Jeffrey B. Yapp & Tamara A. Yapp v. Commissioner ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                               
    T.C. Memo. 2018-147
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    JEFFREY B. YAPP AND TAMARA A. YAPP, Petitioners v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 13805-14.                         Filed September 10, 2018.
    Bertram Paul Husband, Richard Warren Craigo, and Jeffrey M. Wong, for
    petitioners.
    Paulmikell A. Fabian, Mark A. Nelson, Sarah A. Herson, and Amy B.
    Ulmer, for respondent.
    MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
    COHEN, Judge: Respondent determined a $475,135 deficiency and a
    $95,027 section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty with respect to petitioners’
    Federal income tax for 2010. After concessions, the issues for decision are:
    -2-
    [*2] (1) whether payments made for legal and professional services and wage
    payments are deductible as expenses of a business operated by Jeffrey B. Yapp (J.
    Yapp), (2) whether payments and other reported expenses are deductible as
    expenses of a business operated by Tamara A. Yapp (T. Yapp, and together with J.
    Yapp, petitioners), and (3) whether petitioners are liable for the section 6662(a)
    accuracy-related penalty. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code
    in effect for 2010, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
    and Procedure.
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    Some of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulated facts are
    incorporated in our findings by this reference. Petitioners resided in Oregon when
    they filed their petition.
    NXTM, LLC
    J. Yapp was an employee of MTV Networks (MTV) from 2004 until 2009.
    During his employment at MTV, he was involved in the development of a web-
    based promotional platform for music artists (platform). At some point in 2009,
    MTV decided not to pursue further development of the platform, and J. Yapp
    asked MTV to allow him to continue developing the platform on his own.
    -3-
    [*3] On July 16, 2009, J. Yapp formed NXTMUSIC, LLC, as a single-member
    Delaware limited liability company. The company’s name was changed to
    NXTM, LLC (NXTM), on August 5, 2009. On that same date J. Yapp executed
    NXTM’s first operating agreement. On August 31, 2009, NXTM entered into an
    assignment agreement (assignment) with MTV under which NXTM received the
    rights to the platform in exchange for repaying MTV’s prior investment and
    development costs and paying MTV royalties from future sales. Following this
    assignment MTV employees associated with the platform worked for NXTM.
    NXTM used the platform to operate as a musical artist promotional
    company. Taylor Swift was the principal musical artist promoted on the platform.
    To fund further development of the platform NXTM pursued a two-phase
    investment strategy. The first phase included raising funds from friends and
    family; the second phase was to pursue institutional investors.
    As J. Yapp carried out his investment strategy for NXTM, he amended its
    LLC operating agreement several times. J. Yapp executed an agreement dated
    January 1, 2010, that amended and restated NXTM’s first operating agreement in
    preparation for the company to start the institutional investment phase. No
    additional members were added to NXTM through this agreement. In February
    2010 J. Yapp negotiated attorney’s fees NXTM owed to a reduced amount totaling
    -4-
    [*4] $120,000 for work previously performed for NXTM, and he paid the fees out
    of NXTM’s bank account. On March 18, 2010, NXTM’s operating agreement was
    further amended to add 2 “Class A Common Members” and 17 “Series A Preferred
    Members”. The new members included individuals who contributed funding
    during the friends and family investment phase. On September 16, 2010, NXTM’s
    operating agreement was amended to add its institutional investors as members.
    Real Food Real Life, LLC
    During 2009 and 2010 T. Yapp worked to establish her own health food
    business. T. Yapp had been introduced to probiotic supplements during her efforts
    to find treatments for medical conditions suffered by petitioners’ son. T. Yapp
    began working with an Australian company called A.G.M. Foods Pty. Ltd., doing
    business as Grainfields (AGM), whose fermented probiotic supplements she had
    used previously. T. Yapp believed that, if she incorporated AGM’s unpleasant
    tasting supplements into better tasting products, there was an opportunity to
    market and sell probiotic supplements in the United States. On January 1, 2009,
    T. Yapp entered into a distribution agreement (distribution agreement) with AGM.
    Under its terms AGM would help T. Yapp develop her own line of probiotic
    products in exchange for T. Yapp’s marketing and selling AGM’s supplements in
    the United States. In October 2009 T. Yapp formed Real Food Real Life, LLC
    -5-
    [*5] (RFRL), as a single-member California limited liability company to pursue
    this opportunity.
