John Maier III v. Commissioner ( 2002 )


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    119 T.C. No. 16
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    JOHN MAIER III, Petitioner v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 5410-02.              Filed November 20, 2002.
    P filed a petition with the Court challenging R’s
    administrative determination granting his former spouse
    relief from joint and several liability on joint
    returns pursuant to sec. 6015(f), I.R.C. R moved to
    dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    Held: The Court will grant R’s motion and dismiss
    this case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that R
    did not issue a notice of deficiency to P, nor did R
    make any other determination with regard to P that
    would confer jurisdiction on the Court.
    John Maier III, pro se.
    Charles Hall and Scott E. Fink, for respondent.
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    OPINION
    DAWSON, Judge:   This case was assigned to Chief Special
    Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos, pursuant to the provisions of
    section 7443A(b)(5) and Rules 180, 181, and 183.1    The Court
    agrees with and adopts the opinion of the Chief Special Trial
    Judge, which is set forth below.
    OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
    PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge:   This matter is before
    the Court on respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of
    jurisdiction.   As explained in detail below, we shall grant
    respondent’s motion to dismiss.
    Background
    John Maier III (petitioner) filed joint Federal income tax
    returns with his then wife, Judith L. Maier (Ms. Maier), for the
    taxable years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994.     The Maiers
    reported taxes due on their returns for the taxable years 1990,
    1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994, but failed to pay all or part of such
    taxes.
    On December 22, 1995, the Maiers executed a separation
    agreement.   The separation agreement addressed the Maiers’
    outstanding Federal and State income tax liabilities as follows:
    1
    Section references are to sections of the Internal
    Revenue Code, as amended, and Rule references are to the Tax
    Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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    SECTION NINE
    PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBTS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE
    All existing [debts] of the husband and wife shall
    remain the joint obligations of the husband and wife.
    The major joint debts of the parties are past due
    income taxes, both federal and state. These
    obligations, by operation of law, are joint obligations
    and such obligations cannot be changed from being joint
    obligations by the parties. Currently, the wife is
    paying New York State for past income taxes and the
    husband is making payments under a Chapter 13 plan and
    the Federal taxes are the priority creditor. Both the
    husband and wife recognize that it is in their best
    interest to pay all such taxes as quickly as possible.
    The husband and wife agree to use their best efforts to
    pay such taxes and to continue to make payments as set
    forth above. Should either party become unable to pay,
    the other party shall be, as a matter of law, required
    to pay all remaining unpaid taxes. However, any
    payments made by one of the parties, either voluntarily
    or involuntarily, shall not be reimbursed by the other
    party.
    *         *       *        *         *    *       *
    SECTION EIGHTEEN
    INCOME TAX RETURNS
    The parties agree that commencing with the tax
    year 1995 (due April 15, 1996), either party may file
    separately unless both parties mutually agree to file
    jointly. The parties agree that the husband and wife
    shall remain jointly responsible without contribution
    from the other to pay any deficiency in income taxes,
    federal and state, relating to the marital income of
    the parties for earlier years. Husband and wife shall
    also remain jointly liable to pay any penalty or
    interest arising from such income tax liability.
    On December 29, 1995, a final judgment of divorce was
    entered and filed by the Supreme Court of New York (County of
    Schoharie).    The Maiers’ marriage was terminated pursuant to the
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    final judgment of divorce.   The final judgment of divorce stated
    in pertinent part: “it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
    that the Separation Agreement dated December 22, 1995, be
    incorporated in this decree and shall survive the same, and not
    be merged within it”.
    On December 22, 1999, Ms. Maier filed with respondent a Form
    8857, Request For Innocent Spouse Relief, requesting relief from
    joint and several liability for the taxable years 1990, 1991,
    1992, 1993, and 1994.   Respondent notified petitioner that Ms.
    Maier had elected to claim relief from joint and several
    liability and invited petitioner to submit to respondent
    information relevant to Ms. Maier’s claim.   Petitioner submitted
    information to respondent by mail and spoke with respondent’s
    representatives by telephone, but he was not permitted to present
    his position in person.
