In Re the Estate of Shipman , 2013 S.D. LEXIS 67 ( 2013 )

#26512-rev & rem-SLZ
2013 S.D. 42
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
EUGENE SHIPMAN, ALSO KNOWN AS
GENE SHIPMAN, ALSO KNOWN AS
EUGENE E. SHIPMAN, DECEASED
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
GREGORY COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN F. TRANDAHL
Judge
****
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
JEREMY LUND
Special Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for appellant South
Dakota Department of Social
Services.
JACK GUNVORDAHL of
Gunvordahl & Gunvordahl
Burke, South Dakota Attorneys for appellee Estate of
Eugene Shipman.
****
ARGUED ON MARCH 20, 2013
OPINION FILED 06/05/13
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ZINTER, Justice
[¶1.] After Arline Shipman moved into a nursing home in 2008, her
husband, Eugene, “spent down” some of their joint funds to pay for Arline’s care and
to qualify her for Medicaid long-term-care assistance. In 2009, Eugene executed a
will, which disinherited Arline. The will indicated that Eugene had disinherited
Arline because he “ha[d] given her sufficient consideration during [his] lifetime.”
On the same day that the will was executed, Arline’s attorney-in-fact (her son,
David) disclaimed any inheritance Arline may have been entitled to receive from
Eugene’s estate “due to the fact that [Eugene had] taken care of [Arline] and paid
for [her] nursing home care[.]” In 2010, while Arline was receiving Medicaid
assistance for her nursing home care, Eugene unexpectedly predeceased her.
Arline’s guardian ad litem subsequently petitioned for an elective share of Eugene’s
estate. The circuit court denied the petition. The Department of Social Services,
who administers the Medicaid program, intervened and moved to reconsider. The
court denied the Department’s motion, and the Department appeals. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] Eugene and Arline Shipman were married for over fifty years. In April
2008, Arline moved into a nursing home because she was suffering from dementia,
she required full-time care, and Eugene could no longer care for her. In November
2008, Eugene submitted an application to the Department for Medicaid long-term-
care assistance. After assessing the Shipmans’ financial resources, the Department
concluded that Arline did not qualify for Medicaid because the value of the
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Shipmans’ combined “countable resources” exceeded the total allowable limit for
long-term care.
[¶3.] After the Department’s denial of Arline’s initial application, Eugene
spent down $99,953.17 of their joint financial resources to pay for Arline’s nursing
home care. In January 2010, Eugene reapplied for Medicaid on Arline’s behalf. The
Department reassessed the Shipmans’ financial condition, and because their
countable resources were then less than their “protected allowance,” Arline
qualified for Medicaid long-term-care assistance. The Department approved
Arline’s application in February 2010.
[¶4.] In July 2010, Eugene unexpectedly predeceased Arline. As previously
noted, Eugene’s March 9, 2009 will indicated that he had disinherited Arline
because he “ha[d] given her sufficient consideration during [his] lifetime.” Eugene
bequeathed half of his estate to the Shipmans’ son, David, and the remaining half to
the Shipmans’ grandchildren.
[¶5.] Although Eugene had disinherited Arline, surviving spouses are
generally entitled to an elective share of a deceased spouse’s estate. See SDCL 29A-
2-202. However, on the same day that Eugene executed his will in 2009, David, as
Arline’s attorney-in-fact, had disclaimed “any inheritance that [Arline] may [have
been] entitled to in the estate of Eugene Shipman . . . due to the fact that he [had]
taken care of [her] and paid for [her] nursing home care[.]” 1
1. The Estate argues that the disclaimer was in accord with Arline’s “wishes,
desires, and interests,” emphasizing that she was of “sound mind” when she
appointed David as her attorney-in-fact in 2005. The Estate, however, makes
no claim that Arline was of sound mind and capable of making such decisions
(continued . . .)
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[¶6.] David was appointed personal representative of Eugene’s estate (the
Estate) in August 2010. The Estate notified the Department that Arline was
disinherited under Eugene’s will. In response, the Department advised that Arline
would be required to pursue her elective share before receiving further Medicaid
long-term-care assistance.
[¶7.] A guardian ad litem was appointed to represent Arline’s interests. In
October 2010, the guardian petitioned for an elective share and moved to set aside
the disclaimer. 2 The Estate opposed the petition, arguing that the disclaimer was
valid and enforceable. Alternatively, the Estate argued that Arline had already
received her elective share because Eugene had financially cared for Arline during
his lifetime. The Estate explained that Eugene had cared for her before her
institutionalization and he had used their joint resources to pay for Arline’s nursing
home care until she became eligible for Medicaid.
