Michael W. and Charlotte S. Phillips v. Commissioner , 106 T.C. No. 7 ( 1996 )


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    106 T.C. No. 7
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    MICHAEL W. AND CHARLOTTE S. PHILLIPS, Petitioners v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 4745-94.                Filed March 7, 1996.
    Ps contend that they avoided recapture of an
    investment credit claimed with respect to property of a
    partnership subject to secs. 6221 through 6231, I.R.C.,
    as a result of filing an amended return revoking the
    credit subsequent to the disposition of the property.
    Held: The amended return was ineffective because it
    did not conform to the requirements of an
    administrative adjustment request under sec. 6227,
    I.R.C. Held, further, Ps were required to take into
    account their distributive share of the partnership
    investment credit, and conversion of their partnership
    items to nonpartnership items pursuant to the filing of
    a bankruptcy petition did not affect this obligation,
    nor preclude R’s use of a prospective partnership level
    settlement as the basis for computing Ps’ personal tax
    liability.
    Joseph B. Schimmel and Alan R. Chase, for petitioners.
    Ellen T. Fribourg and James P. Dawson, for respondent.
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    OPINION
    LARO, Judge:    Michael W. and Charlotte S. Phillips
    petitioned the Court for redetermination of deficiencies
    determined by respondent for their 1984 and 1986 taxable years in
    the amounts of $25,471 and $69,714, respectively.    After
    petitioners conceded the deficiency for 1984, the sole issue for
    decision is whether petitioners avoided recapture of an
    investment credit claimed for property of a partnership subject
    to sections 6221 through 62311 (the partnership provisions of the
    Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L.
    97-248, sec. 402(a), 
    96 Stat. 324
    ) as a result of filing an
    amended return revoking the credit subsequent to the disposition
    of the property.    We hold that they did not avoid recapture.
    Background
    This case was submitted to us fully stipulated.    The
    stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated
    herein by this reference.    A summary of the facts relevant to our
    decision is as follows.
    Petitioners resided in Miami, Florida, at the time they
    petitioned the Court.    During the years 1985 and 1986 they were
    partners in Ethanol Partners, Ltd. I (Ethanol).    The Schedules
    K-1 they received from Ethanol for taxable year 1985 reported
    property eligible for regular investment credit in the total
    1
    Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
    the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and
    all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
    Procedure.
    - 3 -
    amount of $1,145,508.    On Form 3468, Computation of Investment
    Credit, which they submitted with their joint Federal income tax
    return for 1985, petitioners calculated the amount of their
    available credit with respect to regular investment credit
    property as $114,551 and the amount of their available credit
    with respect to business energy investment credit property as
    $114,000, for a total of $228,551, based on the Schedules K-1.
    Of this total amount, they claimed $45,824 as a credit against
    their tax liability for 1985, leaving a total unused investment
    credit of $211,492.2    In 1986 petitioners filed an amended
    Federal income tax return for 1984, on which they claimed a
    refund resulting from the carryback of $25,471 of the unused
    investment credit for 1985.    On their joint Federal income tax
    return for 1986 petitioners used $118,179 of the balance of the
    unused investment credit to offset recapture tax incurred
    pursuant to section 47(a) on certain Ethanol equipment disposed
    of in that year.
    A notice of final partnership administrative adjustment
    (FPAA) was mailed to the tax matters partner of Ethanol on
    December 5, 1991, and a timely petition for readjustment was
    filed with this Court on April 30, 1992.    At some time in early
    1992, prior to the filing of the petition on behalf of Ethanol,
    petitioners filed amended Federal income tax returns on Form
    1040X for both the 1985 and 1986 taxable years.    On their amended
    return for 1985 they recalculated their tax liability, deleting
    2
    In the calculation of the carryback/carryforward
    alternative minimum tax for 1985 the amount of $28,765 is added.
    - 4 -
    the investment credit of $45,824 as well as a deduction of
    $90,174 which they had claimed as their share of a partnership
    loss.    They reported additional tax due in the amount of $57,459.
    On their amended return for 1986 they recalculated their tax
    liability, deleting a deduction of $162,008 which they had
    claimed as their share of a partnership loss, and reported
    additional tax due of $19,257.    They supplied the following
    explanation for these adjustments on both returns:
    We have been advised that the I.R.S. is
    auditing the tax return of Ethanol Partners
    Ltd XX-XXXXXXX Registration #8605000826 and
    wish to reverse the loss and credits taken on
    this return for Ethanol Partners in order to
    stop the interest charges.
    The amended returns were not accompanied by a Form 8082, Notice
    of Inconsistent Treatment or Amended Return.    Petitioners have
    never made payment of the additional tax liability shown on the
    amended returns.    The additional taxes were assessed on April 9,
    1992.