    On December 11, 2001, respondent issued two letters to
    petitioner.    In the first letter, respondent informed petitioner
    that Ms. Maier’s claim for relief from joint and several
    liability for the taxable year 1990 was not considered because
    the period of limitations with regard to collection under section
    6502 expired as to Ms. Maier on September 30, 2001.   The letter
    also stated:   “Your collection statute has been extended to April
    2, 2006 because of your bankruptcy filing.   You are now the sole
    person responsible for the repayment of the 1990 taxes.”    In the
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    second letter, respondent informed petitioner that Ms. Maier’s
    claim for relief from joint and several liability for the taxable
    years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 had been granted under section
    6015(f).2
    On December 24, 2001, respondent issued to petitioner a
    notice of change to his account for the taxable year 1990 stating
    that he owed $26,077.75, consisting of tax, a penalty for late
    payment, and interest.
    On March 6, 2002, petitioner filed a petition with the Court
    styled “PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF RELIEF FROM JOINT AND
    SEVERAL LIABILITY ON A JOINT RETURN”.3   The petition states that
    petitioner disagrees with respondent’s determination granting Ms.
    Maier relief from joint and several liability for the taxable
    years 1990 to 1994.
    In response to the petition, respondent filed a motion to
    dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.   Respondent contends that the
    Court lacks jurisdiction in this case because petitioner has not
    filed a claim for relief from joint and several liability,
    respondent has not issued to petitioner a notice of deficiency
    2
    Sec. 6015(f) provides that the Commissioner may grant a
    taxpayer relief from joint and several liability on a joint
    return if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances,
    it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid
    tax or any deficiency, and the taxpayer is not eligible for
    relief under subsec. (b) or (c).
    3
    At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in
    Kingston, New York.
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    under section 6213(a), and respondent has not made any other
    determination with regard to petitioner that would confer
    jurisdiction upon the Court.
    Petitioner filed an opposition to respondent’s motion to
    dismiss.   He contends that respondent’s administrative
    determination granting Ms. Maier relief from joint and several
    liability for the years 1990 to 1994 deprived him of due process
    of law, is contrary to section 6015(g)(2), and, absent review by
    this Court, he will be deprived of a judicial remedy.
    Pursuant to notice, this matter was called for hearing at
    the Court’s motions session in Washington, D.C.   Petitioner and
    counsel for respondent appeared at the hearing and offered
    argument with regard to respondent’s motion to dismiss.
    Discussion
    Section 6013(d)(3) provides that if a husband and wife file
    a joint Federal income tax return, “the tax shall be computed on
    the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax
    shall be joint and several.”   However, section 6015(a) provides
    that, notwithstanding section 6013(d)(3), an individual who has
    made a joint return may elect to seek relief from joint and
    several liability on such return.   For a detailed discussion of
    the legislative history of section 6015 (and its predecessor
    section 6013), see Cheshire v. Commissioner, 
    115 T.C. 183
    , 188-
    189 (2000), affd. 
    282 F.3d 326
     (5th Cir. 2002).
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    The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we may
    exercise our jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by
    Congress.   Sec. 7442; Judge v. Commissioner, 
    88 T.C. 1175
    , 1180-
    1181 (1987); Naftel v. Commissioner, 
    85 T.C. 527
    , 529 (1985).
    Congress vested the Court with jurisdiction to review a
    taxpayer’s election to claim relief from joint and several
    liability on a joint return under specified circumstances.         See
    King v. Commissioner, 
    115 T.C. 118
    , 121-122 (2000); Corson v.
    Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 354
    , 363-364 (2000).       A taxpayer may seek
    relief from joint and several liability on a joint return by
    raising the matter as an affirmative defense in a petition for
    redetermination invoking the Court’s deficiency jurisdiction
    under section 6213(a).   See Butler v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 276
    ,
    287-289 (2000).   In addition, a taxpayer may file a so-called
    stand-alone petition seeking relief from joint and several
    liability on a joint return where the Commissioner has issued a
    final determination denying the taxpayer’s claim for such relief
    or the Commissioner has failed to rule on the taxpayer’s claim
    within 6 months of its filing.    See sec. 6015(e)(1); Mora v.
    Commissioner, 
    117 T.C. 279
     (2001).       Finally, a taxpayer may
    request relief from joint and several liability on a joint return
    in a petition for review of a lien or levy action.      See secs.
    6320(c), 6330(c)(2)(A)(i).