[¶8.] After a hearing, the circuit court denied Arline’s petition for an elective
share. The court also denied Arline’s motion to revoke the disclaimer. The court
concluded that Arline had validly disclaimed her right to an elective share. The
court also concluded that Arline had received her “fair share” of Eugene’s estate
when, during the marriage, Eugene used their joint resources to pay for her nursing
home care.
________________________
(. . . continued)
in 2009, when she was in the nursing home and David executed the
disclaimer.
2. The Department states that the motion to set aside the disclaimer was a
motion to revoke the disclaimer. The Estate does not dispute that
characterization, and therefore, we refer to it as a motion to revoke.
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[¶9.] Because the guardian ad litem indicated that he would not appeal the
circuit court’s decision, the Department moved to intervene and petitioned for
reconsideration. 3 The court reconsidered its decision, but denied the Department
relief on the merits. The court concluded that Arline’s disclaimer was valid and not
subject to revocation. The court also reaffirmed that Arline had already received
her elective share of the estate when the Shipmans’ joint resources were used
during the marriage to pay for Arline’s nursing home care.
[¶10.] The Department appeals, raising two issues:
1. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding that Arline
was not entitled to an elective share because she had
received her share of the estate during the marriage
through Eugene’s use of their joint resources to pay for
her nursing home care.
2. Whether the circuit court erred in denying the guardian
ad litem’s motion to revoke Arline’s disclaimer of her
elective share.
3. Counsel for David also notified the Department that Arline did not have
sufficient funds to pay for her continuing care and that she was entitled to
Medicaid assistance from the Department. There is a pending administrative
proceeding in which David and the Department are litigating whether a
“transfer penalty” should be imposed on Arline’s receipt of Medicaid benefits
because she disclaimed her elective share. The Department is arguing for the
imposition of a transfer penalty on Arline’s benefits because Arline’s
disclaimer of her elective share was a transfer of her available resources.
David is arguing there can be no transfer penalty because the circuit court’s
ruling—that Arline had already received her share of Eugene’s estate during
his lifetime—controls the outcome of the administrative proceeding. At oral
argument in this case, the Department indicated that if the circuit court’s
ruling regarding Arline’s elective share was not challenged, there would have
been a judicial determination that there were no resources for Arline to
disclaim, and therefore, Arline could not be penalized for a transfer of
resources. The Department indicated that it intervened so it would not be
collaterally estopped from arguing for the imposition of a transfer penalty in
the administrative proceeding. The administrative proceeding has been
stayed until this case is resolved.
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Decision
Jurisdiction to Hear This Appeal
[¶11.] As a preliminary matter, the Estate challenges this Court’s jurisdiction
to hear the Department’s appeal. The Estate points out that there were no
pleadings attached to the Department’s intervention application in circuit court as
required by SDCL 15-6-24(c). The Estate also points out that the circuit court did
not enter a formal order permitting the Department to intervene.
[¶12.] We first observe that the Department filed an “application” to
intervene in circuit court “in order to protect its interests arising out of the
surviving spouse’s receipt of Medical Assistance from the Department.” Along with
its application, the Department filed a petition that the court reconsider its decision
together with a memorandum in support of the petition. Those documents
identified the Department’s claims and put all parties on notice of the request to
intervene, the grounds thereof, and the relief requested. The documents
substantially complied with the motion and pleading requirements of SDCL 15-6-
24(c). 4
[¶13.] We also note that although the circuit court did not enter a formal
order of intervention, it unmistakably granted the intervention request. In its
memorandum decision on the petition to reconsider, the court specifically stated
4. SDCL 15-6-24(c) provides, in relevant part:
A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene
upon the parties as provided in [SDCL] 15-6-5. The motion shall
state the grounds therefor[e] and shall be accompanied by a
pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which
intervention is sought.
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that “[the Department] now intervenes and asks this court to reconsider its
decision.” The court then proceeded to reconsider its decision on the merits.
Therefore, although there was no formal order, there is no doubt that the circuit
court granted the Department’s request to intervene and reconsider the court’s
initial decision. Because intervention was allowed in circuit court, this Court has
jurisdiction to consider the Department’s appeal.
