Ware v. Comm'r , 93 T.C.M. 1196 ( 2007 )


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  •                         T.C. Memo. 2007-112
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    BEA-JAYE WARE, Petitioner v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 21809-04.            Filed May 1, 2007.
    William J. Day and Austin B. Barnes III, for petitioner.
    Alisha M. Harper, for respondent.
    MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
    HAINES, Judge:   Respondent determined that petitioner is not
    entitled to relief under section 6015(f) for joint income tax
    liabilities for 1997 through 1999 (the years in issue).1   The
    1
    Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
    the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. Amounts are rounded to
    the nearest dollar.
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    issue for decision is whether respondent abused his discretion in
    denying petitioner’s request for equitable relief under section
    6015(f).
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
    The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
    incorporated herein by this reference.2      At the time she filed
    her petition, petitioner resided in Brunswick, Ohio.
    Petitioner and David C. Crouch (Mr. Crouch) were married on
    December 31, 1992.    At the time of trial, petitioner and Mr.
    Crouch remained married and continued to reside in the same
    residence.
    Petitioner and Mr. Crouch are graphic design artists.
    During the years at issue, Mr. Crouch owned and operated Dave
    Crouch Graphics.    Mr. Crouch made no estimated tax payments on
    income he received from Dave Crouch Graphics.      During the years
    at issue, petitioner was employed by Advanstar Communications,
    Inc. (Advanstar).    Advanstar withheld Federal income tax from
    petitioner’s wages, and had she filed her returns as married
    2
    Respondent reserved relevancy objections to three
    exhibits attached to the stipulation of facts and to all trial
    testimony on the basis that such information was not available to
    the Appeals officer when she made her determination in this case.
    While the relevance of some of the disputed exhibits and
    testimony is limited, the Court will give the evidence only such
    consideration as is warranted by its pertinence to the Court’s
    analysis of the instant case.
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    filing separately, petitioner would have been entitled to a
    refund.
    Petitioner and Mr. Crouch filed their 1994 through 1996 tax
    returns as married filing separately.   Petitioner and Mr. Crouch
    filed a joint 1997 Federal income tax return on May 7, 1999,
    reflecting an amount owed of $33,423.   The amount owed was
    attributable solely to Mr. Crouch’s business activities.
    Petitioner and Mr. Crouch included a $6,500 payment with their
    1997 return and made an additional payment of $4,000 in August
    1999.    In October 2000, petitioner received notice that her wages
    were to be garnished in order to pay her and Mr. Crouch’s 1997
    outstanding tax liability.   For pay periods ending November 3 and
    17, and December 1 and 15, 2000, Advanstar withheld $557 from
    petitioner’s pay as garnishment.3
    On November 9, 2000, petitioner and Mr. Crouch filed joint
    Federal income tax returns for 1998 and 1999, reflecting amounts
    owed of $19,671 and $27,321, respectively.   The amounts owed were
    attributable solely to Mr. Crouch’s business activities.   No
    payments accompanied the 1998 and 1999 returns.   Petitioner
    voluntarily signed the returns on November 9, 2000.   At the time
    she signed the returns, she knew there was an outstanding tax
    3
    On Feb. 7, 2002, petitioner and Mr. Crouch’s 1997 joint
    tax liability was discharged under 11 U.S.C. sec. 727, by the
    U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
    Respondent has conceded that he will no longer attempt to collect
    the discharged liability.
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    liability for 1997, that her wages were being garnished to pay
    the 1997 tax liability, and that petitioner and Mr. Crouch could
    not pay the amounts due for 1998 and 1999.
    On or about March 20, 2001, petitioner filed a Form 8857,
    Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, requesting equitable relief
    under section 6015(f).   Along with the Form 8857, petitioner
    submitted a letter explaining why she thought she was entitled to
    equitable relief.   The letter stated in part:
    Our tax matters have always been handled by David. * *
    * I had no knowledge that our Joint tax returns for tax
    years 1997, 1998 and 1999 were not timely filed. I
    became aware of this situation, last summer when * * *
    [a revenue officer] placed her business card in the
    door of our residence. I had no knowledge until this
    happened; and then I only knew Dave was behind for
    1997. When the Service levied my wages in December
    2000; I became aware of the unfiled 1998 & 1999 tax
    returns.
    The underpaid taxes * * * are attributable solely to
    David’s business * * * I have never been involved in my
    husband’s business * * *. David maintained the books
    and records of his business.
    David & I retained the law firm of Roni Lynn Deutch, to
    negotiate a payment plan on the delinquent tax returns.
