Amiotte v. South Dakota Board of Pardons & Paroles ( 2008 )


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  • #24836-a-JKK
    
    2008 SD 123
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    OF THE
    STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
    * * * *
    THOMAS M. AMIOTTE,                                  Appellant,
    v.
    SOUTH DAKOTA BOARD OF
    PARDONS AND PAROLES,                                Appellee.
    * * * *
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
    OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
    MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
    * * * *
    HONORABLE PETER H. LIEBERMAN
    Judge
    * * * *
    NICHOLE CARPER
    Sioux Falls, South Dakota                           Attorney for appellant.
    LAWRENCE E. LONG
    Attorney General
    MAX A. GORS
    Assistant Attorney General
    Department of Corrections
    Pierre, South Dakota                                Attorneys for appellee.
    * * * *
    CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
    NOVEMBER 3, 2008
    OPINION FILED 12/17/08
    #24836
    KONENKAMP, Justice
    [¶1.]        An inmate convicted of aggravated assault was classified by the
    Department of Corrections as an unconvicted sex offender. The classification
    required him to participate in a sex-offender treatment program. He refused. For
    his failure to participate, he was denied parole on his presumptive parole date. The
    inmate challenged the basis for the classification with the Board of Pardons and
    Paroles. The Board ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the inmate’s
    classification. An appeal to the circuit court was affirmed for same reason. We also
    affirm.
    Background
    [¶2.]        On June 19, 2003, Thomas Amiotte was indicted on a charge of second
    degree rape. Following plea negotiations, Amiotte agreed to plead guilty to
    aggravated assault, and the rape charge was dismissed. On January 20, 2004, he
    was sentenced to fifteen years, with ten years suspended. After Amiotte began
    serving his five-year sentence, on February 11, 2004, an Inmate Program Directive
    (IPD) was established for him. His IPD required, among other things, that he
    complete the Special Treatment of Perpetrators (STOP) Program, which includes
    therapy, education, and relapse prevention.
    [¶3.]        Amiotte’s presumptive parole date was set for June 9, 2006. On
    August 19, 2004, he received notice that he was being considered for classification
    as an unconvicted sex offender, based on information that he had a history of
    sexually violent or sexually abusive behavior. Amiotte was informed of his right to
    request a hearing before the Unconvicted Sex Offender Administrative Review
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    Panel (Review Panel), right to present evidence, and to have staff assistance. His
    hearing was held on September 28, 2004. Three people were empanelled to
    determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, Amiotte was an
    unconvicted sex offender. The Review Panel issued a written decision detailing the
    evidence it relied upon and concluded that he was an unconvicted sex offender.
    Amiotte received a copy of this written decision.
    [¶4.]        Amiotte had a right to appeal his decision through the Department of
    Correction’s (DOC) administrative review process. Through this process, he
    appealed the decision to the Secretary of Corrections. Acting Secretary Doug Weber
    reviewed the evidence and agreed with the Panel’s decision to classify Amiotte as an
    unconvicted sex offender. Secretary Weber issued a letter on February 18, 2005,
    affirming Amiotte’s classification and encouraging him to participate in the STOP
    program. Amiotte neither appealed this decision to the circuit court nor
    participated in the STOP program.
    [¶5.]        One month before his June 2006 presumptive parole date, the DOC
    reported to the Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) that Amiotte was not in
    substantial compliance with his IPD for failure to complete the STOP program. The
    Board held a hearing and concluded that Amiotte was not in substantial
    compliance. Consequently, the Board denied him release on parole. The Board set
    November 2006, for consideration of Amiotte’s possible release on discretionary
    parole.
    [¶6.]        On September 13, 2006, Amiotte requested that the Board reconsider
    its decision. Reconsideration was granted and hearings were held on October 18
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    and December 20, 2006. Amiotte requested that the Board examine the Review
    Panel’s previous decision classifying him as an unconvicted sex offender. On
    February 23, 2007, the Board ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to reconsider
    the Panel’s finding. Rather, the Board could only determine whether Amiotte was
    in substantial compliance with his IPD. He had not participated in the STOP
    program, and therefore, the Board affirmed its previous decision denying his release
    on parole.
    [¶7.]         Amiotte appealed the Board’s decision to the circuit court. A hearing
    was held on February 15, 2008. He argued to the court that the Board had
    jurisdiction to reconsider the Review Panel’s classification. The circuit court held
    that the Board had only jurisdiction to determine whether an inmate is in
    substantial compliance with the inmate’s IPD. Because Amiotte was not in
    substantial compliance, the court affirmed the Board’s decision. Amiotte appeals to
    this Court asserting that the Board has jurisdiction to review a decision of the
    Review Panel and also that his classification as an unconvicted sex offender was not
    supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 1
    1.      Because Amiotte challenges the Board’s legal authority, our standard of
    review is de novo. Krukow v. South Dakota Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 
    2006 SD 46
    , ¶7, 716 NW2d 121, 123 (citing Wendell v. South Dakota Dept. of
    Transp., 
    1998 SD 130
    , ¶5, 587 NW2d 595, 597; Boehrns v. South Dakota Bd.
    of Pardons & Paroles, 
    2005 SD 49
    , ¶5, 697 NW2d 11, 12-13). We construe
    statutes according to their intent, determined from the language as a whole,
    along with enactments relating to the same subject. Id. ¶12 (quoting State v.
    Barton, 
    2001 SD 52
    , ¶8, 625 NW2d 275, 278 (quoting Moss v. Guttormson,
    
