Tribune Company, As Agent of and Successor By Merger to the Former the Times Mirror Company, Itself and its Consolidated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner ( 2005 )

125 T.C. No. 8UNITED STATES TAX COURT
TRIBUNE COMPANY, AS AGENT OF AND SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO THE
FORMER THE TIMES MIRROR COMPANY, ITSELF AND ITS CONSOLIDATED
SUBSIDIARIES, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 17443-02. Filed September 27, 2005.
In 1998, Times Mirror’s investment subsidiary,
TMD, divested itself of a legal publishing business
through the Bender transaction. The transaction was
intended and designed to qualify as a tax-free
reorganization under sec. 368, I.R.C. R determined
that the transaction was a taxable sale by TMD to Reed.
Held: The primary consideration received in the
transaction was control over $1.375 billion paid by
Reed. Held, further, the Bender transaction did not
qualify as a tax-free reorganization because the terms
and provisions of the contractual documents, as
interpreted and implemented by Times Mirror and Reed,
effected a sale.
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Joel V. Williamson, Roger J. Jones, Gary S. Colton, Jr.,
Jeffrey Allan Goldman, Matthew C. Houchens, Daniel A. Dumezich,
Patricia Anne Yurchak, Andrew R. Roberson, Thomas Lee Kittle-
Kamp, Nathaniel Carden, and Monica Susana Melgarejo, for
petitioner.
Alan Summers, Cathy A. Goodson, William A. McCarthy,
Usha Ravi, Robert H. Schorman, Jr., Gretchen A. Kindel, and M.
Kendall Williams, for respondent.
CONTENTS
FINDINGS OF FACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. Times Mirror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. Changes in the Legal Publishing Landscape . . . . . . 6
Events Leading Up to the Bender Transaction . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. November 7, 1997, GS Presentation . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. November 17, 1997, Special Meeting of Times Mirror’s
Board of Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
C. Times Mirror’s Announcement Sparks Interest by Reed
and Wolters Kluwer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
D. February 5, 1998, Regular Meeting of Times Mirror’s
Board of Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
E. March 5, 1998, Regular Meeting of Times Mirror’s
Board of Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
F. Reed and Wolters Kluwer Call Off Merger . . . . . . 15
G. Melone, Sigler, and Walker Gain Access to the
“Domestic Sandwich” Structure . . . . . . . . . . 15
H. Reed and Wolters Kluwer Submit Preliminary Interest
Letters to Times Mirror . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
I. The Corporate Joint Venture Structure Is Tabbed as
the Structure of Choice for the Bender
Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
J. April 14, 1998, Regular Meeting of Reed’s Board of
Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
K. Wolters Kluwer and Reed Attend Times Mirror’s
Presentations Regarding Bender . . . . . . . . . . 18
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L. Wolters Kluwer and Reed Submit Offers to Times
Mirror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
M. Times Mirror Responds to Wolters Kluwer’s Offer . . 23
N. April 24, 1998, Special Meeting of Times Mirror’s
Board of Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
O. Organization of CBM Acquisition Parent Co. and
CBM MergerSub Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
P. Adoption of the Merger Agreement . . . . . . . . . . 28
Q. GS Prepares “Fairness Package” for Bender
Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
R. Melone Drafts Memorandum Regarding the Bender
Transaction for E&Y’s Files . . . . . . . . . . . 35
S. May 7, 1998, Regular Meeting of Times Mirror’s Board
of Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
T. May 7, 1998, Annual Meeting of Times Mirror’s
Shareholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
U. Organization of Liberty Bell I . . . . . . . . . . . 38
V. July 9, 1998, Regular Meeting of Times Mirror’s Board
of Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
W. Execution of the LBI Limited Liability Company
Agreement (the management authority) . . . . . . . 42
X. Execution of MB Parent Stockholders Agreement and the
MergerSub Shareholders Agreement . . . . . . . . . 50
Y. Filing of the Restated Certificates of Incorporation
for MB Parent and MergerSub . . . . . . . . . . . 55
The Mechanics of the Bender Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A. Capitalization of MergerSub and MB Parent . . . . . 72
B. Merger of MergerSub and Bender . . . . . . . . . . . 74
C. Capitalization of LBI (the LLC) . . . . . . . . . . 75
D. Closing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Times Mirror’s Management of LBI and the Development of Times
Mirror’s Investment Strategy Following the Closing of the
Bender Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Summary of the LLC’s Investment Activity During 1999 . . . . 87
Times Mirror’s and MB Parent’s Income Tax Returns for 1998 . 87
Times Mirror’s Financial Reporting Following the Close of
the Bender Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
The LLC’s Financial Statements for the Fiscal Years Ended
December 31, 1999 and 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
IRS Determinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
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ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
OPINION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Factual Analysis of the Bender Transaction . . . . . . . . . 109
Times Mirror’s View of the Bender Transaction . . . . . . . . 111
Fiduciary Obligations Among the Parties . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Consideration for the Transfer of Bender to Reed . . . . . . 118
Valuation of MB Parent Common Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Pertinent Precedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Evidentiary Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
COHEN, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of
$551,510,819 with respect to petitioner’s Federal income tax for
1998. The notice of deficiency recharacterized as taxable two
transactions treated by petitioner as tax-free reorganizations.
This opinion addresses the so-called Bender transaction only.
The principal issues for decision are:
(1) Whether the Bender transaction qualifies as a
reorganization under either section 368(a)(1)(A) and (2)(E) or
section 368(a)(1)(B) and, if so,
(2) whether section 269 nonetheless dictates that gain be
recognized on the Bender transaction.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulated
facts are incorporated in our findings by this reference.
Petitioner’s principal place of business was in Chicago,
Illinois, at the time that the petition was filed. Petitioner is
a party to this case solely in its capacity as agent and
successor of The Times Mirror Co., Inc. (Times Mirror).
Background
A. Times Mirror
Before its merger with petitioner, Times Mirror was a
Los Angeles-based news and information company. In June 1995,
Times Mirror hired Mark H. Willes (Willes) to serve as its
president and chief executive officer. Willes became chairman of
Times Mirror’s board of directors in January 1996. Willes’s
business philosophy favored a streamlined operation that
concentrated on “core” businesses.
After June 1995, Times Mirror embarked on a program of
restructuring its businesses, which included focusing on
newspaper publishing. In late 1996, Times Mirror undertook a
series of transactions that resulted in its owning 50 percent of
the Shepard’s McGraw-Hill legal publishing unit (Shepard’s) in a
joint venture with Reed Elsevier (Reed), a publishing and
information enterprise not itself a legal entity but rather a
collective reference to Reed Elsevier plc, a United Kingdom
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entity, and Reed Elsevier NV, a Dutch entity. Times Mirror held
its 50-percent interest in Shepard’s through one of its
subsidiaries, Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. (Bender), a legal
publishing company.
As of December 31, 1997, Times Mirror comprised three
business segments: Newspaper publishing, professional
information, and magazine publishing. The professional
information business segment included Bender and Mosby, Inc.
(Mosby), a health sciences publishing company.
Times Mirror engaged in the legal publishing business
through Bender. TMD, Inc. (TMD), a wholly owned subsidiary of
Times Mirror, owned the only class of issued and outstanding
stock of Bender until July 31, 1998.
B. Changes in the Legal Publishing Landscape
Between 1980 and 1997, the legal publishing industry
experienced significant consolidation. During that period, the
legal publishing market contracted from 20 companies to 5: Reed;
Wolters Kluwer NV (Wolters Kluwer), a Dutch publishing and
information company; West-Thomson; Bender; and the Bureau of
National Affairs.
On October 13, 1997, Reed and Wolters Kluwer announced a
plan to merge. At the time of the announcement, Reed’s holdings
included Lexis-Nexis (Lexis), and Wolters Kluwer’s holdings
included Commerce Clearing House.
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Shortly after the Reed-Wolters Kluwer announcement, Times
Mirror’s management analyzed Bender’s competitive position in the
legal publishing market. Based upon its analysis, Times Mirror’s
management concluded that continued participation in the legal
publishing market was not the most effective use of Times
Mirror’s assets. Accordingly, Times Mirror decided to divest
itself of Bender.
The law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (GD&C) acted as
outside legal counsel for Times Mirror, TMD, and Bender in
connection with the transaction pursuant to which Times Mirror
divested itself of Bender (Bender transaction). Ernst & Young
LLP (E&Y), which served as independent auditor of Times Mirror’s
financial statements during 1994 through 1999, reviewed the tax
and accounting treatment and reporting of the Bender transaction
for Times Mirror. Sometime before November 7, 1997, Times Mirror
engaged Goldman, Sachs & Co. (GS) as a financial adviser and
facilitator for the Bender transaction.
Events Leading Up to the Bender Transaction
A. November 7, 1997, GS Presentation
GS prepared a document, dated November 7, 1997, entitled
“Monetization of Medical/Publishing Assets”, in connection with a
presentation to Times Mirror’s management regarding the Bender
transaction (November 7, 1997, GS presentation). The following
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statements were included in the November 7, 1997, GS
presentation:
# Given the dramatic change in the competitive
landscape of the professional information
publishing sector, this may be an opportune time
for TMC [Times Mirror] to monetize its * * * legal
[publishing] assets
# Monetization of the * * * legal publishing assets
can be executed through a simple, taxable sale for
cash or through a number of tax-advantaged
structures
# The ultimate structure utilized will be a function
of the type of buyer (ie. Strategic or financial)
as well as the nationality of the buyer (ie.
Domestic or foreign) as well as the amount of cash
proceeds TMC would like to receive upfront
The November 7, 1997, GS presentation provided a summary of
Bender’s potential buyers as well as descriptions of several of
GS’s proprietary “tax-advantaged” structures for the Bender
transaction. None of the tax-advantaged structures set forth in
the November 7, 1997, GS presentation were ultimately recommended
by Times Mirror’s management or approved by Times Mirror’s board
of directors for the Bender transaction.
B. November 17, 1997, Special Meeting of Times Mirror’s
Board of Directors
A special meeting of Times Mirror’s board of directors was
convened on November 17, 1997. In connection with this special
meeting, a document entitled “Briefing Packet On Mosby Matthew
Bender” (November 17, 1997, briefing packet) was prepared. A
memorandum dated November 14, 1997, from Willes to the board of
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directors was part of the November 17, 1997, briefing packet.
The section of the November 17, 1997, briefing packet entitled
“Executive Summary” contained the following statements:
The major strategic alternatives, or some combination
thereof, that are open to Times Mirror are the
following:
1. Hold
2. Divest
3. Swap
* * * * * * *
A key issue in any decision to divest or swap will be
the potentially large tax liability on the gain on the
sale due to our low basis in Matthew Bender. Our
preliminary work indicates that there may be a variety
of transaction structures which allow us to minimize
this tax expense.
* * * * * * *
Our preliminary analysis shows that with the very high
premiums currently being offered for legal * * *
publishing operations, more after-tax value could be
created through divestiture than by keeping these
companies. This value is enhanced considerably if the
divestiture could be accomplished through a
tax-advantaged structure.
* * * * * * *
The decision to explore strategic alternatives for
Mosby Matthew Bender is not easy nor a happy one.
* * * However, the facts are that the competitive
environment for * * * legal * * * publishing has
changed dramatically * * *. Matthew Bender is a very
distant third in U.S. legal publishing with a weakening
future competitive position. * * *
Considering these recent developments, we recommend to
the Board that it authorize the exploration of the
divestiture of Matthew Bender, including Shepard’s
* * *
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Willes opened the special meeting of the board of directors
by noting that market consolidation in legal publishing presented
immediate strategic questions that needed to be evaluated fully.
Willes and Kathryn M. Downing, a corporate officer of Times
Mirror, then presented a lengthy review of the situation and the
issues to be addressed. Following this presentation, there was a
substantive discussion among the board of directors. At the
conclusion of this discussion, the board of directors unanimously
instructed Times Mirror’s management to proceed with a formal
review of the company’s options with respect to its ownership of
Bender and its joint ownership of Shepard’s.
C. Times Mirror’s Announcement Sparks Interest by Reed and
Wolters Kluwer
On November 24, 1997, Times Mirror released a statement to
the public that announced the company’s decision to explore
strategic alternatives with respect to its ownership of Bender
and its joint ownership of Shepard’s. After Times Mirror made
this announcement, Reed, Wolters Kluwer, and many others
expressed an interest in acquiring Bender.
Parties that indicated an interest in Bender were initially
sent a standard confidentiality agreement. These confidentiality
agreements set out the ground rules for obtaining confidential
information in connection with a possible sale or other
disposition of Bender. On December 26, 1997, Times Mirror and
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Reed executed a confidentiality agreement. On January 9, 1998,
GS sent a confidentiality agreement to Wolters Kluwer.
On February 2, 1998, Reed signed an addendum to the
confidentiality agreement that it had executed with Times Mirror
and delivered that addendum to Times Mirror. The addendum
expressed the desire of Reed and Times Mirror that Wolters Kluwer
and Reed would jointly investigate and prepare a bid for Bender
and/or Mosby.
D. February 5, 1998, Regular Meeting of Times Mirror’s
Board of Directors
A regular meeting of Times Mirror’s board of directors was
convened on February 5, 1998. At this meeting, the board of
directors reviewed and discussed, among other topics, Times
Mirror’s strategic business plan for 1998 through 2000 and the
company’s financial structure. These matters were also presented
to the board of directors in the form of a written report. In
particular, the section entitled “Strategic Three-Year Plan”
contained the following statements:
Mosby Matthew Bender Process
* * * * * * *
Divestiture Process and Strategy
On November 17, 1997, the Board held a study session
that explored the changed strategic situation for
Matthew Bender legal publishing, including Shepard’s,
and Mosby health sciences publishing. * * *
* * * * * * *
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Following the study session with the Board, we began
the divestiture process. Since that time, Mosby
Matthew Bender management and Times Mirror staff have
been actively working with Goldman Sachs to prepare
financial statements and the offering memorandum and to
identify potential buyers.
In this process, we have adopted the following
strategy:
* * * * * * *
• Acquaint all interested parties with our desire
for a tax-efficient result and explore the
appropriate alternatives in detail in advance of
definitive bids with each party, because different
forms of transactions work with different bidders.
• Since it could be the case that a leveraged spin-
off would generate the same level of after-tax
cash proceeds as an asset sale, establish “straw-
man” values of a cash-for-assets sale and a
leveraged spin-off (much like our cable
transaction) to set a “floor” on the auction at a
high level.
* * * * * * *
Alternative Structures
The specific structure for the divestiture will depend
largely on the financial and operating profile of the
likely purchaser. With the assistance and advice of
Goldman Sachs, Ernst & Young, and Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, this process is being integrated with the
overall sale process to deliver the highest after-tax
value to Times Mirror and its shareholders. * * *
* * * * * * *
Planning Issues
Since we are early in the process, it is not clear what
the impact of this divestiture will be on Times
Mirror’s financial results. * * * The preferred tax-
efficient structures we will explore with potential
buyers would significantly lessen any potential
dilution. * * * [I]t is important to remember that
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the model we developed for 10% or greater growth in
earnings per share did not anticipate continuing
contributions from Mosby Matthew Bender, and the
proceeds will give us a large body of resources to
invest to accelerate the Company’s growth.
