Maureen Patricia Wilson v. Commissioner ( 2008 )


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    131 T.C. No. 5
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    MAUREEN PATRICIA WILSON, Petitioner v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 1026-07L.                Filed September 10, 2008.
    P did not timely request a hearing with R’s Ap-
    peals Office with respect to a proposed levy action.
    As a result, that office held an equivalent hearing
    with respect to that proposed action. Thereafter, R’s
    Appeals Office sent P a document entitled “NOTICE OF
    DETERMINATION CONCERNING COLLECTION ACTION(S) UNDER
    SECTION 6320 and/or 6330” in which that office recited
    those facts. In the document that R’s Appeals Office
    sent P, that office concluded that it was sustaining
    the proposed levy action and that P was not entitled to
    seek judicial review of the conclusions in that docu-
    ment. Inconsistently, R’s Appeals Office concluded in
    the document that it sent P that P was entitled to seek
    judicial review of the conclusions therein by timely
    filing a petition with the Court.
    Held: The document that R’s Appeals Office sent P
    does not embody a determination under sec. 6330, I.R.C.
    Held, further, that document is not a valid notice of
    determination under sec. 6330, I.R.C., that P is enti-
    - 2 -
    tled to appeal under sec. 6330(d)(1), I.R.C. Held,
    further, the Court does not have jurisdiction over this
    case.
    Maureen Patricia Wilson, pro se.
    Laura Daly and A. Gary Begun, for respondent.
    OPINION
    CHIECHI, Judge:   This case is before the Court on its Order
    dated May 30, 2008 (Court’s Show Cause Order), in which the Court
    ordered each party to file a written response to that Order
    showing why this case should not be dismissed for lack of juris-
    diction.   We shall make the Court’s Show Cause Order absolute and
    dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
    The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the
    following.
    Petitioner’s address shown in the petition in this case was
    in Belleville, Michigan.
    On June 29, 1998, respondent assessed against petitioner a
    trust fund recovery penalty under section 66721 of $37,560.77
    that was attributable to the respective unpaid Federal tax
    liabilities of New Wave Communications, Inc., for the periods
    1
    All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
    effect at all relevant times.
    - 3 -
    ended June 30, 1996, through September 30, 1997.2   (We shall
    refer to any unpaid assessed portion of that penalty, as well as
    interest as provided by law accrued after June 29, 1998, as
    petitioner’s unpaid liability.)
    On June 29, 1998, respondent issued to petitioner a notice
    of balance due with respect to petitioner’s unpaid liability.
    On July 19, 2003, respondent issued to petitioner a final
    notice of intent to levy and notice of your right to a hearing
    (notice of intent to levy) with respect to petitioner’s unpaid
    liability.
    Petitioner did not submit to respondent Form 12153, Request
    for a Collection Due Process Hearing, until March 6, 2006.
    Thereafter, respondent granted petitioner an equivalent hearing
    with respondent’s Appeals Office (Appeals Office) with respect to
    the notice of intent to levy.
    On December 20, 2006, the Appeals Office issued to peti-
    tioner a document (Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document)
    that included a form letter entitled “NOTICE OF DETERMINATION
    CONCERNING COLLECTION ACTION(S) UNDER SECTION 6320 and/or 6330”
    (section 6330 determination form letter).   The Appeals Office is
    supposed to use that form letter where it makes a determination
    2
    On Apr. 15, 2003, respondent credited a refund of $507 due
    to petitioner for her taxable year 2002 against the unpaid trust
    fund recovery penalty that respondent had assessed against her on
    June 29, 1998.
    - 4 -
    under section 6330 to sustain a proposed collection action.3    See
    Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 8.22.1.1.1.2.1(4) (Oct. 19,
    2007).
    The section 6330 determination form letter contains certain
    boilerplate language that states in pertinent part:
    We have reviewed the collection actions that were taken
    or proposed for the period(s) shown above. This letter
    is your Notice of Determination, as required by law. A
    summary of our determination is stated below. The
    attached statement shows, in detail, the matters we
    considered at your Appeals hearing and our conclusions
    about them.