    Throughout 2009 and 2010 T. Yapp worked to develop RFRL’s product
    line. She worked to formulate new recipes that incorporated AGM’s supplements
    to achieve products with better taste, texture, and shelf life. When T. Yapp
    developed a workable recipe, she sent it to AGM, and AGM would use her recipe
    to produce a commercial-level product trial run. AGM then sent samples of the
    trial run products to T. Yapp. T. Yapp used the product samples to refine further
    RFRL’s products by conducting focus groups and giving the samples away in
    exchange for feedback. She also wrote and posted articles on RFRL’s website,
    recorded a video presentation for Whole Foods, and met with numerous doctors
    and experts to promote RFRL.
    T. Yapp took steps to launch RFRL’s product line commercially. She hired
    designers to create RFRL’s logo, slogan, and product labels. Together with her
    daughter and brother-in-law, she researched options for shipping RFRL’s
    products. T. Yapp also restructured RFRL in order to separate RFRL-branded
    products from her anticipated non-health food product lines. In May 2010 she
    formed Fermactive, LLC, as a single-member Delaware limited liability company
    -6-
    [*6] that would serve as a parent company with separate divisions for RFRL and
    other products.
    In November 2010 AGM obtained certifications that the RFRL-branded
    products it produced were Kosher, Pareve, and organic. During the month of
    December 2010, T. Yapp solicited and received pre-orders of RFRL products.
    The first shipment of finished RFRL-branded products arrived in the United States
    in late December 2010. The products sustained damage during shipment that
    delayed their ultimate delivery to RFRL. RFRL officially launched its products at
    a party hosted by NXTM on February 25, 2011.
    Tax Reporting for 2009 and 2010
    Petitioners used the same certified public accountant (C.P.A.) to prepare and
    jointly file their Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2009 and
    2010. Petitioners provided their C.P.A. with only the general ledgers their
    bookkeeper kept to record income and expenses for NXTM, RFRL, and their
    household. For both years petitioners treated their respective businesses, NXTM
    and RFRL, as disregarded entities for tax purposes and included Schedules C,
    Profit or Loss From Business, with their jointly filed Forms 1040. Though NXTM
    kept its books using the accrual method of accounting, petitioners filed their 2009
    income tax return using the cash method on the Schedule C prepared for NXTM.
    -7-
    [*7] For 2009 petitioners reported net negative income of $559,179. For 2010
    they claimed a net operating loss (NOL) carryover of $557,423 from 2009.
    Petitioners’ 2010 return included personal expenses as part of RFRL’s business
    deductions and failed to continue to take depreciation deductions claimed for
    2009.
    The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) conducted an examination of
    petitioners’ returns for 2009 and 2010. As a result, the IRS determined
    adjustments to petitioners’ 2009 gross income that increased it from !$559,179 to
    $284,785. These adjustments included the disallowance of $122,737 claimed as
    part of a deduction for NXTM’s wage expenses paid for 2009. The IRS also
    disallowed $120,000 claimed as part of a deduction for legal and professional
    services expenses for NXTM. These expenses were actually paid in 2010. The
    IRS also disallowed all deductions claimed for RFRL-related expenditures.
    The IRS adjustments did not result in a deficiency for petitioners’ 2009
    taxable year. The IRS disallowed in full petitioners’ $557,423 NOL carryforward
    for 2010. On March 28, 2013, the group manager for the IRS examiner executed a
    Civil Penalty Approval Form (penalty approval form) approving the section
    6662(a) and (b)(2) underpayment penalty for a substantial understatement of
    income tax that was determined in the notice of deficiency dated March 17, 2014.
    -8-
    [*8]                                 OPINION
    I.     Business Expense Deductions
    Taxpayers are required to maintain sufficient records to establish the
    amount and purpose of any deduction. Sec. 6001; Higbee v. Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 438
    , 440 (2001); sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs. The taxpayer has
    the burden of proving entitlement to his or her deductions claimed. See New
    Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 
    292 U.S. 435
    , 440 (1934); Rockwell v.
    Commissioner, 
    512 F.2d 882
    , 886 (9th Cir. 1975), aff’g 
    T.C. Memo. 1972-133
    .
    This includes the burden of substantiation. Hradesky v. Commissioner, 
    65 T.C. 87
    , 90 (1975), aff’d per curiam, 
    540 F.2d 821
     (5th Cir. 1976).
