State v. Edwards , 2024 S.D. 62 ( 2024 )

#30448-a-SRJ
2024 S.D. 62IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
WANDA L. EDWARDS, Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MEADE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE JOHN FITZGERALD
Judge
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CONOR DUFFY of
Duffy Law Firm
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and
appellant.
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
ERIN E. HANDKE
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and
appellee.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
APRIL 23, 2024
OPINION FILED 10/16/24
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JENSEN, Chief Justice
[¶1.] A Sturgis police officer initiated a traffic stop after observing a vehicle
being driven without an illuminated headlamp. The driver was arrested after law
enforcement found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on his person.
Wanda Edwards, a passenger, was then asked to step out of the vehicle so they
could conduct a search of the vehicle and its contents. Edwards refused to turn over
her purse that was with her inside the vehicle. Law enforcement forcibly took
Edwards’ purse, searched it, and found a small amount of methamphetamine and
drug paraphernalia. Edwards moved to suppress the contraband found in her
purse. Edwards’ motion was denied, and she was found guilty of possession of a
controlled substance, possession of marijuana, and obstructing a law enforcement
officer. Edwards appeals the denial of her suppression motion. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
[¶2.] On November 4, 2022, Sergeant Jameson Tebben of the Sturgis Police
Department was on patrol in Sturgis. At approximately 7:46 p.m., Sergeant Tebben
observed a sedan traveling eastbound on Lazelle Street with a headlamp that was
not illuminated and initiated a traffic stop.
[¶3.] The driver of the vehicle informed Sergeant Tebben that he did not
have his driver’s license with him. The front seat passenger was able to provide her
driver’s license and identified herself as Wanda Edwards. Edwards indicated that
she was the owner of the vehicle and provided Sergeant Tebben with her vehicle
registration. She was unable to provide proof of insurance.
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[¶4.] Sergeant Tebben brought the driver to his patrol vehicle for further
questioning. The driver identified himself as Alexander Pearman but was unable to
provide his address or social security number. During their conversation, Sergeant
Tebben detected the odor of alcohol on the driver and performed a field sobriety test.
After conducting the field sobriety test, Sergeant Tebben placed the driver inside of
his patrol vehicle and returned to Edwards who was still sitting inside her vehicle.
He asked Edwards what the driver’s name was, and she informed him that the
driver’s name was “Marcus G.” The driver, however, continued to state that his
name was Alexander.
[¶5.] Because Sergeant Tebben was unable to confirm the driver’s identity,
he asked the driver to step out of the patrol vehicle and placed him in handcuffs. As
the driver was placing his hands behind his back, he plunged his left hand into his
front left pocket, which prompted Sergeant Tebben to conduct a pat down search of
the driver. Sergeant Tebben discovered an orange hypodermic needle cap, two
hypodermic needles, and a jewelry bag with a white crystal-like residue on the
driver’s person. The needles and jewelry bag contained substances that
presumptively tested positive for methamphetamine. As a result, the driver was
placed under arrest for false impersonation, possession of a controlled substance,
and drug paraphernalia.
[¶6.] By this time, Meade County Deputy Sheriff Nicolis Forbes and Sturgis
Police Officer Richard St. Peter arrived on the scene to assist. Sergeant Tebben
informed the officers that Edwards was still inside the vehicle and asked the
officers to perform a preliminary breath test (PBT) on Edwards to determine if she
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was able to drive home. He also asked the officers to conduct a search of Edwards’
vehicle.
[¶7.] Deputy Forbes approached Edwards and asked her to step out of the
vehicle. At this time, Edwards was still seated in the passenger seat with her purse
on her lap. As Edwards exited the vehicle, she took her purse from her lap and
placed it over her shoulder. Officer St. Peter instructed Edwards to turn her purse
over to Deputy Forbes. Edwards declined and stated, “I’m going to hold onto my
purse.” Deputy Forbes informed Edwards that he was “going to take [the purse]
and search it.” Edwards responded that Deputy Forbes needed a warrant to search
the purse.
[¶8.] Officer St. Peter attempted to take the purse from Edwards, but she
resisted. Edwards repeatedly claimed that the officers needed a warrant to search
her purse and requested to speak with Sergeant Tebben. Sergeant Tebben
confirmed that they were going to search the vehicle and Edwards’ purse. Edwards
continued to hold onto her purse despite being placed under arrest. Deputy Forbes
was eventually able to forcibly remove the purse from Edwards and placed her into
a patrol vehicle.
[¶9.] Deputy Forbes conducted a search of Edwards’ purse and found two
hypodermic needles, a small mirror with a white crystalline substance on it, and a
bullet-shaped keychain that contained a marijuana cigarette. The needle and
powder presumptively tested positive for methamphetamine.