* * * * * * *
CAPITALIZATION
Introduction
The new three year plan has five principal
capitalization policies:
1) Continue an active share repurchase plan,
buying shares when repurchase is the best
investment of our financial resources
* * * * * * *
5) Invest our cash flow and other capital
resources according to the following
priorities:
• Internally in products and services
that build our established
operations
• Attractive acquisitions that add to
or are complimentary [sic] to
existing businesses
• Opportunistically in common stock
repurchase
• Dividends
Our plan provides sufficient cash flow and other
resources to cover all of these applications. In
practice (and in the absence of a Mosby-Matthew Bender
transaction) for the plan period, the application of
these policies is expected to result in the following
actions:
• Repurchases of * * * 4 million in 1998 and 3
million in each of 1999 and 2000 for an aggregate
of $570 million
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• We expect to borrow approximately $250 million to
use with our free cash flow to finance internal
development, acquisitions, and share repurchase
• Our common dividend will increase by 20% and then
approximately 10% per year
• We will maintain a reserve of borrowing capacity
and cash flow generation sufficient to fund our
internal investment and acquisition programs
If the form of the Mosby-Bender transaction is a cash
sale, we would undoubtedly increase the amount of the
share repurchase target and not borrow additional funds
during the plan period.
* * * * * * *
Our plan going forward, unless the Mosby-Bender
transaction produces an unanticipated result, is to
continue our repurchase activity in the same manner [as
pursued from 1995 through 1997]. * * *
Following the Mosby-Bender transaction we will, once
again, look at our repurchase volume target in light of
what could be significantly enhanced resources for
investment, and weigh the same factors to guide our
program. * * *
E. March 5, 1998, Regular Meeting of Times Mirror’s Board
of Directors
A regular meeting of Times Mirror’s board of directors was
convened on March 5, 1998. At this meeting, Thomas Unterman
(Unterman), executive vice president and chief financial officer
of Times Mirror, with the assistance of several GS
representatives, reported on the status of the strategic review
regarding Bender. These matters were also presented to the board
of directors in a written report. In particular, the section
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entitled “Structural Alternatives” contained the following
statements:
# Structuring Goals
- Maximize after-tax value to Times Mirror and
its shareholders
- Integrate structural considerations into sale
process
- Achieve desired accounting results at time of
sale (and possibly on an ongoing basis)
F. Reed and Wolters Kluwer Call Off Merger
On March 9, 1998, Reed and Wolters Kluwer called off their
previously announced merger. On March 18, 1998, Wolters Kluwer
faxed to GS an executed confidentiality agreement regarding
Bender.
G. Melone, Sigler, and Walker Gain Access to the “Domestic
Sandwich” Structure
On March 24, 1998, three members of E&Y, Martin R. Melone
(Melone), Mary Ann Sigler (Sigler), and Kenneth M. Walker
(Walker), entered into an agreement entitled “Nondisclosure and
Confidentiality Agreement” with Price Waterhouse LLP (PW). At
the time that they entered into the Nondisclosure and
Confidentiality Agreement with PW, Melone was the “Partner-in-
Charge” of E&Y’s audit of Times Mirror, Sigler was a tax partner
at E&Y, and Walker was an engagement partner at E&Y. The
Nondisclosure and Confidentiality Agreement pertained to the
following:
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PW has in the course of its business developed a
technique for restructuring a corporate group (known
within PW as the “Domestic Sandwich”) that is
confidential to PW and has substantial pecuniary value
to PW (the “Proprietary Technique”), which is the
subject of this agreement.
PW desires to provide to Individuals [Sigler, Melone,
and Walker], and Individuals desire to obtain from PW,
a full and complete description of the Proprietary
Technique to enable Individuals to review the
Proprietary Technique and determine whether it [sic]
wishes to use the Proprietary Technique.
As a result of entering into the Nondisclosure and
Confidentiality Agreement with PW, Melone, Sigler, and Walker
gained access to PW’s “Domestic Sandwich” structure.
H. Reed and Wolters Kluwer Submit Preliminary Interest
Letters to Times Mirror
On April 7, 1998, Wolters Kluwer submitted a letter to Times
Mirror that indicated Wolters Kluwer’s preliminary interest in
acquiring Bender and Times Mirror’s 50-percent interest in
Shepard’s. In its preliminary interest letter, Wolters Kluwer
made the following statement regarding the offer price and form
of consideration for this acquisition: “Wolters Kluwer is
prepared to acquire all of the outstanding stock of the Company
[Bender and Times Mirror’s 50-percent interest in Shepard’s] for
cash consideration of U.S. $1.5 billion.”
Reed also submitted a letter to Times Mirror on April 7,
1998, that indicated Reed’s preliminary interest in acquiring
Bender, Mosby, and Times Mirror’s 50-percent interest in
Shepard’s. In its preliminary interest letter, Reed made the
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following statement regarding the offer price and form of
consideration for this acquisition:
Based on the information contained in the information
memorandum on Matthew Bender and Mosby dated March 1998
and the supplemental information delivered to us on
April 2, 1998, and in particular the actual and
forecast financial results for the Properties contained
in those documents, our preliminary evaluation of the
Properties permits us to indicate that we would be
prepared to pay at least $1.2 Billion, which amount is
assumed to be payable in cash on completion.
The individuals involved in coordinating the Bender
transaction for Times Mirror were referred to as the Project
Philadelphia Group. As of April 7, 1998, the Project
Philadelphia Group included officers, directors, and employees
from the following entities: Times Mirror, Mosby, Bender, GS,
GD&C, E&Y, and PW.
I. The Corporate Joint Venture Structure Is Tabbed as the
Structure of Choice for the Bender Transaction
On April 10, 1998, Daniel Shefter (Shefter), an associate at
GS, faxed a revised copy of a document entitled “Presentation
Regarding Corporate Joint Venture Structure” (Shefter CJV
presentation) to members of the Project Philadelphia Group. The
“Corporate Joint Venture Structure” (CJV structure) depicted in
this document was the transaction structure ultimately chosen to
accomplish the Bender transaction.
After Times Mirror had become comfortable with the CJV
structure, it incorporated that structure into the draft
agreements reflecting the details of the Bender transaction.
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Times Mirror also informed prospective bidders that any bids for
Bender that did not incorporate the use of the CJV structure
would be severely disadvantaged in comparison to those bids that
did.
J. April 14, 1998, Regular Meeting of Reed’s Board of
Directors
A regular meeting of Reed’s board of directors was convened
on April 14, 1998, at which Herman S. Bruggink (Bruggink), co-
chairman of Reed, discussed Reed’s potential acquisition of
Bender, Mosby, and Times Mirror’s 50-percent interest in
Shepard’s. During this discussion, Bruggink noted that Times
Mirror was conducting a competitive bidding process for these
businesses and that Reed’s ability to respond on extremely short
notice and Reed’s willingness to bid aggressively would be
crucial to a successful outcome. Upon completing this
discussion, Reed’s board of directors approved resolutions
regarding Reed’s acquisition of Bender, Mosby, and Times Mirror’s
50-percent interest in Shepard’s for an aggregate purchase price
not in excess of $2 billion. Reed’s board of directors
authorized this $2 billion purchase price based upon, inter alia,
Reed’s solid cash position at that time.
K. Wolters Kluwer and Reed Attend Times Mirror’s
Presentations Regarding Bender
Between April 13 and 17, 1998, Times Mirror’s management
held discussions with and made separate presentations regarding
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Bender to Wolters Kluwer and to Reed at Times Mirror’s offices in
New York City. During these meetings, PW and GS made
presentations regarding the CJV structure to Wolters Kluwer and
to Reed. No other structures for potential acquisition of Bender
were discussed during these meetings.
The CJV structure presented to Wolters Kluwer and to Reed
depicted Times Mirror as owning 100 percent of the stock of the
“target”, i.e., Bender, and described the following five steps by
which the acquiror would acquire the target (with dollar amounts
for illustrative purposes only):
1. Acquiror capitalizes Newco at $1,000 with
voting and nonvoting common stock and preferred stock.
The voting common stock has a value of $950 and 20% of
the vote and represents approximately 98% of the total
common equity of Newco. The nonvoting common stock has
a value of $20, is non-voting and represents
approximately 2% of the total common equity of Newco.
The Preferred stock has a value of $30 and 80% of the
vote. Combined, the Newco preferred and non-voting
common will have a value equal to 5% of the total
equity value of Newco.
* * * * * * *
2. Acquiror contributes Newco preferred and Non-
Voting Common stock to MB Parent in exchange for MB
Parent preferred.
* * * * * * *
3. Newco buys MB parent common with 20% of the
vote for $1,000.
* * * * * * *
4. Target merges with Newco with Target
surviving. (Alternatively, Newco could be surviving
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company.) In exchange for its Target Stock, Times
Mirror will receive 100% of MB Parent common stock.
* * * * * * *
5. [MB] Parent contributes $1,000 to LLC in
exchange for non-voting LLC interest.
Times Mirror is sole manager of LLC but is not a
member of the LLC.
An April 22, 1998, memorandum from Charles P. Fontaine
(Fontaine), director of taxes for Reed, to Ian Malcolm (“Mac”)
Highet, executive vice president of corporate development for
Reed, posed the following questions regarding the dividend
requirements of the CJV structure:
Are current dividends required to be paid on the MB
preferred stock or the MB Parent preferred stock?
Can dividends not be paid until the MB preferred stock
is redeemed?
Is a dividend rate of 5% acceptable?
Shefter, for GS, and Hatef Behnia (Behnia), a partner at GD&C,
responded to these questions in the following manner:
Current dividends are required to be paid on both
classes of preferred stock.
Dividends cannot be deferred until the preferred stocks
are redeemed.
A dividend rate in the range of 5.0 to 5.5% is
acceptable (5% is likely to be used). The dividend
rate will be some rate below Treasuries * * *
Fontaine posed the following questions regarding the restrictions
on transfers:
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Can the Target [Bender] after the merger contribute its
assets to a partnership joint venture with another Reed
Elsevier company?
After two (2) years, can Reed Elsevier dispose of the
stock of Target by transferring the entire merger
structure to a third party?
After five (5) years, can Reed Elsevier unwind the
merger structure and dispose of the Target in any
manner?
Can Reed Elsevier dispose of certain assets and lines
of business within two (2) years without Seller’s
consent?
Shefter and Behnia responded to these questions in the following
manner:
The Target cannot contribute its assets to a
partnership following the merger.
As described in the revised documents, after two years
Reed could dispose of the company by transferring the
entire structure.
Note, however, that Reed must represent that at
the time of the acquisition it has no plan or
intent to dispose of the acquired company or its
assets and will covenant that it will not dispose
of the acquired company or its assets within two
years
After five years Reed cannot “unwind” the structure.
It will, however have the ability to sell all the stock
of Target, provided however, that the sale cannot be to
an affiliate of Reed.
Reed cannot dispose of assets or certain lines of
businesses within two years.
Fontaine posed the following questions regarding the terms of the
LLC agreement:
Will the agreement contain some restrictions on the use
of the cash?
- 22 -
Will LLC be obligated to distribute cash to MB Parent
in order to permit MB Parent to pay its tax and any
other liabilities?
Shefter and Behnia responded to these questions in the following
manner:
The LLC agreement will not contain any restrictions on
the use of the cash.
The LLC will be obligated to make cash distributions to
MB Parent in order to permit MB Parent to pay tax
liabilities, dividends on the MB Parent preferred stock
and other general expenses of MB Parent.
L. Wolters Kluwer and Reed Submit Offers to Times Mirror
By letter dated April 22, 1998, Wolters Kluwer submitted to
Times Mirror an offer to acquire Bender and Times Mirror’s
50-percent interest in Shepard’s for a total of $1.4 billion. In
its offer letter, Wolters Kluwer made the following statement
regarding the offer price and form of consideration for this
acquisition:
Wolters Kluwer is prepared to acquire 100% of Matthew
Bender and TMC’s [Times Mirror’s] 50% interest in
Shepard’s for aggregate consideration of
US$ 1.400 billion, which we would propose to allocate
US$ 1.150 billion for Matthew Bender and
US$ 250 million for Shepard’s * * *.
Wolters Kluwer also stated that it was prepared to acquire Bender
substantially in the form of the CJV structure. Wolters Kluwer’s
offer was conditioned on Times Mirror’s negotiating exclusively
with Wolters Kluwer.
After Times Mirror received Wolters Kluwer’s offer but
before Times Mirror entered into an exclusive negotiation period
- 23 -
with Wolters Kluwer, Times Mirror informed Reed that it had
received a significant offer from another bidder that had
accepted the use of the CJV structure for the Bender transaction.
Times Mirror also informed Reed that Reed would have to respond
promptly if it wished to remain in the running for Bender and
Times Mirror’s 50-percent interest in Shepard’s.
By letter dated April 23, 1998, Reed submitted to Times
Mirror an offer to acquire Bender and Times Mirror’s 50-percent
interest in Shepard’s “for a cash consideration of $1.65 billion
and on the terms and conditions reflected in the mark-up of the
Agreement and Plan of Merger.” In its offer letter, Reed
accepted the use of the CJV structure for its purchase of Bender.
Reed’s offer was conditioned on Times Mirror’s acceptance of the
offer by Friday, April 24, 1998, at 5 p.m. “(Los Angeles time)”.
M. Times Mirror Responds to Wolters Kluwer’s Offer
On April 23, 1998, Unterman sent a letter to Wolters Kluwer
in response to Wolters Kluwer’s offer to acquire Bender and Times
Mirror’s 50-percent interest in Shepard’s. Unterman included the
following statements in this letter:
there is one aspect of the proposal which is
structurally defective, and precludes us from complying
with the conditions set forth in your letter. The
insertion in your mark-up of a guaranty by MB Parent of
Matthew Bender’s post-Merger indebtedness to you
materially changes the economic and risk profile of the
transaction in that it creates a significant contingent
liability for MB Parent, the repository of our sales
proceeds. While we assume that you did not intend this
provision as a mechanism to place our sales proceeds at
- 24 -
risk, when questioned on the point, your counsel did
not withdraw it and your counsel did indicate that it
did represent an addition to our proposed structure
designed to create leverage for you in other
circumstances.
In addition, Unterman made the following statements in an
attachment to this letter:
1. Guaranty. The mark-up proposes that MB Parent
guaranty the secured debt of MergerSub to
Acquiror. This proposal would result in the
assets of the LLC being placed at risk and is
unacceptable.