Standard of Review
[¶14.] The parties disagree on the proper standard of review for determining
Arline’s entitlement to an elective share of Eugene’s estate. Under the pre-1995
statutes, entitlement to an elective share was an equitable matter to be determined
by the circuit court. 1980 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 205, § 5; SDCL 30-5A-5 (repealed
1995). “[T]he equitable determination in an elective share proceeding [was
therefore] within the discretion of the [circuit] court and [would] not be overturned
absent an abuse of that discretion.” In re Estate of Donahue, 464 N.W.2d 393, 395
(S.D. 1990). 5 However, under the statutes enacted in 1995, the surviving spouse is
now entitled to an elective share as a matter of right under a formula. SDCL 29A-
5. The Estate cites Estate of Karnen, 2000 S.D. 32, 607 N.W.2d 32, for the
proposition that the standard of review for elective share proceedings under
the 1995 elective share statutes is abuse of discretion. In Estate of Karnen,
the issue was whether the circuit court abused its discretion in using an
inheritance tax table to calculate the value of a life estate for purposes of an
elective share. Id. ¶¶ 22-25, 607 N.W.2d at 38-40. There was no statutory
guidance on determining the value of the life estate, and therefore, we
analyzed the court’s use of inheritance tax tables under the abuse of
discretion standard. However, today’s case involves the interpretation of the
elective share statutes. Estate of Karnen is inapposite because we review
statutory interpretation de novo.
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2-202. See also 1995 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 167, § 148. Furthermore, the question in
this case involves statutory interpretation; i.e. whether the current elective share
statutes permit a charge against the elective share for the cost of nursing home care
expended during the marriage. We apply de novo review to the interpretation of the
elective share statutes. See Conservatorship of Didier, 2010 S.D. 56, ¶ 6, 784
N.W.2d 486, 489 (“Questions of law such as statutory interpretation are reviewed by
the Court de novo.”).
Arline’s Entitlement to an Elective Share
[¶15.] As previously noted, the pre-1995 version of South Dakota’s elective
share statute granted the circuit court discretion in determining a surviving
spouse’s elective share:
[T]he court upon application of the surviving spouse shall award
to the surviving spouse such elective share in the remaining
augmented estate as is equitable taking into account all of the
circumstances of all interested parties and the length and other
circumstances of the marriage of the decedent and such
surviving spouse[.]
SDCL 30-5A-5 (repealed 1995). See also In re Estate of Pejsa, 459 N.W.2d 243, 245
(S.D. 1990). Now, a surviving spouse has a right to an elective share of a deceased
spouse’s estate. SDCL 29A-2-202. 6 Under SDCL 29A-2-202, the surviving spouse’s
6. SDCL 29A-2-202 provides in relevant part:
(a) The surviving spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled in this
State has a right of election, under the limitations and
conditions stated in this Part, to take an elective-share
amount equal to the value of the elective-share percentage of
the augmented estate, determined by the length of time the
spouse and the decedent were married to each other, in
accordance with the following schedule:
(continued . . .)
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elective share is determined by formula. “SDCL 29A-2-202 is clearly a legislative
determination to provide more uniformity in such awards and a corresponding
reduction in the discretion of the [circuit] court which previously existed under
SDCL 30-5A-5.” In re Estate of Elvik, 1998 S.D. 125, ¶ 15 n.4, 587 N.W.2d 587, 590
n.4.
________________________
(. . . continued)
If the decedent and the The elective-share
spouse were married to percentage is:
each other:
...
15 years or more .................................... 50% of the augmented
estate
(b) If the sum of the amounts described in §§ 29A-2-207, 29A-2-
209(a)(1), and that part of the elective-share amount payable
from the decedent’s probate estate and nonprobate transfers
to others under § 29A-2-209(b) and (c) is less than $50,000,
the surviving spouse is entitled to take a supplemental
elective-share amount equal to $50,000, minus the sum of the
amounts described in those sections. The supplemental
elective-share amount is payable from the decedent’s probate
estate and from recipients of the decedent’s nonprobate
transfers to others in the order of priority set forth in § 29A-
2-209(b) and (c).
(c) If the right of election is exercised by or on behalf of the
surviving spouse, the surviving spouse’s homestead
allowance, exempt property, and family allowance, if any, are
not charged against but are in addition to the elective-share
and supplemental elective-share amounts.
(d) The right, if any, of the surviving spouse of a decedent who
dies domiciled outside this state to take an elective share in
property in this state is governed by the law of the decedent’s
domicile at death.
