Mountain State Ford Truck Sales, Inc., E.P. O'Meara, Tax Matters Person v. Commissioner , 112 T.C. No. 7 ( 1999 )


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  •                             112 T.C. No. 7
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    MOUNTAIN STATE FORD TRUCK SALES, INC., E. P. O'MEARA, TAX MATTERS
    PERSON, Petitioner v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 16350-95.                      Filed March 2, 1999.
    Company M (M), a heavy truck dealer, purchased
    heavy truck parts and accessories (parts) from the
    manufacturers of those parts and sold them to its
    customers. M, which is required to use inventories
    pursuant to sec. 471, I.R.C., made elections under sec.
    472, I.R.C., effective as of the close of its taxable
    year 1980, to apply the last-in, first-out (LIFO)
    method of inventory accounting (LIFO method) with
    respect to its parts inventory, to use the dollar-value
    LIFO method, to calculate the price index for its parts
    pool pursuant to the link-chain method, and to use the
    "most recent purchases method" in computing the "total
    current-year cost of items making up" its parts pool.
    In determining that current-year cost as a first step
    in valuing its parts inventory under the dollar-value
    LIFO method, M used the respective manufacturers'
    prices that were in effect as of the date of its physi-
    cal inventory (replacement cost) for the inventoried
    parts that it had purchased.
    Respondent determined that M's method of using
    replacement cost in valuing its parts inventory under
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    the LIFO method does not clearly reflect income because
    it is contrary to the requirements of sec. 472, I.R.C.,
    and the regulations thereunder and that M's ordinary
    income for the year at issue should be adjusted to
    include the amount of the so-called LIFO reserve that M
    had computed during the period 1980 through the year at
    issue.
    Held: Respondent did not abuse respondent's
    discretion in determining that M's method of using
    replacement cost in valuing its parts inventory under
    the LIFO method does not clearly reflect income.
    Held, further: Respondent did not place M on an
    impermissible method of inventory accounting when
    respondent adjusted M's ordinary income for the year at
    issue to include the amount of the so-called LIFO
    reserve that M had computed during the period 1980
    through the year at issue, and consequently respondent
    did not abuse respondent's discretion in making that
    adjustment.
    Leslie J. Schneider, Patrick J. Smith, and William F.
    Garrow, for petitioner.
    Michael J. Cooper, for respondent.
    CHIECHI, Judge:   Respondent determined S corporation adjust-
    ments for 1991 to the ordinary income of Mountain State Ford
    Truck Sales, Inc. (Mountain State Ford), in the amount of
    $504,013.
    The issues remaining for decision are:
    (1) Did respondent abuse respondent's discretion in deter-
    mining that Mountain State Ford's method of using replacement
    cost in valuing its parts inventory under the LIFO method does
    not clearly reflect income?   We hold that respondent did not.
    - 3 -
    (2) Even though we have held that respondent did not abuse
    respondent's discretion in making the determination described
    above, did respondent abuse respondent's discretion by placing
    Mountain State Ford on an impermissible method of inventory
    accounting when respondent adjusted Mountain State Ford's ordi-
    nary income for 1991 to include the amount of the so-called LIFO
    reserve that it had calculated during the period 1980 through
    1991?    We hold that respondent did not.
    FINDINGS OF FACT1
    Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
    Mountain State Ford, which was incorporated in Delaware in
    1968 and has been an S corporation since its taxable year 1987,
    had its principal place of business in Denver, Colorado, at the
    time the petition was filed.    E. P. O'Meara (Mr. O'Meara), who
    worked in the automobile and truck dealer industry on a part-time
    basis since late 1939 and on a full-time basis since January
    1947, is Mountain State Ford's tax matters person.
    In January 1968, Mr. O'Meara started operating Mountain
    State Ford as a heavy truck dealer under a management agreement
    with Ford Motor Company (Ford), which owned all of its stock.      As
    a heavy truck dealer for Ford, Mountain State Ford carried, and
    maintained an inventory of, different types of heavy truck parts
    1
    Unless otherwise indicated, our Findings of Fact and
    Opinion pertain to all periods since the incorporation of
    Mountain State Ford to the trial in this case; all section
    references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for
    the year at issue; and all Rule references are to the Tax Court
    Rules of Practice and Procedure.
    - 4 -
    and accessories manufactured by Ford.    It also carried different
    types of parts of other manufacturers, some of which were present
    in 1968 and others of which were added later.
    Mr. O'Meara continued operating Mountain State Ford under
    the management agreement with Ford until around 1978.   At that
    time, Mr. O'Meara, his son Eugene Peter O'Meara, Jr., and other
    family members completed their purchase from Ford, pursuant to
    the terms of that management agreement, of all of the stock of
    Mountain State Ford, which they began acquiring during 1975.
    After having purchased all of the stock of Mountain State Ford,
    Mr. O'Meara and Eugene Peter O'Meara, Jr., continued to operate
    Mountain State Ford as a heavy truck dealer for Ford.   On July
    31, 1985, Mountain State Ford became a heavy truck dealer for
    American Isuzu Motors Inc. and began carrying its parts.
    Eugene Peter O'Meara, Jr., has been employed by Mountain
    State Ford since 1974 and has served as its president since 1990.
    As its president, Eugene Peter O'Meara, Jr., oversaw all of the
    operations of Mountain State Ford, including its new and used
    heavy truck sales departments, parts department, service depart-
    ment, and lease and rental operations.
    From its incorporation until the date in 1978 on which Ford
    no longer owned any stock of Mountain State Ford, only Ford
    employees served as members of the board of directors of Mountain
    State Ford.   Nonetheless, Mr. O'Meara was involved in all aspects
    of Mountain State Ford's business since it was formed in 1968 and
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    served at various times as Mountain State Ford's general manager,
    president, and chairman of its board of directors.
    When Mountain State Ford commenced business in 1968, the
    accounting methods that it adopted and the books and records that
    it maintained were in accordance with the Ford standard system
    for Ford truck dealers.   That system included the way in which
    the parts inventory was to be maintained.   Throughout the period
    from its incorporation until 1978 when Ford no longer owned any
    stock of Mountain State Ford, Ford required that Mountain State
    Ford retain an independent certified public accountant (C.P.A.)
    to conduct an annual audit, prepare its financial statements,
    provide an unqualified opinion for those statements, prepare its
    tax returns, and observe the taking of its physical inventory.
    During that same period, Ford required that Mountain State Ford's
    independent C.P.A. value Mountain State Ford's parts inventory
    (1) for Ford parts on the basis of "the dealer net prices as
    incorporated in the latest dealer price lists published by Ford"
    and (2) for other manufacturers' parts on the basis of "the
    dealer net prices as incorporated in the latest dealer price
    lists published by the applicable manufacturer".
    On a daily basis, Mountain State Ford ordered and received
    parts from manufacturers that ranged in number from one to
    hundreds, sold parts to customers, and, for reasons not disclosed
    by the record, received parts that were returned by certain of
    its customers.   The price that each manufacturer charged Mountain
    State Ford for each of the parts that it ordered was published in
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    a price list or price catalog (price catalog) that each such
    manufacturer distributed to heavy truck dealers, including
    Mountain State Ford.   On a periodic basis, each manufacturer
    updated its price catalog to reflect any changes in the prices of
    such manufacturer's parts and distributed such updated price
    catalogs to Mountain State Ford and other heavy truck dealers.
    During the period 1980 through 1991, Ford distributed approxi-
    mately four to six updated price catalogs each year.
    The different types of parts that Mountain State Ford
    carried fluctuated in quantity, but usually totaled about 12,000
    out of approximately 17,000 potential different types of parts.