N. April 24, 1998, Special Meeting of Times Mirror’s
Board of Directors
A special meeting of Times Mirror’s board of directors was
convened on April 24, 1998. A document entitled “Mosby Matthew
Bender Update” was prepared for this meeting (April Bender
update). The April Bender update listed the following as one of
Times Mirror’s major accomplishments since the March 5, 1998,
meeting of Times Mirror’s board of directors:
As part of our effort to minimize the tax liability on
the divestiture, we continued to look for tax-efficient
structures. A potential approach that is superior to
the structures reviewed at last month’s Board meeting
was brought to us by Price Waterhouse through Goldman
Sachs. This approach is proprietary to Price
Waterhouse and is subject to a confidentiality
agreement. * * *
The April Bender update also included a section entitled “New Tax
Minimization Approach” that contained the following:
The Price Waterhouse structure separates ownership and
control so that the acquiring company controls Matthew
Bender and Times Mirror controls an amount of cash
- 25 -
equivalent to Matthew Bender’s value, but without
having paid a tax for the shift in control.
The steps in this structure * * * involve the creation
of a special purpose corporation (referred to as
MB Parent * * *) that is owned partly by Times Mirror
and partly by the acquiring company. This special
purpose corporation is controlled by the acquiring
company through its ownership of relatively low value,
nonparticipating preferred stock with 80% voting
control. MB Parent in turn owns preferred stock and
nonvoting common stock in an acquisition subsidiary
that will merge with Matthew Bender and a nonvoting
interest in a single member limited liability company
that holds the cash referred to above. As a result of
the merger of Matthew Bender into the acquisition
subsidiary, Times Mirror will own all of the common
stock and remaining 20% voting power of MB Parent, the
special purpose corporation. However, even though
Times Mirror will not have voting control over
MB Parent, it will control the limited liability
corporation holding all of the cash by virtue of being
the sole (nonequity) manager of the LLC.
The results are as follows:
• Times Mirror will control the LLC, thereby
controlling the cash in it and any assets or
businesses acquired with such cash.
• Times Mirror and the LLC will be consolidated for
financial reporting purposes.
• The acquiring company will control Matthew Bender
and will be able to consolidate for financial
reporting purposes.
• The merger of Matthew Bender into the acquisition
subsidiary in exchange for MB Parent common stock
will qualify as a tax-free reorganization for tax
purposes (even though such common stock does not
carry with it voting control).
• MB Parent, the LLC and Matthew Bender will not be
consolidated for tax purposes with either Times
Mirror or the acquiring company.
- 26 -
• At some later date and upon mutual agreement, the
Matthew Bender and MB Parent preferred stock can
be redeemed at face value and the nonvoting common
can be redeemed at a formula price, which would
leave the acquiring company as the sole owner of
Matthew Bender and Times Mirror as the sole, and
controlling owner of MB Parent, with the ability
to liquidate MB Parent and the LLC without a tax
cost.
During the special meeting of the board of directors,
Willes, Unterman, and Behnia made presentations concerning the
proposed transaction and the competing bids received from Wolters
Kluwer and Reed.
At the conclusion of this discussion, the board approved
resolutions related to the Bender transaction. As part of these
resolutions, the board accepted Reed’s offer for Bender and Times
Mirror’s 50-percent interest in Shepard’s.
O. Organization of CBM Acquisition Parent Co. and
CBM MergerSub Corp.
On April 24, 1998, two of Reed’s wholly owned subsidiaries,
Reed Elsevier Overseas BV (REBV), a Dutch private limited
liability company, and Reed Elsevier U.S. Holdings, Inc. (REUS),
a Delaware corporation, organized CBM Acquisition Parent Co.
(MB Parent) by filing a certificate of incorporation with the
secretary of state of the State of Delaware. MB Parent’s bylaws
included the following provisions:
- 27 -
ARTICLE 2
MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS
* * * * * * *
SECTION 2.05. Quorum. Unless otherwise provided
under the certificate of incorporation or these bylaws
and subject to Delaware Law, the presence, in person or
by proxy, of the holders of a majority of the
outstanding capital stock of the Corporation entitled
to vote at a meeting of stockholders shall constitute a
quorum for the transaction of business.
SECTION 2.06. Voting. (a) Unless otherwise
provided in the certificate of incorporation and
subject to Delaware Law, each stockholder shall be
entitled to one vote for each outstanding share of
capital stock of the Corporation held by such
stockholder. Unless otherwise provided in Delaware
Law, the certificate of incorporation or these bylaws,
the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares of
capital stock of the Corporation present, in person or
by proxy, at a meeting of stockholders and entitled to
vote on the subject matter shall be the act of the
stockholders.
* * * * * * *
SECTION 2.07. Action by Consent. (a) Unless
otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation,
any action required to be taken at any annual or
special meeting of stockholders, or any action which
may be taken at any annual or special meeting of
stockholders, may be taken without a meeting, without
prior notice and without a vote, if a consent or
consents in writing, setting forth the action so taken,
shall be signed by the holders of outstanding capital
stock having not less than the minimum number of votes
that would be necessary to authorize or take such
action at a meeting at which all shares entitled to
vote thereon were present and voted and shall be
delivered to the Corporation by delivery to its
registered office in Delaware, its principal place of
business, or an officer or agent of the Corporation
having custody of the book in which proceedings of
meetings of stockholders are recorded. * * * Prompt
notice of the taking of the corporate action without a
- 28 -
meeting by less than unanimous written consent shall be
given to those stockholders who have not consented in
writing.
* * * * * * *
ARTICLE 3
DIRECTORS
* * * * * * *
SECTION 3.03. Quorum and Manner of Acting.
Unless the certificate of incorporation or these bylaws
require a different number, a majority of the total
number of directors shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business, and the affirmative vote of a
majority of the directors present at [a] meeting at
which a quorum is present shall be the act of the Board
of Directors. * * *
As of the time of trial of this case, MB Parent’s bylaws had
never been amended.
On April 27, 1998, REBV and REUS organized CBM MergerSub
Corp. (MergerSub) by filing a certificate of incorporation with
the secretary of state of the State of New York.
P. Adoption of the Merger Agreement
On April 26, 1998, a document entitled “Agreement and Plan
of Merger”, prepared by GD&C, was presented to representatives of
Times Mirror, TMD, Bender, REUS, REBV, MB Parent, and CBM
Acquisition Corp. The Agreement and Plan of Merger set forth the
terms and details of the Bender transaction. On that same date,
the boards of directors of TMD, Bender, REUS, REBV, and MB Parent
adopted resolutions that approved each of those corporation’s
engaging in the Bender transaction.
- 29 -
On April 27, 1998, representatives of Times Mirror, TMD,
Bender, REUS, REBV, MB Parent, and MergerSub executed an
agreement entitled “Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of
Merger” (the Bender agreement). Through the Bender agreement,
MergerSub replaced CBM Acquisition Corp. as a party to the Bender
transaction. The Bender agreement superseded the Agreement and
Plan of Merger in its entirety.
The recitals to the Bender agreement stated, in pertinent
part, the following:
WHEREAS, the TM Parties [Times Mirror, TMD, and
Bender, collectively], Acquiror [REUS and REBV,
collectively], MB Parent, and CBM Acquisition Corp.
have entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated
as of April 26, 1998 (the “Existing Merger Agreement”);
WHEREAS, the TM Parties and the Reed Parties
[REUS, REBV, MB Parent, and MergerSub, collectively]
desire to amend and restate the Existing Merger
Agreement on the terms and subject to the conditions
set forth in this Agreement;
WHEREAS, in anticipation of the Merger (as defined
in Section 1.1), MB Parent will file a Restated
Certificate of Incorporation of MB Parent * * * with
the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware;
WHEREAS, in anticipation of the Merger, MergerSub
will file a Restated Certificate of Incorporation of
MergerSub * * * with the Secretary of State of the
State of New York;
WHEREAS, immediately prior to the Effective Time
(as defined below), in consideration of an amount in
cash equal to $1,375,000,000 less the net proceeds
received by MergerSub from the MergerSub Debt (as
defined below) from REUS and REBV, MergerSub will issue
to REUS (i) seven hundred and ninety-two (792) shares
of Common Stock, par value $.01 per share, of MergerSub
(“MergerSub Common Stock”), which MergerSub Common
- 30 -
Stock will have 16% of the voting power of all of the
outstanding shares of capital stock entitled to vote in
an election of directors (“Voting Power”) and such
other designations, preferences, voting powers, rights
and qualifications as are set forth in the MergerSub
Certificate of Incorporation, (ii) 75% of the
authorized shares of Nonvoting Participating Preferred
Stock, par value $.01 per share, of MergerSub
(“MergerSub Participating Preferred Stock”), and
(iii) 75% of the authorized shares of Voting Preferred
Stock, par value $.01 per share, of MergerSub
(“MergerSub Preferred Stock”), which MergerSub
Preferred Stock will have 60% of the Voting Power and
such other designations, preferences, voting powers,
rights and qualifications as are set forth in the
MergerSub Certificate of Incorporation and MergerSub
will issue to REBV (i) one hundred and ninety-eight
(198) shares of MergerSub Common Stock, which MergerSub
Common Stock will have 4% of the Voting Power and such
other designations, preferences, voting powers, rights
and qualifications as are set forth in the MergerSub
Certificate of Incorporation, (ii) 25% of the
authorized shares of MergerSub Participating Preferred
Stock, which MergerSub Participating Preferred Stock
will have no Voting Power and such other designations,
preferences, voting powers, rights and qualifications
as are set forth in the MergerSub Certificate of
Incorporation and (iii) 25% of the authorized shares of
MergerSub Preferred Stock, which MergerSub Preferred
Stock will have 20% of the Voting Power and such other
designations, preferences, voting powers, rights and
qualifications as are set forth in the MergerSub
Certificate of Incorporation;
WHEREAS, immediately prior to the Effective Time
(as defined in Section 1.3), MergerSub will borrow
$600,000,000 on terms not inconsistent with the terms
set forth in Section 7.8 (“MergerSub Debt”) from an
affiliate of Acquiror;
WHEREAS, immediately prior to the Effective Time,
in consideration for 75% of the authorized and
outstanding shares of MergerSub Participating Preferred
Stock held by REUS, MB Parent will issue to REUS 75% of
the authorized shares of Voting Preferred Stock, par
value $.01 per share, of MB Parent (“MB Parent
Preferred Stock”), which MB Parent Preferred Stock will
have 60% of the Voting Power and such other
- 31 -
designations, preferences, voting powers, rights and
qualifications as are set forth in the MB Parent
Certificate of Incorporation;
WHEREAS, immediately prior to the Effective Time,
in consideration for 25% of the authorized and
outstanding shares of MergerSub Preferred Stock and 25%
of the authorized and outstanding shares of MergerSub
Participating Preferred Stock held by REBV, MB Parent
will issue to REBV 25% of the MB Parent Preferred
Stock, which MB Parent Preferred Stock will have 20% of
the Voting Power and such other designations,
preferences, voting powers, rights and qualifications
as are set forth in the MB Parent Certificate of
Incorporation;
WHEREAS, immediately prior to the Effective Time,
in consideration for $1,375,000,000, MB Parent will
issue to MergerSub 100% of the authorized shares of
Common Stock, par value $.01 per share, of MB Parent
(“MB Parent Common Stock”), which MB Parent Common
Stock will have 20% of the Voting Power and such other
designations, preferences, voting powers, rights and
qualifications as are set forth in the MB Parent
Certificate of Incorporation;
WHEREAS, in anticipation of the Merger, MB Parent
will cause Liberty Bell I, LLC, a single-member
Delaware limited liability company (“LLC”) to be formed
under the laws of the State of Delaware prior to the
Effective Time by filing with the Secretary of State of
the State of Delaware the Certificate of Formation of
LLC * * *;
WHEREAS, in anticipation of the Merger, MB Parent,
an affiliate of MB Parent and Times Mirror will enter
into a Limited Liability Company Agreement of LLC
pursuant to which the affiliate of MB Parent shall be
appointed the initial manager of LLC and, immediately
after the Effective Time, Times Mirror shall be
appointed the manager of LLC * * *;
WHEREAS, immediately after the Effective Time, in
accordance with the terms of the LLC Agreement,
MB Parent will make a contribution to LLC in the amount
of $1,375,000,000;
- 32 -
In the Bender agreement, Reed and Times Mirror agreed, in
pertinent part, to the following:
SECTION 1.1. The Merger. At the Effective Time
(as defined in Section 1.3) and upon the terms and
subject to the conditions of this Agreement and in
accordance with the New York Business Corporation Law
* * *, MergerSub shall be merged with and into * * *
[Bender] (the “Merger”). Following the Merger, * * *
[Bender] shall continue as the surviving corporation
(the “Surviving Corporation”) and the separate
corporate existence of MergerSub shall cease. The
Merger is intended to qualify as a tax-free
reorganization under Section 368 of the Code.
* * * * * * *
SECTION 1.8. Conversion of Shares.
(a) Merger Consideration. At the Effective
Time, each share of common stock, par value $100.00 per
share, of * * * [Bender] (individually a “Share” and
collectively the “Shares”) issued and outstanding
immediately prior to the Effective Time (other than
Shares held in * * * [Bender’s] treasury or by any of
* * * [Bender’s] Subsidiaries), all of which are owned
by TMD, shall, by virtue of the Merger and without any
action on the part of MergerSub, * * * [Bender] or the
holder thereof, be converted into and shall become the
right to receive a number of the fully paid and
nonassessable shares of MB Parent Common Stock held by
MergerSub immediately prior to the Effective Time equal
to a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of
shares of MB Parent Common Stock held by MergerSub
immediately prior to the Effective Time and the
denominator of which is the number of Shares
outstanding immediately prior to the Effective Time
(the “Merger Consideration”).
* * * * * * *
SECTION 1.10. Exchange of Certificates.
* * * * * * *
(c) Effect of Exchange. All shares of
MB Parent Common Stock issued upon the surrender of
- 33 -
certificates representing Shares in accordance with the
terms hereof shall be deemed, to the fullest extent
permitted by applicable law, to have been issued in
full satisfaction of all rights pertaining to such
Shares * * *
* * * * * * *
SECTION 2.4. Conditions to TM Parties’
Obligations. The obligations of the TM Parties to
consummate the Merger are subject to the satisfaction
(or waiver by each of the TM Parties) as of the
Effective Time of the following conditions:
* * * * * * *
(f) Legal Opinions.
* * * * * * *
(ii) Times Mirror shall have received a
favorable opinion of its legal counsel, in form and
substance reasonably satisfactory to it, as to the
qualification of the Merger as a reorganization under
the provisions of Section 368 of the Code.
SECTION 2.5. Substitution Transaction. In the
event that the condition to the obligations of Times
Mirror, TMD and * * * [Bender] to consummate the
Closing contained in Section 2.4(f)(ii) is not
satisfied or waived by October 31, 1998 or such earlier
date on which all other conditions in Sections 2.1, 2.2
and 2.4 have been satisfied or waived (the “Revision
Date”) then * * * (iii) for a period of 45 days from
the Revision Date (the “Renegotiation Period”),
Acquiror and Times Mirror shall enter into bona-fide
negotiations with a view to determining whether
agreement can be reached as to the terms and conditions
upon which the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement may be structured so as to replicate as much
as practicable the relative economic benefits that each
party and their Affiliates would have derived from the
transactions contemplated by the Agreement (any such
restructured transaction hereafter referred to as the
“Substitution Transaction”), (iv) unless the parties
agree to the terms and conditions of a Substitution
Transaction during the Renegotiation Period, as soon as
practicable following the expiration of such period,
- 34 -
Times Mirror shall sell to REUS and REUS shall purchase
from Times Mirror, all the outstanding shares of * * *
[Bender] for a cash purchase price of $1,375,000,000
* * *
* * * * * * *
SECTION 7.7. Enforceability of LLC Agreement.
