law enforcement chased Coleman to
the parking lot of The Bridges strip mall.
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[¶3.] Once in the parking lot, law enforcement tried to encircle Coleman’s
Malibu to prevent her escape. To that end, law enforcement struck Coleman’s
Malibu several times from different angles, causing it to spin in different directions.
Trooper Steen exited the vehicle, positioned himself directly in Coleman’s path, and
directed her to get out of her car. Coleman shifted her vehicle from reverse and
accelerated directly at Trooper Steen. Considering himself in mortal danger,
Trooper Steen fired one round at Coleman, which penetrated the windshield and
struck Coleman in the right arm. 1
[¶4.] Injured but still refusing to stop, Coleman tried to drive away.
Coleman’s Malibu collided with Trooper Steen’s patrol car, bounced off another
patrol car, and eventually smashed into a storefront. Another patrol car, hoping to
disable Coleman’s vehicle, struck the back of her Malibu, causing it to turn parallel
with the storefront. Trooper Steen positioned himself in front of Coleman’s Malibu
and ordered her out of the car. Coleman shifted into drive and accelerated her
vehicle directly towards Trooper Steen at such a rate that she left black marks on
the pavement. Coleman struck Trooper Steen, throwing him onto the hood of her
Malibu. Trooper Steen travelled on the hood for approximately thirty yards before
falling off and striking his head on the pavement. Coleman ran over Trooper
Steen’s ankle as she drove away. Coleman exited The Bridges’ parking lot, and the
pursuit resumed. Law enforcement apprehended Coleman several minutes later
1. Law enforcement officers shot Coleman a total of four times during the
episode.
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when she stopped her vehicle and attempted to flee on foot. Coleman’s blood alcohol
content was approximately 0.26% at the time of her arrest.
[¶5.] As a result of the incident, Trooper Steen received life-threatening
injuries, including multiple skull fractures, a traumatic brain injury, and a broken
ankle. Doctors placed Trooper Steen in a medically induced coma and removed a
portion of his skull to allow for brain swelling. Trooper Steen spent two months in
the hospital recovering from his injuries. The traumatic brain injury caused
Trooper Steen to permanently lose his senses of taste, smell, and hearing in one ear.
He continues to have additional problems with fine motor control, equilibrium,
mobility, and stress fractures in his ankle and may never fully recover.
[¶6.] On November 5, 2012, a Lincoln County Grand Jury returned an eight-
count indictment charging Coleman with attempted first-degree murder, three
alternative counts of aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer, hit and
run accident resulting in death or injury, and aggravated eluding. On February 11,
2013, a superseding indictment was filed, which added two counts of DUI (charged
in the alternative). Ultimately, Coleman, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement,
pleaded guilty to count 2, aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, and count
9, DUI. Coleman also admitted to the part II information alleging that she had
been convicted of three prior DUI offenses in the last ten years. She also admitted
the second part II information alleging that she had been convicted of a prior
nonviolent felony. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and
recommend a sentence of no more than 42.5 years.
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[¶7.] At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court considered both mitigating
and aggravating factors surrounding the offense. Trooper Steen and several of his
family members testified about the impact of Trooper Steen’s injuries on the
activities of his daily life. They also made recommendations to the court regarding
an appropriate sentence. The State argued that the severity of Trooper Steen’s
injuries, Coleman’s intoxication, her conduct during the incident, and other
aggravating factors weighed heavily in favor of the maximum sentence. Coleman
testified on her own behalf and told the court that she had a history of sexual abuse,
an addiction to alcohol, severe depression, and other mental health issues. She also
expressed her remorse and apologized to Trooper Steen and his family. She
emphasized to the court that she was capable of rehabilitation.
[¶8.] Coleman’s counsel argued that a sentence of 42.5 years would be
excessive considering Coleman’s nonviolent criminal history and degree of
intoxication at the time of the offense. In support of her argument, Coleman
provided the circuit court with a Sentence Comparison Synopsis, summarizing
sentences received by different offenders statewide for the offense of aggravated
assault against a law enforcement officer. Coleman analyzed the ten most serious
sentences received by defendants, focusing on the nature of the offenses and the
defendants’ prior criminal histories. Coleman’s counsel noted that if the court
imposed a maximum 55-year sentence, with 12.5 years suspended as requested by
the State, it would be the second longest sentence in the history of South Dakota for
this type of crime. Coleman’s counsel argued that the circumstances of this case did
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not warrant a sentence of this magnitude when compared to the cases in the
Synopsis.
[¶9.] After listening to the evidence, the circuit court acknowledged that it
must examine all of the facts surrounding the case and that every case is unique.