    I was not offered nor received counsel with respect to
    my option of filing separately; from David, for the
    unfiled years. * * *
    If I had received knowledge of the tax situation by my
    husband, our tax preparer, or Roni Lynn Deutch I would
    have elected to file separate federal & state of Ohio
    tax returns for 1997, 1998 & 1999.
    On August 17, 2001, respondent notified petitioner that the Form
    8857 had been received and requested additional information.
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    On September 19, 2001, petitioner submitted to respondent a
    Form 886-A, Innocent Spouse Questionnaire.   Petitioner reported
    monthly gross income of $3,715 and monthly expenses of $5,685.
    Petitioner’s monthly expenses included, among other things, $300
    for clothing, $700 for vehicle expenses, $240 for “pet care”, and
    $400 in miscellaneous expenses.
    On December 20, 2001, respondent issued petitioner an
    initial determination letter.   Respondent determined that
    petitioner was not entitled to equitable relief under section
    6015(f) for the years at issue, stating:
    To qualify for relief under IRC Section 6015(f), you
    must establish that you believed the tax would be paid
    at the time of filing the return. Information in your
    case file does not establish that you had belief that
    the tax would be paid at the time of filing.
    Therefore, your request for relief for the tax years *
    * * [at issue] has been disallowed.
    On March 4, 2002, respondent received from petitioner a Form
    12509, Statement of Disagreement, in which petitioner repeated
    her arguments set forth in her request for innocent spouse
    relief.
    On July 22, 2002, respondent advised petitioner that her
    case had been received for consideration and identified Appeals
    Officer Denise Neidermeyer (Ms. Neidermeyer) as the person
    handling her case.   Ms. Neidermeyer determined that “The taxpayer
    knew or had reason to know that the tax would not be paid when
    she signed the [1998 and 1999] returns.    This is evidenced by the
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    fact that her wages were garnished for prior-year joint
    liabilities before she signed the 1998 and 1999 returns.”   Ms.
    Neidermeyer recommended that petitioner be denied equitable
    relief under section 6015(f).   On August 12, 2004, respondent
    issued petitioner a notice of determination denying her request
    for equitable relief under section 6015(f).
    On November 15, 2004, petitioner filed her petition with
    this Court.   Petitioner contended that respondent abused his
    discretion in denying her equitable relief under section 6015(f).
    This case was called for trial on March 27, 2006.
    On July 25, 2006, this Court issued Billings v.
    Commissioner, 
    127 T.C. 7
    (2006), holding that the Court does not
    have jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s denial of relief
    under section 6015(f) in a case where no deficiency has been
    asserted.   Our holding in Billings was in accord with the Courts
    of Appeal opinions in Bartman v. Commissioner, 
    446 F.3d 785
    (8th
    Cir. 2006), affg. in part and vacating T.C. Memo. 2004-93, and
    Commissioner v. Ewing, 
    439 F.3d 1009
    (9th Cir. 2006), revg. 
    118 T.C. 494
    (2002).   On September 1, 2006, respondent filed a motion
    to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction contending that, in light of
    Billings v. 
    Commissioner, supra
    , the Court lacked jurisdiction
    over this case.
    In the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-
    432, div. C, sec. 408, 120 Stat. 3061, Congress reinstated our
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    jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s determinations under
    section 6015(f) with respect to tax liability remaining unpaid on
    or after December 20, 2006.     Upon order of the Court, the parties
    certified that petitioner’s liability for tax years 1998 and 1999
    remained unpaid as of December 20, 2006.4     Accordingly, the Court
    determined that it has jurisdiction over this case and denied
    respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    OPINION
    If a husband and wife file a joint Federal income tax
    return, they generally are jointly and severally liable for the
    tax due.    Sec. 6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 276
    ,
    282 (2000).    However, a spouse may qualify for relief from joint
    and several liability under section 6015(b) or (c) if various
    requirements are met.      The parties agree that petitioner does not
    qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c).
    If relief is not available under section 6015(b) or (c), the
    Commissioner may relieve an individual of liability for any
    unpaid tax if, taking into account all the facts and
    circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold the individual
    liable.    Sec. 6015(f).   This Court has jurisdiction to review a
    denial of equitable relief under section 6015(f).     Sec. 6015(e);
    4
    Petitioner’s 1997 tax year is no longer at issue.     See
    supra note 3.
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    see also Farmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-74; Van Arsdalen
    v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-48.
    We review the Commissioner’s denial of relief for abuse of
    discretion.   Jonson v. Commissioner, 
    118 T.C. 106
    , 125 (2002),
    affd. 
    353 F.3d 1181
    (10th Cir. 2003); Farmer v. 
    Commissioner, supra
    ; Van Arsdalen v. 