The Reed Parties will not commence, maintain, or join
any action (at law or otherwise) that asserts that the
LLC Agreement is unenforceable.
On April 28, 1998, the board of directors of MergerSub
adopted resolutions that approved MergerSub’s engaging in the
Bender transaction.
Q. GS Prepares “Fairness Package” for Bender Transaction
On or about April 27, 1998, GS prepared a document entitled
“Fairness Package” with respect to the Bender transaction and
Times Mirror’s sale of its 50-percent interest in Shepard’s. The
Fairness Package included a page entitled “Summary of Proposed
Transaction” that described the structure and consideration for
the Bender transaction and Times Mirror’s sale of its 50-percent
interest in Shepard’s in the following manner:
# Purchase of 100% of the stock of * * * [Bender]
and Times Mirror’s 50% partnership interest in
* * * [Shepard’s] for $1.65 billion in cash
- Purchase of * * * [Bender] for
$1.4 billion using the PW tax-advantaged
structure (“PW Structure”)
- Purchase of * * * [Shepard’s] for
$250 million with a section 338(h)(10)
election
- 35 -
The Fairness Package also included a page entitled “Summary of
Financial Impact” that listed Times Mirror’s “After-tax Cash
Proceeds from Sale” using the CJV structure as $1,641,500,000.
GS determined this $1,641,500,000 amount by assuming (1) a
$1.4 billion “tax-free” purchase of Bender and (2) that the sale
of Times Mirror’s 50-percent interest in Shepard’s would generate
$241.5 million in after-tax proceeds.
R. Melone Drafts Memorandum Regarding the Bender
Transaction for E&Y’s Files
On or about April 29, 1998, Melone drafted a memorandum
entitled “Times Mirror Matthew Bender Sale” for E&Y’s files.
Melone included the following statements regarding the Bender
transaction and Times Mirror’s sale of its 50-percent interest in
Shepard’s in this memorandum:
Times Mirror has entered into an agreement with Reed
Elsevier for the sale of Matthew Bender for
$1,375,000,000 and the sale of Times Mirror’s interest
in Shepard’s Inc. for $225,000,000. The sale of
Matthew Bender is structured as a reorganization in
which the $1,375 million proceeds from the sale will
end up in an LLC whose ownership is as shown in the
attached chart. Through the various shareholder
agreements, certificates of incorporation and the LLC
management agreement, Times Mirror has total control
over the assets and operations of the LLC and Reed
Elsevier has total control over the assets and
operations of Matthew Bender. The structure is
designed to result in no tax due by Times Mirror on the
profit from the sale of Matthew Bender.
* * * * * * *
- 36 -
Consolidation
* * * Times Mirror controls the assets of the LLC
through the management agreement, which specifically
states that Times Mirror has no fiduciary duty to the
holder of Acquisition Parent [MB Parent] and may use
its discretion as to the use of the assets. Times
Mirror may have the LLC buy its own debt instruments or
Times Mirror stock, make business acquisitions or any
other transaction to the benefit of Times Mirror. The
only limitation is that Times Mirror may not upstream
LLC assets to itself.
Times Mirror owns all of the common stock of
Acquisition Parent and the 20% vote it carries. The
ownership of the common stock provides Times Mirror
with 100% of the residual ownership and value of
Acquisition Parent following redemption of the
preferred stock, which is virtually assured in at least
20 years due to the redemption rights and certain put
and call options. The equity value of the preferred
stock is limited to its stated (redemption) value and
fixed dividend payments.
Times Mirror has the ability to ensure that the Board
of Directors of Acquisition Parent may not do anything
that may affect the control or viability of the LLC.
Certain board actions require the unanimous vote of the
Board. These include:
• the incurrence of indebtedness or guarantees of
indebtedness of Acquisition Parent
• the sale, transfer or other disposition, pledge or
assignment of any portion or all of its LLC
interest
• the issuance of any other securities of
Acquisition Parent
All of these factors indicate that Times Mirror not
only controls the assets of the LLC, but also is the
beneficiary of all of the ownership risks and rewards
of the LLC. * * *
- 37 -
S. May 7, 1998, Regular Meeting of Times Mirror’s Board
of Directors
A regular meeting of Times Mirror’s board of directors was
convened on May 7, 1998. A document entitled “Mosby Matthew
Bender Divestiture Update” was presented to Times Mirror’s board
of directors at this meeting (May Bender update). The May Bender
update included the following statements:
Following the special Board meeting on Friday,
April 24, we began exclusive negotiations with Reed
Elsevier for the divestiture of Matthew Bender and our
50% interest in Shepard’s. Negotiations started Friday
afternoon and continued for most of the day Saturday.
Contracts and press releases were finalized Saturday
night and signed on Sunday, after all corrections to
the contracts had been made. The transaction was in
line with the parameters reviewed with the Board, with
a total value of $1.65 billion. Matthew Bender will be
divested through a merger that takes advantage of the
proprietary tax structure that was presented to the
Board. Pending the customary regulatory review, the
transaction is expected to be completed this summer.
T. May 7, 1998, Annual Meeting of Times Mirror’s
Shareholders
Times Mirror’s annual shareholder meeting was convened on
May 7, 1998. At this meeting, Willes discussed, among other
topics, Times Mirror’s “decision to sell * * * [Mosby and Matthew
Bender] for strategic reasons.” Willes made the following
remarks with respect to this topic: “You have read in recent
days that we have reached agreements to sell Matthew Bender, and
our 50% interest in Shepard’s for $1.65 billion. We have also
agreed to sell Mosby for $415 million. This is a phenomenal
amount of money for some phenomenal businesses.”
- 38 -
U. Organization of Liberty Bell I
On May 22, 1998, Michael S. Udovic (Udovic), assistant
general counsel for Times Mirror, filed the Certificate of
Formation for Liberty Bell I, LLC (LBI), with the secretary of
state of the State of Delaware. On May 26, 1998, Udovic resigned
from his position as the authorized person of LBI. LBI did not
have an authorized person between the time of Udovic’s
resignation and July 28, 1998.
V. July 9, 1998, Regular Meeting of Times Mirror’s Board
of Directors
A regular meeting of Times Mirror’s board of directors was
convened on July 9, 1998, at which the board of directors
discussed, among other topics, the pending Bender transaction.
According to the minutes of this meeting, Unterman discussed the
following matters with the board of directors:
Thomas Unterman * * * reviewed the pending transactions
involving Mosby and Matthew Bender and their impact
upon the Company’s financial projections, concluding
that Times Mirror remained on target to meet each of
its major financial objectives for the year. He noted
that the proceeds from the dispositions of these
businesses will be received by two limited liability
companies and, utilizing materials previously furnished
to the Board of Directors, discussed the short-term
investment strategies Times Mirror will follow in
connection with its management of those companies.
These matters were also presented to the board of directors in a
written report. In particular, the section entitled “Finance
Report” contained the following statements:
- 39 -
FINANCE REPORT
INTRODUCTION
Our financial objectives for this year included:
a) earnings growth of 20%,
b) continued use of every available opportunity
to finance investment in the growth of our
businesses * * *,
c) optimization of the proceeds from the Mosby
Matthew Bender disposition so that future
year dilution is minimized, and
d) continuation of return on capital in excess
of 12%.
At mid-year we can report that we are still on this
course and all of our corporate objectives for the year
are both in sight and within reach. While there are
more “moving pieces” than usual, there are four major
items to note:
• First, as expected, following the Mosby Matthew
Bender (MMB) agreements, we are required to treat
MMB as discontinued operations and the “street”
has recalibrated our performance to a continuing
earnings basis and will track us this way from now
on.
* * * * * * *
• Third, in light of the very large MMB gain on
sale, we have begun to review our entire balance
sheet, our work processes, and all of our systems
to determine if appropriate charges, write-offs,
or buy-down/buy-outs of contracts might prove
beneficial. * * *
• Fourth, as is discussed under a separate tab
entitled Capitalization/Investment, following the
MMB sale, we will have a very substantial level of
resources for redeployment over time in operating
assets and for recapitalization.
* * * * * * *
- 40 -
GAIN ON SALE AND DISCONTINUED EARNINGS REPORTING
* * * By divesting MMB, we are completely exiting the
legal and health sciences publishing business, and are
required to separately report MMB earnings as
discontinued operations. Similarly, the gain on sale
appears in the discontinued line.
* * * * * * *
* * * We will receive over $2.0 billion in cash from
the sale. * * *
* * * * * * *
BALANCE SHEET REVIEW
After the magnitude of the gain on the MMB sale became
apparent, we decided to use this opportunity to conduct
a thorough examination of our balance sheet, operations
and investments to see what actions we could take to
benefit the businesses in future years.
* * * * * * *
CAPITALIZATION AND
INVESTMENT STRATEGY
Introduction
The disposition of Mosby Matthew Bender (MMB) will
produce an unprecedented level of investible [sic]
capital for Times Mirror. Net proceeds of
approximately $2.0 billion will be deposited into our
accounts requiring immediate rigorous management.
The net proceeds of the MMB disposition, in conjunction
with our annual operating cash flow will provide the
company with enormous investment capacity over the next
few years. If we can successfully deploy this
investment capacity in assets that meet our return
criteria, our total 5 year investment capacity would be
as much as $5 billion. Investment at this level would
still enable us to retain our current solid credit
ratings and associated financial flexibility.
Our first responsibility upon receipt of the
disposition proceeds is to establish a short term
- 41 -
portfolio management framework. The primary objective
of this activity is to preserve principal value while
earning a return commensurate with the risk parameters
we establish through our investment policy.
Second, we will begin to redeploy these resources into
operating assets to drive revenue growth and into share
repurchases to start to return towards our target
capitalization. In the current high asset valuation
environment, in view of our well developed return
discipline, this program could require several years.
Most significantly, we are not looking at our resources
as a war chest for a big cash acquisition. Instead, we
are expecting increases of approximately 25%, a
doubling of our recent spending rate on acquisitions of
businesses that are closely related to or fill in gaps
in our core businesses, acceleration of our share
repurchase plans and, in general, an acceleration of
investments in our base businesses.
This stance leaves us with ample resources for pursuing
unexpected opportunities and will position us to try to
“make things happen” as important strategic initiatives
are identified. It also means that we will allocate a
portion of our surplus cash investment portfolio to
investments with medium term horizons in order to
increase the overall return on our cash. Examples of
this type of investing include the investment we made
in Target Media Partners in connection with the
Recycler purchase, and the Latin Communications Group
opportunity we discussed at the last meeting, as well
as increases in “new media” venture capital
investments. We will also allocate a portion of the
funds for tax-advantaged investments to enhance yield
and for “pre-funding” our charitable commitments with
contributions to our tax-exempt affiliates.
* * * * * * *
Short Term Portfolio Strategy
The following shows the gross amount of disposition
proceeds the company will be receiving:
- 42 -
($ Millions)
Company Sold Entity Receiving Funds Amount (Gross)
Shepards Corporate $275
Bender Liberty Bell I L.L.C. 1,375
Mosby Liberty Bell II L.L.C. 415
Total: $2,065
Immediately we will utilize the funds to pay necessary
transaction expenses, pay down short-term corporate
debt, and then invest the remaining funds under our
short-term investment policy * * *. This policy
ensures preservation of capital and maintenance of
liquidity through prudent standards for credit quality,
instrument type and overall portfolio limitations. At
the same time, it provides for sufficient flexibility
to allow us to search for yield advantages where
possible. The following table shows the net investible
[sic] funds that should be available to deploy in
short-term instruments:
($ Millions)
Estimated Cash
Transaction Short-Term
Fees and Debt
Funds Location Gross Funds Expenses Reduction Net Funds
Corporate $275 -- ($275) $0
Liberty Bell I 1,375 (64) -- 1,311
Liberty Bell II 415 (22) -- 393
Total: $1,704
W. Execution of the LBI Limited Liability Company Agreement
(the management authority)
On July 28, 1998, representatives of Times Mirror, Lexis,
and MB Parent executed an agreement entitled “Limited Liability
Company Agreement of Liberty Bell I, LLC” (LBI LLC agreement).
The terms of the LBI LLC agreement included the following:
This Limited Liability Company Agreement
(together with the schedules attached hereto, this
- 43 -
“Agreement”) of LIBERTY BELL I, LLC (the “Company”), is
entered into by CBM ACQUISITION PARENT CO., a Delaware
corporation, as the sole member (the “Initial Member”),
LEXIS, INC., a Delaware corporation, as the initial
manager of the Company (the “Initial Manager”), and THE
TIMES MIRROR COMPANY, in its corporate capacity and as
the manager of the Company appointed pursuant to
Section 9(b) (“TMC”). * * *
The Initial Member, the Initial Manager and
TMC, by execution of this Agreement, hereby agree as
follows:
1. Name; Formation; Tax Treatment.
The name of the limited liability company
shall be LIBERTY BELL I, LLC or such other name as the
Manager may from time to time hereafter designate.
* * * The parties hereto intend that pursuant to
Treasury Regulations Sections 301.7701-3, the Company
be disregarded as an entity and not be treated as
separate from the Initial Member. * * *
* * * * * * *
5. Members; Member Rights; Meetings.
* * * * * * *
c. No Member shall have any right, power, or
duty, including the right to approve or vote on any
matter (including, without limitation, any vote,
approval or consent relating to the merger of the
Company with or into an “other business entity” (as
defined in the Act), the consolidation of the Company
with or into an other business entity, the
domestication of the Company to an other business
entity, the conversion of the Company to an other
business entity, the transfer of the Company to any
other jurisdiction or, to the fullest extent permitted
by law, the dissolution of the Company), except as
expressly required by this Agreement, the Act or other
applicable law.
* * * * * * *
- 44 -
7. Purposes.
The purpose of the Company is to invest in
such property or securities and to conduct such
businesses and other legal activities as the Manager
determines is in the best interests of the Company.
* * * * * * *
9. Management.
a. The Manager shall have the sole right to
manage the business of the Company and shall have all
powers and rights necessary, appropriate or advisable
to effectuate and carry out the purposes and business
of the Company, and no Member or other person other
than the Manager shall have any authority to act for or
bind the Company or to vote on or approve any of the
actions to be taken by the Company (unless otherwise
expressly required by the Act or other applicable law).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Initial Manager
shall not take any action in respect of or on behalf of
the Company, other than the opening of one or more bank
accounts in the name of the Company, the appointment of
an agent for service of process for the Company and the
performance of other ministerial duties in connection
with the organization and formation of the Company.