    For each such type of part, Mountain State Ford could have
    carried as few as one unit or as many as several dozen units,
    each or several of which it acquired at different times and
    different prices and from different manufacturers.   The units of
    different types of parts in Mountain State Ford's parts inventory
    turned over at different rates.   While Mountain State Ford's
    parts inventory generally turned over every 3 or 4 months, some
    units of different types of parts were in its parts inventory for
    more than 12 months.
    The respective manufacturers of the different types of parts
    carried by Mountain State Ford assigned parts numbers (parts
    numbers) to those types of parts.   During any year, a manufac-
    turer could have (1) changed a part number for a type of part
    without altering that type of part and/or (2) added a new part
    number because it altered an existing type of part and/or occa-
    - 7 -
    sionally developed a new type of part.   However, from year to
    year, only 10 percent to 15 percent of the parts numbers for
    parts carried by Mountain State Ford changed.   For the parts
    numbers that did change, Mountain State Ford could have deter-
    mined the corresponding parts numbers for the year prior to the
    change, but did not do so.
    While each different type of part that Mountain State Ford
    carried in its parts inventory was assigned a part number, in
    most instances each unit of a particular type of part was not
    identified separately from every other unit of that same type of
    part.   However, in some instances each unit of the same type of
    certain large parts, such as engines, transmissions, and rear
    axles, was identified not only by a part number, but also by a
    serial number.
    Consistent with standard industry practice for heavy truck
    dealers, Mountain State Ford maintained an inventory of parts by
    using a computerized recordkeeping system which listed, inter
    alia, the quantity of units on hand of each of the different
    types of parts that it carried.   Mountain State Ford maintained
    that system, which it referred to as its perpetual recordkeeping
    system (perpetual inventory recordkeeping system), with the
    assistance of a company that provided computer services (computer
    vendor) to businesses in the heavy truck dealer industry.   The
    manufacturers authorized several computer vendors to assist heavy
    truck dealers in the valuation of those dealers' parts invento-
    ries.   Prior to 1994 Mountain State Ford utilized Ford's Dealer
    - 8 -
    Computer Services Division, and since 1994 it has utilized ADP,
    Inc., as its computer vendor.   In addition to advising Mountain
    State Ford and other heavy truck dealers of changes in the prices
    of its parts through the periodic distribution of updated price
    catalogs, each manufacturer provided to the computer vendors, at
    about the same times it distributed such catalogs, computer-ready
    mediums, such as magnetic tapes (computerized price update
    tapes), which reflected such price changes.
    Under its perpetual inventory recordkeeping system, Mountain
    State Ford (1) added to its parts inventory the number of units
    of each type of part that were delivered and returned to it and
    (2) removed from its parts inventory the number of units of each
    type of part that it sold.   When Mountain State Ford received the
    parts that it had ordered from a manufacturer, it also received a
    computer-ready medium, such as a magnetic tape (shipping tape),
    and packing sheets (packing sheets) that included a packing slip.
    The shipping tape reflected the part number of each type of part
    and the number of units of each such type that the manufacturer
    had shipped, or had intended to ship, to Mountain State Ford, but
    did not contain any information showing the prices that the
    manufacturer charged Mountain State Ford for those parts.
    Mountain State Ford used the shipping tape to enter into its
    perpetual inventory recordkeeping system the part number and the
    number of units of each type of part that the manufacturer
    shipped, or intended to ship, to it.
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    The packing sheets that accompanied each shipment of parts
    to Mountain State Ford reflected the same information which
    appeared on the shipping tape and which Mountain State Ford
    entered into its perpetual inventory recordkeeping system.
    Mountain State Ford used the packing sheets to verify that it
    received the quantity of units of each type of part that was
    shown as shipped on such sheets and on the shipping tape.    Upon
    delivery at Mountain State Ford's place of business of parts
    shipped to it, an employee in its parts department compared the
    packing sheets with the quantity of units of each type of part
    that had been delivered.   If after making that comparison the
    employee determined that the packing sheets were inaccurate, an
    employee adjusted Mountain State Ford's perpetual inventory
    recordkeeping system to reflect the quantity of units of each
    type of part that had in fact been delivered to it.
    At the end of each business day, Mountain State Ford trans-
    mitted to its computer vendor a record of the transactions that
    were effected on that day.   The computer vendor computed a value
    for the quantity of units of each type of part (1) delivered to,
    (2) returned to, and/or (3) sold by Mountain State Ford on each
    business day by using the price which the manufacturer of each
    such type was charging on that day and which was reflected on the
    computerized price update tape that each such manufacturer had
    provided to that vendor and in the updated price catalog that
    each such manufacturer had distributed to Mountain State Ford and
    other heavy truck dealers.
    - 10 -
    Mountain State Ford generally received invoices on a monthly
    basis from the manufacturers for the parts that those manufactur-
    ers had shipped, or had intended to ship, to it.   With respect to
    those parts, each such invoice showed the part number of each
    type of part, the quantity of units of each such type, and the
    purchase price of each such unit.   (We shall sometimes refer to
    the price of each unit of each type of part as shown on the
    invoice that the manufacturer sent to Mountain State Ford as the
    invoice price.)
    Upon receipt of a manufacturer's invoice, an employee of
    Mountain State Ford entered the total of the invoice prices
    (aggregate invoice price) of all the parts, but not the invoice
    price of each unit of each type of part, into an account which
    Mountain State Ford maintained for the parts that it purchased
    (purchases account).   Mountain State Ford did not utilize the
    purchases account in maintaining its inventory.    Another employee
    of Mountain State Ford in charge of payables verified with the
    parts department that Mountain State Ford had received the number
    of units of each type of part that was listed on each invoice,
    and, if so, Mountain State Ford paid the aggregate invoice price.
    Once Mountain State Ford paid the aggregate invoice price, it
    filed the invoice by manufacturer and invoice date.
    Where (1) there was a shortage in the quantity of units of
    one or more types of parts that the manufacturer intended to ship
    to Mountain State Ford, as shown on the shipping tape and the
    packing sheets, (2) the manufacturer mistakenly sent Mountain
    - 11 -
    State Ford an invoice which billed it for the units that it had
    not received, and (3) Mountain State Ford paid, for reasons not
    disclosed in the record, the incorrect aggregate invoice price,
    Mountain State Ford filed a shortage claim (shortage claim) with
    the manufacturer from whom it had ordered the parts.   In those
    instances where Mountain State Ford filed a shortage claim, the
    manufacturer to whom such a claim was made issued a credit to
    Mountain State Ford in an amount calculated by reference to the
    manufacturer's price in effect around the time Mountain State
    Ford filed the shortage claim for each unit listed in that claim.
    The manufacturer issued a credit in that amount regardless
    whether it had originally charged, and sent Mountain State Ford
    an invoice showing, a different invoice price for each such unit.
    Mountain State Ford took a physical inventory in late
    September or early October, and in a couple of instances in early
    November, of each year and adjusted the balance of the quantity
    of the units of each type of part reflected in its perpetual
    inventory recordkeeping system to reflect each such quantity
    physically on hand.   After taking the physical inventory, Moun-
    tain State Ford notified the computer vendor of each such quan-
    tity physically on hand.   Consistent with standard industry
    practice in the heavy truck dealer industry, the computer vendor
    determined the value of Mountain State Ford's parts inventory as
    of the date of the physical inventory by computing a value for
    the quantity of units of each type of part physically on hand by
    using the price which the manufacturer of each such type was
    - 12 -
    charging as of that date and which was reflected on the computer-
    ized price update tape that each such manufacturer had provided
    to that vendor. (We shall refer to the prices reflected on those
    tapes at which the different types of parts were valued as of the
    date of Mountain State Ford's physical inventory as replacement
    cost.)   The replacement cost on which Mountain State Ford valued
    the parts in its parts inventory as of the date of the physical
    inventory was not necessarily the same as the invoice prices
    thereof.   In order to determine the value of its parts inventory
    at the end of each year (ending parts inventory), Mountain State
    Ford adjusted, in a manner not disclosed by the record, its parts
    inventory valued at the time of its physical inventory for any
    deliveries and returns of parts to it and/or sales of parts by it
    between that time and the end of the year.    Prior to 1980,
    Mountain State Ford's ending parts inventory, determined as just
    described, was used as its ending parts inventory for both
    financial statement and Federal income tax (Federal tax) pur-
    poses.