    On December 18, 1992, petitioners filed a petition for
    bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code with
    the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida.
    Respondent did not file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy
    court, and the court did not make a determination of petitioners’
    tax liability.    Petitioners received a bankruptcy discharge
    pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 505 on May 17, 1993.
    On December 16, 1993, respondent timely mailed to
    petitioners a notice of deficiency for the 1984 and 1986 taxable
    years.    The deficiencies were determined on the basis of a
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    prospective settlement of the partnership proceedings, pursuant
    to which the business energy investment credit would be
    disallowed for 1985, while a regular investment credit would be
    allowed for 1985 and then subject to recapture in 1986.
    Consistent with this settlement, respondent determined
    petitioners’ share of the investment credit for 1985 to be
    $114,000 and their recapture liability for 1986 to be $63,270.
    The settlement with Ethanol was finalized and decision was
    entered by this Court on May 19, 1994.
    Discussion
    This opinion is concerned only with the regular investment
    credit claimed by petitioners, which respondent for the most part
    allowed.   The business energy investment credit which petitioners
    also claimed and which respondent disallowed is not at issue and
    may be disregarded.   Petitioners’ main argument may be summarized
    as follows.   There can be no liability for recapture of an
    investment credit that was not used.       Use of an allowable
    investment credit is optional.    Although petitioners originally
    claimed an investment credit on partnership section 38 property
    for the 1985 taxable year, they subsequently filed an amended
    return deleting the credit.    By assessing the additional tax
    shown on the amended return, respondent allowed them to revoke
    their original claim.   This left them in the same position as if
    they had never claimed the credit.3      Accordingly, when in 1986
    3
    Petitioners conveniently overlook the fact that when they
    recalculated their tax liability on the amended return for 1986,
    they neglected to delete the investment credit carryover that
    (continued...)
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    there was a disposition of the section 38 property, they incurred
    no recapture liability under section 47(a) and section 1.47-6,
    Income Tax Regs.   We disagree.
    Assessment of additional tax liability shown on an amended
    return does not estop the Commissioner from refusing to recognize
    the amended return upon subsequent audit.     Courts have repeatedly
    upheld the Commissioner’s authority to determine a taxpayer’s
    liability without regard to an amended return that was previously
    accepted.   Burnet v. Porter, 
    283 U.S. 230
     (1931); Bird v. United
    States, 
    241 F.2d 516
     (1st Cir. 1957); Polt v. Commissioner,
    
    233 F.2d 893
     (2d Cir. 1956), affg. Estate of Dula v.
    Commissioner, 
    23 T.C. 646
     (1955); Melahn v. Commissioner, 
    9 T.C. 769
     (1947) (Court reviewed).4     As these cases illustrate,
    assessment of additional taxes shown on an amended return is
    routine IRS procedure.5   To ascribe to this essentially
    (...continued)
    offset $118,179 of tax liability. Thus they have in fact used
    more of the credit than they acknowledge. The logic of their
    position would also require the filing of an amended return for
    1984 deleting the credit carried back to that year, a point they
    belatedly admitted by conceding the deficiency for 1984.
    4
    Contra Daniels Jewelers v. United States, 
    150 Ct. Cl. 525
    ,
    
    279 F.2d 226
     (1960), in which the court was evidently troubled by
    the Commissioner’s inconsistency in retracting earlier acceptance
    of the taxpayer’s untimely election only for those years in which
    the taxpayer’s tax liability would have been decreased by the
    election.
    5
    The assessments in this case may have been too hasty. In
    respondent’s brief she explained that the additional tax
    liability shown on petitioners’ amended returns for 1985 and 1986
    was automatically assessed pursuant to sec. 6201(a)(1). This
    provision authorizes assessment of taxes shown on the return.
    But this authority is subject to the restriction on assessment of
    a deficiency attributable to a partnership item during a period
    (continued...)
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    ministerial act the same binding effect as a considered judgment
    would make little sense as a practical matter.
    Respondent’s ultimate rejection of petitioners’ amended
    return for 1985 was entirely proper.     The ability of a taxpayer
    to amend his return creates administrative problems for a tax
    system in which determination and assessment of taxes are
    predicated on the annual accounting principle.     Pacific Natl. Co.
    v. Welch, 
    304 U.S. 191
    , 194 (1938); Bartlett v. Delaney, 
    173 F.2d 535
     (1st Cir. 1949).   Allowing the taxpayer to use the benefit of
    hindsight to select the most favorable set of intertemporal tax
    consequences for his transactions would be highly prejudicial to
    the revenue.   Melahn v. Commissioner, supra at 776-777.