The court also indicated that it had read and examined the Presentence
Investigation Report, which contained Coleman’s background and history. The
court stated:
Primarily, I look at the crime that has been convicted in front of
me; I look at the history and background of the defendant; the
prospects of rehabilitation; I look at the impact on the victim;
and, first and foremost, as I have often said in court in front of a
defendant, as a [j]udge, I look at my first job as a judge and that
is safety and protection of the community.
The circuit court sentenced Coleman to 50 years for aggravated assault against a
law enforcement officer with 10 years suspended and 5 years for DUI-fourth offense
with 2.5 years suspended. The court required Coleman to serve the sentences
consecutively. Coleman alleges that her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment and violates the Eighth Amendment.
Standard of Review
[¶10.] While we generally review a circuit court’s decision regarding
sentencing for abuse of discretion, we review claims of Eighth Amendment
violations under the gross disproportionality test. State v. Garreau, 2015 S.D. 36,
¶ 7, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___.
Analysis
[¶11.] “The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of ‘cruel
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and unusual punishments.’” State v. Williams, 2006 S.D. 11, ¶ 12, 710 N.W.2d 427,
431 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII). When we assess a claim of an Eighth
Amendment violation,
[w]e first determine whether the sentence appears grossly
disproportionate. To accomplish this, we consider the conduct
involved[] and any [other] relevant . . . conduct. . . . If these
circumstances fail to suggest gross disproportionality, our
review ends. If, on the other hand, the sentence appears grossly
disproportionate, we may, in addition to examining the other
Solem factors, conduct an intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis
to aid our comparison or remand to the circuit court to conduct
such comparison before resentencing. We may also consider
other relevant factors, such as the effect upon society of this type
of offense.
State v. Craig, 2014 S.D. 43, ¶ 33, 850 N.W.2d 828, 837 (emphasis added) (quoting
State v. Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 17, 577 N.W.2d 575, 580). “[G]enerally, a sentence
within the statutory maximum will not [be] disturbed on appeal.” Bonner, 1998
S.D. 30, ¶ 10, 577 N.W.2d at 578 (citing State v. Kaiser, 526 N.W.2d 722, 726 (S.D.
1995)).
[¶12.] To determine whether a sentence appears grossly disproportionate, we
first look at Coleman’s conduct. An intoxicated Coleman led law enforcement on a
high-speed chase for over 20 minutes in Sioux Falls. Law enforcement officers
ordered Coleman to stop or pull over, and she repeatedly failed to obey their
commands. Instead, her conduct evinced a determined effort to avoid being
apprehended at all costs in that she continued to evade the police even after
receiving multiple gunshot wounds. Coleman further caused property damage and
put the general public at risk during the incident.
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[¶13.] Additionally, Coleman assaulted Trooper Steen on two occasions with
her vehicle, causing severe, life-threatening injuries from which he may never fully
recover. Her conduct evinced a complete lack of concern for his life or safety. As the
circuit court noted when imposing the sentence:
This is an extremely serious case, number one, because of your
behavior and your acts in the case; trying [to] run over
somebody, a pedestrian in this case, in [e]ffect, on Trooper Steen
. . . out of his car, is extremely serious and the State was
justified in initially I think bringing an attempted murder
charge in that kind of situation. There certainly is an argument
to be made and could have been made to a jury that that is
exactly what you intended when you did what you did in this
case. Clearly, Trooper Steen when he saw you accelerating
towards him and then fired his gun, believed that he was in
grave mortal danger. And I cannot imagine too many more
serious aggravated assault against law enforcement fact
situations than that.
[¶14.] As a result of Coleman’s conduct, Trooper Steen suffered serious
injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, loss of taste, smell, hearing in one ear,
mobility, fine motor control, and a broken ankle. Trooper Steen and his family
testified that he continues to struggle daily, and his life plans must be altered to
accommodate his condition.
[¶15.] Second, we look at other relevant conduct. Coleman’s DUI conviction
arising out of this incident was her fourth DUI offense in four years. She
acknowledged that she had a drinking problem, but failed to get help to address her
addiction. Her decision to continue to drink and drive posed a significant risk to the
community as a whole.
[¶16.] Coleman asserts that the circuit court did not adequately consider her
character and history. “[T]he sentencing court should acquire a thorough
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acquaintance with the character and history of the [person] before it. This study
should examine a defendant’s general moral character, mentality, habits[,] social
environment, tendencies, age, aversion or inclination to commit crime, life, family,
occupation, and previous criminal record.” Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 19, 577 N.W.2d
at 580 (quoting State v. Chase in Winter, 534 N.W.2d 350, 354-55 (S.D. 1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Coleman contends that there was “little
evidence” to suggest that the court actually considered her history and character.
