FPL Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner , 116 T.C. No. 7 ( 2001 )


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  •                       116 T.C. No. 7
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    FPL GROUP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES, Petitioner v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 5271-96.                    Filed February 1, 2001.
    On its consolidated Federal income tax returns for
    the years in issue, F claimed a credit for Federal
    taxes on fuels. F now seeks credits in addition to
    amounts claimed on F’s original Federal income tax
    returns. R argues that the so-called “one claim” rule
    contained in sec. 6427(i)(1), I.R.C., acts as a bar to
    F’s additional claims for credit under sec. 34, I.R.C.
    Held: F is not barred by the so-called “one
    claim” rule of sec. 6427(i)(1), I.R.C., from obtaining
    additional credits under sec. 34, I.R.C.
    Robert Thomas Carney, for petitioner.
    James F. Kearney, for respondent.
    - 2 -
    OPINION
    RUWE, Judge:   This matter is before the Court on
    respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment filed pursuant
    to Rule 121.1   The sole issue presented is whether petitioner is
    barred by the so-called “one claim” rule of section 6427(i)(1)
    from obtaining a credit under section 34 for amounts of Federal
    excise taxes paid on fuels.
    Background
    FPL Group, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing
    under the laws of the State of Florida with its principal office
    located in Juno Beach, Florida.    FPL Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries
    (petitioner) filed consolidated Federal income tax returns for
    the years 1988 through 1992.    Petitioner attached to each return
    a Form 4136, Computation of Credit for Federal Tax on Fuels.
    Form 4136 is used to claim credit for Federal excise tax paid on
    fuels sold or used during the period of the claim.   On its
    Federal income tax returns for those years, petitioner claimed
    credits for Federal taxes on fuels as follows:
    Year                     Credit
    1988                    $279,732
    1989                     233,053
    1990                     275,303
    1991                     391,516
    1992                     332,568
    1
    Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
    the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and
    all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
    Procedure.
    - 3 -
    In its second amended petition, petitioner alleged that
    respondent erred in failing to allow additional fuel tax credits
    for vehicles which are not “highway use” vehicles in the
    following amounts:
    Year                    Credit
    1988                   $135,194
    1989                    136,840
    1990                    143,340
    1991                    202,096
    1992                    215,649
    These amounts are in addition to the amounts claimed as credits
    on petitioner’s original Federal income tax returns for those
    years.
    Discussion
    I.   Summary Judgment
    Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
    avoid unnecessary and expensive trials.     See Northern Ind. Pub.
    Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 
    101 T.C. 294
    , 295 (1993); Shiosaki v.
    Commissioner, 
    61 T.C. 861
    , 862 (1974).     Rule 121(a) provides that
    either party may move for summary judgment upon all or any part
    of the legal issues in controversy.     Full or partial summary
    judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law.
    See Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 
    98 T.C. 518
    ,
    520 (1992), affd. 
    17 F.3d 965
     (7th Cir. 1994).     Respondent, as
    the moving party, bears the burden of proving that no genuine
    issue exists as to any material fact and that he is entitled to
    - 4 -
    judgment as a matter of law.   See Bond v. Commissioner, 
    100 T.C. 32
    , 36 (1993); Naftel v. Commissioner, 
    85 T.C. 527
    , 529 (1985).
    In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the factual
    materials and the inferences drawn from them must be considered
    in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.   See Bond v.
    Commissioner, supra at 36; Naftel v. Commissioner, supra at 529.
    In the instant case, there is no genuine issue as to any of the
    material facts that we have set forth in the background section
    of this opinion.
    II.   Sections 6427 and 34
    Respondent argues that petitioner is making a second claim
    under section 6427 and that the so-called “one claim” rule
    contained in section 6427(i)(1) acts as a bar to petitioner’s
    claim for credit.   Petitioner argues that its claim for credit is
    being made under section 34 and that the “one claim” rule in
    section 6427(i)(1) has no application.