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    In the instant case, Ms. Maier filed a request for relief
    from joint and several liability with regard to unpaid taxes that
    she and petitioner reported on joint returns for the taxable
    years 1990 through 1994.    Following administrative proceedings,
    respondent concluded:    (1) Ms. Maier was not responsible for
    unpaid taxes for 1990 on the ground the period of limitations on
    collection had expired as to her, and (2) Ms. Maier qualified for
    relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(f) for
    the years 1991 through 1994.    Having apparently obtained complete
    relief administratively, Ms. Maier did not file a petition with
    the Court.4
    The parties are in agreement that respondent has not issued
    a notice of deficiency to petitioner for the years in question.
    Therefore, petitioner cannot invoke the Court’s deficiency
    jurisdiction under section 6213(a).     There likewise is no dispute
    that petitioner did not file a Form 8857 requesting relief from
    joint and several liability for any of the years in question, nor
    has the Commissioner issued to petitioner a final determination
    denying such relief.    Consequently, the petition filed herein
    cannot be characterized as a stand-alone petition under section
    4
    Had respondent denied Ms. Maier’s claim for relief under
    sec. 6015(f), she would have had the opportunity to invoke the
    Court’s jurisdiction to review the matter under subsec. (e). See
    Ewing v. Commissioner, 
    118 T.C. 494
     (2002) (holding the Court has
    jurisdiction to determine whether equitable relief is available
    to a taxpayer for underpayment of tax shown on a joint return).
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    6015(e)(1).   Nor is there any indication that the petition was
    filed for the purpose of obtaining review of a lien or levy
    action under section 6320 or 6330.
    Section 6015 does not contemplate either the action or the
    relief requested in the petition filed herein.    In particular,
    section 6015(e)(1), titled “Petition For Review By Tax Court”,
    provides in pertinent part that a petition may be filed with the
    Court by an “individual * * * who elects” relief from joint and
    several liability on a joint return.   Consistent with this
    provision, section 6015(e)(1)(A) provides that a petition must be
    filed:   (1) Within 90 days after the date the Secretary mails a
    notice of final determination of relief to the individual; or (2)
    if no notice of final determination is issued, no later than 6
    months after the date an election is filed with the Secretary.
    As previously discussed, petitioner has not filed an election
    with respondent claiming relief from joint and several liability
    on a joint return.   It is thus clear that petitioner does not
    qualify as an individual who may file a petition with the Court
    under section 6015(e)(1).
    Section 6015(e)(4) provides direction as to the nonelecting
    or “other spouse”.   The section provides in pertinent part that
    the “Tax Court shall develop rules which provide the individual
    * * * not making the election with adequate notice and an
    opportunity to become a party to a proceeding”.    (Emphasis
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    added.)       Consistent with section 6015(e)(4), the Tax Court
    promulgated Rule 325(b), which permits the “other individual” to
    file a notice of intervention.       Reading section 6015(e) as a
    whole and in conjunction with Rule 325(b), it is clear that
    intervention by a nonelecting spouse presumes an existing
    proceeding (i.e., a deficiency, stand-alone, or collection review
    proceeding) brought by an electing spouse.       In the instant case,
    there is no existing proceeding in which petitioner may
    intervene.5
    Petitioner contends that respondent’s administrative
    determination granting Ms. Maier relief from joint and several
    liability violates the principle of res judicata embodied in
    section 6015(g)(2).6      Petitioner also contends that respondent
    5
    Our holding that sec. 6015(e) does not contemplate the
    present action is borne out by the host of ancillary issues that
    would arise if the Court were to exercise jurisdiction. From a
    procedural standpoint, we note that sec. 6015 does not establish
    a time limit within which a nonelecting spouse may file such an
    action. Along the same lines, there is no provision describing
    the impact, if any, that the Court’s review of such matters might
    have on the rights of an electing spouse who is granted relief
    from joint and several liability during the administrative
    process. We do not believe that Congress intended to cloud the
    process with such uncertainty and ambiguity.
    6
    Sec. 313(a)(2)(A) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act
    of 2001, Pub. L. 106-554, 
    114 Stat. 2763
    , redesignated former
    subsec. (g) as subsec. (h) and inserted after subsec. (f) a new
    subsec. (g) which provides in pertinent part:
    SEC. 6015(g) Credits And Refunds.--
    *         *       *       *       *       *        *
    (continued...)
