Matter of Cameron Trust , 2019 S.D. 35 ( 2019 )

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2019 S.D. 35IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
In the Matter of the CLEOPATRA CAMERON GIFT TRUST,
Dated May 26, 1998, and the CAMERON FAMILY EXEMPT GST TRUST
FBO CLEOPATRA CAMERON, created under the
CAMERON FAMILY TRUST,
dated December 20, 1996, as amended.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LINCOLN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
THE HONORABLE NATALIE DAMGAARD
Judge
****
DREW DUNCAN
AMANDA W. ENGEL of
The Duncan Law Firm, LLP
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for appellant
Christopher Pallanck.
COREY THOMAS DENEVAN of
Boyce Law Firm, LLP
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for appellee Trident
Trust Company.
REBECCA L. WILSON of
Myers Billion, LLP
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Guardian Ad Litem for appellee
minor children C.S.C.-P. and
T.C.C.-P.
****
ARGUED ON
NOVEMBER 13, 2018
OPINION FILED 06/26/19
JAYNA M. VOSS
BOBBI L. THURY of
Legacy Law Firm, P.C.
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for appellee
Cleopatra Cameron.
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SALTER, Justice
[¶1.] Trust beneficiary Cleopatra Cameron filed a petition in the circuit
court requesting a determination of whether the trust’s spendthrift provision
prohibits direct payments of her child support obligation to her ex-husband,
Christopher Pallanck. A California family court previously ordered the direct
payments as part of the couple’s divorce, citing a particular feature of California
trust law. The circuit court concluded the direct payment order was a method of
enforcing Cleopatra’s child support obligation to be determined under local law and,
therefore, not entitled to full faith and credit. The court further determined that
South Dakota law recognizes the validity of spendthrift clauses and their
prohibition upon compulsory direct payments to a beneficiary’s creditors, like
Christopher, who now appeals. We affirm.
Background
[¶2.] Cleopatra’s father, Arthur A. Cameron Jr., established the Cameron
Family Trust for his own benefit during his life. He also established the Cleopatra
Cameron Irrevocable Gift Trust, under which Cleopatra was the primary
beneficiary. Arthur died on September 2, 2001, and the Family Trust was
partitioned into individual shares for each of his three children, including a share
for Cleopatra. This share was further divided into the GST1 Exempt Trust and the
Non-GST Exempt Trust. Spendthrift provisions in the Gift Trust, Non-GST Exempt
1. The term “GST” is an estate planning term used to refer to a generation
skipping transfer, most often used in connection with the generation skipping
transfer tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 2601 (2013), et seq. GST trusts are specifically
defined under the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. § 2632(c)(3)(B) (2013).
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Trust, and GST Exempt Trust (collectively the Trust) prohibit the trustee from
making direct payments to Cleopatra’s creditors and grant the trustee the sole
discretion to make distributions.
[¶3.] Cleopatra and Christopher were married in 2005 and lived in
California with their two young children. Christopher commenced a divorce action
in January 2009 in Santa Barbara County, California. During the pendency of the
divorce, the California family law court (the family court) entered interim orders
granting Christopher sole custody of the children, as well as establishing temporary
child support and spousal support obligations for Cleopatra. At the time, Cleopatra
received Trust distributions of $40,000 per month which, when considered with
Christopher’s relatively modest income from part-time employment, yielded a
monthly child support obligation for Cleopatra of $8,863. In addition, the court
ordered Cleopatra to pay Christopher interim spousal support of $14,761 per month
and interim attorney’s fees of $50,000.
[¶4.] The family court joined the Trust in the divorce action on February 3,
2009, to facilitate regular payment of the interim financial obligations it had
imposed upon Cleopatra. The family court later confirmed that its intent was to
utilize a particular feature of California trust law to require the Trust to directly
fund Cleopatra’s child support obligation.2
2. As described more fully below, the feature of California trust law that
preempts a trust instrument’s spendthrift provision and allows for
compulsory trust distributions to non-beneficiaries only applies to child
support and spousal support payments, though the family court here also
utilized the procedure to enforce Cleopatra’s other interim financial
obligations to pay attorney’s fee awards.