    Section 162(a) allows as a deduction “all the ordinary and necessary
    expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
    business”. An expense is ordinary if it is normal, usual, or customary in the
    taxpayer’s trade or business, and it is necessary if appropriate or helpful for such
    business. See Deputy v. du Pont, 
    308 U.S. 488
    , 495 (1940); see also Lingren v.
    Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo 2016-213
    .
    A taxpayer is not carrying on a trade or business for section 162(a) purposes
    until the business is functioning as a going concern and performing the activities
    for which it was organized. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d
    -9-
    [*9] 901, 907 (4th Cir. 1965), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
    382 U.S. 68
     (1965); see also Glotov v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2007-147
    . Business
    operations with respect to the activity must have actually commenced. See
    McKelvey v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2002-63
    , aff’d, 76 F. App’x 806 (9th
    Cir. 2003). “Until that time, expenses related to that activity are not ‘ordinary and
    necessary’ expenses currently deductible under section 162 * * * but rather are
    ‘start-up’ or ‘pre-opening’ expenses.” See Woody v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2009-93
    , slip op. at 9-10 (citing Hardy v. Commissioner, 
    93 T.C. 684
    , 687-688
    (1989), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 1990 U.S. App. Lexis 19670 (10th Cir.
    Oct. 29, 1990)), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 519 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Startup expenses,
    although not deductible during the pre-opening phase, may generally be deducted
    or capitalized and deducted over time upon a taxpayer’s becoming actively
    engaged in business pursuant to section 195. Sec. 1.195-1T, Temporary Income
    Tax Regs., 
    73 Fed. Reg. 38910
     (July 8, 2008).
    A.     NXTM
    1.    Legal and Professional Services
    Petitioners concede that respondent properly disallowed the NXTM
    Schedule C deductions claimed for legal and professional services for 2009. They
    nonetheless argue that legal fees of $120,000 paid by NXTM in February 2010 are
    - 10 -
    [*10] deductible from their 2010 gross income. Respondent’s position is that
    since NXTM became a multimember LLC in 2010 it should be treated as a
    partnership for tax purposes. According to respondent, J. Yapp failed to
    substantiate that his outside basis in his NXTM partnership interest was sufficient
    to allow him to deduct the full amount of the legal fees paid.
    J. Yapp testified at trial that when NXTM paid the legal fees in February
    2010 it was still a single-member LLC. He further testified that NXTM did not
    admit new members until March 2010. The NXTM operating agreement and
    subsequent amendments in evidence support J. Yapp’s testimony that NXTM
    remained a single-member LLC until the second amendment to the operating
    agreement was executed in March 2010. A single-member LLC is disregarded as
    an entity separate from its owner for Federal income tax purposes unless it elects
    otherwise. See secs. 301.7701-2(a), 301.7701-3(b)(i) and (ii), Proced. & Admin.
    Regs. Petitioners also provided evidence that NXTM paid $120,000 for legal fees
    in 2010, including company emails negotiating the reduction and payment of legal
    fees owed, bank statements showing wire transfers from NXTM’s account, and a
    copy of a cleared electronic check drawn on NXTM’s account. These documents,
    coupled with J. Yapp’s testimony, are credible evidence that NXTM paid legal
    fees of $120,000 during February 2010 and that at the time of payment NXTM
    - 11 -
    [*11] was a single-member LLC and therefore a disregarded entity. Since NXTM
    was not a partnership at the time the legal fees were paid, J. Yapp is not required
    to substantiate his outside basis in his NXTM partnership interest in order to
    deduct the full amount of the legal fees paid. Cf. sec. 704(d). We conclude that
    petitioners are entitled to a deduction of $120,000 for these expenses.
    2.    Wages
    Petitioners contend that respondent improperly disallowed $122,737 of a
    deduction for wages claimed on their 2009 return for NXTM, which was part of
    the NOL carryover claimed for 2010. Respondent disallowed this portion of the
    wage deduction claimed for NXTM for lack of substantiation. While 2009 is not a
    year in issue in this case, we may determine the correct amount of NOL for a year
    not in issue as a preliminary step in determining the correct amount of an NOL
    carryover to a taxable year in issue. Sec. 6214(b); Calumet Indus., Inc. v.
    Commissioner, 
    95 T.C. 257
    , 274-275 (1990). Deductions may include a
    reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for services actually
    rendered. Compensation is deductible under section 162(a)(1) only if it is (1)
    reasonable in amount, (2) based on services actually rendered, and (3) paid or
    incurred. Eller v. Commissioner, 
    77 T.C. 934
    , 962 (1981).