    Throughout the period from its incorporation until the date
    in 1978 on which Ford no longer owned any stock of Mountain State
    Ford, Mountain State Ford did not use the invoice prices or the
    purchases account in maintaining its inventory under its perpet-
    ual inventory recordkeeping system.    That was because, as dis-
    cussed above, Ford required that Mountain State Ford's parts
    inventory be valued for Ford parts on the basis of "the dealer
    net prices as incorporated in the latest dealer price lists
    - 13 -
    published by Ford" and for other manufacturers' parts on the
    basis of "the dealer net prices as incorporated in the latest
    dealer price lists published by the applicable manufacturer".
    Nor did Mountain State Ford maintain inventory records which
    showed the invoice price that it paid for each unit of each type
    of part (1) delivered and/or returned to it and added to its
    parts inventory and/or (2) sold by it and removed from that
    inventory.    However, Mountain State Ford did maintain other
    records, such as accounts payable records and invoices, which
    listed the invoice price paid by Mountain State Ford for each
    unit of each type of part delivered to it.
    After 1978, when Ford no longer owned any stock of Mountain
    State Ford, Mountain State Ford was free to use an engagement
    letter in employing a C.P.A. to audit its financial statements
    and prepare its tax returns that was different from the letter
    that it had previously used when Ford owned stock of Mountain
    State Ford.   Mountain State Ford also became free to adopt
    accounting methods and/or procedures that were different from
    those which it employed when it was owned by Ford, including its
    method of valuing its parts inventory on the basis of replacement
    cost, provided that it sought and received the consent of the
    Internal Revenue Service before it made a change, inter alia, in
    that method of valuing its parts inventory.    After 1978, when
    Ford no longer owned any stock of Mountain State Ford, Mountain
    State Ford made no attempt to determine whether it could have
    modified its perpetual inventory recordkeeping system so that it
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    could have used invoice prices in valuing its parts inventory.
    Nor did it determine whether it could have created a new inven-
    tory recordkeeping system that could have used invoice prices in
    that inventory valuation process.   Instead, Mountain State Ford
    continued to use replacement cost in valuing its parts inventory
    because it had used that method when Ford owned it and because
    that was the method used by the heavy truck dealer industry.
    In 1978, respondent conducted an examination of Mountain
    State Ford's return for 1976, during which respondent requested
    documents with respect to Mountain State Ford's inventories for
    that year.   As part of that examination, respondent did not
    propose any adjustments to Mountain State Ford's method of
    valuing its parts inventory.
    From its incorporation in 1968 through 1979, Mountain State
    Ford accounted for its parts inventory on the basis of the lower
    of cost or market (LCM).   Mountain State Ford submitted Form 970
    (Form 970), Application to Use LIFO Inventory Method, with its
    1980 return.   In that form, Mountain State Ford adopted the LIFO
    method of valuing its parts inventory and its new heavy trucks
    inventory, effective as of the close of its taxable year ended
    December 31, 1980.   It adopted the same method for both financial
    statement and Federal tax purposes.     As pertinent here with
    respect to Mountain State Ford's parts inventory,2 the Form 970
    2
    Mountain State Ford's election of the LIFO method with
    respect to its new heavy trucks inventory is not at issue in this
    case.
    - 15 -
    stated that Mountain State Ford intended to (1) take inventory
    "at actual cost regardless of market value", (2) value its parts
    inventory on the dollar-value LIFO method, (3) use one pool
    (parts pool) for its parts inventory, (4) calculate the price
    index for its parts pool pursuant to the link-chain method, and
    (5) "determine the cost of * * * [parts] in the closing inventory
    in excess of those in the opening inventory" on the basis of
    "most recent purchases"; i.e., pursuant to the most recent
    purchases method under section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(a), Income Tax
    Regs. (most recent purchases method).   Mountain State Ford
    attached a schedule to the Form 970 which stated in pertinent
    part:
    Cost System Used for Parts Inventory
    The taxpayer [Mountain State Ford] keeps detailed
    records of the cost of all parts in inventory. The
    total actual cost of all parts inventory will be di-
    vided by the number of each type of part on hand at the
    end of the year.
    In response to a request in the Form 970 to indicate the "Method
    used in computing LIFO value of dollar-value pools", Mountain
    State Ford attached a schedule which stated in pertinent part:
    Link-Chain Method for Parts Inventory
    The taxpayer [Mountain State Ford] receives weekly
    reports from Ford Motor Company which indicate the
    increase in prices for a major portion of the parts
    inventory which is supplied to the taxpayer from Ford
    Motor Company. The taxpayer compares this list of
    prices with the actual cost of the same items in the
    parts inventory to develop a current year price index.
    * * * The index developed by this large sample is then
    applied to the total parts inventory. Once a yearly
    index is developed it will be added to prior year
    indices to develop a cumulative index.
    - 16 -
    After having elected the LIFO method, Mountain State Ford
    continued to use replacement cost, determined in the same manner
    as it had calculated it prior to that election, in valuing its
    ending parts inventory for financial statement and Federal tax
    purposes.   However, Mountain State Ford used replacement cost in
    that valuation process as the starting point in determining its
    ending parts inventory under the dollar-value LIFO method; i.e.,
    it used replacement cost in the computation of the total current-
    year cost of items making up its parts pool under section 1.472-
    8(e)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs. (current-year cost of its parts
    pool).   After computing such current-year cost, Mountain State
    Ford computed an annual price index designed to measure the
    change in the cost of parts from one year to the next.   That
    index was computed by reference to, inter alia, the respective
    manufacturers' prices each week for parts carried by Mountain
    State Ford in its parts inventory and the respective manufactur-
    ers' prices for such parts as of the end of the preceding week.
    At the time Mountain State Ford adopted the LIFO method, it
    made no attempt to determine whether it could have modified its
    perpetual inventory recordkeeping system so that it could have
    used invoice prices in valuing its parts inventory.   Nor did it
    determine whether it could have created a new inventory record-
    keeping system that could have used invoice prices in that val-
    uation process.   Instead, Mountain State Ford continued to use
    replacement cost in valuing its parts inventory under the LIFO
    - 17 -
    method because it had used that method prior to adopting the LIFO
    method and because that was the method used by the heavy truck
    dealer industry.    In using replacement cost in valuing its parts
    inventory under the LIFO method, Mountain State Ford was not
    attempting to, and did not, determine or approximate the invoice
    prices of the parts that it purchased.
    On May 22, 1995, respondent issued a notice of final S
    corporation administrative adjustment (notice or FSAA) for 1991
    to Mr. O'Meara, the tax matters person.    In the notice, respon-
    dent did not terminate the elections that Mountain State Ford
    made in the Form 970 to value its parts inventory under the
    dollar-value, link-chain LIFO method and to use the most recent
    purchases method in determining the current-year cost of its
    parts pool.    However, respondent determined in the notice that
    the cost of goods sold reported in Mountain State Ford's 1991
    return should be reduced, and the ordinary income reported in
    that return should be increased, by $463,515.3    The amount of
    that reduction and that increase was equal to the amount of the
    LIFO reserve that Mountain State Ford had calculated over the
    period 1980 through 1991 (LIFO reserve).    The adjustment at issue
    in the notice thus was based on restoring to Mountain State
    Ford's income the amount of that LIFO reserve.    In making that
    adjustment, respondent was unable to, and did not, recompute
    Mountain State Ford's non-LIFO inventory value under a method
    3
    The parties settled the remaining adjustments in the
    notice.