However, a review of the record indicates that the circuit court read and considered
Coleman’s Presentence Investigation Report, 2 the mitigating evidence presented by
Coleman and her counsel at the hearing, the testimony of Coleman and her mother,
and Coleman’s likelihood for rehabilitation. We afford circuit courts a “wide
latitude regarding the type and source of the information utilized[]” to determine a
defendant’s sentence. State v. Berget, 2013 S.D. 1, ¶ 74, 826 N.W.2d 1, 24.
Therefore, the record does not support Coleman’s contention that the circuit court
failed to adequately consider her character, history, and other relevant personal
information.
[¶17.] We also consider “the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty[.]” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010, 77 L. Ed. 2d
637 (1983), quoted in State v. Guthmiller, 2003 S.D. 83, ¶ 43, 667 N.W.2d 295, 309.
2. The Presentence Investigation Report contains relevant biographical and
historical information about Coleman. In its oral pronouncement of
Coleman’s sentence, the circuit court specifically stated that it “looked at the
history and background of the defendant.” Additionally, the court indicated
it considered Coleman’s mental health issues, post-traumatic stress disorder,
alcohol problem, and chances for rehabilitation.
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Coleman received 55 years for her crimes, which the court reduced to 42.5 years by
suspending the execution of 12.5 years upon certain conditions. While Coleman
received a lengthy sentence, we do not think it appears grossly disproportionate
under the Eighth Amendment considering the gravity of the offense. Coleman was
convicted of aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer, which is a class 2
felony carrying a maximum sentence of 25 years in the penitentiary. SDCL 22-18-
1.05; SDCL 22-18-1.1; SDCL 22-6-1. With the part II enhancement as a habitual
offender, the offense would be punishable as a class 1 felony, subjecting her to up to
50 years for just this one offense. SDCL 22-7-7; SDCL 22-6-1. Compared to other
forms of assault, aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer carries the
highest potential punishment. See, e.g., SDCL 22-18-1 (simple assault, class 1
misdemeanor); SDCL 22-18-1.05 (simple assault against a law enforcement officer,
class 6 felony); SDCL 22-18-1.1 (aggravated assault, class 3 felony). The
Legislature also classified attempted first-degree murder as a class 2 felony. SDCL
22-4-1; SDCL 22-24-4(1).
[¶18.] While aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer carries a
potentially lengthy sentence, it is by no means the most severe punishment, or most
egregious offense, under South Dakota law. The offense of first-degree murder
carries the highest penalty, punishable by death or life without parole. SDCL 22-
16-12; SDCL 22-6-1. Trooper Steen nearly died as a result of Coleman’s actions. If
he had done so, Coleman would have faced a potential murder charge. “Thus,
[Coleman’s] sentence is far from ‘the most severe punishment that the State could
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have imposed on any criminal for any crime.’” See Garreau, 2015 S.D. 36, ¶ 10, ___
N.W.2d at ___ (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 297, 103 S. Ct. at 3013).
[¶19.] Coleman nonetheless argues that her sentence is harsh in that she is
26 years old and will be required to serve many years before she is first eligible for
parole. Certainly Coleman’s sentence is severe, but so were her actions and so are
Trooper Steen’s lifelong injuries. Coleman’s decision to ignore her alcohol addiction
despite three prior DUI convictions placed the public at risk and forever altered the
course of Trooper Steen’s life and her own. A severe sentence in and of “[i]tself is
not equivalent to cruel and unusual[]” punishment. Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 27, 577
N.W.2d at 582. Indeed, it is “‘the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the
crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality.’” Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S.
Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991)). Considering the nature of Coleman’s
conduct, the severity of the injuries to Trooper Steen, Coleman’s previous DUI
offenses, and the sentence being within the statutory limits, we conclude “these
circumstances fail to suggest gross disproportionality.” State v. Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14,
¶ 29, 796 N.W.2d 397, 406 (quoting Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 17, 577 N.W.2d at 580).
This is not one of the “exceedingly rare cases” where Coleman’s sentence was
grossly disproportionate “to the particulars of the offense and the offender.” Id.
¶ 39 (citing Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 25, 577 N.W.2d at 582) (internal quotation
marks omitted). As Coleman’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate, we decline
to conduct an intra-/inter-jurisdictional analysis. We affirm.
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[¶20.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER, SEVERSON, and
WILBUR, Justices, concur.
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