    - 12 -
    [*12] In support of their contention petitioners offered evidence in the form of a
    general ledger listing numerous payments to several individuals under the heading
    “payroll” and bank statements showing electronic transfers from NXTM’s
    account. At trial J. Yapp briefly testified that when MTV assigned the platform to
    NXTM the MTV employees associated with the platform’s development came to
    work for NXTM. Petitioners produced no corroborating witnesses or other
    contemporaneous employment-related documents such as employment contracts,
    Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, or Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous
    Income, to substantiate their claim. Petitioners failed to provided any details
    regarding the number of NXTM’s employees, their job descriptions, or the
    amounts that NXTM was obligated to pay them. Petitioners thus failed to meet
    their burden to substantiate entitlement to a deduction for wages paid greater than
    that allowed by respondent.
    B.     RFRL Expenditures
    Petitioners contend that their expenditures related to developing RFRL’s
    product line qualify as deductible business expenses under section 162.
    Respondent contends that even though petitioners paid these expenses they are
    startup expenditures subject to the limitations of section 195 as opposed to section
    162 business expenses. Respondent further argues that even if RFRL qualified as
    - 13 -
    [*13] an active trade or business, petitioners failed to substantiate the expenses
    that they deducted for RFRL.
    Section 195(a) provides the general rule that no current deduction shall be
    allowed for startup or pre-opening expenses. Section 195(c) defines “start-up
    expenditures” to include any amount:
    (A) paid or incurred in connection with--
    (i) investigating the creation or acquisition of an active
    trade or business, or
    (ii) creating an active trade or business, or
    (iii) any activity engaged in for profit and for the
    production of income before the day on which the active trade
    or business begins, in anticipation of such activity becoming an
    active trade or business, and
    (B) which, if paid or incurred in connection with the operation
    of an existing active trade or business * * * would be allowable as a
    deduction for the taxable year in which paid or incurred.
    Startup expenses, although not deductible during the pre-opening phase, may
    generally be deducted or capitalized and deducted over time upon a taxpayer’s
    becoming actively engaged in a trade or business pursuant to section 195. Sec.
    1.195-1T, Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra; see Woody v. Commissioner, slip
    op. at 10.
    - 14 -
    [*14] Whether a taxpayer’s activities constitute the carrying on of a trade or
    business requires an examination of the facts and circumstances of each case. See
    Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 
    480 U.S. 23
    , 36 (1987); see also Woody v.
    Commissioner, slip op. at 9-10. When determining whether a trade or business
    exists the Court focuses on three factors: (1) whether the taxpayer undertook the
    activity intending to earn a profit, (2) whether the taxpayer is regularly and
    actively involved in the activity, and (3) whether the taxpayer’s activity has
    actually commenced. See Woody v. Commissioner, slip op. at 11.
    When, as a threshold matter, did T. Yapp complete RFRL’s startup phase
    and become actively engaged in business? Petitioners both testified at trial about
    T. Yapp’s efforts to research and develop an RFRL-branded product line.
    Generally, their testimony suggested that RFRL’s business was still in
    development and had not begun operating in 2010. T. Yapp testified about testing
    and experimenting with different RFRL product recipes; learning about the
    potential health benefits of using probiotic products; and creating RFRL’s product
    line through trial and error. Numerous email conversations, cost analyses, online
    educational articles, bank records, credit card statements, and canceled checks in
    evidence also demonstrate that RFRL remained in the startup phase throughout
    2010. Significantly, the first delivery of market-ready RFRL products did not
    - 15 -
    [*15] arrive in the United States until late December 2010, and shipping-related
    damage delayed the products’ delivery to RFRL even further. Petitioners
    launched RFRL’s products at an official launch party in February 2011.
    T. Yapp's description of her activities during 2010 and the corroborating
    documentation persuade us that the definition of startup expenses in section 195(c)
    is applicable to those activities. The preponderance of the evidence leads to the
    conclusion that petitioners’ RFRL-related activities did not rise to the level of a
    trade or business until the company’s official launch in February 2011 at the
    earliest. It was at this point that RFRL actually commenced offering probiotic
    health food for sale. See, e.g., Koenig v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1998-215
    ,
    slip op. at 13-14 (citing Kennedy v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1973-15
    ), aff’d,
    
    221 F.3d 1348
     (9th Cir. 2000). Since all the expenses at issue in this case were
    paid or incurred before the February 2011 launch, we conclude that they qualify as
    startup expenditures. As such the RFRL-related expenses are subject to the
    provisions of section 195 and cannot currently be deducted under section 162. See
    Hardy v. Commissioner, 
    93 T.C. 684
    . We sustain respondent’s determination in
    the notice to disallow deductions for these expenses.