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[¶5.] On March 10, 2009, the family court conducted a hearing on
Christopher’s motion to show cause to determine whether Cleopatra and Wells
Fargo, who were co-trustees at the time, should be held in contempt for failing to
pay temporary child support. The court found that Cleopatra and Wells Fargo acted
in bad faith and abused their discretion when they failed to satisfy the child support
obligation and issued the following order:
The [c]ourt will order the Bank, and its successor, and Mother to
pay child support, spousal support, and attorney fees from
Mother’s Trust including any other ordered awards in this
action until further order of the [c]ourt. Wells Fargo Bank and
any successor are joined in this action until further order of
[c]ourt.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶6.] Wells Fargo objected on the basis that the family court had no
authority to order direct payments from a spendthrift trust to a creditor or child
support obligee. However, it ultimately complied with the March 10, 2009, order,
made the payments directly to Christopher, and did not seek interlocutory appellate
review.
[¶7.] Around the time the divorce action was beginning, Cleopatra and
Wells Fargo requested approval from a different California judge sitting as a
probate court to resign their positions as co-trustees. The probate court granted the
request and approved the appointment of BNY Mellon (BNY) as the sole successor
trustee in April 2009, after BNY agreed to be bound by the family court’s March 10
child support and spousal support order.
[¶8.] At this juncture, it seems helpful to explain the provisions of California
trust law which are at the heart of this appeal. Where, as here, child support
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obligors are trust beneficiaries who do not have the ability to compel distributions,
California’s probate code, nevertheless, allows a court to “order the trustee to satisfy
. . . [a] support judgment out of . . . future payments that the trustee, pursuant to
the exercise of the trustee’s discretion, determines to make to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary.” Cal. Prob. Code § 15305(c) (West 2019) (emphasis added). A
California Court of Appeal panel has interpreted this text to authorize an order
compelling a trustee to satisfy an unpaid support obligation where the trial court
finds the trustee has exercised its discretion in bad faith to deny a request for a
distribution. Ventura Cty. Dep’t of Child Support Servs. v. Brown, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d
489, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Relying upon the fact that the trustee had not
exercised its discretion to satisfy a child support obligation, the Ventura County
court concluded:
[A] court may overcome the trustee’s discretion under the
narrow circumstances present here: when there is an
enforceable child support judgment that the trustee refuses to
satisfy. Under these circumstances, the trial court may order
the trustee to satisfy past due and ongoing support obligations
from the trust.
Id.[¶9.] In addition to imposing interim support obligations upon Cleopatra,
the family court also ordered “Mother and/or the Trusts” to pay interim attorney’s
fees to Christopher. The court initially ordered $50,000 in attorney’s fees and then
ordered an additional $100,000 in attorney’s fees on June 16, 2009, both of which
were paid by the Trust. The court ordered another $100,000 for attorney’s fees on
December 1, 2009. BNY elected to appeal the December 1 attorney’s fee award,
which was immediately reviewable under California law.
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[¶10.] In an April 2011 unpublished decision, a California Court of Appeal
panel reversed the family court’s order to the extent it required BNY to make direct
attorney’s fee payments to Christopher. In re Marriage of Pallanck, No. 1304784,
2011 WL 1459964 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2011). The appellate court concluded the
Ventura County exception that allows a court to order a trustee to make direct
payments from a spendthrift trust is narrow and depends upon the existence of an
enforceable child support obligation that a trustee refuses in bad faith to satisfy.
Id. at *4. The family court’s December 1 order, by contrast, did not involve a child
support obligation or a bad faith “refusal to satisfy a delinquent order.”3 Id.
[¶11.] While the attorney’s fees appeal was pending, the family court issued a
final judgment of divorce on October 26, 2010. The judgment incorporated a written
statement of decision, dated May 17, 2010, in which the family court granted
Christopher legal and physical custody of the couple’s two minor children.
Cleopatra’s parenting time was significantly restricted and subject to supervision.
The court set Cleopatra’s monthly child support at $8,786 and ordered the Trust to
“make the child support payments directly to Father each and every month[,]”
adopting “in full” its earlier “comments on this subject made in [c]ourt and in
writing[.]”