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    must respect the State court’s final judgment of divorce under
    the Full Faith and Credit Clause contained in Article IV of the
    U.S. Constitution.   In conjunction with these arguments,
    petitioner avers that he should be permitted to maintain the
    present action as a logical extension of the Court’s holdings in
    cases such as King v. Commissioner, supra, and Corson v.
    Commissioner, supra.
    The cases that petitioner cites in support of the
    proposition that he should be permitted to maintain this action
    concern section 6015(h)(2) (formerly section 6015(g), see supra
    note 6), which provides:
    SEC. 6015(h). Regulations.--The Secretary shall
    prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry
    out the provisions of this section, including--
    *      *       *        *       *       *       *
    (2) regulations providing the opportunity for an
    individual to have notice of, and an opportunity to
    participate in, any administrative proceeding with
    respect to an election made under subsection (b) or (c)
    by the other individual filing the joint return.
    In Corson v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayers filed with the
    6
    (...continued)
    (2) Res Judicata.--In the case of any election
    under subsection (b) or (c), if a decision of a court
    in any prior proceeding for the same taxable year has
    become final, such decision shall be conclusive except
    with respect to the qualification of the individual for
    relief which was not an issue in such proceeding. The
    exception contained in the preceding sentence shall not
    apply if the court determines that the individual
    participated meaningfully in such prior proceeding.
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    Court a joint petition for redetermination challenging a joint
    notice of deficiency for the taxable year 1981.    After obtaining
    separate counsel, the electing spouse filed an amendment to the
    petition asserting her entitlement to relief from joint and
    several liability under former section 6013(e).    After both
    taxpayers entered into separate stipulations with the
    Commissioner conceding an income tax deficiency of $21,711 and
    the application of increased interest under section 6621(c), the
    Commissioner entered into a further stipulation with the electing
    spouse granting her relief from joint and several liability under
    section 6015(c).   Upon learning of the second stipulation, the
    nonelecting spouse declined to execute a stipulated decision for
    submission to the Court, prompting the Commissioner to file a
    motion for entry of decision.    In denying the Commissioner’s
    motion, the Court stated:
    Section 6015(e)(1) is structured so that
    administrative consideration (or failure to rule) will
    precede any court action when innocent spouse status is
    raised in a stand alone petition. Section 6015(g)(2),
    in turn, contemplates an opportunity for the
    nonelecting spouse to participate at the administrative
    level. Section 6015(e)(4) then speaks of a similar
    chance for participation should the matter move from an
    administrative to a judicial forum. Hence, as a general
    premise, we believe that these subsections, when read
    together, reveal a concern on the part of the lawmakers
    with fairness to the nonelecting spouse and with
    providing him or her an opportunity to be heard on
    innocent spouse issues. Presumably, the purpose of
    affording to the nonelecting spouse an opportunity to
    be heard first in administrative proceedings and then
    in judicial proceedings is to ensure that innocent
    spouse relief is granted on the merits after taking
    into account all relevant evidence. After all, easing
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    the standards for obtaining relief is not equivalent to
    giving relief where unwarranted.
    Corson v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. at 365
    ; see Hale Exemption Trust
    v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2001-89
    .     Although we did not attempt
    to determine “the precise contours of the rights granted to a
    nonelecting spouse under section 6015(e),” our denial of the
    Commissioner’s motion for entry of decision had the effect of
    allowing the nonelecting spouse his day in Court.     Corson v.
    Commissioner, supra at 365.
    In King v. Commissioner, supra, the Court delineated the
    procedures under which a nonelecting spouse would be permitted to
    intervene and challenge an electing spouse’s claim for relief
    under section 6015.   The circumstances in King differed from
    those in Corson in that, while the Commissioner issued separate
    notices of deficiency to the taxpayers, only the electing spouse
    filed a petition for redetermination with the Court.    The sole
    issue raised in the electing spouse’s petition was her claim for
    relief from joint and several liability under former section
    6013(e).   While the case was pending, Congress repealed former
    section 6013(e) and enacted section 6015.    Thereafter, the
    Commissioner filed with the Court a report stating that the
    Commissioner concluded that the electing spouse qualified for
    relief under section 6015(b).    The report further stated that the
    Commissioner believed that the nonelecting spouse should be
    notified of the action and be given an opportunity to participate
    in the proceeding.    After the Court directed service of a copy of
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    the petition and a copy of the Court’s Rule 325 on the
    nonelecting spouse, the nonelecting spouse filed with the Court a
    motion for leave to file notice of intervention (embodying notice
    of intervention).   The Court subsequently granted the nonelecting
    spouse’s motion, stating:
    We hold that whenever, in the course of any
    proceeding before the Court, a taxpayer raises a claim
    for relief from joint liability under section 6015, and
    the other spouse (or former spouse) is not a party to
    the case, the Commissioner must serve notice of the
    claim on the other individual who filed the joint
    return for the year(s) in issue. The notice shall
    advise such other individual of his or her opportunity
    to file a notice of intervention for the sole purpose
    of challenging the petitioning individual's entitlement
    to relief from joint liability pursuant to section
    6015. Such notice shall include a copy of * * * Rule
    325. The Commissioner shall at the same time file with
    the Court a certification of such notice or, in a
    stand-alone case brought under section 6015(e)(1)(A),
    state in the answer that such notice has been provided.