    If you want to dispute this determination in court, you
    must file a petition with the United States Tax Court
    within 30 days from the date of this letter.
    The section 6330 determination form letter also contains
    certain information specific to the taxpayer to whom it is
    issued, such as the name and the address of the taxpayer, the
    type of tax at issue, the tax period at issue, and the Appeals
    Office’s “Summary of Determination” regarding the action proposed
    to collect the taxpayer’s tax liability.
    The Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document contained the
    boilerplate language discussed above.   That document also con-
    tained the following “Summary of Determination” that pertained to
    3
    Instead of using the section 6330 determination form let-
    ter, the Appeals Office is supposed to use a form letter entitled
    “Decision Letter Concerning Equivalent Hearing Under Section 6320
    and/or 6330 of the Internal Revenue Code” (form decision letter)
    where the taxpayer did not timely request a hearing with that
    office under sec. 6330 and an equivalent hearing was granted.
    See IRM pt. 8.22.1.3.2(3) (Oct. 19, 2007).
    - 5 -
    petitioner:
    Collection Due Process (CDP) requested regarding the
    proposed levy action.
    The request was received 3/10/2006.
    LT 1058 was sent to the taxpayerQs [sic] last known
    address on 7/19/2003.
    Therefore, the request made was not timely.
    Based on the telephone conference and the administra-
    tive file the collection action is sustained.
    See the attached Appeals Case Memorandum.
    The Appeals case memorandum included as part of the Appeals
    Office December 20, 2006 document stated in pertinent part:
    * Per review of computer transcripts, the CDP notice
    Letter 11 (LT-11) Final Notice - of Intent to Levy, and
    Notice of Your Right to a Hearing was sent by Certified
    Mail, Return Receipt Requested, to the taxpayer’s last
    known address, which was also the address, indicated on
    the CDP hearing request. The date of the notice was
    July 19, 2003.
    * IRC 6330 * * * allows a taxpayer to raise any rele-
    vant issues relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed
    levy at the due process hearing. The Form 12153,
    Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing was re-
    ceived March 10, 2006, which was more than 30 days from
    the date of the LT11. Although the taxpayer’s request
    was not timely regarding the levy, the taxpayer was
    granted an Equivalent Hearing -– equivalent in all
    respects except that the taxpayer will not have the
    right to judicial review. Therefore, the decision of
    Appeals will be final regarding the Notice of levy.
    On June 4, 2008, respondent filed a response to the Court’s
    Show Cause Order (respondent’s response).   Although the Court
    ordered petitioner to file a response to that Order, she did not
    do so.
    - 6 -
    On July 8, 2008, the Court held a hearing on the Court’s
    Show Cause Order.    There was no appearance by or on behalf of
    petitioner.   Counsel for respondent appeared and was heard.
    On July 22, 2008, respondent filed a supplement to respon-
    dent’s response.    In respondent’s response as supplemented,
    respondent indicates that it is respondent’s position that the
    Court does not have jurisdiction over the instant case.
    Our jurisdiction under section 6330(d)(1) depends upon the
    issuance of a valid notice of determination and a timely filed
    petition.   Offiler v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 492
    , 498 (2000).     In
    Offiler, the Court addressed whether it had jurisdiction under
    section 6330(d)(1) where the taxpayer had failed to request
    timely a hearing with the Appeals Office under section 6330.      The
    Court held in Offiler that (1) because the taxpayer there in-
    volved did not timely request such a hearing, “Appeals made no
    determination pursuant to section 6330(c)”, 
    id. at 497
    , and
    (2) “Because there was no Appeals determination for this Court to
    review, there is simply no basis for our jurisdiction under
    section 6330(d)”, 
    id. at 498
    .    See also Moorhous v. Commissioner,
    
    116 T.C. 263
    , 269-270 (2001); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 255
    , 261-263 (2001).