Accordingly, as of the Effective Time of the Merger,
the Company shall have no liabilities or obligations
other than pursuant to this Agreement.
b. The Manager shall serve until an Event of
Withdrawal has occurred [the resignation or dissolution
of the Manager]. The removal of the Manager shall be
only at the request and direction of the Manager and
under no other circumstances, including, without
limitation, for cause. Upon any such Event of
Withdrawal, a new Manager shall be selected by the old
Manager prior to such resignation or dissolution,
provided that if the Manager does not make such
selection, Members holding a Majority in Interest shall
be entitled to select a new Manager. Notwithstanding
anything contained herein, immediately after the
Effective Time of the Merger and without any action on
the part of TMC, the Initial Manager or any Member, the
Initial Manager (or any other Manager, if applicable)
shall be automatically removed as Manager and TMC shall
become the Manager hereunder.
- 45 -
c. The Manager may appoint the Officers of
the Company, who need not be Members, to such terms and
to perform such functions as the Manager shall
determine in its sole discretion as set forth in
Section 10. The Manager may appoint, employ or
otherwise contract with such other persons or entities
for the transaction of the business of the Company or
the performance of services for or on behalf of the
Company as it shall determine in its sole discretion.
The Manager may delegate to any such Officer, person or
entity such authority to act on behalf of the Company
as the Manager may from time to time deem appropriate
in its sole discretion.
* * * * * * *
e. Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, to the fullest extent permitted by law,
including Section 18-1101(c) of the Act, and without
creating any duties or obligations of the Manager by
implication or otherwise, it is expressly acknowledged
and agreed that to the extent the Manager owes any
fiduciary duties or similar obligations to the Initial
Member under any principles of law or equity or
otherwise, such duties and obligations shall be owed
solely to the holders of the Initial Member’s common
equity and not to the holders of any other class of the
Initial Member’s equity.
* * * * * * *
10. Officers.
a. Officers. The Officers of the Company
shall be chosen by the Manager and shall consist of at
least a President, a Secretary and a Treasurer. * * *
The Manager may appoint such other Officers and agents
as it shall deem necessary or advisable who shall hold
their offices for such terms and shall exercise such
powers and perform such duties as shall be determined
from time to time by the Manager. The salaries of all
Officers and agents of the Company shall be fixed by or
in the manner prescribed by the Manager. * * * Any
Officer elected or appointed by the Manager may be
removed at any time, with or without cause, by the
Manager. Any vacancy occurring in any office of the
Company shall be filled by the Manager.
- 46 -
* * * * * * *
11. Books and Records.
a. The Manager shall keep or cause to be
kept complete and accurate books of account and records
with respect to the Company’s business. The Company’s
books of account shall be kept using the method of
accounting determined by the Manager. The Company’s
independent auditor shall be an independent public
accounting firm selected by the Manager. The Manager
shall give each Member reasonable access during normal
business hours to the books and records of the Company.
* * * * * * *
12. Capital Contributions.
The Initial Member was deemed admitted as the
sole Member of the Company upon the execution and
delivery of this Agreement. After the Effective Time
of the Merger and immediately after TMC shall have been
appointed Manager pursuant to Section 9(b), the Initial
Member will contribute the amount of cash to the
Company listed on Schedule B attached hereto [$1.375
billion].
* * * * * * *
15. Distributions.
Distributions of cash or other assets of the
Company shall be made at such times and in such amounts
as the Manager may determine in its sole discretion;
provided, however, that notwithstanding the foregoing,
the Initial Member shall be entitled to receive, and
the Company and the Manager shall make, distributions
of cash (or other assets of the Company acceptable to
the Member) to the Initial Member in the amounts and at
the times sufficient to enable the Initial Member
(a) to pay all of its liabilities, obligations and
expenses as and when they come due and (b) to make any
payments on, or distributions in respect of, the issued
and outstanding shares of the Voting Preferred Stock of
the Initial Member in accordance with the terms
thereof. * * *
- 47 -
16. Return of Capital.
The Manager shall not have any liability for
the return of each Member’s capital contribution, which
return shall be payable solely from the assets of the
Company at the absolute discretion of the Manager,
subject to the requirements of the Act and Section 15
hereof.
* * * * * * *
18. Exculpation and Indemnification.
a. No Member, Manager, Officer, employee or
agent of the Company and no employee, representative,
agent, shareholder or Affiliate of the Member or the
Manager (collectively, the “Covered Persons”) shall be
liable to the Company or any other Person who has an
interest in or claim against the Company for any loss,
damage or claim incurred by reason of any act or
omission performed or omitted by such Covered Person in
good faith on behalf of the Company and in a manner
reasonably believed to be within the scope of the
authority conferred on such Covered Person by this
Agreement, except that a Covered Person shall be liable
for any such loss, damage or claim incurred by reason
of such Covered Person’s gross negligence or willful
misconduct. Notwithstanding anything herein to the
contrary, “Covered Person” shall include any person
that was a Member, Manager, Officer, employee or agent
of the Company or an employee, representative, agent,
shareholder or Affiliate of the Member or the Manager
at the time the act or omission described in this
Section 18(a) was performed or omitted even if such
person is no longer a Member, Manager, Officer,
employee or agent of the Company or an employee,
representative, agent, shareholder or Affiliate of a
Member or the Manager at the time the loss, damage or
claim is incurred as a result of such act or omission.
* * * * * * *
e. To the extent that, at law or in equity,
a Covered Person has duties (including fiduciary
duties) and liabilities relating thereto to the Company
or to any other Covered Person, a Covered Person acting
under this Agreement shall not be liable to the Company
or to any other Covered Person for its good faith
- 48 -
reliance on the provisions of this Agreement or any
approval or authorization granted by the Company or any
other Covered Person. The provisions of this
Agreement, to the extent that they restrict the duties
and liabilities of a Covered Person otherwise existing
at law or in equity, are agreed by the Member and the
Manager to replace such other duties and liabilities of
such Covered Person.
f. The foregoing provisions of this
Section 18 shall survive any termination of this
Agreement.
19. Resignation.
No Member shall have the right to resign from
the Company except with the consent of the Manager and
upon such terms and conditions as may be specifically
agreed upon between the Manager and the resigning
Member.
* * * * * * *
21. Dissolution.
Subject to the provisions of Section 22 of
this Agreement, the Company shall be dissolved and its
affairs wound up upon the first to occur of the
following:
a. The determination of the Manager to
dissolve the Company;
b. The occurrence of an Event of Withdrawal;
c. The occurrence of any event which
terminates the membership of the last remaining Member
of the Company unless the business of the Company is
continued in a manner permitted by the Act including,
without limitation, the appointment by the Manager of a
member of this Company within ninety (90) days after
the occurrence of such an event; or
d. The entry of a decree of judicial
dissolution under Section 18-802 of the Act.
* * * * * * *
- 49 -
23. Assignments of Percentage Interest.
No Member may, directly or indirectly, sell,
assign, pledge or otherwise transfer or encumber any
portion of such Member’s Percentage Interest (a
“Transfer”) to any other person without the prior
written consent of the Manager, which may be given or
withheld in its sole discretion and which consent may
be subject to such terms and conditions as the Manager
may determine. Any purported Transfer in violation of
Section 23 shall be null and void and shall not be
recognized by the Company.
24. Waiver of Partition; Nature of Interest.
Except as otherwise expressly provided in
this Agreement, to the fullest extent permitted by law,
each Member hereby irrevocably waives any right or
power that such Member might have to cause the Company
or any of its assets to be partitioned, to cause the
appointment of a receiver for all or any portion of the
assets of the Company, to compel any sale of all or any
portion of the assets of the Company pursuant to any
applicable law or to file a complaint or to institute
any proceeding at law or in equity to cause the
dissolution, liquidation, winding up or termination of
the Company. No Member shall have any interest in any
specific assets of the Company. The interest of each
Member in the Company is personal property.
* * * * * * *
29. Amendments.
This Agreement may be amended by the Manager
at any time in its sole discretion, provided that
(a) any amendment to Section 9(d), Section 11, the
first sentence of Section 13, Section 14, the proviso
to the first sentence of Section 15, Section 17,
Section 18, Section 20, Section 24, this Section 29 or
Section 34 hereof shall not be effective without the
Initial Member’s prior written consent, which consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld and (b) any
amendment which materially and adversely affects the
rights of any Member shall not be effective without
such Member’s consent, such consent not to be
unreasonably withheld; provided further that, in
addition to any consent or approval otherwise required
- 50 -
under this Section 29 or applicable law, any amendment
which materially and adversely affects the rights of
all the Members in the same or similar manner shall
only be effective if such amendment has been approved
by Members holding a Majority in Interest, such
approval not to be unreasonably withheld; and provided
further that any amendment to Section 9 must be
approved by TMC in its sole discretion.
* * * * * * *
33. Enforceability by TMC.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Agreement, the Member agrees that this Agreement
constitutes a legal, valid and binding agreement of the
Member, and is enforceable against the Member by TMC
(both in its corporate capacity, prior to the Effective
Time of the Merger, and in its capacity, as of
immediately after the Effective Time of the Merger, as
the Manager of the Company), in accordance with its
terms. In addition, TMC (both in its corporate
capacity, prior to the Effective Time of the Merger,
and in its capacity, as of immediately after the
Effective Time of the Merger, as the Manager of the
Company) is an intended beneficiary of this Agreement.
X. Execution of MB Parent Stockholders Agreement and the
MergerSub Shareholders Agreement
On July 28, 1998, representatives of Times Mirror, TMD,
REUS, REBV, and MB Parent executed an agreement entitled
“CBM Acquisition Parent Co. Stockholders Agreement” (MB Parent
stockholders agreement). Under the terms of the MB Parent
stockholders agreement, Times Mirror, TMD, REUS, REBV, and MB
Parent agreed, in pertinent part, to the following:
Section 1. Call Option with Respect to Voting
Preferred Stock.
(a) Grant of Call Option. Acquirors [REUS and
REBV] hereby grant to TMD an option, exercisable by TMD
no earlier than fifteen (15) days after the occurrence
- 51 -
of any Call Event (as defined below), to purchase, in
the manner provided in Section 1(d), all, but not less
than all, of the outstanding shares of [MB Parent]
Voting Preferred Stock, at a purchase price per share
equal to 100% of the Stated Value thereof on the date
of purchase, payable in cash.
(b) Definition of Call Event. A “Call Event”
shall mean (i) June 30, 2018, (ii) any voluntary
transfer or other disposition by the Company
[MB Parent] of all or any portion of the shares of
MergerSub Participating Preferred Stock or (iii) any
voluntary transfer or other disposition by the Company
of all or any portion of the shares of MergerSub Voting
Preferred Stock.
(c) Call Option Subject to the Company’s Right of
Redemption. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the right
of TMD to exercise the option granted pursuant to
Section 1(a) shall be subject to the Company’s right to
redeem the Voting Preferred Stock pursuant to
Section 3(g)(i) of Article V of the Restated
Certificate of Incorporation of the Company upon the
occurrence of a Redemption Event (as defined therein)
and to the Company’s obligation to redeem the Voting
Preferred Stock of a holder of Voting Preferred Stock
at the option of such holder pursuant to
Section 3(g)(ii) of Article V of the Restated
Certificate of Incorporation of the Company upon the
occurrence of an event specified therein.
* * * * * * *
Section 2. Put Option with Respect to Voting
Preferred Stock.
(a) Grant of Put Option. TMD hereby grants to
each Acquiror an option, exercisable after (i) June 30,
2018 or (ii) upon the occurrence of any failure of
Liberty Bell I, LLC (or a successor thereof) or its
manager to make distributions contemplated by
Section 15 of the Limited Liability Company Agreement
of Liberty Bell I, LLC, dated as of July 28, 1998
* * *, to require TMD to purchase, in the manner
provided in Section 2(b), the shares of the [MB Parent]
Voting Preferred Stock held by each Acquiror, at a
purchase price per share equal to 100% of the Stated
Value thereof on the date of purchase, payable in cash.
- 52 -
Section 3. Restrictions on Transfer.
(a) General. No holder of shares of [MB Parent]
Voting Preferred Stock shall, directly or indirectly,
transfer or otherwise dispose of any shares of
[MB Parent] Voting Preferred Stock owned by such holder
or any interest therein prior to June 30, 2000. * * *
Also on July 28, 1998, representatives of REUS, REBV,
MB Parent, and MergerSub executed an agreement entitled
“CBM MergerSub Corp. Shareholders Agreement” (MergerSub
shareholders agreement). Under the terms of the MergerSub
shareholders agreement, REUS, REBV, MB Parent, and MergerSub
agreed, in pertinent part, to the following:
Section 1. Call Option with Respect to Voting
Preferred Stock.
(a) Grant of Call Option. MB Parent hereby grants
to Acquirors [REUS and REBV] an option, exercisable by
Acquirors on or after July 15, 2018, to purchase, in
the manner provided in Section 1(c), all, but not less
than all, of the outstanding shares of [MergerSub]
Voting Preferred Stock, at a purchase price per share
equal to 100% of the Stated Value thereof on the date
of purchase.
(b) Call Option Subject to the Company’s Right of
Redemption. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the right
of Acquirors to exercise the option granted pursuant to
Section 1(a) shall be subject to the Company’s
[MergerSub’s] right or obligation, as the case may be,
to redeem the Voting Preferred Stock pursuant to
Section 4(g)(i) of Article V of the Restated
Certificate of Incorporation of the Company upon the
occurrence of an event specified therein and the
Company’s obligation to redeem the Voting Preferred
Stock of a holder of Voting Preferred Stock at the
option of such holder pursuant to Section 4(g)(ii) of
Article V of the Restated Certificate of Incorporation
of the Company upon the occurrence of an event
specified therein.
- 53 -
* * * * * * *
Section 2. Put Option with Respect to Voting
Preferred Stock.
(a) Grant of Put Option. Acquiror[s] hereby
grants [sic] to MB Parent an option, exercisable after
June 30, 2018, to require Acquirors to purchase, in the
manner provided in Section 2(b), all, but not less than
all, of the outstanding shares of the [MergerSub]
Voting Preferred Stock, at a purchase price per share
equal to 100% of the Stated Value thereof on the date
of purchase.
* * * * * * *
Section 3. Call Option with Respect to
Participating Preferred Stock.
(a) Grant of Call Option. MB Parent hereby grants
to Acquirors an option, exercisable by Acquirors on or
after July 15, 2018, to purchase, in the manner
provided in Section 3(c), all, but not less than all,
of the outstanding shares of [MergerSub] Participating
Preferred Stock, at a purchase price per share equal to
the dollar amount derived from the EBITDA Formula (as
defined in Section 3(g)(i)(B) of Article V of the
Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company).
(b) Call Option Subject to the Company’s Right of
Redemption. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the right
of Acquirors to exercise the option granted pursuant to
Section 3(a) shall be subject to the Company’s right to
redeem the Participating Preferred Stock pursuant to
Section 3(g)(i) of Article V of the Restated
Certificate of Incorporation of the Company upon the
occurrence of an event specified therein and the
Company’s obligation to redeem the Participating
Preferred Stock pursuant to Section 3(g)(ii) of
Article V of the Restated Certificate of Incorporation
of the Company upon the occurrence of an event
specified therein.