    A.   Section 6427
    Section 6427 provides a mechanism whereby a purchaser of
    fuel can obtain payment from the Secretary of taxes previously
    imposed on fuel which was not used for taxable purposes by the
    - 5 -
    purchaser.   See sec. 6427(a),2 (l).3   Subsections (a) and (l) of
    section 6427 specifically pertain to nontaxable uses of diesel
    fuel previously taxed under sections 40414 and 4091.5
    Limitations on filing a claim for payment under section 6427
    are addressed in section 6427(i).   The general rule of limitation
    for payment of claims filed under section 6427 is that not more
    than one claim may be filed by any person with respect to fuel
    used during the taxable year.   Section 6427(i) provides:
    SEC. 6427(i). Time for Filing Claims; Period Covered.--
    (1) General rule.--Except as provided in
    paragraphs (2),(3), and (4), not more than one claim
    may be filed under subsection (a),(b),(d), [e in 1988
    2
    SEC. 6427(a). Nontaxable uses.--Except as provided in
    subsection (k), if tax has been imposed under section 4041(a) or
    (c) on the sale of any fuel and the purchaser uses such fuel
    other than for the use for which sold, or resells such fuel, the
    Secretary shall pay (without interest) to him an amount equal to
    * * *
    3
    SEC. 6427(l). Nontaxable uses of diesel fuel and aviation
    fuel taxed under section 4091.-–
    (1) In general.--Except as provided in subsection
    (k), * * * if any fuel on which tax has been imposed by
    section 4091 is used by any person in a nontaxable use,
    the Secretary shall pay (without interest) to the
    ultimate purchaser of such fuel an amount equal to the
    aggregate amount of tax imposed on such fuel under
    section 4091.
    4
    Sec. 4041 imposes a tax on fuel sold for use or used in a
    diesel-powered highway vehicle. Sec. 4041 does not apply if tax
    was already imposed under sec. 4091. See sec. 4041(a)(1).
    5
    Sec. 4091 imposes a tax on the sale of any taxable diesel
    fuel by the producer or importer thereof. See sec. 4091(a).
    Taxable diesel fuel is that which is suitable for use in a
    highway vehicle. See sec. 4092(a).
    - 6 -
    and 1989],(g),(h),(l), or (q)[(p) in 1988] by any
    person with respect to fuel used * * * during his
    taxable year; * * *[6]
    Section 6427(i) does not refer to any claims filed under
    subsection (k).   Section 6427(k) makes the following reference to
    an income tax credit in lieu of payment:
    SEC. 6427(k). Income Tax Credit in Lieu of Payment.--
    *   *     *     *      *    *      *
    (3) Allowance of credit against income tax.--
    For allowances of credit against the income
    tax imposed by subtitle A for fuel used or resold
    by the purchaser, see section 34.
    B.   Section 34
    Section 34 allows a credit against income tax imposed under
    subtitle A for the taxable year equal to the sum of the amounts
    payable to the taxpayer under section 6427.         See sec. 34(a)(3).7
    6
    The exceptions provided in paragraphs (2),(3), and (4) of
    sec. 6427(i) are not relevant to this case.
    7
    Sec. 34(a) provides:
    SEC. 34(a). General rule.-– There shall be allowed as a
    credit against the tax imposed by this subtitle for the
    taxable year an amount equal to the sum of the amounts
    payable to the taxpayer–-
    *    *     *     *      *    *      *
    (3) under section 6427-–
    (A) with respect to fuels used for
    nontaxable purposes or resold, or
    (B) with respect to any qualified
    diesel-powered highway vehicle purchased (or
    (continued...)
    - 7 -
    However, credit is not allowed under section 34(a) for an amount
    payable under section 6427, if a claim for such amount is timely
    filed and is “payable” under such section.8   Sec. 34(b).
    C.   Analysis
    The Court of Federal Claims has recently held that the “one
    claim” rule under section 6427(i) does not bar timely claims for
    tax credit under section 34.   See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. &
    Subs. v. United States, 
    47 Fed. Cl. 298
     (2000).    We agree with
    the Court of Federal Claims and its reasoning.
    Section 34(a)(3) provides:   “There shall be allowed as a
    credit * * * an amount equal to the sum of the amounts payable to
    the taxpayer * * * under section 6427”.   The text of section 34
    does not suggest that the credit it affords is limited by any of
    the procedural provisions of section 6427.    Rather, the reference
    to section 6427 contained in section 34 appears merely to be a
    convenient measure of the amount of the credit to be afforded.
    Section 6427(k) does not purport to control or limit the rights
    7
    (...continued)
    deemed purchased under section 6427(g)(6)),
    during the taxable year (determined without regard to
    section 6427(k)).