    - 16 -
    [*16] II.    Accuracy-Related Penalty
    Section 6662(a) and (b)(2) imposes a 20% accuracy-related penalty on any
    underpayment of Federal income tax attributable to a substantial understatement of
    income tax. An understatement of income tax is substantial if it exceeds the
    greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000. Sec.
    6662(d)(1)(A). As determined in the notice of deficiency petitioners’
    understatement of income tax for 2010 was substantial, and respondent determined
    the penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(2) for that year.
    Under section 7491(c) respondent has the burden of production with respect
    to the accuracy-related penalty. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 438
    , 446
    (2001). To satisfy respondent’s burden of production under section 7491(c),
    respondent must produce evidence showing, inter alia, that respondent’s
    representatives complied with section 6751(b)(1). See Graev v. Commissioner,
    149 T.C. ___, ___ (slip op. at 14) (Dec. 20, 2017), supplementing and overruling
    in part 
    147 T.C. 460
     (2016). The record contains a penalty approval form that
    shows that respondent’s representatives complied with section 6751(b)(1).
    Responded has met the burden of production in this case. See 
    id.
     at ___, slip op.
    at 22. As respondent has done so, it is petitioners’ burden to establish that the
    - 17 -
    [*17] imposition of the penalty is not appropriate. See Higbee v. Commissioner,
    
    116 T.C. at 447
    .
    Section 6664(c)(1) provides an exception to the section 6662(a) penalty if it
    is shown that there was reasonable cause for any portion of the underpayment and
    the taxpayer acted in good faith. The determination of whether a taxpayer acted
    with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking
    into account all the pertinent facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1),
    Income Tax Regs. The most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort
    to assess his or her proper tax liability. 
    Id.
     Circumstances that may indicate
    reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law
    that is reasonable in view of the taxpayer’s experience, knowledge, and education.
    
    Id.
    According to petitioners, the penalties are not applicable because they relied
    upon their C.P.A. to report the Federal income tax liabilities shown on their joint
    returns. Under certain circumstances a taxpayer’s reliance upon professional
    advice may establish the taxpayer’s reasonable cause and good faith with respect
    to an underpayment of tax. To establish reasonable cause through reliance on
    professional advice the taxpayer must prove that (1) the adviser was a competent
    professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer
    - 18 -
    [*18] provided necessary and accurate information to the adviser, and (3) the
    taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser’s judgment. Neonatology
    Assocs., P.A. v. Commissioner, 
    115 T.C. 43
    , 99 (2000), aff’d, 
    299 F.3d 221
     (3d
    Cir. 2002). Reliance on a return preparer is not reasonable where “even a cursory
    review” of the tax return would reveal errors. Metra Chem. Corp. v.
    Commissioner, 
    88 T.C. 654
    , 662 (1987).
    Petitioners have not established that they provided their C.P.A. with
    complete and accurate information. T. Yapp testified at trial that they provided
    their C.P.A. with only the general ledgers that their bookkeeper kept to record
    income and expenses for NXTM, RFRL, and the Yapp household.
    Furthermore, J. Yapp admitted at trial that he approved the filing of the
    returns without fully reviewing them. Had petitioners reviewed the returns, they
    would have noticed the numerous mistakes that they claim their C.P.A. made, such
    as selecting the wrong accounting method for reporting NXTM’s taxable income
    in 2009, including personal expenses as part of RFRL’s business deductions, and
    failing to continue to claim on the 2010 return depreciation deductions claimed for
    2009. The identified mistakes undermine any assumption that the preparer was a
    competent professional merely because he was a C.P.A. Petitioners’ purported
    reliance on their C.P.A. does not establish that they acted with reasonable cause
    - 19 -
    [*19] and in good faith. Therefore, the Court sustains respondent’s determination
    that petitioners are liable for the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty for
    2010.
    We have considered all of the parties’ arguments, and, to the extent not
    addressed above, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit. To
    reflect the foregoing,
    Decision will be entered
    under Rule 155.