* * * * * * *
Section 4. Put Option with Respect to
Participating Preferred Stock.
- 54 -
(a) Grant of Put Option. Acquirors hereby grant
to MB Parent an option, exercisable after June 30,
2018, to require Acquirors to purchase, in the manner
provided in Section 2(b), all, but not less than all,
of the outstanding shares of the [MergerSub]
Participating Preferred Stock, at a purchase price per
share equal to the dollar amount derived from the
EBITDA Formula.
* * * * * * *
Section 5. Certain Additional Call Options.
(a) Grant of Call Option. MB Parent hereby grants
to Acquirors an option, exercisable by Acquirors upon
the occurrence of a Call Event (as defined * * * below)
to purchase in the manner provided in Section 5(c),
all, but not less than all, of either or both of
(i) the shares of [MergerSub] Voting Preferred Stock,
at a purchase price per share equal to 100% of the
Stated Value thereof on the date of purchase and
(ii) the shares of [MergerSub] Participating Preferred
Stock, at a purchase price per share equal to the
dollar amount derived from the EBITDA Formula.
(b) Definition of Call Event. For purposes of
Section 5, a “Call Event” shall mean (i) that the Net
Worth of Liberty Bell I, LLC is less than $275 million,
(ii) the insolvency, liquidation, bankruptcy, or any
similar event, of MB Parent, (iii) any threatened or
actual involuntary transfer or disposition by MB Parent
of any shares of Participating Preferred Stock, (iv)
any threatened or actual involuntary transfer or
disposition by MB Parent of any shares of Voting
Preferred Stock or (v) any failure of Liberty Bell I,
LLC (or a successor thereof) or its manager to make
distributions contemplated by Section 15 of the Limited
Liability Company Agreement of Liberty Bell I, LLC
dated as of July 28, 1998 * * *
* * * * * * *
Section 6. Drag-Along Rights.
(a) The Drag-Along Right. After June 30, 2003, if
Acquirors (together with any of their successors,
transferees and assigns, the “Selling Shareholders”)
propose to sell all of the shares of [MergerSub] Common
- 55 -
Stock to a single person or to any group of related
persons (the “Prospective Purchaser”), then such
Selling Shareholders shall have the right (the “Drag-
Along Right”) to compel MB Parent (together with its
successors, transferees and assigns, the “Drag-Along
Shareholders”) to sell all of the shares of [MergerSub]
Participating Preferred Stock and [MergerSub] Voting
Preferred Stock owned by them to the Prospective
Purchaser at, in the case of Voting Preferred Stock, a
price per share equal to 100% of the Stated Value of
the Voting Preferred Stock on the date of purchase and,
in the case of the Participating Preferred Stock, a
price per share equal to the dollar amount derived from
the EBITDA Formula, and otherwise on the same terms and
subject to the same conditions, as the Selling
Shareholders are able to obtain with respect to the
Common Stock. * * *
* * * * * * *
Section 7. Restrictions on Transfer.
(a) General. Except as otherwise permitted or
required hereby, no holder of shares of Voting
Preferred Stock shall, directly or indirectly, transfer
or otherwise dispose of any shares of Voting Preferred
Stock owned by such holder or any interest therein
prior to June 30, 2003. Except as otherwise permitted
or required hereby, no holder of shares of
Participating Preferred Stock shall, directly or
indirectly, transfer or otherwise dispose of any shares
of Participating Preferred Stock owned by such holder,
or any interest therein prior to June 30, 2003. * * *
Y. Filing of the Restated Certificates of Incorporation
for MB Parent and MergerSub
On July 29, 1998, a restated certificate of incorporation
for MB Parent was filed with the Secretary of State of the State
of Delaware. The restated certificate of incorporation for MB
Parent established five directors, of whom three would constitute
a quorum, and included the following provisions:
- 56 -
ARTICLE V
AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK
Section 1. Authorized Shares.
The total number of shares of all classes of
capital stock which the corporation shall have the
authority to issue is Five Thousand (5,000) shares, of
which (1) One Thousand (1,000) shares, having a par
value of $.01 per share, shall be Common Stock (“Common
Stock”) and (ii) Four Thousand (4,000) shares, having a
par value of $.01 per share, shall be Voting Preferred
Stock (“Voting Preferred Stock”).
Section 2. Common Stock.
* * * * * * *
(b) Voting Rights.
(i) Voting Power. Except as otherwise
provided in Section (3)(i)(ii) of this Article V, the
holders of shares of Common Stock shall be entitled to
vote on all matters presented to the stockholders of
the corporation. Except as otherwise provided herein
or required by law, the holders of Common Stock shall
vote together with the holders of shares of Voting
Preferred Stock. Each share of Common Stock shall be
entitled to one (1) vote per share.
(ii) Voting Rights with Respect to Election
or Removal of Directors. The holders of shares of
Common Stock shall be entitled, voting as a separate
class, to elect one (1) director of the corporation
(the “Common Stock Director”). The Common Stock
Director shall be removed only by a vote of the holders
of a majority of the shares of Common Stock, voting as
a separate class.
Section 3. Voting Preferred Stock.
* * * * * * *
(b) Issuance and Stated Value. The shares of
Voting Preferred Stock shall be issued by the
corporation for their Stated Value (as defined below),
in such amounts, at such times and to such persons as
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shall be specified by the corporation’s Board of
Directors, from time to time. For the purposes hereof,
the “Stated Value” of each share of Voting Preferred
Stock (regardless of its par value) shall be $17,187.50
per share plus the Unpaid Dividend Amount (as defined
below), which Stated Value shall be proportionately
increased or decreased for any subdivision,
combination, reclassification or stock split,
respectively, of the outstanding shares of Voting
Preferred Stock. For the purposes hereof, the “Unpaid
Dividend Amount” with respect to each share of the
Voting Preferred Stock shall be equal to the aggregate
of all Quarterly Dividends (as defined below) that the
holder of such share shall have theretofore become
entitled to receive for such share but that shall not
have been declared and paid by the Board of Directors
of the corporation.
(c) Rank. The Voting Preferred Stock shall, with
respect to dividend rights and rights on liquidation,
winding up and dissolution, rank (i) senior to the
Common Stock and all other classes or series of stock
of the corporation now or hereafter authorized, issued
or outstanding that by their terms expressly provide
that they are junior to the Voting Preferred Stock or
which do not specify their rank with respect to the
Voting Preferred Stock (collectively with the Common
Stock, “Junior Securities”) and (ii) on a parity with
all classes or series of stock of the corporation now
or hereafter authorized, issued or outstanding that by
their terms expressly provide that they will rank on
parity with the Voting Preferred Stock as to dividend
distributions and distributions upon liquidation,
winding up and dissolution of the corporation
(collectively, “Parity Securities”).
(d) Dividends.
(i) Amount of Dividends. On the last
business day of each March, June, September and
December in each calendar year (the “Dividend Accrual
Date”), each holder of record as of the close of
business on the Dividend Accrual Date of shares of the
Voting Preferred Stock as their names appear in the
stock register of the corporation on such date shall
become entitled to receive (when, as and if declared by
the Board of Directors of the corporation) a dividend
(the “Quarterly Dividend”) equal to one and three
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hundred seventy-five thousands percent (1.375%) of the
Stated Value of such share (pro-rated for any portion
of the full calendar quarter that such share shall have
been issued and outstanding).
* * * * * * *
(e) Restrictions on Junior Payments. So long as
any shares of Voting Preferred Stock are outstanding,
the corporation shall not (i) declare, pay or set apart
for payment any dividend on, or make any distribution
in respect of, Junior Securities or any warrants,
rights, calls or options exercisable or convertible
into any Junior Securities, either directly or
indirectly, whether in cash, obligations or shares of
the corporation or other property * * *, (ii) make any
payment on account of, or set apart for payment money
for a sinking or other similar fund for, the purchase,
redemption, retirement or other acquisition for value
of any of, or redeem, purchase, retire or otherwise
acquire for value any of, the Junior Securities * * *
or any warrants, rights, calls or options exercisable
for or convertible into any of the Junior Securities,
or (iii) permit any corporation or other entity
directly or indirectly controlled by the corporation to
purchase, redeem, retire, or otherwise acquire for
value any of the Junior Securities or any warrants,
rights, calls or options exercisable for or convertible
into any Junior Securities.
(f) Liquidation Preference.
(i) Liquidation Preference. In the event of
any voluntary or involuntary liquidation, dissolution
or winding up of the affairs of the corporation, the
holders of shares of Voting Preferred Stock then
outstanding shall be entitled to be paid out of the
assets of the corporation available for distribution to
its stockholders, whether such assets are capital or
surplus and whether or not any Quarterly Dividends are
declared, an amount equal to the Stated Value for each
share outstanding on the date fixed for liquidation,
dissolution or winding up (the “Liquidation
Preference”), before any payment shall be made or any
assets distributed to the holders of Junior Securities.
* * *
* * * * * * *
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(g) Redemption.
(i) Redemption by the Corporation.
(A) The corporation may, at its option upon
or after the occurrence of any Redemption Event (as
defined below), redeem, out of funds legally available
therefor, in the manner provided in Section 3(g)(ii)(A)
of this Article V, all, but not less than all, of the
shares of Voting Preferred Stock, at a redemption price
equal to 100% of the Stated Value thereof on the date
of redemption payable in cash.
(B) For purposes of this Section 3(g)(i), a
“Redemption Event” shall mean (x) June 30, 2018, (y)
any transfer or other disposition by the corporation of
shares of Participating Preferred Stock, par value $.01
per share, of CBM MergerSub Corp., a New York
corporation (hereinafter “CBM MergerSub Corp.”)
[MergerSub], or the comparable securities of any
successor corporation to CBM MergerSub Corp. (the
“MergerSub Participating Preferred Stock”) or (z) any
transfer or other disposition by the corporation of
shares of Voting Preferred Stock, par value $.01 per
share, of CBM MergerSub Corp. or the comparable
securities of any successor corporation to
CBM MergerSub Corp. (the “MergerSub Voting Preferred
Stock”).
(ii) Redemption at Option of Holders.
(i) After June 30, 2018 or (ii) upon the occurrence of
any failure of Liberty Bell I, LLC (or a successor
thereof) or its manager to make distributions
contemplated by Section 15 of the Limited Liability
Company Agreement of Liberty Bell I, LLC dated as of
July 28, 1998 * * *, any holder of shares of Voting
Preferred Stock shall be entitled at its option, to
require the corporation to redeem, out of funds legally
available therefor, in the manner provided in
Section 3(g)(iii)(B) of this Article V, all of the
shares of the Voting Preferred Stock held by such
holder, at a redemption price per share equal to 100%
of the Stated Value thereof on the date of redemption
payable in cash.
* * * * * * *
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(i) Voting Rights.
(i) Voting Power. Except as otherwise
provided in Section 2(b)(ii) of this Article V or as
required by law, the holders of Voting Preferred Stock
shall be entitled to vote on all matters presented to
the stockholders of the corporation. Except as
otherwise provided herein or required by law, the
holders of Voting Preferred Stock shall vote together
with the holders of shares of Common Stock. Each share
of Voting Preferred Stock shall be entitled to one (1)
vote per share.
(ii) Voting Rights with Respect to Election
of Directors. The holders of shares of Voting
Preferred Stock shall be entitled, voting as a separate
class, to elect four (4) directors of the corporation
(the “Preferred Stock Directors”). A Preferred Stock
Director shall be removed only by the vote of the
holders of a majority of the shares of Voting Preferred
Stock, voting as a separate class.
* * * * * * *
(j) Transfer Restrictions.
(i) General. No holder of shares of Voting
Preferred Stock shall, directly or indirectly, transfer
or otherwise dispose of any shares of Voting Preferred
Stock owned by such holder, or any interest therein
prior to June 30, 2000. * * *
* * * * * * *
ARTICLE VI
POWERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Except as otherwise provided by law, the Board of
Directors is expressly authorized and empowered by
majority vote to determine all matters relating to the
business and management of the corporation; provided,
however, the following actions shall be taken by the
corporation only upon the unanimous vote of the Board
of Directors including, in each case, the Common Stock
Director: (a) the incurrence of indebtedness or any
other similar obligation, including in the form of any
guaranty of the indebtedness of another person; (b) the
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sale, transfer or other disposition, pledge,
encumbering or assignment by the corporation of all or
any portion of its limited liability company interest
in Liberty Bell I, LLC; (c) the amendment of this
Restated Certificate of Incorporation; (d) the issuance
by the corporation of any shares of capital stock, or
any other securities or options or warrants to purchase
any shares of capital stock or other securities;
(e) the declaration of any dividends with respect to
the Common Stock; (f) the sale or redemption of the
shares of MergerSub Participating Preferred Stock held
by the corporation prior to June 30, 2003 other than in
accordance with the terms thereof or of the
CBM MergerSub Corp. Shareholders Agreement among
CBM MergerSub Corp., Reed Elsevier U.S. Holdings Inc.,
Reed Elsevier Overseas BV and the corporation dated as
of July 28, 1998 * * * (the “MergerSub Shareholders
Agreement”); (g) the sale or redemption of the shares
of MergerSub Voting Preferred Stock held by the
corporation prior to June 30, 2003 other than in
accordance with the terms of the Shareholder Agreement;
(h) the approval by the Board of Directors of any
action taken by the corporation with respect to any
shareholder resolution relating to a change in the
Restated Certificate of Incorporation of CBM MergerSub
Corp. or any successor entity, or a modification of the
terms of the MergerSub Participating Preferred Stock or
the MergerSub Voting Preferred Stock, except for an
increase in the authorized shares of Common Stock of
CBM MergerSub Corp., (i) the approval by the Board of
Directors of any action taken by the corporation with
respect to any shareholder resolution relating to the
liquidation or dissolution of CBM MergerSub Corp. or
any successor corporation, the merger into or
consolidation with another entity of CBM MergerSub
Corp. or any successor corporation unless the
certificate of incorporation of the surviving
corporation in such merger or consolidation is the
Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Matthew Bender
& Company, Incorporated, immediately after giving
effect to the merger of CBM MergerSub Corp. with and
into Matthew Bender & Company, Incorporated, without
any amendment or restatement; (j) the amendment of the
Stockholders Agreement or (k) the amendment of the
MergerSub Shareholders Agreement.
- 62 -
(On August 6, 1998, a certificate of correction was filed with
the secretary of state of the State of Delaware with respect to
MB Parent’s restated certificate of incorporation. The minor
corrections that were made to MB Parent’s restated certificate of
incorporation as a result of this filing are reflected in the
preceding excerpt.)
Also on July 29, 1998, a restated certificate of
incorporation for MergerSub was filed with the Department of
State of the State of New York. The restated certificate of
incorporation for MergerSub established five directors, of whom
three would constitute a quorum, and included the following
provisions:
ARTICLE V
AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK
Section 1. Authorized Shares.