    In determining whether the Court had jurisdiction under
    section 6330(d)(1) in Lunsford v. Commissioner, 
    117 T.C. 159
    (2001), the Court restated the principle set forth in Offiler
    - 7 -
    that its jurisdiction under that section depended upon the
    issuance of a valid notice of determination and a timely filed
    petition.     
    Id. at 161
    .   According to the Court in Lunsford, “Our
    jurisdiction under section 6330(d)(1) * * * is established when
    there is a written notice that embodies a determination to
    proceed with the collection of the taxes in issue, and a timely
    filed petition.”4    
    Id. at 164
    .    In determining whether the Court
    had jurisdiction under section 6330(d)(1), the Court indicated in
    Lunsford that there was “nothing in the notice of determination
    which leads us to conclude that the determination was invalid.”
    
    Id. at 165
    .    The Court held in Lunsford that it had jurisdiction
    over that case.     
    Id.
    In Craig v. Commissioner, 
    119 T.C. 252
     (2002), the Court
    addressed whether it had jurisdiction under section 6330(d)(1)
    where the Appeals Office had issued to the taxpayer a form
    decision letter5 after the taxpayer had timely requested a hear-
    ing with that office under section 6330.      The form decision
    letter involved in Craig stated that (1) the taxpayer did not
    4
    In Lunsford v. Commissioner, 
    117 T.C. 159
    , 164 (2001), the
    Court concluded that in determining whether the Court had juris-
    diction under sec. 6330(d)(1) the nonjurisdictional provisions of
    sec. 6330, such as the provisions relating to whether there was
    an appropriate hearing opportunity, whether the hearing was
    conducted properly, whether the hearing was fair, and whether the
    hearing was conducted by an impartial Appeals officer, are not to
    be taken into consideration.
    5
    See supra note 3.
    - 8 -
    timely request a hearing with the Appeals Office under section
    6330, (2) the Appeals Office granted the taxpayer an equivalent
    hearing, (3) the Appeals Office concluded that it was sustaining
    the proposed collection action, and (4) the taxpayer was not
    entitled to seek judicial review of the conclusions in that form
    letter.   Id. at 256.   The Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
    however, acknowledged in Craig that the taxpayer did timely
    request a hearing with the Appeals Office under section 6330.
    Id. at 253.   The Court held in Craig that “where Appeals issued
    the decision letter to * * * [the taxpayer] in response to * * *
    [the taxpayer’s] timely request for a Hearing, * * * the ‘deci-
    sion’ reflected in the decision letter * * * is a ‘determination’
    for purposes of section 6330(d)(1).”    Id. at 259.   In reaching
    that holding, the Court indicated in Craig that
    Although the Appeals officer concludes an equivalent
    hearing by issuing a decision letter, as opposed to a
    notice of determination, the different names which are
    assigned to these documents are merely a distinction
    without a difference when it comes to our jurisdiction
    over this case, where a Hearing was timely requested.
    * * *
    * * * The fact that respondent held with * * * [the
    taxpayer] a hearing labeled as an equivalent hearing,
    rather than a hearing labeled as a Hearing, and that
    respondent issued to petitioner a document labeled as a
    decision letter, rather than a document labeled as a
    notice of determination, does not erase the fact that
    * * * [the taxpayer] received a “determination” within
    the meaning of section 6330(d)(1). * * *
    Id. at 258-259.
    - 9 -
    In the instant case, the Appeals Office used a section 6330
    determination form letter when it notified petitioner in the
    Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document of its conclusions
    regarding her appeal with respect to the proposed levy action.
    As a result, the Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document was
    entitled “NOTICE OF DETERMINATION CONCERNING COLLECTION ACTION(S)
    UNDER SECTION 6320 and/or 6330” and contained, inter alia, the
    following boilerplate language:   “If you want to dispute this
    determination in court, you must file a petition with the United
    States Tax Court within 30 days from the date of this letter.”
    However, the Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document also
    contained the following statements that pertained to petitioner:
    (1) Petitioner did not timely request a hearing with the Appeals
    Office with respect to the notice of intent to levy; (2) the
    Appeals Office granted petitioner an equivalent hearing with
    respect to that notice; (3) the Appeals Office concluded that it
    was sustaining the proposed levy action; and (4) petitioner was
    not entitled to seek judicial review of the conclusions in the
    Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document.