[¶10.] Edwards was arrested and later indicted for possession of a controlled
substance; possession of marijuana, two ounces or less; obstructing a law
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enforcement officer; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The State also filed a
part II habitual offender information alleging that Edwards had been convicted of a
prior felony.
[¶11.] Edwards moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop,
arguing that law enforcement lacked probable cause to search her purse. At the
suppression hearing, the court heard testimony from Sergeant Tebben, Deputy
Forbes, and Officer St. Peter, and received recordings from the officers’ body
cameras.
[¶12.] The court denied Edwards’ motion to suppress, reasoning that law
enforcement was authorized to search the vehicle and its contents incident to the
driver’s arrest. Upon the arrest of the driver, the court concluded that law
enforcement could search any container inside the vehicle and Edwards’ attempt to
remove her purse from the vehicle did not defeat the fact that it was a container
inside the vehicle at the time of the arrest.
[¶13.] Prior to trial, the State dismissed the charge for possession of
marijuana and the part II information. At a bench trial, Edwards was found guilty
of possession of a controlled substance, obstructing a law enforcement officer, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Edwards appeals her convictions arguing that
her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches was violated when law
enforcement conducted a warrantless search of her purse.
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Standard of Review
[¶14.] “Our standard of review for suppression motions is well established.”
State v. Rosa, 2022 S.D. 76, ¶ 12, 983 N.W.2d 562, 566 (quoting State v. Mousseaux,
2020 S.D. 35, ¶ 10, 945 N.W.2d 548, 551). “We review the denial of a motion to
suppress based on the alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right as a
question of law by applying the de novo standard of review.” Id. (quoting State v.
Rolfe, 2018 S.D. 86, ¶ 10, 921 N.W.2d 706, 709). “[A]s a general matter[,]
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de
novo on appeal.” Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 2004 S.D. 33, ¶ 8, 678 N.W.2d 176,
180). However, “[w]e review any underlying factual findings of the circuit court
‘under the clearly erroneous standard.’” State v. Red Cloud, 2022 S.D. 17, ¶ 21, 972
N.W.2d 517, 525–26 (quoting State v. Doap Deng Chuol, 2014 S.D. 33, ¶ 19, 849
N.W.2d 255, 261).
Analysis and Decision
[¶15.] Edwards concedes that law enforcement was authorized to search her
vehicle after they found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on the driver’s
person. However, she cites United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L.
Ed. 210 (1948), and argues that “probable cause to search a vehicle does not extend
to the person of a passenger inside that vehicle.” She highlights that Officer St.
Peter acknowledged that he and the responding officers did not have any probable
cause to believe that Edwards was in possession of illegal contraband at the time
her purse was searched. Edwards attempts to distinguish this Court’s decision in
State v. Steele, 2000 S.D. 78, 613 N.W.2d 825, and the United States Supreme
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Court’s decision in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed.
2d 408 (1999), by asserting that her purse was intimately connected to her person
because she held it on her lap or over her shoulder at all times during her encounter
with law enforcement. Based on this fact, she asserts that her purse “is more
analogous to a pocket attached [to her] outer clothing than a container resting
elsewhere in the vehicle.” 1
[¶16.] The State argues that law enforcement was authorized to search
Edwards’ vehicle both as a search incident to a lawful arrest and because there was
probable cause to believe that criminal activity was present inside the vehicle based
upon the drug residue and paraphernalia found on the driver’s person. The State
relies on Steele, 2000 S.D. 78, ¶ 5, 613 N.W.2d at 826, which held that when an
officer lawfully arrests an occupant of a vehicle, the officer may “as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile,” including “the contents of any containers found within the passenger
compartment[.]”
[¶17.] The State, citing Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302, 119 S. Ct. at 1301, also
argues that once probable cause exists to search a motor vehicle for contraband, law
enforcement is authorized to search the vehicle and its contents, including the
personal belongings of the driver and passenger. From the State’s perspective,
allowing “a passenger to remove a container from the vehicle and claim it is part of
1. Edwards cites decisions from other state courts concluding that a purse
physically attached to an individual is entitled to an increased expectation of
privacy, much like outer clothing. See Idaho v. Newsom, 979 P.2d 100 (Idaho
1998); Iowa v. Campbell, 908 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017); Kansas v.
Boyd, 64 P.3d 419 (Kan. 2003).