    Commissioner, supra
    .    The taxpayer seeking
    relief has the burden of proof.    Alt v. Commissioner, 
    119 T.C. 306
    , 311 (2002), affd. 
    101 Fed. Appx. 34
    (6th Cir. 2004).     To
    prevail, the taxpayer must show that the Commissioner’s
    determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis
    in fact or law.     Butler v. 
    Commissioner, supra
    at 291-292; Farmer
    v. 
    Commissioner, supra
    ; Van Arsdalen v. 
    Commissioner, supra
    .
    The Commissioner promulgated a list of factors in Rev. Proc.
    2000-15, sec. 4, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448-449, that the Commissioner
    considers in determining whether to grant equitable relief under
    section 6015(f).5    First, the Commissioner will not grant relief
    unless seven threshold conditions have been met:    (1) The
    taxpayer must have filed joint returns for the taxable years for
    which relief is sought; (2) the taxpayer does not qualify for
    5
    Respondent’s determination was subject to Rev. Proc.
    2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447. Rev. Proc. 
    2000-15, supra
    , was
    superseded by Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, for requests
    for relief under sec. 6015(f) that were filed on or after Nov. 1,
    2003, or if pending on Nov. 1, 2003, for which no preliminary
    determination letter had been issued as of Nov. 1, 2003. While
    petitioner’s request was pending on Nov. 1, 2003, a preliminary
    determination letter was issued before Nov. 1, 2003.
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    relief under section 6015(b) or (c); (3) the taxpayer must apply
    for relief no later than 2 years after the date of the
    Commissioner’s first collection activity after July 22, 1998,
    with respect to the taxpayer; (4) the liability must remain
    unpaid; (5) no assets were transferred between the spouses filing
    the joint returns as part of a fraudulent scheme by such spouses;
    (6) there were no disqualified assets transferred to the taxpayer
    by the nonrequesting spouse; and (7) the taxpayer did not file
    the returns with fraudulent intent.      Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec.
    4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448.    Respondent concedes that petitioner
    meets these conditions.
    Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. at 448-449, lists
    two factors which, if true, the Commissioner treats as favoring
    relief:   (1) The taxpayer is separated or divorced from the
    nonrequesting spouse; and (2) the taxpayer was abused by the
    nonrequesting spouse.    Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B.
    at 449, also lists two factors which, if true, the Commissioner,
    treats as not favoring relief:    (3) The taxpayer received
    significant benefit (beyond normal support) from the unpaid
    liability or the item giving rise to the deficiency; and (4) the
    taxpayer has not made a good faith effort to comply with Federal
    income tax laws in the tax years following the tax year to which
    the request for relief relates.    See Ferrarese v. Commissioner,
    T.C. Memo. 2002-249.    The Commissioner generally does not
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    consider the absence of any of the factors (1), (2), (3), or (4)
    as weighing in favor of, or against, whether to grant relief
    under section 6015(f).    Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1
    C.B. at 448-449.
    Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, lists the following four
    factors which, if true, the Commissioner treats as favoring
    relief, and which, if not true, the Commissioner treats as not
    favoring relief:    (5) The taxpayer would suffer economic hardship
    if relief were denied; (6) in the case of a liability that was
    properly reported but not paid, the taxpayer did not know and had
    no reason to know that the liability would not be paid; (7) the
    liability for which relief is sought is attributable to the
    nonrequesting spouse; and (8) the nonrequesting spouse has a
    legal obligation pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement to pay
    the outstanding tax liability (weighs against relief only if the
    requesting spouse has the obligation).       Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec.
    4.03, also states that no single factor is controlling, all
    factors will be considered and weighed appropriately, and the
    list of factors in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4, is not exhaustive.
    1.   Petitioner’s Marital Status
    Petitioner and Mr. Crouch were still married when petitioner
    sought relief.     This factor is neutral.
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    2.    Spousal Abuse
    Petitioner did not allege that she suffered from spousal
    abuse.    This factor is neutral.
    3.     Significant Benefit
    Respondent determined that petitioner received significant
    benefit beyond normal support from the unpaid tax liability.
    During the years at issue, petitioner and Mr. Crouch failed to
    pay self-assessed taxes of nearly $70,000, excluding any
    penalties or interest.     While the outstanding tax liability arose
    solely from Mr. Crouch’s business activities, petitioner does not
    allege that Mr. Crouch secreted his earnings that would otherwise
    have been used to pay the taxes due.        The record establishes that
    petitioner’s and Mr. Crouch’s failure to pay the taxes due
    increased their expendable income.         Further, petitioner testified
    that her husband’s income allowed her to meet the monthly
    expenses in excess of her own income.        Petitioner’s monthly
    expenses included $300 for clothing, $700 for vehicle expenses,
    $240 for pet care, and $400 in miscellaneous expenses.        While
    neither petitioner nor respondent has elaborated on what “normal
    support” is in this case, the above-described expenses certainly
    go beyond normal support.    Because the underpayment of tax
    allowed petitioner to meet these expenses, we find that
    petitioner received significant benefit beyond normal support
    from the unpaid liability.    This factor weighs against relief.