    The Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document is internally
    inconsistent.6   We must decide whether that document embodies a
    6
    Unlike the Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document
    involved in the instant case, the notice of determination in-
    volved in Lunsford v. Commissioner, 
    supra,
     was not internally
    inconsistent. In Lunsford, there was nothing in the notice of
    (continued...)
    - 10 -
    determination under section 6330.   We cannot resolve that ques-
    tion on the basis of the Appeals Office’s conclusion in the
    Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document that it was sustaining
    the proposed levy action.   That is because a determination that
    the Appeals Office makes under section 6330 where the taxpayer
    timely requested a hearing under that section and a decision that
    the Appeals Office makes where the taxpayer did not timely
    request a hearing under section 6330 both will indicate that the
    Appeals Office is sustaining the proposed collection action.
    See, e.g., Lunsford v. Commissioner, 
    117 T.C. 159
     (2001);
    Moorhous v. Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 263
     (2001).   Nor can we
    resolve whether the Appeals Office December 20, 2006 document
    embodies a determination under section 6330 on the basis of the
    Appeals Office’s having sent to petitioner a section 6330 deter-
    mination form letter entitled “NOTICE OF DETERMINATION CONCERNING
    COLLECTION ACTION(S) UNDER SECTION 6320 and/or 6330”.   That is
    because the name or the label of a document does not control
    6
    (...continued)
    determination involved there that led the Court to conclude that
    that notice was not valid. Id. at 165. Similarly, the notice of
    determination involved in Kim v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-
    96, was not internally inconsistent. Like Lunsford and unlike
    the instant case, in Kim there was nothing in the notice of
    determination involved there that led the Court to conclude that
    that notice was not valid. In respondent’s response as supple-
    mented, respondent takes the position that Kim was wrongly
    decided. We need not address that position. That is because Kim
    is materially distinguishable from the instant case.
    - 11 -
    whether the document embodies a determination under section 6330.
    See Craig v. Commissioner, 
    119 T.C. at 258
    -259.
    We can, however, resolve whether the Appeals Office December
    20, 2006 document embodies a determination under section 6330 on
    the basis of the undisputed statement in that document that
    petitioner did not timely request a hearing with the Appeals
    Office under section 6330(b) with respect to the notice of intent
    to levy.7   In determining whether the Court has jurisdiction
    under section 6330(d)(1), the Court must take into consideration
    the jurisdictional provision in section 6330(b) prescribing the
    30-day period within which a taxpayer must request a hearing with
    the Appeals Office.8   See Offiler v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. at 497
    -498.    Because petitioner did not timely request a hearing
    with the Appeals Office with respect to the notice of intent to
    levy, that office did not make a determination under section
    6330.    See id. at 497.   We hold that the Appeals Office December
    20, 2006 document does not embody a determination under section
    6330.    We further hold that the Appeals Office December 20, 2006
    7
    Petitioner does not dispute, and the record independently
    establishes, that petitioner did not timely request a hearing
    with the Appeals Office with respect to the notice of intent to
    levy.
    8
    The instant case is thus unlike Lunsford v. Commissioner,
    
    117 T.C. 159
     (2001). In Lunsford, the Court indicated that the
    nonjurisdictional provisions in sec. 6330 are not to be taken
    into consideration in determining whether the Court has jurisdic-
    tion under sec. 6330(d)(1). 
    Id. at 164
    . See supra note 4.
    - 12 -
    document is not a valid notice of determination under section
    6330 that petitioner is entitled to appeal pursuant to section
    6330(d)(1).   Accordingly, we hold that we do not have jurisdic-
    tion over this case.9
    To reflect the foregoing,
    An order making the Court’s
    Show Cause Order absolute and
    dismissing this case for lack of
    jurisdiction will be entered.
    9
    On June 6, 2007, respondent filed a motion for summary
    judgment. We shall deem that motion moot.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1026-07L

Filed Date: 9/10/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2018