    Accordingly, the case law recognizes limits on the effectiveness
    of amended returns, generally.     Koch v. Alexander, 
    561 F.2d 1115
    ,
    (...continued)
    of 150 days after the FPAA is mailed to the tax matters partner.
    Sec. 6225. A “deficiency” for purposes of sec. 6225 means the
    excess of tax due over the amount shown on the original return
    plus any additional amount shown as tax on an amended return,
    “other than amounts of additional tax which such return clearly
    indicates the taxpayer is protesting rather than admitting.”
    Sec. 301.6211-1(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Treatment of the
    investment credits had been a matter of controversy during the
    audit of Ethanol and was the subject of adjustments in the FPAA.
    On their amended returns for 1985 and 1986 petitioners explained
    that their purpose in seeking to revoke the credit was merely to
    stop the interest charges, not to concede liability.
    Consequently, it appears that the assessed amounts should have
    been treated as part of the deficiency attributable to a
    partnership item. See Powerstein v. Commissioner, 
    99 T.C. 466
    (1992). Yet respondent assessed these amounts only 125 days
    after issuing the FPAA. If respondent’s assessments with respect
    to the amended returns exceeded the scope of her authority, the
    argument that these assessments validated petitioners’ amended
    returns becomes all the more dubious.
    - 8 -
    1117 (4th Cir. 1977); Goldstone v. Commissioner, 
    65 T.C. 113
    (1975).
    Additional concerns are implicated where the taxpayer is a
    partner and the item he seeks to change is an item that is more
    appropriately determined at the partnership level.   Consistent
    treatment of these “partnership items” for all partners is a
    central principle of the TEFRA unified partnership audit and
    litigation procedures.   See secs. 6221, 6222, 6227, 6231(a)(3);
    H. Conf. Rept. 97-760, at 600-601 (1982), 1982-
    2 C.B. 600
    ,
    662-663.   To help the Secretary monitor consistency and to
    facilitate coordination, the statute and regulations thereunder
    establish specific procedures for changing the treatment of
    partnership items on a partner’s return.   Sec. 6227; secs.
    301.6227(b)-1T, 301.6227(c)-1T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
    
    52 Fed. Reg. 6788
     (Mar. 5, 1987).   As an express legislative
    prescription, these procedures apparently supersede the
    discretionary administrative standards and case law governing the
    acceptance of amended returns generally:   a partner’s treatment
    of partnership items on his return may not be changed except in
    accordance with these procedures.   Sec. 301.6221-1T(a), Temporary
    Proced. & Admin. Regs., 
    52 Fed. Reg. 6781
     (Mar. 5, 1987).
    Section 6227 provides that in order to change the treatment
    of a partnership item on his return the partner must file a
    request for administrative adjustment (RAA).   Sec. 6227(a), (c).
    The RAA is filed on Form 8082, Notice of Inconsistent Treatment
    or Amended Return, together with the partner’s amended Federal
    income tax return.   Sec. 301.6227(c)-1T, Temporary Proced.
    - 9 -
    & Admin. Regs., supra.    The RAA may be filed no later than
    (i) 3 years after the later of the filing date or due date of the
    partnership return for the taxable year to which the request
    relates, and (ii) the date on which an FPAA is mailed to the tax
    matters partner with respect to that taxable year.     Sec. 6227(a).
    If a request to change the treatment of a partnership item
    conforming to the requirements of section 6227 is received by the
    Secretary, he is authorized to approve it or take certain
    specified actions necessary for resolution of the issue through a
    unified partnership proceeding or through regular deficiency or
    refund procedures.    Sec. 6227(c).   The statute does not authorize
    the Secretary to consider a nonconforming request.
    A partner’s distributive share of investment credit is a
    partnership item for purposes of the TEFRA provisions.     Maxwell
    v. Commissioner, 
    87 T.C. 783
    , 790 (1986); Southern v.
    Commissioner, 
    87 T.C. 49
    , 54 (1986); sec. 301.6231(a)(3)-1(a),
    Proced. & Admin. Regs.    Petitioners attempted to revoke the
    investment credit claimed for 1985 by filing Form 1040X without
    Form 8082.    They filed their amended return for 1985 after
    respondent had mailed an FPAA to the tax matters partner and
    approximately 6 years after the Ethanol return for the 1985
    taxable year would have been due.     Petitioners did not satisfy
    the statutory requirements, and consequently their amended return
    was not effective to change the treatment of the investment
    credit on their original 1985 return.6
    6
    If petitioners’ amended return for 1986 purported to
    (continued...)