    - 18 -
    using the invoice prices of parts inventoried or a cost other
    than replacement cost.   That was because Mountain State Ford did
    not have, and did not provide to respondent, the records that
    were necessary in order to calculate for the period 1980 through
    1991 (1) the LIFO value and the non-LIFO value of its parts
    inventory and (2) its LIFO reserve on the basis of invoice prices
    or a cost other than replacement cost.   Thus, the non-LIFO value
    that was used to compute the amount of the adjustment at issue in
    the notice (i.e., the amount of the LIFO reserve that Mountain
    State Ford had calculated for the period 1980 through 1991) was
    based on replacement cost.
    OPINION
    The issues presented implicate not only section 472, enti-
    tled "Last-In, First-Out Inventories", but also section 446,
    entitled "General Rule for Methods of Accounting", and section
    471, entitled "General Rule for Inventories".   Sections 446 and
    471 and the regulations thereunder are the provisions that vest
    the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) with wide
    discretion in determining whether a method of inventory account-
    ing should be disallowed because it does not clearly reflect
    income.   Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 
    439 U.S. 522
    , 532-
    533 (1979); Consolidated Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    111 T.C. 1
    , 19 (1998).   The Commissioner's interpretation of the
    clear-reflection standard under sections 446 and 471 may not be
    disturbed unless it is clearly unlawful or plainly arbitrary.
    Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, supra; Consolidated Manufac-
    - 19 -
    turing, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra.   The Commissioner's discre-
    tion under sections 446 and 471 is not unbridled, however.    Thor
    Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 533; Consolidated
    Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra.   Even if a taxpayer's
    accounting method does not result in a clear reflection of
    income, the Commissioner may not change the taxpayer's accounting
    method to another method that also fails to reflect income
    clearly.   Harden v. Commissioner, 
    223 F.2d 418
    , 421 (10th Cir.
    1955), revg. 
    21 T.C. 781
     (1954) and affg. Harden v. Hinds, 48
    AFTR 1268, 54-1 USTC par. 9348 (W.D. Okla. 1954); Rotolo v.
    Commissioner, 
    88 T.C. 1500
    , 1514 (1987).
    As framed by petitioner, the question relating to the clear-
    reflection-of-income standard is whether respondent abused
    respondent's discretion in concluding that, in computing the LIFO
    value of its dollar-value parts pool under the link-chain
    method,4 Mountain State Ford's use of replacement cost in
    4
    The parties disputed at trial whether there are deficien-
    cies in the manner in which Mountain State Ford computed the
    price indices under its link-chain method. However, after trial
    the parties entered into a second supplemental stipulation
    regarding those price indices. According to that stipulation, in
    the event that the Court were to sustain Mountain State Ford's
    method of using replacement cost in computing the LIFO value of
    its parts inventory, respondent's adjustment in the notice to
    Mountain State Ford's ordinary income for 1991 would be reduced
    from $463,515 to $53,870. That reduction would be made in that
    event in order to reflect the parties' agreement in the second
    supplemental stipulation to correct certain of the alleged
    deficiencies that respondent had found in Mountain State Ford's
    computation of the price indices under its link-chain method.
    The parties further agreed in that stipulation that in the event
    that the Court were not to permit Mountain State Ford's method of
    using replacement cost in computing the LIFO value of its parts
    (continued...)
    - 20 -
    determining the current-year cost of its parts pool pursuant to
    any other proper method under section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(d),
    Income Tax Regs.5 (any other proper method), which petitioner
    claims Mountain State Ford elected in the Form 970, does not
    clearly reflect income.   Respondent agrees with petitioner's
    framing of the issue relating to the clear-reflection-of-income
    standard except that respondent contends that Mountain State Ford
    4
    (...continued)
    inventory, respondent's adjustment in the notice to Mountain
    State Ford's ordinary income for 1991 would be sustained. Thus,
    no issue regarding the price indices calculated by Mountain State
    Ford under its link-chain method remains for our decision.
    5
    Sec. 1.472-8(e)(2), Income Tax Regs., which describes the
    double-extension method of computing the LIFO value of a dollar-
    value pool, provides in pertinent part:
    (ii) The total current-year cost of items making
    up a pool may be determined--
    (a) By reference to the actual cost of
    the goods most recently purchased or
    produced;
    (b) By reference to the actual cost of
    the goods purchased or produced during the
    taxable year in the order of acquisition;
    (c) By application of an average unit
    cost equal to the aggregate cost of all of
    the goods purchased or produced throughout
    the taxable year divided by the total number
    of units so purchased or produced; or
    (d) Pursuant to any other proper method
    which, in the opinion of the Commissioner,
    clearly reflects income.
    Although sec. 1.472-8, Income Tax Regs., relating to the dollar-
    value LIFO method does not discuss how the link-chain method that
    Mountain State Ford elected in the Form 970 is to be applied, the
    parties agree that sec. 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs.,
    applies to the link-chain method.
    - 21 -
    elected in the Form 970 to use the most recent purchases method,
    and not any other proper method, in determining the current-year
    cost of its parts pool.6
    In inventorying goods with respect to which a taxpayer
    elected the LIFO method, the taxpayer is required to (1) treat
    those goods remaining on hand at the end of the taxable year as
    being (a) those included in the opening inventory of the taxable
    year, in the order of acquisition and to the extent thereof, and
    (b) those acquired during the taxable year, sec. 472(b)(1); sec.
    1.472-1(a), Income Tax Regs.; and (2) inventory them at cost,
    sec. 472(b)(2); sec. 1.472-2(b), Income Tax Regs.
    There are two basic LIFO computational systems.    One is
    based on specific goods (specific-goods LIFO method).    See sec.
    1.472-2, Income Tax Regs.   The other is based on the dollars
    invested in inventory and is known as the dollar-value LIFO
    method.   See sec. 1.472-8, Income Tax Regs.   Under the specific-
    goods LIFO method, quantitative changes in inventory during the
    year are measured in terms of an appropriate unit, such as
    pounds, pieces, or gallons.   The dollar-value LIFO method deter-
    mines increases or deceases in inventory in terms of total
    6
    The parties and their respective experts also disagree
    about whether Mountain State Ford's method of using replacement
    cost under the LIFO method complies with generally accepted
    accounting principles (GAAP) and conforms as nearly as may be to
    the best accounting practice in Mountain State Ford's trade or
    business, as required by sec. 471 and the regulations thereunder.
    However, our resolution of the disagreement between the parties
    about the clear-reflection-of-income standard makes it
    unnecessary for us to address the parties' and their respective
    experts' dispute over GAAP.
    - 22 -
    dollars, rather than in terms of physical units.    Amity Leather
    Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 
    82 T.C. 726
    , 732 (1984).   To deter-
    mine under the dollar-value LIFO method whether there has been an
    increase or a decrease in inventory during the year, the ending
    inventory is valued in terms of total dollars that are equivalent
    in value to the dollars used to value the beginning inventory.
    Id.
    Respondent argues that the term "cost" in section 472(b)(2)
    and the regulation thereunder (viz., section 1.472-2(b), Income
    Tax Regs.) means actual cost and that, as required by section
    472(b)(2), section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs., pertain-
    ing to the dollar-value LIFO method mandates that the determina-
    tion of the current-year cost of items making up a pool be made
    on the basis of, or by reference to, actual cost.   According to
    respondent, Mountain State Ford's method of using replacement
    cost, instead of actual cost, in determining the current-year
    cost of its parts pool contravenes those requirements of the Code
    and regulations, and consequently that method does not clearly
    reflect income.