    See * * * Rule 324(a)(2). Any intervention shall be
    made in accordance with the provisions of * * * Rule
    325(b).
    King v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 125.
    The instant case differs fundamentally from Corson and King
    in that the electing spouse (here Ms. Maier) did not file a
    petition with the Court electing to claim relief under section
    6015.   Ms. Maier did not file such petition with the Court
    because respondent granted her claim for relief under section
    6015(f) at the close of the administrative process.   In light of
    this distinction, Corson and King do not support petitioner’s
    contention that he should be permitted to invoke the Court’s
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    jurisdiction for the purpose of reviewing respondent’s
    administrative determination.
    Section 6015(h)(2) contemplates that petitioner be given
    notice of, and the opportunity to participate in, administrative
    proceedings addressing Ms. Maier’s election to claim relief from
    joint and several liability.7    The record shows that petitioner
    was notified of Ms. Maier’s claim and that he was permitted to
    submit information to respondent relative to that claim.
    Although petitioner remains dissatisfied with the level of
    participation afforded him during the administrative process,
    there is no directive in section 6015, or any other statutory
    7
    Sec. 1.6015-6(a)(1), Income Tax Regs., provides in
    pertinent part:
    §1.6015-6. Nonrequesting spouse’s notice and
    opportunity to participate in administrative
    proceedings.–-(a) In general–-(1) When the Secretary
    receives an election under §1.6015-2 or 1.6015-3, or a
    request for relief under §1.6015-4, the Secretary must
    send a notice to the nonrequesting spouse’s last known
    address that informs the nonrequesting spouse of the
    requesting spouse’s claim for relief. The notice must
    provide the nonrequesting spouse with an opportunity to
    submit any information that should be considered in
    determining whether the requesting spouse should be
    granted relief from joint and several liability. A
    nonrequesting spouse is not required to submit
    information under this section. * * *
    (2) The Secretary must notify the nonrequesting
    spouse of the Secretary’s final determination with
    respect to the requesting spouse’s claim for relief
    under section 6015. * * *
    Sec. 1.6015-6(b), Income Tax Regs., sets forth a
    nonexclusive list of the matters that a nonrequesting spouse
    might include in information submitted to the Secretary.
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    provision, vesting the Court with jurisdiction to review
    respondent’s administrative determination to grant Ms. Maier
    relief from joint and several liability.
    Petitioner contends that, absent review by the Court, he
    will be left without a judicial remedy.    Whether petitioner truly
    lacks a judicial remedy or not, it is well settled that the Court
    may not rely on equitable considerations to expand its
    jurisdiction beyond the parameters established by Congress.     See
    Commissioner v. McCoy, 
    484 U.S. 3
    , 7 (1987) (holding per curiam
    that the Tax Court is "a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks
    general equitable powers"); Healy v. Commissioner, 
    351 F.2d 602
    ,
    603 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding in the context of a late filing that
    "no matter how allegedly inequitable the situation" the Tax Court
    does not have the authority to excuse a taxpayer from
    jurisdiction requirements in the statute); Axe v. Commissioner,
    
    58 T.C. 256
    , 259 (1972).   To the extent that petitioner believes
    that he has suffered an injustice due to a flaw in the
    controlling statutory provisions, his recourse may be to seek a
    legislative remedy.
    - 17 -
    Accordingly, we shall dismiss this case for lack of
    jurisdiction.   To reflect the foregoing,
    An order will be entered
    granting respondent’s motion
    to dismiss for lack of
    jurisdiction.