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    If respondent’s ultimate rejection of the amended return was
    warranted on procedural grounds, it was also appropriate as a
    matter of substantive law.    A partnership is treated as a
    separate entity for tax accounting purposes:    in general, the
    determination of allowable deductions, losses, and credits
    arising from a business conducted in partnership form is made at
    the partnership level, and the decision to report these items is
    made at the partnership level as well.    Sec. 703.   Each partner’s
    distributive shares of these items are determined pursuant to the
    partnership agreement.   Sec. 704(a).   The partner is required to
    take his distributive shares into account in determining his
    income tax.   Sec. 702(a).   The investment credit is one of the
    partnership items for which each partner must take into account
    his distributive share, determined by applying statutorily
    specified percentages to the share of total basis or cost of
    partnership section 38 property that is allocated to him under
    the partnership agreement and reported to him on Schedule K-1.
    Former secs. 46(a), (b), and (c) (before amendment in 1990);
    Southern v. Commissioner, supra at 54; sec. 1.46-3(f), Income Tax
    Regs.
    (...continued)
    revoke the carryover of the unused portion of the credit to that
    year, it was likewise ineffective, but for different reasons.
    Carryover of an investment credit is not a partnership item, but
    an “affected item”. Sec. 6231(a)(5); Maxwell v. Commissioner,
    
    87 T.C. 783
    , 790 (1986). Therefore sec. 6227 is inapplicable and
    the general requirements for acceptance of amended returns
    expounded by this Court in Goldstone v. Commissioner, 
    65 T.C. 113
    (1975) would govern. Petitioners did not satisfy these
    requirements.
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    In the settlement that respondent reached with Ethanol, the
    investment credit at issue was, for the most part, allowed.
    Petitioners do not argue that this credit was not properly
    allowed or that their distributive share of the allowable credit
    was improperly computed.   There is no basis in the record for
    concluding otherwise than that the treatment of the investment
    credit on petitioners’ original return was proper to the extent
    allowed by respondent, and that the treatment on their amended
    return was improper.
    Petitioners challenge the substance of respondent’s
    determination only on the ground that when they filed their
    bankruptcy petition in December 1992, partnership items on their
    return converted automatically to nonpartnership items by
    operation of law, pursuant to section 6231(b)(1)(D) and (c)(2)
    and section 301.6231(c)-7T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
    
    52 Fed. Reg. 6793
     (Mar. 5, 1987).   This conversion had the
    following effects, in their view.   First, “Any TEFRA proceeding
    making a determination of the proper treatment of partnership
    items has no effect on the treatment of non-partnership items.”
    Therefore the prospective settlement with Ethanol on which
    respondent relied in determining petitioners’ deficiency was
    entirely irrelevant to their liability.   Second, the conversion
    of the investment credit to a nonpartnership item effectively
    eliminated the requirement that petitioners’ treatment conform to
    the partnership level treatment of this item.
    These arguments are based on a number of misconceptions.
    The regulations provide for conversion of partnership items to
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    nonpartnership items in order to prevent the automatic bankruptcy
    stay, 11 U.S.C. section 362(a), from interfering with any pending
    partnership proceeding.   Sec. 301.6231(c)-7T(a), Temporary
    Proced. & Admin. Regs., supra.    The consequences of conversion
    are purely procedural:    the partner filing the bankruptcy
    petition drops out of the partnership proceeding, allowing that
    proceeding to continue without regard to the automatic stay,
    Computer Programs Lambda v. Commissioner, 
    89 T.C. 198
    , 206
    (1987), and requiring the Commissioner to issue a notice of
    deficiency to the partner, within an extended limitations period,
    in order to adjust any converted items, secs. 6212, 6229(f); H.
    Conf. Rept. 97-760, at 611 (1982), 1982-
    2 C.B. 600
    , 668.
    Petitioners are mistaken in believing that the conversion of
    their investment credit to the status of a nonpartnership item
    had substantive consequences for their tax liability as well.
    The prospective settlement on which respondent relied in
    determining petitioners’ deficiency in December 1993, and which
    was finalized in December 1994, is not irrelevant to petitioners’
    liability.    Although petitioners are not bound by a settlement to
    which they were not parties, the settlement was presumably based
    upon facts that are relevant to the determination of petitioners’
    distributive share of the partnership credit and to the
    applicability of recapture in 1986.     The conversion did not in
    any way alter the relationship between petitioners’ participation
    and share in Ethanol and their tax liability for the years 1985
    and 1986.    Petitioners could have contested the deficiency
    determination on the ground that it did not properly reflect the
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    facts relevant to their liability for these years.    They have not
    done so.   Respondent’s determination is, accordingly, sustained.
    To reflect the foregoing,
    Decision will be entered
    for respondent.