    Petitioner concedes that if the Court were to find that
    Mountain State Ford's method of using replacement cost were to
    contravene the requirements of the provisions of the Code and the
    regulations upon which respondent relies, that method would not
    clearly reflect income.   However, petitioner argues that those
    provisions do not require that Mountain State Ford determine the
    current-year cost of its parts pool by using actual cost.
    - 23 -
    According to petitioner, respondent's interpretation of the term
    "cost" in section 472(b)(2) as meaning actual cost is wrong, and
    Mountain State Ford's method of using replacement cost qualifies
    as any other proper method under section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(d),
    Income Tax Regs., which does not require the use of actual cost.
    To support his argument that respondent's position about the
    meaning of the term "cost" in section 472(b)(2) and the regula-
    tion thereunder is wrong, petitioner asserts:
    With regard to the "cost" requirement in section
    472(b)(2), the petitioner submits that an examination
    of the statute and regulations, as well as the histori-
    cal development surrounding the LIFO method, makes
    clear that the cost requirement in section 472(b)(2) is
    simply the expression of the rule that the lower of
    cost or market method may not be used in conjunction
    with the LIFO method. Accordingly, the respondent is
    attempting to extend the cost requirement in section
    472(b)(2) far beyond its intended scope.
    *    *    *    *    *    *       *
    * * * The use of replacement costs * * * under the
    dollar-value LIFO method does not in any way represent
    a use of lower of cost or market and, accordingly, does
    not violate the cost requirement of section 472.
    Even assuming arguendo that petitioner were correct in his
    contention about the reason why Congress required that goods for
    which a taxpayer elected the LIFO method be inventoried at cost,7
    that contention does not address the meaning of the term "cost"
    7
    It is noteworthy that the replacement cost as of the date
    of Mountain State Ford's physical inventory, which it used in
    determining the LIFO value of its dollar-value parts pool, is
    analogous to "market" in inventory tax accounting. See Thor
    Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 
    439 U.S. 522
    , 534 (1979); sec.
    1.471-4(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.
    - 24 -
    in section 472(b)(2) and the regulation thereunder.          Section
    472(b)(2) provides:
    (b) Method Applicable.--In inventorying goods
    specified in the application described in subsection
    (a), the taxpayer shall:
    *      *    *    *     *      *    *
    (2) Inventory them at cost * * *
    The regulation under section 472(b)(2), section 1.472-2(b),
    Income Tax Regs., provides:
    (b) The inventory shall be taken at cost regard-
    less of market value.
    Both parties rely in part on dictionary definitions of the
    word "cost" to support their divergent positions regarding the
    meaning of the term "cost" in section 472(b)(2) and the regula-
    tion thereunder.       According to respondent, the commonly under-
    stood and generally accepted meaning of the word "cost", as
    reflected in dictionary definitions, is actual cost.          According
    to petitioner, dictionary definitions of the word "cost" "clearly
    encompass replacement cost."        We agree with respondent.
    Black's Law Dictionary 345 (6th ed. 1990) defines the word
    "cost" to mean:       "Expense; price.   The sum or equivalent ex-
    pended, paid or charged for something.          See also Actual cost;
    Costs; Net cost; Rate."       Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
    262 (10th ed. 1996) defines the word "cost" to include:          "The
    amount or equivalent paid or charged for something:          price."
    Webster's Third New International Dictionary 515 (1993 ed.)
    defines the word "cost" to include:          "the amount or equivalent
    - 25 -
    paid or given or charged or engaged to be paid or given for
    anything bought or taken in barter or for service rendered".    We
    conclude that the common and ordinary meaning of the word "cost"
    is actual cost or the price paid for something.8
    We see no reason, however, to rely in this case on dictio-
    nary definitions of the word "cost" to determine the meaning of
    the term "cost" in section 472(b)(2) and section 1.472-2(b),
    Income Tax Regs.    That is because the term "cost" is defined in
    regulations under section 471, the "General Rule for Invento-
    ries".    Application of the definition of cost in those regula-
    tions (section 1.471-3, Income Tax Regs., entitled "Inventories
    at cost"), which is based on what we have concluded is the common
    and ordinary meaning of the word "cost", will result in a deter-
    mination of the actual cost of merchandise or goods purchased or
    produced during the taxable year,9 or in certain instances an
    approximation of such cost determined upon a reasonable basis
    (reasonable approximation).10
    8
    The accounting profession generally defines the word
    "cost" as used in inventory accounting "as the price paid or
    consideration given to acquire an asset". Accounting Research
    Bulletin No. 43, "Restatement and Revision of Accounting Research
    Bulletins", ch. 4, statement 3 (June 1953).
    9
    As pertinent here, sec. 1.471-3(b), Income Tax Regs.,
    defines the term "cost" in the case of merchandise purchased
    since the beginning of the taxable year as "the invoice price".
    10
    Sec. 1.471-3(d), Income Tax Regs., provides in pertinent
    part that in certain instances "costs may be approximated upon
    such basis as may be reasonable and in conformity with
    established trade practice in the particular industry."
    - 26 -
    The definition of the term "cost" in section 1.471-3, Income
    Tax Regs., is virtually the same as the definition of the term
    "cost" as it appeared in the regulations promulgated under
    section 203 of the Revenue Act of 1918 (1918 Act), ch. 18, 40
    Stat. 1060, the original predecessor of section 471, which first
    required certain taxpayers to use the inventory accounting
    method.   See Regs. 45, art. 1583 (1918).   The definition of the
    term "cost" as it appeared in the regulations under the 1918 Act
    was repromulgated in virtually the same language in the regula-
    tions issued under all subsequent Federal tax provisions that
    continued to require certain taxpayers to use the inventory
    accounting method.   The term "cost" in inventory tax accounting
    had a settled meaning when Congress first permitted certain
    taxpayers to elect the LIFO method, Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289,
    sec. 22(d), 52 Stat. 459,11 and shortly thereafter when Congress
    11
    The regulations in effect when Congress first allowed
    certain taxpayers to elect the LIFO method and required that the
    goods with respect to which that method was elected be invento-
    ried at cost, Regs. 94, art. 22(c)-3 (1936), defined the term
    "cost" for inventory accounting purposes as follows:
    Art. 22(c)-3.   Inventories at cost.--Cost means:
    (1) In the case of merchandise on hand at the
    beginning of the taxable year, the inventory price of
    such goods.
    (2) In the case of merchandise purchased since the
    beginning of the taxable year, the invoice price less
    trade or other discounts, except strictly cash dis-
    counts approximating a fair interest rate, which may be
    deducted or not at the option of the taxpayer, provided
    a consistent course is followed. To this net invoice
    price should be added transportation or other necessary
    (continued...)
    - 27 -
    permitted all taxpayers to elect that method, Revenue Act of
    1939, ch. 247, sec. 219, 53 Stat. 877.   In requiring that goods
    for which a taxpayer adopted the LIFO method be inventoried at
    cost, Congress presumptively was aware of the established regula-
    tory definition of the term "cost" in inventory tax accounting.
    If Congress had intended for the term "cost" in LIFO inventory
    tax accounting to have a meaning different from that regulatory
    definition, it would have so stated.   It did not do so when it
    11
    (...continued)
    charges incurred in acquiring possession of the goods.
    (3) In the case of merchandise produced by the
    taxpayer since the beginning of the taxable year,
    (a) the cost of raw materials and supplies entering
    into or consumed in connection with the product,
    (b) expenditures for direct labor, (c) indirect ex-
    penses incident to and necessary for the production of
    the particular article, including in such indirect
    expenses a reasonable proportion of management ex-
    penses, but not including any cost of selling or return
    on capital, whether by way of interest or profit.