3. It is not clear from the appellate opinion whether the panel relied upon the
fact that the interim fee award was not a support order and, therefore, not
within the text of Cal. Prob. Code § 15305 or whether the appellate court’s
holding was based upon the absence of a bad faith determination. Both seem
implicated in the decision, and it appears either would have served as a basis
to reverse the family court’s December 1 order.
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[¶12.] Following the judgment, the family court later modified the amount of
Cleopatra’s child support obligation on October 9, 2012. The decision does not
reference the Trust as a party or incorporate the rulings from the 2010 judgment,
and it is unclear from the record that the Trust received notice of the modification
proceeding. Nevertheless, the Trust continued to pay child support directly to
Christopher following the modification.
[¶13.] A few months earlier, in July 2012, Cleopatra invoked her authority
under the Trust instruments to move the situs of the Trust to South Dakota. BNY
resigned as the sole trustee in 2014 and was replaced by Citicorp Trust of South
Dakota. Citicorp resigned the same year and was replaced by Bankers Trust
Company of South Dakota. On February 28, 2014, Cleopatra petitioned for court
supervision of the Trust in Lincoln County, seeking several forms of relief, including
approval of the change of situs and amendment of the Trust instruments. The
circuit court granted Cleopatra’s petition and concluded supervision of the Trust
after allowing Cleopatra’s requested relief. The Trust continued to pay child
support to Christopher for a period of time despite its new situs.
[¶14.] Around November 2016, Trident Trust Company, Inc. (Trident)
became the acting trustee, and Empire Trust (Empire) was appointed as the trust
protector. See SDCL 55-1B-1(2) (defining the role of trust protector); SDCL 55-1B-6
(listing potential statutory “powers and discretions” of trust protectors). Empire
reviewed the Trust’s spendthrift provision and determined that it would not accede
to the trustee’s direct child support payments to Christopher. Empire viewed the
direct payments as contrary to the Trust’s spendthrift provision and the
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Legislature’s explicit intent regarding the rights of creditors to the assets of
spendthrift trusts. Empire also regarded the direct payments as improvident in
light of the Trust’s rapidly depleting assets. In January 2017, Trident ended direct
child support payments to Christopher.
[¶15.] On May 1, 2017, Cleopatra petitioned the circuit court to resume court
supervision of the Trust. She also sought a declaration from the court as to whether
the Trust is prohibited from making child support payments directly to Christopher.
The court resumed supervision over the Trust4 and, following a hearing, issued a
memorandum opinion in which it concluded “the Trust is prohibited by the terms of
the Trust from making any child support payments directly to [Christopher].”
[¶16.] The circuit court also concluded that the means of enforcing the
California child support obligation were determined by South Dakota—not
California—law. Therefore, the family court’s order requiring the trustee to make
direct child support payments to Christopher in contravention of the Trust’s
spendthrift provision was not entitled to full faith and credit. Christopher
appeals, 5 raising one issue for our consideration: whether the circuit court erred
when it determined the Trust is prohibited from making child support payments
directly to Christopher.
4. The children are named as secondary beneficiaries under the Trust, and the
circuit court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent their interests.
5. Cleopatra and the Minor Children, through their guardian ad litem, joined
the brief of Appellee Trident Trust pursuant to SDCL 15-26A-67.
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Analysis
[¶17.] The current dispute arose in the context of the circuit court’s
supervision of the Trust and was prompted by a request for the court’s instructions
concerning the Trust’s obligation under the child support direct payment provision
of the California divorce judgment.6 On appeal, the question presented by
Christopher is “[w]hether the Trust is prohibited [by its spendthrift provision] from
making child support payments directly to[him]. . . .” We think the more relevant
inquiry, however, is whether the California direct payment order is entitled to full
faith and credit. This issue involves purely legal questions of constitutional
principles of full faith and credit as well as questions of statutory interpretation.
“Issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation are questions of law” which we
review de novo. Expungement of Oliver, 2012 S.D. 9, ¶ 5, 810 N.W.2d 350, 352.