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[¶16.] Nevertheless, the circuit court made its decision on what it described
as a matter of equity. The circuit court explained that Arline “already received and
benefitted from her rightful share, and her deceased husband’s last will and
testament is reflective of this fact.” On the petition for reconsideration, the court
expressly stated that it had “made an equitable determination that [Arline]
Shipman had in fact already received her elective share of the marital estate when
her late husband, Eugene Shipman, spent down one-half of their marital estate to
pay for the nursing home facility care she received[.]” However, as previously
noted, entitlement to an elective share under SDCL 29A-2-202 is no longer a matter
of equity: it is a matter of right. The circuit court erred in applying equitable
principles rather than SDCL 29A-2-202’s statutory requirements in determining
Arline’s entitlement to an elective share. 7 Because Arline and Eugene had been
married for over fifteen years, Arline had a right to an elective share that was fifty
percent of Eugene’s augmented estate. See SDCL 29A-2-202.
[¶17.] The circuit court also erred in determining that Arline had “already
received her elective share” because, during the marriage, Eugene used marital
assets to pay for Arline’s nursing home care. First, the record reflects that these
were joint marital assets, and the court did not consider Arline’s ownership interest
7. Even if the circuit court had been authorized to make an equitable
determination of Arline’s entitlement to an elective share, the decision in this
case was not equitable. Prior to Eugene’s death, Eugene spent down
$99,953.72 of Eugene and Arlines’ joint resources to support Arline in a
nursing home. But the Department’s brief reflects that if she obtains an
elective share, Arline would be entitled to approximately $208,388.15, less
enforceable claims against the Estate. The circuit court also failed to
consider Arline’s contribution to the joint marital resources that were used
for her nursing home care.
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in those assets. Second, Arline’s elective share comes from the augmented estate,
see SDCL 29A-2-209, but expenses paid by one spouse for necessary support of the
other during the marriage are not chargeable against the augmented estate. The
augmented estate consists of certain transfers (not relevant here 8) and property
remaining after the first spouse dies. See SDCL 29A-2-203 (defining the augmented
estate as the sum of the decedent’s net probate estate, certain non-probate
transfers, the surviving spouse’s property, and certain non-probate transfers by the
surviving spouse). And the Legislature expressly delineated what expenses may be
charged against the augmented estate, but the cost of spousal care expended during
the marriage is not one of them. See SDCL 29A-2-204 (“The value of the augmented
estate includes the value of the decedent’s probate estate, reduced by funeral and
administration expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances, exempt
property, and enforceable claims.”). The circuit court acknowledged that “[c]learly,
the money spent by Eugene Shipman on [Arline’s] nursing home care is not a part
8. The expense of nursing home care paid by one spouse for the support of the
other during their lifetimes is not a “transfer” that is included in the
augmented estate. Although a number of non-probate transfers are included
in the augmented estate, transfers “to or for the benefit of . . . [the] surviving
spouse” are excluded. SDCL 29A-2-205(2)-(3).
The Estate, however, argues that Arline agreed to Eugene’s expenditure of
the funds for her nursing home care, and therefore, she is not entitled to now
claim that those funds do not satisfy her elective share. The Estate relies on
In re Estate of Fries, 782 N.W.2d 596, 605-06 (Neb. 2010). In Estate of Fries,
the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that “[l]ogically, when a spouse agrees to
a transfer of property that diminishes the eventual decedent’s estate, the
surviving spouse should not be allowed to reclaim the value of the transferred
property in the augmented estate.” Id. at 606. But, the Nebraska court was
speaking of the value of “property” (assets) transferred to a third party rather
than marital expenses paid by spouses to support each other during the
marriage. Estate of Fries is inapposite.
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of . . . the augmented estate[.]” Because the money spent by Eugene to support
Arline during the marriage was not included in or chargeable against the
augmented estate, Arline’s elective share could not be satisfied by the value of those
expenditures.
[¶18.] More importantly, Arline’s elective share could not be satisfied by
money used during the marriage to pay Arline’s nursing home expenses because
those funds were utilized to fulfill Eugene’s and Arline’s duty to financially support
themselves and each other. “A person shall support himself or herself and his or
her spouse out of his or her property or by his or her labor.” SDCL 25-7-1. As we
noted in In re Estate of Amundson, 2001 S.D. 18, ¶ 16, 621 N.W.2d 882, 886:
“Spouses owe a mutual duty of support during their lives[.]” 9 The joint funds
Eugene spent on Arline’s nursing home care were utilized to satisfy the marital
duty of support during their marriage.