    (4) In any industry in which the usual rules for
    computation of cost of production are inapplicable,
    costs may be approximated upon such basis as may be
    reasonable and in conformity with established trade
    practice in the particular industry. Among such cases
    are (a) farmers and raisers of live stock (see article
    22(c)-6), (b) miners and manufacturers who by a single
    process or uniform series of processes derive a product
    of two or more kinds, sizes, or grades, the unit cost
    of which is substantially alike (see article 22(c)-7),
    and (c) retail merchants who use what is known as the
    "retail method" in ascertaining approximate cost (see
    article 22(c)-8).
    The definition of the term "cost" in Regs. 94, art. 22(c)-3
    (1936), is virtually identical to the definition of that term in
    sec. 1.471-3, Income Tax Regs.
    - 28 -
    first enacted the LIFO provisions or at any other time thereaf-
    ter.    We hold that the definition of the term "cost" in section
    1.471-3, Income Tax Regs., which is intended to arrive at actual
    cost, applies to the term "cost" in section 472(b)(2) and the
    regulation thereunder.12   See Commissioner v. Keystone Consol.
    Indus., Inc., 
    508 U.S. 152
    , 158-159 (1993).
    12
    Our holding as to the meaning of the term "cost" in sec.
    472(b)(2) and the regulation thereunder disposes of petitioner's
    contention that "respondent may not interpret the rules and
    regulations in a way that will impose unreasonable administrative
    burdens on taxpayers attempting to use the LIFO method or in a
    way that will diminish or eliminate the availability of the LIFO
    method to a significant group of taxpayers". Respondent has no
    discretion to deviate from the requirements of the Code and the
    regulations even if such requirements were to impose administra-
    tive burdens on Mountain State Ford. On the record before us,
    however, we find that petitioner has not established that respon-
    dent's position in the present case that the term "cost" in sec.
    472(b)(2) means actual cost would result in the imposition of
    unreasonable administrative burdens on Mountain State Ford.
    Petitioner acknowledges that it is not impossible for Mountain
    State Ford to use actual cost, and not replacement cost, in
    valuing its parts inventory. In fact, Mr. Hommer, petitioner's
    expert on computerized inventory-tracking systems, admitted that
    the reason why there is no inventory recordkeeping system cur-
    rently available in the automobile and truck dealer industry that
    uses actual cost in that valuation process is because there has
    been no demand for such a system in that industry. Moreover,
    when Mountain State Ford adopted the LIFO method, Mountain State
    Ford made no attempt to determine whether it could have modified
    its perpetual inventory recordkeeping system so that it could
    have used invoice prices, i.e., actual cost, in valuing its parts
    inventory. Nor did it determine whether it could have created a
    new inventory recordkeeping system that could have used invoice
    prices or actual cost in that valuation process. In fact, when
    questioned by this Court as to why Mountain State Ford continued
    to use replacement cost, and did not use invoice prices or actual
    cost after it elected the LIFO method as of 1980, Eugene Peter
    O'Meara, Jr., testified that replacement cost had been utilized
    by Mountain State Ford previously and that Mountain State Ford
    did not consider using other than replacement cost when it
    elected the LIFO method.
    - 29 -
    To support his position that Mountain State Ford's method of
    using replacement cost to determine the current-year cost of its
    parts pool qualifies as any other proper method under section
    1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(d), Income Tax Regs., which in his view does
    not require the use of actual cost, petitioner contends (1) that
    Mountain State Ford elected in the Form 970 to use any other
    proper method in determining that current-year cost13 and
    (2) that Mountain State Ford's use of replacement cost qualifies
    as such a method.   We disagree on both counts.   Mountain State
    Ford did not elect in the Form 970 to use any other proper
    method.   Instead, Mountain State Ford elected in that form to
    "determine the cost of * * * [parts] in the closing inventory" on
    the basis of "most recent purchases".   On the record before us,
    we find that Mountain State Ford elected to determine the
    current-year cost of its parts pool pursuant to the most recent
    purchases method described in section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(a),
    13
    In support of his position that Mountain State Ford
    elected in the Form 970 to use any other proper method, peti-
    tioner points out that Mountain State Ford "attached to the Form
    970 a description of its method that clearly indicated * * *
    [that Mountain State Ford] was basing its index of computations
    on Ford's latest weekly price lists for parts". We note ini-
    tially that Mountain State Ford used replacement cost (viz., the
    prices reflected in the respective manufacturers' computerized
    price update tapes in effect as of the date of Mountain State
    Ford's physical inventory) in determining the current-year cost
    of its parts pool; it did not use all of the various "latest
    weekly price lists" to which Mountain State Ford referred in the
    Form 970 and which it indicated in that form it intended to use
    in calculating its price indices under its link-chain method. It
    is also noteworthy that in the Form 970 Mountain State Ford
    stated that it intended to take inventory "at actual cost regard-
    less of market value".
    - 30 -
    Income Tax Regs.   That regulation requires such cost to be
    determined by "reference to the actual cost of the goods most
    recently purchased".   Sec. 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(a), Income Tax Regs.
    Mountain State Ford did not request, and did not receive, the
    permission of the Commissioner to use a method different from the
    most recent purchases method that it elected in the Form 970.
    See sec. 472(e).   We conclude that Mountain State Ford was
    precluded in determining the current-year cost of its parts pool
    from using a method other than the most recent purchases method
    which it elected in the Form 970 that it filed with its 1980
    return.
    Even if, as petitioner contends, Mountain State Ford had
    elected in the Form 970 to use any other proper method under
    section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(d), Income Tax Regs., that method must
    be a proper method and must, in the opinion of the Commissioner,
    clearly reflect income.   Respondent determined that Mountain
    State Ford's method of using replacement cost in determining the
    current-year cost of its parts pool was not a proper method and
    does not clearly reflect income because section 472(b)(2) re-
    quires that Mountain State Ford calculate such current-year cost
    by using actual cost, which in this case is the invoice prices.
    Petitioner contends that respondent abused respondent's discre-
    tion in making that determination.     Petitioner asserts:
    An examination of * * * [section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii),
    Income Tax Regs.] indicates that whereas the earliest
    and latest acquisitions cost methods (Treas. Reg. §§
    1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(a) & (b)) are described in terms of
    actual cost, this term is not used in describing either
    - 31 -
    the average acquisitions cost method or the so-called
    "other" method that * * * [Mountain State Ford] is
    using. Accordingly, the respondent's interpretation of
    the regulations imports into Treas. Reg. § 1.472-
    8(e)(2)(ii)(d) a requirement that does not exist in the
    regulations. For example, under the average acquisi-
    tions cost method described in Treas. Reg. § 1.472-
    8(e)(2)(ii)(c), the unit cost assigned would often not
    be the actual cost of any units; for example, where
    half the units acquired during the year were acquired
    at a cost of $10 and half were acquired at a cost of
    $11, the unit cost determined under the average cost
    method, $10.50, is not the actual cost of any units.
    As petitioner acknowledges, the determination of the
    current-year cost of items making up a pool must be made
    (1) under the most recent purchases method under section 1.472-
    8(e)(2)(ii)(a), Income Tax Regs., by "reference to the actual
    cost of the goods most recently purchased or produced", and
    (2) under the earliest acquisition method under section 1.472-
    8(e)(2)(ii)(b), Income Tax Regs., by "reference to the actual
    cost of the goods purchased or produced during the taxable year
    in the order of acquisition".    We believe that those respective
    regulations mandate that actual cost be used because of the
    requirement in section 472(b)(2) that goods with respect to which
    a taxpayer elected the LIFO method be inventoried at cost; i.e.,
    actual cost.   Section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(c), Income Tax Regs.,
    requires a taxpayer electing the average unit cost method de-
    scribed therein to divide the aggregate cost of all the goods
    purchased or produced throughout the taxable year, which peti-
    tioner does not dispute, and we conclude, means the aggregate
    actual cost of such goods, by the total number of units so
    purchased or produced in order to arrive at an average unit cost.