[¶18.] The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
The command to afford the judgments of foreign states full faith and credit is
further codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2013), which provides that authenticated
records and judicial proceedings “shall have the same full faith and credit in every
6. Two statutes within SDCL Chapter 21-22, authorizing court supervision of
trusts, are implicated here. First, SDCL 21-22-13 provides that “[t]he
trustor, a fiduciary, or a beneficiary of any trust under court supervision may
at any time petition the court for its action as to any matter relevant to the
administration of the trust[.]” In addition, SDCL 21-24-5 provides that
interested persons may seek “a declaration of rights or legal relations . . . to
direct the personal representatives or trustees . . .” or “determine any
question arising in the administration of the estate or trust[.]”
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court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State[.]”
[¶19.] The United States Supreme Court has recognized that providing full
faith and credit to the judgments of foreign states serves the salutary purpose of
limiting the opportunity to relitigate issues that have been resolved previously
through the judicial process. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348-49,
62 S. Ct. 608, 612, 86 L. Ed. 885 (1942). As a result, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause “alter[s] the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the
judicial proceedings of the others, and . . . make[s] them integral parts of a single
nation.” V.L. v. E.L., __ U.S. __, __, 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020, 194 L. Ed. 2d 92 (2016)
(per curiam) (quoting Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277, 56 S.
Ct. 229, 234, 80 L. Ed. 220 (1935)); see also Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330, 334
(S.D. 1987) (recognizing that valid foreign judgments are given effect in the
interests of comity).
[¶20.] Generally, if the judgment was “rendered by a court with adjudicatory
authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, [it]
qualifies for recognition throughout the land.” Id. Furthermore, “[a] State may not
disregard the judgment of a sister State because it disagrees with the reasoning
underlying the judgment or deems it to be wrong on the merits.” Id.; see also
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462, 61 S. Ct. 339, 342, 85 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1940)
(“[T]he full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the
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merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity
of the legal principles on which the judgment is based.”).
[¶21.] There are, however, certain limitations upon the requirements of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. Providing full faith and credit to a foreign state’s
judgment “does not mean that States must adopt the practices of other States
regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.
Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive
effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law.”
Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235, 118 S. Ct. 657, 665,
139 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1998); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 99
(1971) (“The local law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of
another state is enforced.”). “‘Evenhanded’ means only that the state executes a
sister state judgment in the same way that it would execute judgments in the forum
court.” Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 159 (5th Cir. 2011).
[¶22.] Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Baker, noted that the power
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to make the judgment of “one State[]
conclusive evidence in the courts of another State[.]” 522 U.S. at 242, 118 S. Ct. at
668 (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 291-
92, 8 S. Ct. 1370, 1375, 32 L. Ed. 239 (1888)). Yet despite the preclusive power of
one state’s judgment, it “can only be executed in [the forum state] as its laws may
permit.” Id. (quoting Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 187, 21 S. Ct. 555, 556, 45 L.
Ed. 810 (1901)); see also Adar, 639 F.3d at 161 (holding there was no violation of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause where a Louisiana registrar recognized the validity of
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a New York adoption decree, but only allowed one unmarried parent’s name on the
Louisiana birth certificate because under Louisiana law, only married couples could
jointly adopt).
[¶23.] Here, an examination of the statute upon which the family court relied
to order direct Trust payments to Christopher reveals it to be a conspicuous method
of enforcing a support obligation where an obligor is the beneficiary of a trust
protected by a spendthrift provision:
(c) Whether or not the beneficiary has the right under the trust
to compel the trustee to pay income or principal or both to or for
the benefit of the beneficiary, the court may, to the extent that
the court determines it is equitable and reasonable under the
circumstances of the particular case, order the trustee to satisfy
all or part of the support judgment out of all or part of future
payments that the trustee, pursuant to the exercise of the
trustee’s discretion, determines to make to or for the benefit of
the beneficiary.
(d) This section applies to a support judgment notwithstanding
any provision in the trust instrument.
Cal. Prob. Code § 15305 (emphasis added.)