[¶19.] In contrast, the elective share involves an independent duty for “the
survivor’s financial needs after the death of a spouse.” 10 See id. After the death of
9. Eugene’s statutory duty to support Arline was not affected by the
Department’s assessment and calculation of their combined resources. See
SDCL 28-6-20 (providing that the division of assets for purposes of
determining eligibility for long-term medical assistance does not “affect any
state statute concerning the duty to support a spouse[ ]”).
10. The Estate relies on comments to the Uniform Probate Code that identify the
purpose of the elective share: “to prevent the surviving spouse from electing a
share of the probate estate when the spouse has received a fair share of the
total wealth of the decedent either during the lifetime of the decedent or at
death by life insurance, joint tenancy assets, and other nonprobate
arrangements.” See Unif. Probate Code § 2-202 cmt. (pre-1990 version). In
this case, Arline did not receive a fair share of Eugene’s total wealth.
Instead, Arline received marital support that Eugene was obligated to
(continued . . .)
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one spouse, the duty of support “continues in favor of the survivor in the form of a
claim on the decedent’s estate[;]” i.e., by claiming an elective share. See id. The
circuit court’s reasoning fails to recognize that these duties are independent.
Further, allowing the duty of support owed during the marriage to satisfy the duty
of support owed when one spouse dies would effectively eliminate the elective share.
Under the circuit court’s reasoning, an estate of any deceased spouse could claim
that other ordinary forms of support (food, clothing, and shelter) provided during
the marriage satisfied the surviving spouse’s elective share. This would completely
eliminate the elective share statutes, which are intended “to protect a surviving
spouse from disinheritance[.]” See Estate of Karnen, 2000 S.D. 32, ¶ 14, 607 N.W.2d
at 36. Simply stated, marital assets used by spouses during their lives satisfy their
marital duty of support. Assets in the augmented estate are used to satisfy the
deceased spouse’s independent duty of providing for the surviving spouse’s financial
needs after the deceased spouse’s death. But assets utilized during the marriage to
satisfy the mutual duty of marital support may not be used to satisfy a deceased
spouse’s additional duty to provide post-death support through the elective share.
[¶20.] We conclude that Arline was entitled to an elective share that could
not be satisfied by the spousal support Eugene was required to provide Arline
during their marriage. Because Arline was entitled to an elective share, we next
determine whether Arline’s disclaimer was revocable by the guardian ad litem.
________________________
(. . . continued)
provide during the marriage. We also note that this comment was not
included in the post-1990 version of the Uniform Probate Code adopted in
South Dakota.
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Disclaimer of Elective Share
[¶21.] SDCL 29A-2-801(a) authorizes disclaimers of a surviving spouse’s
elective share. Although the statute provides that the surviving spouse has a “right
to disclaim irrevocably,” see id., “a surviving spouse, if he or she obtains court
approval, has the right to revoke or rescind a disclaimer[,] . . . providing no adverse
rights have intervened and no prejudice has been shown to the creditors of the
widow or widower or to other persons interested in the estate.” In re Estate of Berg,
355 N.W.2d 13, 15 (S.D. 1984). The disclaimer is revocable until the time period to
file a disclaimer has lapsed. See id.
[¶22.] The Department argues that the guardian ad litem’s motion to revoke
the disclaimer should have been granted because it was in the best interests of
Arline and no other persons interested in the estate would have been prejudiced. 11
The Department also argues that the motion to revoke should have been granted
because the disclaimer was used as an estate planning tool for the Shipmans’ son’s
and grandchildren’s inheritance at the expense of the Department. However, citing
In re Estate of Berg, the Estate argues that Eugene’s heirs were “predetermined” in
the 2009 will, and those beneficiaries would suffer damage to their “legal rights” if
Arline were allowed to revoke her disclaimer.