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their person, defeats the purpose of warrantless searches” because it would create
an unworkable standard for law enforcement to determine what is searchable,
leading to extensive litigation and suppression motions. The State contends that
the cases from other jurisdictions relied upon by Edwards are inapposite to the
current case because they involve instances where officers lacked probable cause to
search the vehicle or confiscated a passenger’s purse before they had probable cause
to search the vehicle in which it was found. See Kansas v. Boyd, 64 P.3d 419, 427
(Kan. 2003) (distinguishing Houghton); Iowa v. Campbell, 908 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2017) (same).
[¶18.] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
VI, § 11 of our State Constitution protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” 2 Thus, “warrantless searches are unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional unless the search falls into one of the limited exceptions.” Steele,
2000 S.D. 78, ¶ 5, 613 N.W.2d at 826 (citing State v. Meyer, 1998 S.D. 122, ¶¶ 21–
27, 587 N.W.2d 719, 723–24).
[¶19.] The United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the
warrant requirement where ‘“contraband goods concealed and illegally transported
in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant’ where
probable cause exists.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300, 119 S. Ct. at 1301 (quotation
2. Edwards challenges the search of her purse under the South Dakota
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
but does not argue that Art. VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution
provides greater protection than afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
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omitted). “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the
object of the search.” U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.
Ed. 2d 572 (1982). Thus, when a police officer has probable cause to search a
vehicle, they “may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable
of concealing the object of the search.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307, 119 S. Ct. at
1304. However, probable cause to search a vehicle and its containers does “not
justify a body search of a passenger.” Id. at 303, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 (citing Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222).
[¶20.] Edwards does not challenge the determination that once law
enforcement found contraband on the driver’s person, they also had probable cause
to search the vehicle and its containers. Edwards’ sole contention is that her purse
was intimately connected to her person and not subject to search.
[¶21.] In Houghton, the driver of a vehicle was arrested after he admitted
that a hypodermic needle found in his pocket was used to inject methamphetamine.
Id. at 298, 119 S. Ct. at 1300. The defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, was
removed to conduct a search of the vehicle. Id. Law enforcement searched the
defendant’s purse discovered inside the vehicle and found drug paraphernalia inside
the purse. Id. Houghton concluded that the search of the passenger’s purse was
constitutional and “that such a package may be searched, whether or not its owner
is present as a passenger or otherwise, because it may contain the contraband that
the officer has reason to believe is in the car.” Id. at 307, 119 S. Ct. at 1304.
Relying on Ross, the Court stated, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a
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lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its
contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Id. at 301, 119 S. Ct. at 1301(quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 825, 102 S. Ct. at 2173) (emphasis added). Further, “our
later cases describing Ross have characterized it as applying broadly to all
containers within a car, without qualification as to ownership.” Id.
[¶22.] Houghton also reasoned that “[p]assengers, no less than drivers,
possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they
transport in cars, which ‘trave[l] public throughfares,’ ‘seldom serv[e] as . . . the
repository of personals effects,’ are subjected to police stop and examination to
enforce ‘pervasive’ government controls ‘[a]s an everyday occurrence,’ and, finally,
are exposed to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open to public
scrutiny.” Id. at 303, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 (alterations in original) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). In addition, the Court stated that during a traffic stop, a
passenger’s privacy interests are “considerably diminished, [whereas] the
governmental interests at stake are substantial. Effective law enforcement would
be appreciably impaired without the ability to search a passenger’s belongings . . .
[because a] criminal might be able to hide contraband in a passengers’ belongings as
readily as in other containers in the car[.]” Id. at 304, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 (citations
omitted). 3 “A passenger’s personal belongings, just like the driver’s belongings or
3. In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer wrote that “[p]urses are special
containers. They are repositories of especially personal items that people
generally like to keep with them at all times.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 308,
119 S. Ct. at 1304 (Breyer, J., concurring). Based on this special relationship,
Justice Breyer was “tempted to say that . . . if a woman’s purse, like a man’s
billfold, were attached to her person . . .” that it “might then amount to a kind
(continued . . .)
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containers attached to the car like a glove compartment, are ‘in’ the car, and the
officer has probable cause to search for contraband in the car.” Id. at 302, 119 S. Ct.
at 1301 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824, 102 S. Ct. at 2173).
[¶23.] The State also cites Steele as an alternative basis to authorize the
search of the vehicle and Edwards’ purse, as a search incident to arrest. It is
unnecessary to consider Steele to justify the search of the vehicle because there is no
dispute that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle in this instance. 4
However, Steele is instructive on the issue before us, that being the specific
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(. . . continued)
of ‘outer clothing,’ which under the Court’s cases would properly receive
increased protection.” Id. (citation omitted). However, the United States
Supreme Court has never adopted Justice Breyer’s view, and this Court has
rejected such a view, because it would blur the bright-line rule regarding
searches of passenger’s belongings and ignores the reality that passengers
are often involved in the same activity as the driver and can easily hide
incriminating evidence in their personal belongings that are on or near their
person. See Steele, 2000 S.D. 78, ¶¶ 11–18, 613 N.W.2d at 828–30.