The total number of shares of all classes of
capital stock which the corporation shall have
authority to issue is Twenty-Three Thousand Nine
Hundred Seventy (23,970) shares, of which (i) Twenty
Thousand (20,000) shares, having a par value of
$.01 per share, shall be Common Stock (“Common Stock”)
having the rights, preferences and privileges set forth
in Section 2 of this Article V, (ii) Ten (10) shares,
having a par value of $.01 per share, shall be
Nonvoting Participating Preferred Stock (“Participating
Preferred Stock”) having the rights, preferences and
privileges set forth in Section 3 of this Article V and
(iii) Three Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty (3,960) shares,
having a par value of $.01 per share, shall be Voting
Preferred Stock (“Voting Preferred Stock” and, together
with the Participating Preferred Stock, “Preferred
Stock”) having the rights, preferences and privileges
set forth in Section 4 of this Article V.
- 63 -
Section 2. Common Stock.
* * * * * * *
(i) Voting Power. Except as otherwise
provided in Sections 4(i)(ii) of this Article V, the
holders of shares of Common Stock shall be entitled to
vote on all matters presented to the shareholders of
the corporation. Except as otherwise provided herein
or required by law, holders of shares of Common Stock
shall vote together with holders of shares of Voting
Preferred Stock. Except as otherwise provided in
Section 2(a)(ii), the shares of Common Stock shall
represent, in the aggregate, twenty (20) votes and each
share of Common Stock outstanding on the relevant
record date shall have a vote equal to twenty (20)
divided by the number of shares of Common Stock
outstanding on such record date.
(ii) Voting Rights with Respect to Election
or Removal of Directors and Certain Other Matters. The
holders of shares of Common Stock shall be entitled,
voting as a separate class, to elect one (1) director
of the corporation (the “Common Stock Director”). The
Common Stock Director shall be removed only by the vote
of the holders of a majority of the shares of Common
Stock, voting as a separate class. In voting for the
election or removal of the Common Stock Director or in
any other matter on which the Common Stock shall vote
as a separate class, each share of Common Stock shall
be entitled to one vote per share.
Section 3. Participating Preferred Stock.
(a) Issuance. The shares of Participating
Preferred Stock shall be issued by the corporation for
their par value, without stated value.
(b) Rank. The Participating Preferred Stock
shall, (i) with respect to rights with respect to the
Quarterly Preferred Dividends (as defined below) and
rights with respect to the Participating Preferred
Liquidation Preference (as defined below) upon
liquidation, winding up and dissolution, rank
(x) senior to the Common Stock and all other classes or
series of stock of the corporation now or hereafter
authorized, issued or outstanding that by their terms
expressly provide that they are junior to the
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Participating Preferred Stock as to Quarterly Preferred
Dividend distributions or as to the Participating
Preferred Liquidation Preference upon liquidation,
winding up or dissolution or which do not specify their
rank with respect to the Participating Preferred Stock
(collectively with the Common Stock, “Participating
Junior Securities”) and (y) on a parity with the Voting
Preferred Stock and all other classes or series of
stock of the corporation now or hereafter authorized,
issued or outstanding that by their terms expressly
provide that they will rank on parity with the Voting
Preferred Stock as to the dividend distributions and
distributions upon liquidation, winding up and
dissolution of the corporation (collectively with the
Voting Preferred Stock, “Preferred Parity Securities”)
and (ii) with respect to the Participating Dividends
(as defined below) and all other rights with respect to
distributions upon liquidation, winding up or
dissolution, on a parity with the Common Stock.
(c) Quarterly Preferred Dividends.
(i) Amount of Quarterly Preferred Dividends.
On the last business day of each March, June, September
and December in each calendar year (the “Preferred
Dividend Accrual Date”), each holder of record as of
the close of business on the Preferred Dividend Accrual
Date of shares of the Participating Preferred Stock as
their names appear in the stock register of the
corporation on such date shall become entitled to
receive (when, as and if declared by the Board of
Directors of the corporation) a dividend (the
“Quarterly Preferred Dividend”) equal to one cent
($.01) per share (pro-rated for any portion of a full
calendar quarter that such share shall have been issued
and outstanding).
* * * * * * *
(d) Restrictions on Participating Junior Payments.
So long as any shares of Participating Preferred Stock
are outstanding, the corporation shall not (i) declare,
pay or set apart for payment any dividend on, or make
any distribution in respect of, Participating Junior
Securities or any warrants, rights, calls or options
exercisable or convertible into any Participating
Junior Securities, either directly or indirectly,
whether in cash, obligations or shares of the
- 65 -
corporation or other property * * *, (ii) make any
payment on account of, or set apart for payment money
for a sinking or other similar fund for, the purchase,
redemption, retirement or other acquisition for value
of any of, or redeem, purchase, retire or otherwise
acquire for value any of, the Participating Junior
Securities * * * or any warrants, rights, calls or
options exercisable for or convertible into any of the
Participating Junior Securities, or (iii) permit any
corporation or other entity directly or indirectly
controlled by the corporation to purchase, redeem,
retire or otherwise acquire for value any of the
Participating Junior Securities or any warrants,
rights, calls or options exercisable for or convertible
into any Participating Junior Securities, in each case,
at any time when there is an Unpaid Preferred Dividend
Amount. For the purposes hereof, the “Unpaid Preferred
Dividend Amount” with respect to each share of the
Participating Preferred Stock shall be equal to the
aggregate of all Quarterly Preferred Dividends that the
holder of such share shall have theretofore become
entitled to receive for such share but that shall not
have been declared and paid by the Board of Directors
of the corporation.
(e) Participating Dividends. Each holder of
record as of the close of business on the record date
set therefor of shares of Participating Preferred Stock
* * * shall become entitled to receive on a pro rata
basis with the holders of shares of Common Stock any
dividend (when, as and if declared by the Board of
Directors of the corporation) with respect to the
Common Stock (the “Participating Dividend”).
(f) Participating Preferred Liquidation
Preference.
(i) Participating Preferred Liquidation
Preference. In the event of any voluntary or
involuntary liquidation, dissolution or winding up of
the affairs of the corporation, the holders of shares
of Participating Preferred Stock then outstanding shall
be entitled to be paid out of the assets of the
corporation available for distribution to its
shareholders, whether such assets are capital or
surplus and whether or not any Quarterly Preferred
Dividends are declared, an amount equal to the par
value for each share outstanding on the date fixed for
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liquidation, dissolution or winding up (the
“Participating Preferred Liquidation Preference”),
before any payment shall be made or any assets
distributed to the holders of Participating Junior
Securities. * * *
(ii) Additional Rights Upon Liquidation. In
addition to the Participating Preferred Liquidation
Preference, each holder of shares of Participating
Preferred Stock will be entitled to participate on a
pro rata basis with holders of shares of the Common
Stock in any distribution of the assets of the
corporation upon liquidation, winding up or
dissolution.
* * * * * * *
(g) Redemption.
(i) Redemption by the Corporation.
(A) After (i) June 30, 2018, (ii) the
insolvency, liquidation, bankruptcy or any similar
event, of CBM Acquisition Parent Co. (hereinafter
referred to as “MB Parent”), (iii) any threatened or
actual involuntary transfer or disposition by MB Parent
of any shares of Participating Preferred Stock,
(iv) any threatened or actual involuntary transfer or
disposition by MB Parent of any shares of Voting
Preferred Stock or (v) any failure of Liberty Bell I,
LLC (or a successor thereof) or its manager to make
distributions contemplated by Section 15 of the Limited
Liability Company Agreement of Liberty Bell I, LLC
dated as of July __, 1998 * * * (each of the events
described in clauses (ii) through (v), a “Trigger
Event”), the corporation may, at its option, redeem,
out of funds legally available therefor, in the manner
provided in Section 3(g)(iii)(A) of Article V, all, but
not less than all, of the shares of Participating
Preferred Stock, at a redemption price per share,
payable in cash, equal to the dollar amount derived
from the EBITDA Formula (as defined below).
(B) “EBITDA Formula” means (x)(I) 8.5
multiplied by Trailing Four Quarter EBITDA less
(II) Debt less (III) the aggregate Stated Value of the
Voting Preferred Stock multiplied by (y).01 divided by
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(z) the number of shares of Participating Preferred
Stock then outstanding or, expressed algebraically
.01 x (8.5 x Trailing Four Quarter EBITDA - Debt - Aggregate Stated Value of the Voting Preferred
Stock)
number of shares of Participating Preferred Stock then outstanding
“Trailing Four Quarter EBITDA” means the sum of the
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization of the corporation as of the last day of
each of the preceding four fiscal quarters of the
corporation ended prior to the date of determination
* * *. “Debt” means all indebtedness for borrowed
money of the corporation * * *
(ii) Redemption at Option of Holders. After
June 30, 2018, any holder of shares of Participating
Preferred Stock shall be entitled, at its option, to
require the corporation to redeem, out of funds legally
available therefor, in the manner provided in Section
3(g)(iii)(B) of this Article V, all of the shares of
the Participating Preferred Stock held by it, at a
redemption price per share, payable in cash, equal to
the dollar amount derived from the EBITDA Formula.
* * * * * * *
(i) Voting Rights. Except as specifically set
forth in the NYBCL [the Business Corporation Law of the
State of New York], the holders of shares of
Participating Preferred Stock shall not be entitled to
any voting rights with respect to any matters voted
upon by shareholders of the corporation.
(j) Restrictions on Transfer.
(i) No holder of shares of Participating
Preferred Stock shall, directly or indirectly, transfer
or otherwise dispose of any shares of Participating
Preferred Stock owned by such holder, or any interest
therein prior to June 30, 2003. * * *
* * * * * * *
Section 4. Voting Preferred Stock.
* * * * * * *
(b) Issuance and Stated Value. The shares of
Voting Preferred Stock shall be issued by the
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corporation for their Stated Value (as defined below),
in such amounts, at such times and to such persons as
shall be specified by the corporation’s Board of
Directors, from time to time. For the purposes hereof,
the “Stated Value” of each share of Voting Preferred
Stock (regardless of its par value) shall be
$15,559.6369 per share plus the Unpaid Dividend Amount
(as defined below), which Stated Value shall be
proportionately increased or decreased for any
subdivision, combination, reclassification, or stock
split, respectively, of the outstanding shares of
Voting Preferred Stock. For the purposes hereof, the
“Unpaid Dividend Amount” with respect to each share of
Voting Preferred Stock shall be equal to the aggregate
of all Quarterly Dividends (as defined below) that the
holder of such share shall have theretofore become
entitled to receive for such share but that shall not
have been declared and paid by the Board of Directors
of the corporation.
(c) Rank. The Voting Preferred Stock shall, with
respect to dividend rights and rights on liquidation,
winding up and dissolution, rank (i) senior to the
Common Stock, the Participating Preferred Stock with
respect to the Participating Dividend rights of the
Participating Preferred Stock, and all other classes or
series of stock of the corporation now or hereafter
authorized, issued or outstanding that by their terms
expressly provide that they are junior to the Preferred
Stock or which do not specify their rank with respect
to the Voting Preferred Stock (collectively with the
Common Stock, “Junior Securities”) and (ii) on a parity
with the Participating Preferred Stock with respect to
the Preferred Dividend rights of the Participating
Preferred Stock and all other classes or series of
stock of the corporation now or hereafter authorized,
issued or outstanding that by their terms expressly
provide that they will rank on parity with the Voting
Preferred Stock as to dividend distributions and
distributions upon the liquidation, winding up and
dissolution of the corporation (collectively, “Parity
Securities”).
(d) Quarterly Dividends.
(i) Amount of Quarterly Dividends. On the
last business day of each Preferred Dividend Accrual
Date, each holder of record as of the close of business
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on the Preferred Dividend Accrual Date of shares of the
Voting Preferred Stock as their names appear in the
stock register of the corporation on such date shall
become entitled to receive (when, as and if declared by
the Board of Directors of the corporation) a dividend
(the “Quarterly Dividend”) equal to one and one-quarter
percent (1¼%) of the Stated Value of such share (pro-
rated for any portion of a full calendar quarter that
such share shall have been issued and outstanding).
* * * * * * *
(e) Restrictions on Junior Payments. So long as
any shares of Voting Preferred Stock are outstanding,
the corporation shall not (i) declare, pay or set apart
for payment any dividend on, or make any distribution
in respect of, Junior Securities or any warrants,
rights, calls or options exercisable or convertible
into any Junior Securities, either directly or
indirectly, whether in cash, obligations or shares of
the corporation or other property * * * (ii) make any
payment on account of, or set apart for payment money
for a sinking or other similar fund for, the purchase,
redemption, retirement or other acquisition for value
of any of, or redeem, purchase, retire or otherwise
acquire for value any of, the Junior Securities * * *
or any warrants, rights, calls or options exercisable
for or convertible into any of the Junior Securities,
or (iii) permit any corporation or other entity
directly or indirectly controlled by the corporation to
purchase, redeem, retire or otherwise acquire for value
any of the Junior Securities or any warrants, rights,
calls or options exercisable for or convertible into
any Junior Securities at any time when there is an
Unpaid Dividend Amount with respect to the Voting
Preferred Stock. * * *
(f) Liquidation Preference.
(i) Liquidation Preference. In the event of
any voluntary or involuntary liquidation, dissolution
or winding up of the affairs of the corporation, the
holders of shares of Voting Preferred Stock then
outstanding shall be entitled to be paid out of the
assets of the corporation available for distribution to
its shareholders, whether such assets are capital or
surplus and whether or not any Quarterly Dividends are
declared, an amount equal to the Stated Value for each
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share outstanding on the date fixed for liquidation,
dissolution or winding up (the “Liquidation
Preference”), before any payment shall be made or any
assets distributed to the holders of Junior Securities.
* * *
* * * * * * *
(g) Redemption.
(i) Redemption by the Corporation. After
(A) June 30, 2018, the corporation may, at its option,
in the manner provided in Section 4(g)(iii)(A), and
(B) upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the
corporation shall, in the manner provided in Section
4(g)(iii)(B) of this Article V, redeem, out of funds
legally available therefor, all, but not less than all,
of the shares of Voting Preferred Stock, at a
redemption price per share equal to 100% of the Stated
Value thereof on the date of redemption payable in
cash.
(ii) Redemption at Option of Holders. After
June 30, 2018, any holder of shares of Voting Preferred
Stock shall be entitled, at its option, to require the
corporation to redeem, out of funds legally available
therefor, in the manner provided in Section
4(g)(iii)(C) of this Article V, the shares of the
Preferred Stock held by it, at a redemption price per
share equal to 100% of the Stated Value thereof on the
date of redemption payable in cash.
* * * * * * *
(i) Voting Rights.