[¶24.] It is equally clear that the Ventura County court also perceived Cal.
Prob. Code § 15305 to be an enforcement provision. The Ventura County court
broadened the enforcement authority of California trial courts to order direct trust
payments, notwithstanding a spendthrift provision, upon a finding the trustee acted
in bad faith by not authorizing a distribution. The court described Cal. Prob.
Code § 15305 as a means of enforcing the support order, observing, “A spendthrift
provision ‘is not effective to exempt the trust from enforcement of a judgment for
support of a minor child . . . .’” Ventura Cty., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 495 (emphasis
added) (quoting Cal. Prob. Code § 15305, cmt.).
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[¶25.] Viewed in this context, the family court’s order compelling the direct
payment of child support from the Trust was an unmistakable means of enforcing
Cleopatra’s obligation. Christopher’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument that
the direct payment order was, in truth, an enforcement method. In our view, the
trustee was not the child support obligor and was only nominally joined in the
divorce action to enforce Cleopatra’s obligation. Because the means of enforcing
judgments do not implicate full faith and credit considerations, the circuit court
here was not required to submit to the California order compelling direct payments
from the Trust if this method of self-executing enforcement is not authorized by
South Dakota law. Based upon a review of our relevant statutes, it is not
authorized and is, in fact, expressly prohibited.
[¶26.] Our Legislature has placed formidable barriers between creditor
claims and trust funds protected by a spendthrift provision. See SDCL 55-1-41 (“If
the trust contains a spendthrift provision, no creditor may reach present or future
mandatory distributions from the trust at the trust level.”); SDCL 55-1-35 (“No
trustee is liable to any creditor for paying the expenses of a spendthrift trust.”).
More to the point, the Legislature has emphatically rejected even the specter of an
argument that would allow a child support creditor to reach trust funds protected
by a spendthrift provision. Indeed, this precise legal theory is identified in § 59 of
the Restatement (Third) Trusts (2003) which states that “[t]he interest of a
beneficiary in a valid spendthrift trust can be reached in satisfaction of an
enforceable claim against the beneficiary for . . . support of a child . . . .” However,
the Legislature anticipated such an argument in South Dakota courts and
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definitively foreclosed it with its 2007 enactment of SDCL 55-1-25 which provides in
part:
In the area of creditor rights, the Restatement of Trusts (Third)
and the Uniform Trust Code create many new positions of law
as well as adopts many minority positions of law. The
provisions of §§ 55-1-24 to 55-1-43, inclusive, affirmatively reject
many of these positions. Therefore, the Legislature does not
intend the courts to consult the Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Trusts . . . § 59 . . . with respect to subject matters addressed by
the provisions of §§ 55-1-24 to 55-1-43, inclusive.
(Emphasis added); see also Richardson v. Richardson, 2017 S.D. 92, ¶ 16,
906 N.W.2d 369, 374 (stating that courts “must be mindful of the Legislature’s
public policy determinations . . . .”).
[¶27.] Further, in light of this clear statutory course, we cannot accept
Christopher’s argument that we reverse the circuit court because our Legislature
has taken “a stance and is not willing to allow our trust laws to evade outstanding
child support obligations.” In fact, the statute upon which he relies for this broad
public policy argument is SDCL 55-16-15 which, by its terms, does not apply to the
situation we confront here. The statute simply prevents child support obligors from
transferring assets into a domestic asset protection trust to avoid their preexisting
child support obligations. Here, though, Cleopatra is not the settlor of the Trust,
and there is no claim she transferred assets into the Trust to avoid child support
obligations.7
7. Christopher also suggests that the direct payment provision of the California
divorce judgment could be viewed as akin to an “alternative arrangement” in
lieu of an order for withholding of income under SDCL 25-7A-23. However,
the statute applies only to actual agreements between the parties which are
reduced to writing and “approved by the court.” Here, these circumstances
(continued . . .)