    - 32 -
    Although, as petitioner points out, application of the average
    unit cost method under section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(c), Income Tax
    Regs., might not result in assigning a unit cost equal to the
    actual cost of any units purchased or produced during the taxable
    year, the determination of the current-year cost of items making
    up a pool under that regulation is required to be made on the
    basis of, or by reference to, the actual cost of all goods
    purchased or produced during the taxable year.   That regulation
    thus complies with the mandate of section 472(b)(2) that actual
    cost be used.
    As we have just explained, each of the methods prescribed in
    section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(a), (b), and (c), Income Tax Regs.,
    relating to the dollar-value LIFO method mandates, as required by
    section 472(b)(2), that the determination of the current-year
    cost of items making up a pool be made on the basis of, or by
    reference to, actual cost.14   We conclude that, in order for a
    14
    Pursuant to the requirement of sec. 472(b)(2), each of
    the methods prescribed in sec. 1.472-2(d)(1)(i)(a), (b), and (c),
    Income Tax Regs., relating to the specific-goods LIFO method also
    mandates that the cost of goods on hand as of the close of the
    taxable year with respect to which the taxpayer elected the LIFO
    method and which are in excess of what were on hand as of the
    beginning of the taxable year be determined on the basis of, or
    by reference to, the actual cost of certain or all of the goods
    purchased or produced during the taxable year, regardless of
    identification with specific invoices and regardless of specific
    cost accounting records. See sec. 1.472-2(d), Income Tax Regs.
    Consistent with sec. 472(b)(2), sec. 472(b)(3) and the regula-
    tions thereunder specifically require that goods with respect to
    which a taxpayer elected the LIFO method that are included in the
    opening inventory of the taxable year for which the LIFO method
    is first used are to be considered as having been acquired at
    the same time and at a unit cost determined by reference to the
    (continued...)
    - 33 -
    method to qualify under section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(d), Income Tax
    Regs., as any other proper method which clearly reflects income,
    the method must, as required by section 472(b)(2), determine the
    current-year cost of items making up a pool on the basis of, or
    by reference to, actual cost (or in certain instances a reason-
    able approximation of such cost).   Assuming arguendo that Moun-
    tain State Ford had elected to use any other proper method under
    section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii)(d), Income Tax Regs., in the Form 970
    that it filed with its 1980 return, which we have found it did
    not, petitioner has not persuaded us that the method which
    Mountain State Ford used to determine that current-year cost,
    which was based on replacement cost and not actual cost, is a
    proper method that clearly reflects income under that regula-
    tion.15
    In further support of his position that Mountain State
    Ford's method of using replacement cost, and not actual cost, in
    14
    (...continued)
    aggregate actual cost of such goods (i.e., by dividing such
    actual cost by the number of units on hand). Sec. 1.472-2(c),
    Income Tax Regs. The aggregate actual cost is to be determined
    pursuant to the inventory method used by the taxpayer under the
    regulations applicable to the taxable year preceding the taxable
    year for which the election of the LIFO method is made, with the
    exception that restoration is to be made with respect to any
    write-down to market values resulting from the pricing of former
    inventories. Id.
    15
    In using replacement cost to determine current-year cost
    under sec. 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs., Mountain State
    Ford was not attempting to, and did not, determine or approximate
    the actual cost (i.e., the invoice prices) of the parts that it
    purchased. It would have been sheer happenstance if the replace-
    ment cost that Mountain State Ford used equaled or reasonably
    approximated such actual cost.
    - 34 -
    valuing its parts inventory under the dollar-value LIFO method is
    proper, petitioner asserts:
    ever since this Court's decision in Hutzler Brothers v.
    Commissioner, 
    8 T.C. 14
     (1947), taxpayers have been
    permitted to use the retail method in conjunction with
    the dollar-value LIFO method despite the fact that
    under the retail method a taxpayer does not compute the
    actual cost of the items in its inventories under any
    of the three inventory ordering conventions.
    We turn first to petitioner's suggestion in the foregoing
    excerpt from his brief that respondent is arguing in this case
    that it is necessary under the dollar-value, link-chain LIFO
    method which Mountain State Ford elected to determine the actual
    cost of each unit inventoried.   We do not understand respondent
    to be taking that position.   To the contrary, as section 1.472-
    8(e)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs., makes clear, the requirement in
    section 472(b)(2) that goods for which a taxpayer elected the
    LIFO method be inventoried "at" cost does not mean that, in
    determining the current-year cost of items making up a pool, it
    is necessary to determine the actual cost of each unit invento-
    ried.16
    Turning now to petitioner's argument about the retail
    method, petitioner is correct that the retail method is permitted
    to be used in conjunction with the dollar-value LIFO method,
    Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 
    8 T.C. 14
     (1947); sec. 1.472-
    1(k), Income Tax Regs.; sec. 1.472-8(e)(1), Income Tax Regs., and
    that that method "does not compute the actual cost of the items
    16
    Nor is it necessary to do so under the specific-goods
    LIFO method. See sec. 1.472-2(d), Income Tax Regs.
    - 35 -
    in" a taxpayer's inventory.   However, the actual cost reasonably
    approximated under the retail method, which is described in
    section 1.471-8, Income Tax Regs., satisfies the definition of
    the term "cost" in section 1.471-3(d), Income Tax Regs.   Conse-
    quently, the requirement in section 472(b)(2) that goods for
    which a taxpayer elected the LIFO method be inventoried at
    "cost", which we have held has the same meaning accorded the term
    "cost" in section 1.471-3, Income Tax Regs., is satisfied by a
    retailer who elects the dollar-value LIFO method, determines a
    reasonable approximation of actual cost under the retail method,
    and, inter alia, complies with section 1.472-1(k), Income Tax
    Regs., and section 1.472-8(e)(1), Income Tax Regs.   We reject
    petitioner's argument that the use of the retail method in
    conjunction with the dollar-value LIFO method means that Mountain
    State Ford's method of using replacement cost under the dollar-
    value LIFO method is permitted by section 472 and the regulations
    thereunder.17
    17
    We also reject petitioner's position that the use of the
    standard cost method in conjunction with the dollar-value LIFO
    method supports his position that Mountain State Ford's method of
    using replacement cost under the dollar-value LIFO method is
    permitted under sec. 472 and the regulations thereunder. In this
    regard, petitioner states:
    taxpayers have been consistently permitted to use the
    standard cost method under both the full absorption
    method and the uniform capitalization method, in con-
    junction with the dollar-value LIFO method, despite the
    fact that standard costs are merely a predetermined
    estimate of the taxpayer's actual costs. Treas. Reg.
    §§ 1.471-11(d)(3); 1.263A-1(f)(3)(ii)(A).
    (continued...)
    - 36 -
    We hold that Mountain State Ford's method of using replace-
    ment cost in determining the current-year cost of its parts pool
    under the dollar-value LIFO method contravenes the requirements
    of section 472(b)(2), section 1.472-2(b), Income Tax Regs., and
    section 1.472-8(e)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs.   We further hold
    17
    (...continued)
    In advancing the foregoing argument, petitioner fails to mention
    that, in determining the cost of inventoried goods, a taxpayer
    subject to the inventory accounting method is and/or was ex-
    pressly made subject by sec. 1.471-3, Income Tax Regs., to
    (1) sec. 1.263A-1, Income Tax Regs., on or after Jan. 1, 1994;
    (2) sec. 1.263A-1T, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 52 Fed. Reg.