    8
    Sec. 34(b) provides:
    SEC. 34(b). Exception.--Credit shall not be
    allowed under subsection (a) for any amount payable
    under section 6421 or 6427, if a claim for such amount
    is timely filed and, under section 6421(j) or 6427(k),
    is payable under such section.
    - 8 -
    afforded petitioner under section 34.    Section 6427(k)(3)
    provides:   “For allowances of credit against the income tax
    imposed by subtitle A for fuel used or resold by the purchaser,
    see section 34.”   The plain language of section 6427(k)(3)
    indicates that credits are provided in section 34, not section
    6427.   Indeed, section 34(b) contemplates that a taxpayer may
    have made claims for payment under section 6427 and disallows
    credit only to the extent it duplicates such claims.
    Respondent argues that section 6427(i), which generally
    prohibits the filing of more than one claim for payment,
    prohibits any credit if the taxpayer has made a prior claim for
    credit under section 6427(k).    But section 6427(i) imposes the
    “one claim” rule only with respect to claims for payment made
    under specified subsections.    Subsection (k) is not one of the
    specified subsections in subsection (i).    And as previously
    explained, claims for credit are made under section 34, not
    section 6427(k).
    The legislative history of the Airport and Airway Revenue
    Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-258, sec. 207, 84 Stat. 246, which added
    section 6427 to the Code, supports our view that sections 34 and
    6427 are parallel authorities.    Section 207(a) of that act added
    section 6427 to the Code, while section 207(c) of the act, 84
    Stat. 248, amended the existing section 39 (which is now section
    - 9 -
    34) by adding the language now found in section 34(a)(3).9
    The text of the conference report provides, in part, as
    follows:
    This amendment provides procedures for the payment of
    amounts (under a new section 6427 of the Code) or for
    the crediting against income tax (under the existing
    section 39 of the Code) in the case of the retailers
    excise taxes on gasoline and special fuels. * * *
    The amendment also provides that, in general, the
    time for filing claims for credit under section 39, and
    the time for filing full-year claims by government
    bodies or exempt organizations for excise tax payments
    under specified sections of the Code, will be
    comparable to the time in which claim for credit or
    refund of income taxes may be filed.
    The House recedes with technical changes. [Conf.
    Rept. 91-1074, at 51 (1970), 1970-1 C.B. 401, 407.]
    The conference report speaks of “procedures” to be made
    available, in a parallel structure of relief by “payment”
    (section 6427) or by “crediting against income tax” (section 39).
    The conference report does not suggest that section 6427 provides
    the exclusive or otherwise controlling authority.
    The Senate report confirms our conclusion that sections 39
    and 6427 were viewed by Congress as parallel authorities.    The
    Senate report provides the following discussion regarding the
    different treatments of credits against income tax and payments
    under the excise tax provisions:
    Under the committee amendments, credits against
    income tax for gasoline, diesel fuels, special fuels,
    or lubricating oil tax (sec. 39) are to give rise to
    9
    See supra note 7.
    - 10 -
    interest on overpayments as in the case of other income
    tax credits. On the other hand, payments under the
    excise tax provisions (secs. 6420, 6421, 6424, and
    6427) for the gasoline, diesel fuels, special fuels, or
    lubricating oil taxes, as the case generally with
    regard to excise taxes (and as under present law), are
    made without interest being paid to the taxpayer. [S.
    Rept. 91-706, at 23 (1970), 1970-1 C.B. 386, 399.]
    The Senate report does not suggest that the credits
    available under section 39 were created or limited by section
    6427.     The Senate report also notes the extension of the time
    within which a section 6427 claim may be made “will make the
    filing of full-year claims (but not the quarterly claims) for
    refunds (under secs. * * * 6427) similar to the new rule for
    claims for credits against income tax (under sec. 39).”     S. Rept.
    91-706, supra at 23, 1970-1 C.B. at 399.     Thus, the relief
    afforded by sections 39 and 6427 appears to have been intended to
    be equal in authority and effect.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we deny respondent’s motion for
    partial summary judgment, and we hold that petitioner is not
    barred by the so-called “one claim” rule of section 6427(i)(1)
    from obtaining a credit for fuel tax under section 34(a)(3).
    An appropriate order will be
    issued denying respondent’s motion
    for partial summary judgment.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 5271-96

Citation Numbers: 116 T.C. No. 7

Filed Date: 2/1/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2018