State v. Dahl , 2012 S.D. LEXIS 5 ( 2012 )

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2012 S.D. 8IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
* * * *
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
ROBERT CLARENCE DAHL, Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
BROWN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
* * * *
HONORABLE SCOTT P. MYREN
Judge
* * * *
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
FRANK GEAGHAN
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
RICHARD A. SOMMERS
JUSTIN M. SCOTT of
Bantz, Gosch & Cremer, LLC
Aberdeen, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
* * * *
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON NOVEMBER 14, 2011
OPINION FILED 02/01/12
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
[¶1.] Robert Dahl appeals his conviction for third-offense DUI, arguing that
the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the
stop of his vehicle because the stop lacked reasonable suspicion. The arresting
officer initiated the investigatory stop to determine whether Dahl violated the
statute requiring a vehicle executing a right turn to be driven as closely as
practicable to the right-hand curb. Because the arresting officer’s interpretation of
the relevant statute was reasonable, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural Background
[¶2.] At approximately 10:49 p.m., on the evening of May 14, 2010,
Aberdeen police officer Jeffrey Koval was driving east near the 100 block of
Southeast Sixth Avenue in Aberdeen. Officer Koval observed a red SUV make a
wide right-hand turn from a parking lot onto Sixth Avenue. According to Officer
Koval, the vehicle appeared to partially cross over the dotted white line separating
the two east-bound lanes of the four-lane street. Officer Koval initiated a traffic
stop and ultimately arrested the driver of the vehicle, Dahl, for driving under the
influence of alcohol.
[¶3.] Dahl moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the stop of his
vehicle arguing that Officer Koval lacked reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
After reviewing the surveillance video from Officer Koval’s dashboard camera, the
circuit court concluded that Dahl’s vehicle had clearly crossed the dividing line and
that Officer Koval therefore had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Following a
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bench trial, Dahl was convicted of third-offense DUI and was sentenced to two years
in the state penitentiary, with one year suspended. Dahl appeals.
Analysis and Decision
[¶4.] Dahl argues that Officer Koval lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his
vehicle, and that the stop was therefore a violation of his Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. He further claims that all
evidence derived from the stop must be suppressed as a result of the constitutional
violation. “Our review of a motion to suppress based on an alleged violation of a
constitutionally protected right is a question of law examined de novo.” State v.
Bergee, 2008 S.D. 67, ¶ 9, 753 N.W.2d 911, 913-14 (quoting State v. Hayen, 2008
S.D. 41, ¶ 5, 751 N.W.2d 306, 308).
[¶5.] “An investigatory traffic stop must be ‘based on objectively reasonable
and articulable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring.’” State
v. Herren, 2010 S.D. 101, ¶ 7, 792 N.W.2d 551, 554 (quoting Bergee, 2008 S.D. 67, ¶
10, 753 N.W.2d at 914). In Herren, this Court quoted the United States Supreme
Court as follows:
When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-
suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they
must look at the “totality of the circumstances” of each case to
see whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and
objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing. This process
allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that “might well elude
an untrained person.” Although an officer’s reliance on a mere
“‘hunch’” is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of
criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable
cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a
preponderance of the evidence standard.
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Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750, 151
L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002)).
[¶6.] “Recognizing that the term ‘reasonable suspicion’ cannot be precisely
defined, we have said that it ‘is a common sense and non-technical concept dealing
with the practical considerations of everyday life.’” Id. ¶ 8 (quoting State v.
Quartier, 2008 S.D. 62, ¶ 10, 753 N.W.2d 885, 888). “Reasonable suspicion to stop
must be based on ‘specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.’” Id. (quoting State
v. Akuba, 2004 S.D. 94, ¶ 15, 686 N.W.2d 406, 413). “[I]n making a reasonable
suspicion determination, we must [l]ook at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each
case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for
suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting Bergee, 2008 S.D. 67, ¶ 10, 753 N.W.2d
at 914). “The stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.”
Id.[¶7.] Dahl argues that Officer Koval’s stop was based on his mistaken belief
that partially crossing into the left lane was prohibited by statute. This Court has
recently held that an officer’s objectively unreasonable “mistake of law” cannot
provide the basis for a traffic stop. State v. Wright, 2010 S.D. 91, ¶ 21, 791 N.W.2d
791, 799; Webb v. South Dakota Dept. of Commerce and Regulation, 2004 S.D. 63, ¶
10, 680 N.W.2d 661, 665. SDCL 32-26-17, the statute upon which Officer Koval
relied as the basis for his stop, provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in § 32-26-20, the driver of a
vehicle intending to turn to the right at an intersection shall
approach such intersection in the lane for traffic nearest to the
right-hand side of the highway, and in turning shall keep as
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closely as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the
highway.
While this statute does not explicitly prohibit a driver from crossing into another
lane when making a right-hand turn, this does not necessarily mean that Officer
Koval made a mistake of law in concluding that Dahl’s conduct violated the statute.
Dahl was still required to stay “as close as practicable” to the right-hand curb. This
language requires an observing officer to exercise judgment in determining whether
a violation may have occurred.
[¶8.] This case is therefore distinguishable from Wright and Webb, where
each officers’ interpretation of the applicable law was objectively unreasonable. See
Wright, 2010 S.D. 91, ¶ 21, 791 N.W.2d at 799; Webb, 2004 S.D. 63, ¶ 9, 680 N.W.2d
at 665. In this case, by contrast, the language of SDCL 32-26-17 requires the
officer to make a determination as to what is “practicable” under the circumstances.
Officer Koval reasonably concluded that Dahl’s vehicle did not stay as close as
practicable to the curb while making the turn, and he may well be correct that
Dahl’s conduct violated the statute. The stop initiated by Koval was therefore
appropriate to investigate whether Dahl violated SDCL 32-26-17.
[¶9.] However, even if Dahl did not break any traffic laws, Officer Koval still
had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. This Court has upheld the
reasonableness of a traffic stop when an officer observes a vehicle crossing lines on
the road. See State v. Ballard, 2000 S.D. 134, ¶ 11, 617 N.W.2d 837, 840 (crossing
center line and fog line); State v. Sleep, 1999 S.D. 19, ¶ 8, 590 N.W.2d 235, 238
(crossing the dividing line between two lanes on a four-lane highway). A review of
the video evidence in this case supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Dahl’s
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vehicle “clearly crossed over the line” while making the right-hand turn. The turn
appeared to be considerably wider than necessary under the circumstances and
created the reasonable inference that the driver of the vehicle might be impaired.
This was a specific and articulable fact that Officer Koval identified as the basis for
his stop, rather than a mere hunch or curiosity. While the evidence may not have
been substantial, it was sufficient to satisfy the relatively low standard of
reasonable suspicion.
Conclusion
[¶10.] This case is distinguishable from Wright and Webb because Officer
Koval did not make a mistake of law by concluding that Dahl’s vehicle did not stay
“as close as practicable” to the right-hand curb when making the turn. Even if Dahl
did not violate any traffic laws, his wide turn and crossing over the dividing line
were sufficient to form the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle.
[¶11.] Affirmed.
[¶12.] KONENKAMP, ZINTER, SEVERSON, and WILBUR, Justices, concur.
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