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    4.   Compliance With Tax Laws
    Petitioner complied with Federal income tax laws after 1999,
    the last year in issue.   This factor is neutral.
    5.   Economic Hardship
    A factor treated by the Commissioner as weighing in favor of
    relief under section 6015(f) is that paying the taxes owed would
    cause the requesting spouse to suffer economic hardship.     Rev.
    Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1)(b), 2000-1 C.B. at 448.    The
    Commissioner considers the taxpayer to suffer economic hardship
    if paying the tax would prevent the taxpayer from paying
    reasonable basic living expenses.    Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4)(i),
    Proced. & Admin. Regs.; Rev. Proc. 2000-15, secs. 4.02(1)(c) and
    4.03(1)(b), 2000-1 C.B. at 448-449.
    Respondent determined that petitioner failed to allege that
    economic hardship would arise if she were denied relief.
    Petitioner did not allege in her request for innocent spouse
    relief, at trial, or in her opening brief that she would suffer
    economic hardship if denied relief.    Petitioner’s first and only
    mention of economic hardship is in her reply brief, where she
    states:   “It is simply baffling that respondent cannot determine
    for itself that petitioner would suffer economic hardship if
    relief from joint and several liability is not granted when it
    was garnishing $557.45 from her paychecks leaving her a paltry
    $356.55 for two (2) weeks take home pay.”    While the garnishment
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    certainly reduced petitioner’s expendable income in November and
    December of 2000, it does not establish that payment of the
    outstanding tax liability would prevent petitioner from paying
    reasonable basic living expenses.   Petitioner has presented no
    evidence, either to respondent or to the Court, that she would
    suffer economic hardship if denied relief.    Common sense suggests
    that payment of the outstanding tax liability would put
    petitioner in a less-than-desirable financial situation.
    However, based on petitioner’s complete lack of proof, we have no
    choice but to conclude petitioner would not suffer economic
    hardship if she were denied relief.     This factor weighs against
    relief.
    6.   Knowledge or Reason To Know
    In determining whether a taxpayer qualifies for equitable
    relief under section 6015(f), the Commissioner considers whether
    the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know that the
    reported liability would be unpaid at the time the return was
    signed.   Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(2)(b), 2000-1 C.B. at 449.
    Respondent determined that petitioner knew or had reason to
    know that the reported liability would be unpaid when the 1998
    and 1999 returns were filed.   Petitioner argues that she was
    unaware of the tax problems surrounding Mr. Crouch’s business
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    activities and that she had no reason to know their 1998 and 1999
    reported tax liabilities would be unpaid.6
    Prior to signing and filing the 1998 and 1999 tax returns,
    petitioner’s wages were garnished by respondent to pay
    petitioner’s and Mr. Crouch’s joint 1997 tax liability.     At the
    least, this put petitioner on notice of the tax problems she and
    Mr. Crouch were facing.   Even more detrimental to her argument,
    petitioner testified that she knew they could not pay the amount
    due when she signed the returns.    We find petitioner knew or had
    reason to know that the reported liability would be unpaid at the
    time she signed the returns.   This factor weighs against relief.
    7.   Whether the Underpayment of Tax Is Attributable to the
    Non-Requesting Spouse
    Respondent concedes that the underpayment of tax was solely
    attributable to Mr. Crouch’s business activities.     This factor
    favors relief.
    8.   Legal Obligation To Pay
    Because there is no decree or agreement imposing such
    obligation, this factor is neutral.
    The only factor favoring relief is that the underpayment of
    tax was attributable to Mr. Crouch.     This factor is strongly
    6
    In support of her argument, petitioner cites Browda v.
    Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2004-16. Under sec. 7463(b),
    summary opinions are not treated as precedent for any other case,
    and we do not consider further petitioner’s argument as it
    relates to Browda.
    - 15 -
    outweighed by the significant benefit petitioner received from
    the underpayment, her knowledge or reason to know that the
    reported liability would be unpaid, and her failure to
    demonstrate economic hardship.   Based on the above, we find that
    petitioner has failed to carry her burden of showing respondent
    abused his discretion in denying her equitable relief under
    section 6015(f).
    In reaching our holding herein, we have considered all
    arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned above, we
    conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.
    To reflect the foregoing and respondent’s concession
    regarding petitioner’s 1997 tax year,
    An appropriate
    decision will be entered.