    10060 (Mar. 30, 1987), for taxable years beginning on or after
    Dec. 31, 1986, until Dec. 31, 1993; and (3) sec. 1.471-11, Income
    Tax Regs., for taxable years beginning on or before Dec. 31,
    1986. All of those regulations allow or allowed the use of the
    standard cost method. Under that method, a taxpayer may allocate
    an appropriate amount of direct and indirect costs to property
    that such taxpayer produces through the use of preestablished
    standard allowances, without reference to costs actually incurred
    during the taxable year. See sec. 1.263A-1(f)(3)(ii)(A), Income
    Tax Regs. We have held that the term "cost" in sec. 472(b)(2)
    has the same meaning accorded to the term "cost" in sec. 1.471-3,
    Income Tax Regs. Sec. 472(b)(2) thus permits the use of the
    standard cost method in inventorying goods at cost under the LIFO
    method.
    In advancing his argument about the standard cost method,
    petitioner also fails to mention that the regulations in effect
    at different times describing the standard cost method (viz.,
    sec. 1.263A-1(f)(3)(ii), Income Tax Regs., sec. 1.263A-
    1T(b)(3)(iii)(D), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 10065
    (Mar. 30, 1987), and sec. 1.471-11(d)(3), Income Tax Regs.)
    require and/or required a taxpayer to "reallocate to the goods in
    ending inventory a pro rata portion" of the variance between the
    predetermined estimate and actual cost unless such variance is
    not "significant" in amount. If that variance is not "signifi-
    cant" in amount, it does not have to be allocated to the tax-
    payer's goods in ending inventory unless such an allocation is
    made in the taxpayer's financial reports. See sec. 1.263A-
    1(f)(3)(ii)(B), Income Tax Regs.; sec. 1.263A-1T(b)(3)(iii)(D)
    (2), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra; sec. 1.471-11(d)(3)(ii),
    Income Tax Regs.
    - 37 -
    that, consequently, that method does not clearly reflect income.
    See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 
    439 U.S. 522
     (1979).
    Petitioner argues that if we were to find, as we have, that
    Mountain State Ford's method of using replacement cost in valuing
    its parts inventory under the LIFO method does not clearly
    reflect income, that method should nonetheless be sustained
    because respondent changed that method to an impermissible method
    which does not clearly reflect income.    In support of his posi-
    tion, petitioner cites Dayton Hudson Corp. & Subs. v. Commis-
    sioner, 
    153 F.3d 660
    , 664 (8th Cir. 1998), revg. T.C. Memo. 1997-
    260; Harden v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d at 421; Prabel v. Commis-
    sioner, 
    91 T.C. 1101
    , 1112 (1988), affd. 
    882 F.2d 820
     (3d Cir.
    1989); and Golden Gate Litho v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-
    184.    Relying on those cases, petitioner argues:
    The respondent is unwilling to admit the conse-
    quences of the adjustment he seeks in this case. The
    respondent claims he "has not replaced one impermissi-
    ble method with another." The respondent in his brief
    refuses to admit that his adjustment changes * * *
    [Mountain State Ford's] inventory value from a dollar-
    value LIFO value determined using replacement costs as
    current-year costs to an inventory value that is in its
    entirety equal to current replacement costs. At trial,
    however, the respondent admitted that this was the
    case. * * * it is internally inconsistent for the
    respondent to claim that a LIFO inventory value based
    on using replacement costs as current-year costs does
    not clearly reflect income while maintaining that the
    inventory must be adjusted to a value that is in its
    entirety equal to current replacement costs. If the
    respondent were correct in his claim that the use of
    replacement costs to determine current-year costs under
    dollar-value LIFO produces an impermissible inventory
    value, then an inventory value based entirely on cur-
    rent replacement costs would surely be even more
    impermissible.
    - 38 -
    Respondent counters that respondent has not terminated
    Mountain State Ford's elections to value its parts inventory
    under the dollar-value, link-chain LIFO method and to use the
    most recent purchases method in determining the current-year cost
    of its parts pool.   According to respondent, respondent has
    merely required Mountain State Ford to conform to the elections
    that it made in the Form 970 which it filed with its 1980 tax
    return.   Respondent states on brief:
    All respondent has done in this case is to determine
    that * * * [Mountain State Ford's] LIFO reserve was
    incorrectly calculated because * * * [Mountain State
    Ford] used replacement cost. * * * [Mountain State
    Ford] did not attempt to reconstruct or recalculate the
    corrected reserve amount or provide evidence from which
    an estimate could be made. Because of this, respondent
    was unable to determine the amount of the corrected
    reserve and had to restore the reserve to income.
    We agree with respondent.   In contradistinction to the cases
    on which petitioner relies, in the instant case Mountain State
    Ford did not comply with the requirement of section 1.472-2(h),
    Income Tax Regs., that it maintain detailed inventory records "as
    will enable the district director readily to verify * * * [Moun-
    tain State Ford's] inventory computations as well as * * * [its]
    compliance with the requirements of section 472" and the regula-
    tions thereunder.    Consequently, Mountain State Ford did not
    have, and did not provide to respondent, the records that were
    necessary in order to calculate for the period 1980 through 1991
    (1) the LIFO and non-LIFO value of its parts inventory and
    (2) its LIFO reserve on the basis of invoice prices or a cost
    other than replacement cost.
    - 39 -
    We do not understand the statements of respondent's counsel
    during his opening statement at trial to be a concession by
    respondent that respondent placed Mountain State Ford on a non-
    LIFO method that utilizes replacement cost, and we reject peti-
    tioner's contention to the contrary.    Even if respondent's
    counsel had made such a concession during his opening statement
    at trial, we would not consider it to be a concession that binds
    respondent.   That is because, inter alia, any such concession
    would have been contrary to respondent's position as set forth in
    paragraph 51 of the stipulation of facts, which was made part of
    the record in this case immediately before the Court allowed
    counsel for the parties to make opening statements.    The position
    of respondent in paragraph 51 of the stipulation of facts is
    totally consistent with the notice.    In the notice, respondent
    did not terminate Mountain State Ford's elections to value its
    parts inventory under the dollar-value, link-chain LIFO method
    and to use the most recent purchases method in order to determine
    the current-year cost of its parts pool.18   Mountain State Ford
    remains on those methods and cannot account for its parts inven-
    tory on any other methods without first receiving permission from
    18
    Pursuant to sec. 3.01(c), Rev. Proc. 79-23, 1979-1 C.B.
    564, "Failure by the taxpayer to value its LIFO inventory at cost
    for Federal income tax purposes, for the year preceding the LIFO
    election, the year of the LIFO election, and all subsequent
    taxable years" may warrant the termination of that taxpayer's
    LIFO election. However, such termination is within the discre-
    tion of respondent and is not mandatory. See Consolidated
    Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    111 T.C. 1
    , 38 (1998). In
    the present case, respondent chose not to exercise that discre-
    tion and did not terminate Mountain State Ford's LIFO election.
    - 40 -
    the Commissioner.   See sec. 472(e); sec. 1.472-5, Income Tax
    Regs.
    On the record before us, we find that respondent did not
    place Mountain State Ford on an improper method of inventory
    accounting in the notice.   We further find that respondent did
    not abuse respondent's discretion in making the adjustment at
    issue in the notice.   Consequently, we sustain that adjustment.19
    To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties,
    Decision will be entered
    under Rule 155.
    19
    We have considered all of the arguments and contentions
    of petitioner that are not addressed herein and find them to be
    without merit or irrelevant.