    1996 SD 76
    , ¶10, 551 NW2d 14, 17)) (additional citation omitted).
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    #24836
    Analysis and Decision
    [¶8.]         The DOC is authorized to establish procedures for managing its
    inmates, which includes the creation of an IPD for each inmate. SDCL 1-15-20;
    SDCL 24-15A-34. Amiotte was classified by the DOC as an unconvicted sex
    offender. This meant that he was required to complete the STOP program as part
    of his IPD. He invoked his right to challenge the classification using the DOC’s
    administrative review process. He appealed the Review Panel’s decision to the
    Secretary of Corrections, but afterwards he did not appeal the Secretary’s decision
    to the circuit court. Nonetheless, Amiotte claims the DOC’s classification of an
    inmate is subject to review by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. He relies on SDCL
    24-15A-39 and the DOC administrative review policies.
    [¶9.]         When the DOC classifies an inmate as an unconvicted sex offender, the
    DOC administrative review process allows the inmate a right to challenge that
    decision. 2 The classification is first appealed to the Warden. If the Warden affirms,
    the inmate can appeal to the Secretary of Corrections. The Secretary’s decision can
    then be appealed to the circuit court. See Tibbetts v. State, 336 NW2d 658, 661-62
    (SD 1983). The Board’s role in evaluating an inmate’s IPD is invoked when an
    2.      The DOC administrative remedy process includes both informal and formal
    processes. The informal process directs the inmate to “try to resolve it
    through an informal resolution.” However, “[i]f the inmate believes the issue
    has not been properly resolved, he/she may obtain the Request for
    Administrative Remedy form from his/her Unit Staff.” Through this request
    the inmate submits a formal complaint, after which a written response will
    be provided signed by the Warden within thirty working days. For a
    complaint related to an inmate classification as an unconvicted sex offender,
    “[t]he Warden’s Response to a Request for Administrative Remedy may only
    be appealed to the Secretary of Corrections. . . .”
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    inmate’s parole date approaches. The Board decides whether the inmate has
    substantially complied with that inmate’s IPD and whether the inmate should be
    granted parole. 3 SDCL 24-15A-39.
    [¶10.]        Based on our review of SDCL Chapter 24-15A and the DOC
    administrative review policies, we find no language expressly or impliedly granting
    the Board jurisdiction to review the DOC’s classification. The plain language of
    SDCL 24-15A-39 gives the Board only the power to determine whether the inmate
    is in substantial compliance with that inmate’s IPD. Moreover, there is no inherent
    power in the Board to review the DOC’s classification of an inmate, simply because
    it is the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
    [¶11.]        While the Board does not have jurisdiction to review the DOC’s
    classification, Amiotte was not without judicial redress. He could have challenged
    the classification in the circuit court after the Secretary affirmed the DOC’s
    decision. This he did not do, and the Board is not the proper forum to now challenge
    the DOC’s classification. Because we conclude that the Board does not have
    jurisdiction, we need not consider whether Amiotte’s classification as an
    unconvicted sex offender was based on a preponderance of the evidence.
    [¶12.]        Affirmed.
    3.       Under SDCL 24-15A-39:
    The board may determine the inmate has substantively complied with
    the individual program directive and release the inmate at the
    inmate’s initial parole date or as soon as reasonably possible following
    the initial parole date and hearing. The board may also determine the
    inmate has not substantively met the requirements of the individual
    (continued . . .)
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    [¶13.]       GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, ZINTER, and
    MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.
    __________________
    (. . . continued)
    program directive, deny release at the initial parole date and set the
    time for a subsequent discretionary parole hearing.
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