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[¶28.] Nor are we persuaded by Christopher’s argument that the absence of
appellate review of the family court’s order for direct trust payments implicates
principles of res judicata which, in turn, bar any objection in South Dakota. Simply
put, the order remains an unmistakable method of self-executing enforcement
which does not “travel with the sister state judgment.” Baker, 522 U.S. at 235,
118 S. Ct. at 665. Therefore, the constitutional full faith and credit issue remains
the central inquiry guiding our review, even amid Christopher’s res judicata
argument. See 18B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4467
(2d ed.), Westlaw (April 2019 update) (“It may prove that the[] exceptions [to full
faith and credit] will generally mean only that direct enforcement can be denied,
while res judicata is still required in some part. A second state need not directly
enforce an injunction entered by another state, for example, but may often be
required to honor the issue preclusion effects of the first judgment.”).
[¶29.] Furthermore, because Christopher has not registered a judgment for
enforcement, it is unnecessary to address his arguments for the application of the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act under SDCL 15-16A and the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) under SDCL 25-9C. However,
even if the order had been registered for enforcement under SDCL 25-9C-602, the
registered support order is only “enforceable in the same manner and is subject to
the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state.” SDCL 25-9C-
603(b). Similarly, the choice of law provisions of the UIFSA provide that an
________________________
(. . . continued)
are not present, and we determine the provisions of SDCL 25-7A-23 are not
applicable.
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enforcing state “shall apply the procedures and remedies of this state.” SDCL 25-
9C-604(c); see also, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h) (2013) (Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA)) (“In a proceeding to establish, modify, or enforce a
child support order, the forum State’s law shall apply . . . .”) (emphasis added).
[¶30.] Under the circumstances, therefore, both the UIFSA and the
FFCCSOA leave enforcement mechanisms to the legal standards of the forum state,
even if it is without jurisdiction to modify the order. In this regard, a forum state
may use its own enforcement mechanisms if it does not alter “the amount, scope, or
duration” of the issuing state’s judgment. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hamilton,
914 N.E.2d 747, 752 (Ind. 2009) (Indiana court’s order for parent to pay $150 a
month in child support to avoid incarceration was a “valid enforcement
mechanism[]” because arrearages were accrued in accordance with a Florida court’s
order.); In re Justin H., No. M2013–02517–COA–R3–JV, 2015 WL 3455953 at *6
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015) (“[T]he trial court did not impermissibly ‘modify’ the
original child support order by changing only the intermediary designated to receive
Ms. Hansen’s child support payment. . . . Instead this minor alteration constituted
an enforcement mechanism[.]”).8
[¶31.] Our holding here has no impact upon Cleopatra’s legal obligation to
support her children. This obligation remains very much intact and is the subject of
continuing litigation in the California family court which appears to have
8. See also Loree v. Pearson, 88 S.D. 330, 332, 219 N.W.2d 615, 616 (1974)
(holding trial court impermissibly modified a final foreign judgment by
reducing the amount).
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continuing jurisdiction.9 Our decision here is consistent with overarching principles
of full faith and credit which apply broadly to all judgments and orders.10
[¶32.] We affirm.
[¶33.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KERN and JENSEN, Justices,
concur.
9. Trident Trust offers a multi-faceted jurisdictional argument on appeal which
posits that the family court lacked jurisdiction over the Trust in 2010 and
also that it lacks jurisdiction over the Trust now after the situs was changed
to South Dakota. The former argument, if it were successful, could serve as a
basis for denying full faith and credit to the direct payment order, but on this
record, we are not convinced the family court lacked either subject matter
jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. See V.L., 136 S. Ct. at 1021 (citation
omitted) (“Where a judgment indicates on its face that it was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, such jurisdiction ‘is to be presumed unless
disproved.’”). Trident Trust’s latter jurisdictional argument does not alter
our full faith and credit analysis and, if accepted, would mean that a trust’s
relocation to South Dakota categorically relieves it of all obligations under
orders previously rendered in other jurisdictions. We adopt no such rule and
resolve this case based on its unique facts and procedural history under the
principles set forth above.
10. Because it is not separately raised as an issue in this appeal, we express no
opinion as to the efficacy of the decision by the trustee and trust protector to
unilaterally cease direct payments to Christopher prior to a judicial
determination that it was relieved of any obligations under the terms of the
order.
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