4. The defendant in Steele was arrested on a probation violation and law
enforcement subsequently searched the vehicle incident to the arrest. Like
the case before us, the defendant passenger in Steele only challenged the
search of her purse. She did not challenge the search of vehicle as a valid
search incident to arrest. This reflected the widely accepted view, at the
time, from New York v. Belton that an arrest automatically authorized a
warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest to include “any object capable of
holding another object,” as well as “boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.” Id.
¶ 6, 613 N.W.2d at 827 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61
n.4, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 n.4, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981)). But in 2009, the
United States Supreme Court clarified the Belton rule in Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 335, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). The
Supreme Court held “that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident
to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot
access the interior of the vehicle.” Id. Instead, Gant held that the
“circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a
lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Id. at 343, 129 S. Ct. at 1719(citation omitted).
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authority to search Edwards’ purse in connection with an otherwise valid
warrantless search.
[¶24.] On this question, Steele, like Houghton, correctly balanced the privacy
claims associated with a person’s purse with the need for a bright-line rule in cases
where a warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment is authorized.
Requiring officers to determine whether a purse is sufficiently attached to an
individual so that it is deserving of a heightened expectation of privacy would blur
an established bright-line rule and would lead to the “seemingly inconsistent
rulings caused by fact-driven analys[es]” that Belton and Houghton sought to
eliminate. Id. ¶ 7, 613 N.W.2d at 827 (citation omitted). See Belton, 453 U.S. at
460, 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
[¶25.] The heightened interests of law enforcement to search a vehicle and its
contents, based upon probable cause that contraband is in the vehicle, outweigh
Edwards’ diminished expectation of privacy in her personal belongings that she
brought into the vehicle. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303, 119 S. Ct. at 1302(“Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with
regard to the property that they transport in cars[.]”). For these reasons, Edwards’
purse was not entitled to a heightened expectation of privacy and was subject to the
same search conditions as any other container found inside of the vehicle that was
capable of concealing contraband.
[¶26.] We affirm.
[¶27.] KERN, SALTER, and DEVANEY, Justices, concur.
[¶28.] MYREN, Justice, dissents.
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MYREN, Justice (dissenting).
[¶29.] I agree that law enforcement was entitled to search the vehicle, given
the drugs found on Pearman. Although the scope of a vehicle search includes
passengers’ belongings found in the car, it does “not justify a body search of a
passenger.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.
Ed. 2d 408 (1999) (citing U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210(1948) (emphasis added)).
[¶30.] In Houghton, the passenger’s purse was found on the backseat of the
vehicle. 526 U.S. at 298, 119 S. Ct. at 1299. In contrast, Edwards had her purse on
her lap when the car was stopped. Edwards kept the purse in her possession at all
times. When asked to exit the vehicle, she took it from her lap and put it on her
shoulder. When law enforcement told her they were going to search her purse, she
denied consent and asserted they were not authorized to search the purse without a
warrant. Law enforcement articulated no reason to believe her purse contained
illegal drugs other than the fact that she was in the same car that Pearman had
occupied. The majority opinion notes the “reality” that passengers are often
involved in the same activity as the driver. In response, I note the reality that
passengers are often NOT involved in the same activity as the driver.
[¶31.] I fully understand that it would be more convenient for law
enforcement if they are allowed to search everything whenever they stop a vehicle.
However, the convenience of law enforcement should not eliminate Edwards’ right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. What makes this search unreasonable is that law enforcement had no
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probable cause to believe Edwards was engaged in criminal activity. Because she
always maintained possession of her purse, this is not a circumstance where a
“criminal might be able to hide contraband in a passenger’s belongings as readily as
in other containers in the car.” Id. at 296, 119 S. Ct. at 1299 (citing Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 102, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980)).
[¶32.] My view is consistent with Justice Breyer’s approach in Houghton.
“Purses are special containers. They are repositories of especially personal items
that people generally like to keep with them at all times.” Id. at 308, 119 S. Ct. at
1304 (Breyer, J., concurring). Edwards clearly viewed her purse in that way, as
evidenced by the fact that she always kept it in her possession. Because law
enforcement was not allowed to search her person and she always maintained direct
control and possession of her purse, I would hold that law enforcement was not
authorized to search her purse. For these reasons, I dissent.
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