[¶23.] We first consider whether the guardian ad litem was acting in Arline’s
best interests in moving to revoke the disclaimer. See In re Guardianship of
Stevenson, 2013 S.D. 4, ¶ 16, 825 N.W.2d 911, 914-15 (“A . . . guardian ad litem . . .
is appointed to act in a protected person’s best interests.”). As we have just ruled,
11. There is no dispute that the motion was timely.
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at the time the guardian was appointed, Arline was entitled to an elective share of
Eugene’s estate. The Estate does not dispute that Arline’s failure to pursue her
elective share would compromise Arline’s Medicaid eligibility for nursing home
care. 12 Thus, if the disclaimer were not revoked, Arline may lose Medicaid
eligibility in addition to not receiving her fifty percent share of the augmented
estate. Under the circumstances, it was in Arline’s best interests to revoke the
disclaimer. See Estate of Wyinegar, 711 A.2d 492, 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (stating
that it was in the institutionalized surviving spouse’s best interests to seek his
elective share because “[f]ailure to take the election against [the deceased spouse’s
will] could potentially compromise [the surviving spouse’s] entitlement to continued
[public] medical assistance in addition to denying him the benefit of the elective
share”).
[¶24.] We now address the Estate’s claim of prejudice. See Estate of Berg, 355
N.W.2d at 15. The circuit court did not find that any person interested in the estate
would be “prejudiced.” Rather, after noting the requirements for revoking a
disclaimer under Estate of Berg, the court indicated that the Shipmans’ heirs were
“predetermined” by Eugene’s will.
[¶25.] The Estate argues that the beneficiaries under the will would be
prejudiced if the disclaimer were revoked because their inheritance was
predetermined and would be reduced. However, the rights of a beneficiary
designated in a will are subject to the surviving spouse’s elective share. See SDCL
12. We express no opinion regarding the Department’s contention that Arline
would lose Medicaid eligibility if the disclaimer is valid and enforceable.
That issue remains to be decided in the pending administrative proceeding.
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29A-3-101 (“The power of a person to leave property by will, and the rights of . . .
devisees[ ] and heirs to the person’s property are subject to the restrictions and
limitations contained in [South Dakota’s Uniform Probate Code] to facilitate the
prompt settlement of estates. Upon the death of a person, that person’s . . .
property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by will or . . . to the heirs, . . .
subject to [the] . . . elective share of the surviving spouse[.]”). Therefore, the
interest of the beneficiaries designated in Eugene’s will was always subject to
Arline’s elective share. Those beneficiaries had no predetermined right to an
inheritance that was free of Arline’s elective share. Because no prejudice to
interested parties has been demonstrated on this record, the circuit court erred in
not granting the guardian’s motion to revoke the disclaimer. 13
[¶26.] We finally note that Medicaid is for “individuals receiving nursing
home . . . care services [that] are in fact poor and have not transferred assets that
should be used to purchase the needed services before Medicaid benefits are made
available.” In re Estate of Meland, 2006 S.D. 22, ¶ 11, 712 N.W.2d 1, 4. “Medicaid .
. . is not to be used as an estate planning tool.” Id. But here, Arline’s disclaimer
was used as an estate planning tool. 14 The disclaimer was executed
13. The Estate also argues that Arline’s disclaimer was valid. We only note that
the disclaimer was executed by Arline’s son, who was her attorney-in-fact, the
personal representative of Eugene’s estate, and a beneficiary under the will
who would take substantially more if the disclaimer he executed was valid.
Because we determine that the guardian ad litem’s motion to revoke the
disclaimer should have been granted, we do not reach the question
concerning the validity of such a disclaimer.
14. The circuit court disagreed, reasoning:
(continued . . .)
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contemporaneously with Eugene’s will in an attempt to obtain Medicaid benefits
while simultaneously transferring the value of Arline’s elective share to the
Shipmans’ son and grandchildren. The circuit court should have granted the
guardian ad litem’s motion to revoke the disclaimer.
[¶27.] Reversed and remanded for Arline to obtain her elective share.
[¶28.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, SEVERSON, and
WILBUR, Justices, concur.
________________________
(. . . continued)
This disclaimer was not done as an estate planning tool, but was
done to help Eugene preserve his assets because he assumed
that he would be the surviving spouse, and he assumed he
would need the assets to provide for his own daily needs.
But at the time the disclaimer and will were executed, they did nothing to
provide for Eugene’s daily needs while he was alive. They were used to
preserve his son’s and grandchildren’s future inheritance, the very essence of
estate planning. David, Arline’s attorney-in-fact, admitted that the
disclaimer was executed because “Dad had spent down Mom’s share of the
money that was to be spent down for Social Services, and that was his—
trying to get his wishes that the kids would get something; that we did that
so—to try to protect what was left.”
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