(i) Voting Power. Except as otherwise
provided in Section 2(a)(ii) of this Article V or as
required by law, the holders of Voting Preferred Stock
shall be entitled to vote on all matters presented to
the shareholders of the corporation. Except as
otherwise provided herein or required by law, the
holders of shares of Voting Preferred Stock shall vote
together with the holders of shares of Common Stock.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 4(i)(ii) and
4(i)(iii) of this Article V, the shares of Voting
Preferred Stock shall represent, in the aggregate,
eighty (80) votes * * *
- 71 -
(ii) Voting Rights With Respect to Election
or Removal of Directors and Certain Other Matters. The
holders of Voting Preferred Stock shall be entitled,
voting as a separate class, to elect four (4) directors
of the corporation (the “Preferred Stock Directors”).
A Preferred Stock Director shall be removed only by the
vote of the holders of a majority of the shares of
Voting Preferred Stock, voting as a separate class. In
voting for the election or removal of a Preferred Stock
Director or in any other matter on which the Voting
Preferred Stock shall vote as a separate class, each
share of Voting Preferred Stock shall be entitled to
one vote per share.
* * * * * * *
(j) Restrictions on Transfer. No holder of shares
of Voting Preferred Stock shall, directly or
indirectly, transfer or otherwise dispose of any shares
of Voting Preferred Stock owned by such holder, or any
interest therein prior to June 30, 2003. * * *
* * * * * * *
ARTICLE X
RESTRICTIONS ON MERGERS, ETC.
The corporation may not be liquidated, dissolved,
merged into or consolidated with another entity and no
other entity may be merged into or consolidated with
the corporation without the unanimous approval of all
of the shareholders of the corporation entitled to
vote.
ARTICLE XI
CERTAIN WAIVERS
The holders of the Preferred Stock hereby
acknowledge and agree that their rights against the
corporation, the directors of the corporation and
holders of Common Stock are only those explicitly
provided by this Restated Certificate of Incorporation
or in any shareholders agreement executed among the
shareholders of this corporation and to the extent
that, at law or in equity, the corporation, the
- 72 -
directors of the corporation or holders of Common Stock
would otherwise have any other duties (including
fiduciary duties) or obligations to the holders of the
Preferred Stock, either at law or in equity, such
duties and obligations are waived.
The Mechanics of the Bender Transaction
The mechanics of the Bender transaction are set forth below.
All of the events described in this section occurred on July 31,
1998, in accordance with detailed instructions prepared by GD&C.
A. Capitalization of MergerSub and MB Parent
As the first step in the capitalization of MergerSub,
MergerSub borrowed $600 million from the Luxembourg branch of
Elsevier, S.A., an affiliate of Reed. The Luxembourg branch of
Elsevier, S.A., transferred the $600 million to a bank account
that MergerSub maintained at Citibank (MergerSub Citibank
account).
In addition to MergerSub’s borrowing $600 million from the
Luxembourg branch of Elsevier, S.A., REUS and REBV contributed
$616,562,500 and $158,437,500, respectively, to MergerSub. REUS
and REBV transferred their respective contributions to MergerSub
to the MergerSub Citibank account.
After making their respective contributions to MergerSub,
REUS and REBV owned all of the issued and outstanding common
stock of MergerSub, all of the voting preferred stock of
MergerSub, and all of the participating preferred stock of
MergerSub.
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After the capitalization of MergerSub was completed, REUS
and REBV contributed all of their shares of MergerSub voting
preferred stock and MergerSub participating preferred stock to
MB Parent in exchange for 100 percent of MB Parent voting
preferred stock. As a class, the MB Parent voting preferred
stock held by REUS and REBV was entitled to 80 percent of the
voting power of MB Parent and had the power to elect four of the
five directors of MB Parent.
In addition to REUS and REBV’s contributions to MB Parent,
MergerSub contributed $1.375 billion to MB Parent. In return,
MB Parent issued 1,000 shares, i.e., all, of its common stock to
MergerSub. The 1,000 shares of MB Parent common stock received
by MergerSub were entitled to 20 percent of the voting power of
MB Parent. As a class, the MB Parent common stock held by
MergerSub had the power to elect one of the five directors of
MB Parent. MergerSub transferred the $1.375 billion from the
MergerSub Citibank account to a bank account that MB Parent
maintained at Citibank (MB Parent Citibank account).
After the capitalization transactions described above had
been completed, REUS, REBV, and MB Parent together owned all of
the issued and outstanding common stock of MergerSub, all of the
voting preferred stock of MergerSub, and all of the participating
preferred stock of MergerSub. In addition, REUS, REBV, and
MergerSub together owned all of the issued and outstanding common
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stock of MB Parent and all of the voting preferred stock of MB
Parent.
B. Merger of MergerSub and Bender
After the capitalization transactions described above had
been completed, MergerSub merged with and into Bender under the
relevant provisions of the New York Business Corporation Law,
with Bender continuing as the surviving corporation. At the time
that the merger of MergerSub with and into Bender became
effective, all outstanding MergerSub stock was converted into
Bender stock, in the same number of shares, in the same classes,
and with the same voting power, rights, and qualifications as the
previously issued MergerSub common stock, Mergersub voting
preferred stock, and MergerSub participating preferred stock.
After the merger of MergerSub with and into Bender, REUS,
REBV, and TMD held the following interests in MB Parent:
MB Parent Stock REUS REBV TMD
Common stock
Shares owned -- -- 1,000
Percentage of class -- -- 100%
Percentage of vote -- -- 20%
Voting preferred stock
Shares owned 3,000 1,000 --
Percentage of class 75% 25% --
Percentage of vote 60% 20% --
In addition, REUS, REBV, and MB Parent held the following
interests in Bender:
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Bender Stock REUS REBV MB Parent
Common stock
Shares owned 792 198 --
Percentage of class 80% 20% --
Percentage of vote 16% 4% --
Voting preferred stock
Shares owned -- -- 3,960
Percentage of class -- -- 100%
Percentage of vote -- -- 80%
Participating preferred stock
Shares owned -- -- 10
Percentage of class -- -- 100%
Percentage of vote -- -- --
C. Capitalization of LBI (the LLC)
Pursuant to section 9.b. of the LBI LLC agreement, Times
Mirror became the manager of LBI immediately following when the
merger of MergerSub with and into Bender became effective. As of
that time, Lexis informed Mellon Trust and Bank of America that
Times Mirror had replaced Lexis as manager of LBI and that they
were to take instructions directly from Times Mirror on any
administrative and operational aspects relating to LBI’s bank
accounts.
Immediately following Times Mirror’s appointment as manager
of LBI, MB Parent contributed $1.375 billion to LBI. MB Parent
transferred the $1.375 billion from the MB Parent Citibank
account to a bank account that LBI maintained at Citibank (LBI
Citibank account). The $1.375 billion was then transferred from
the LBI Citibank account to a bank account that LBI maintained at
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Bank of America. Times Mirror maintained its bank accounts at
Bank of America as well.
D. Closing
The Bender transaction closed on July 31, 1998. Times
Mirror’s sale of its 50-percent interest in Shepard’s also closed
on that date.
From the time that the Bender transaction closed to the time
of trial of this case, Bender continued as a going concern in the
legal publishing business. The parties have agreed that the
merger of MergerSub with and into Bender, with Bender as the
surviving corporation, under the terms of the Bender agreement
and in accordance with New York Business Corporation Law,
satisfied the continuity of business enterprise requirement for
qualification as a tax-free reorganization under section 368.
Times Mirror’s Management of LBI and the Development of Times
Mirror’s Investment Strategy Following the Closing of the Bender
Transaction
On July 31, 1998, the law firm of Richards, Layton & Finger
(RL&F) prepared an opinion regarding LBI for Times Mirror,
MB Parent, REUS, and REBV. With respect to the LBI LLC
agreement, RL&F was of the opinion that:
2. The LLC Agreement constitutes a legal, valid
and binding agreement of the Member [MB Parent] and
Manager [Times Mirror], and is enforceable against the
Member and the Manager, in accordance with its terms.
3. If properly presented to a Delaware court, a
Delaware court applying Delaware law, would conclude
that (i) the removal of the Manager shall be only at
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the request and direction of the Manager and under no
other circumstances, including, without limitation, for
cause, as provided for in Section 9(b) of the LLC
Agreement and (ii) such provision, contained in
Section 9(b) of the LLC Agreement, that requires the
removal of the Manager to be only at the request and
direction of the Manager, constitutes a legal, valid
and binding agreement of the Member, and is enforceable
against the Member, in accordance with its terms.
On September 1, 1998, Times Mirror, acting in its capacity
as manager of LBI, approved a purchase agreement into which LBI
had entered with Merrill Lynch International on August 17, 1998
(LBI-MLI purchase agreement). Pursuant to the LBI-MLI purchase
agreement, LBI agreed to purchase 1.5 million shares of Series A
common stock of Times Mirror from Merrill Lynch International for
an initial price of approximately $92 million.
On September 30, 1998, Times Mirror, acting in its capacity
as manager of LBI, approved the change of LBI’s name to Eagle New
Media Investments, LLC (hereinafter referred to as the LLC).
A meeting of the officers of the LLC was convened on
October 5, 1998. As of that date, the officers of the LLC were
Unterman; Debra A. Gastler (Gastler), vice president of taxes for
Times Mirror; Steven J. Schoch, vice president and treasurer of
Times Mirror; William A. Niese (Niese); Kay D. Leyba; Anne M.
Bacher; and Udovic. At this meeting, Unterman informed the other
LLC officers of plans to invest the LLC’s funds in shares of
Series A common stock of Times Mirror and in three companies:
Northern Lights, Sinanet, and Homeshark.com.
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A regular meeting of Times Mirror’s board of directors was
convened on October 8, 1998. A written report for this meeting
contained the following statements:
Mosby and Matthew Bender Update
Since our last Board meeting in July, substantial
progress has been made in the divestiture of Mosby and
Matthew Bender.
The divestiture of Matthew Bender/Shepard’s * * *
closed on July 31. Times Mirror received $275 million
in cash for the sale of our 50% interest in Shepard’s
and Liberty Bell I was funded with $1,375 million
through the merger of Matthew Bender. As indicated at
the last Board meeting, the cash received by Times
Mirror was used to repay short-term debt and the funds
held by Liberty Bell will be invested in the repurchase
of Times Mirror stock and in high-quality short-term
investments.
In addition, the section of the October 8, 1998, board report
entitled “Capital Planning Discussion” contained the following
statements:
Introduction
Since the July Board meeting, we have continued to
sharpen our focus on our intended use of the proceeds
from the Mosby and Matthew Bender dispositions as well
as our continuing significant free cash flow. It had
not been our assumption that we would immediately turn
around and use these resources as a war chest to
finance a major acquisition program, and over the past
several months we tested this presumption by examining
in detail the prospect for value creation and the
acceleration of earnings growth through acquisitions.
* * *
* * * * * * *
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Background
In August, with the closing of the Matthew Bender and
Shepards divestitures, we began what we expect will be
an extensive period of managing surplus capital. * * *
Ultimately, our planning challenge is to assess
realistically what the levels of spending might be in
the primary areas of priority which we have stated to
the Board before:
# Capital investments in existing businesses to
drive growth
# Acquisitions that enhance our existing lines
of business
# Dividends necessary to maintain a payout
ratio commensurate with our peer group
average
# Consistent with long-term capitalization
goals, opportunistic stock repurchase
* * * * * * *
Sizing Our Resources
In August, the closing of the divestiture of Matthew
Bender resulted in the deposit of $1,375 million of
gross proceeds into the account of Liberty Bell I,
L.L.C., an investment affiliate of Times Mirror.
Additionally, the divestiture of our share of the
Shepards joint venture resulted in the deposit in Times
Mirror’s account of $275 million. While the cash
received by Times Mirror has all been used to retire
short-term debt, the following approximately depicts
the current deployment of capital within Liberty Bell:
$ Millions
Short-term Money Market Assets $1,000
Times Mirror Common Stock¹ 384
Other 2
Total Liberty Bell Assets $1,386
¹ At cost
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* * * * * * *
Looked at from a spending capacity viewpoint, the
following shows our 1999-2001 total resources for
investment:
$ Millions
Current Surplus Balance¹ $1,400
1999-2001 Capex 375
1999-2001 Acquisitions 900
Excess Debt Capacity Estimate 500
Total 3-year Resources $3,175
¹ Includes Mosby proceeds
* * * * * * *
Share Repurchase Status and Outlook
As previously discussed, we expect to have
approximately $3.2 billion of investment capacity over
the next few years. Because our realistic expectations
are to spend about $1.5 billion on acquisitions,
capital projects and dividends, this leaves
$1.5-$2 billion to be deployed in share repurchase,
which is our highest return alternative in the absence
of additional high-return acquisitions or capital
projects.
* * * * * * *
Investment Plans
Most immediately, we have concerned ourselves with
establishing a short-term investment plan that
emphasizes safety and liquidity. Over time, any L.L.C.
funds not deployed in acquisitions, capital investments
or Times Mirror stock shall be managed under our Short-
Term Investment Policy.
After the board of directors had considered the materials
that had been presented to it regarding the LLC and Eagle
Publishing (an LLC created for the Mosby transaction), the board
approved resolutions with respect to the use of the LLC and Eagle
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Publishing in Times Mirror’s share repurchase program and in
transactions involving the purchase of Times Mirror’s outstanding
debt securities.
During the period August 1 through December 31, 1998, Times
Mirror directed the LLC to purchase (1) approximately
13.3 million shares of Times Mirror for between $750 million and
$760 million and (2) interests in several Internet media
companies for approximately $9 million.
In a finance report presented to the Times Mirror board of
directors on February 4, 1999, the following statement appeared:
Resources-Background
In 1998, with the closing of the Matthew Bender, Mosby
and Shepards divestitures, we began what we expect will
be an extensive period of managing surplus capital. As
we have articulated in the past, our initial
responsibility is to manage this cash under a short-
term investment policy, which stresses preservation of
capital. This naturally results in returns
commensurate with the low tolerance for risk.
Ultimately, our planning challenge is to assess
realistically what the levels of spending might be in
the primary areas of priority, which we have
articulated before:
• Capital investments in existing businesses to
drive growth
• Acquisitions that enhance our existing lines of
business
• Dividends necessary to maintain a payout ratio
commensurate with our peer group average
• Consistent with long-term capitalization goals,
opportunistic stock repurchase
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* * * * * * *
Sizing Our Resources
In the second half of 1998, the closing of the
divestiture of Matthew Bender and Mosby resulted in the
deposit of $1,790 million of gross proceeds into the
accounts of the two Eagle LLC’s, both investment
affiliates of Times Mirror. Additionally, the
divestiture of our share of the Shepards joint venture
resulted in the deposit in Times Mirror’s account of
$275 million. While the cash received by Times Mirror
has all been used to retire short-term debt, the
following approximately depicts the 1/12/99 deployment
of capital within the Eagle LLC’s:
$ Millions
Short-term Money Market Assets $1,025
Times Mirror Common Stock (13.3M shares) 780
Tax Credit Partnerships¹ 19
New Media Investments¹ 7
Total Eagle Assets $1,831
¹ At cost
A preliminary cash flow analysis for the 1999-2001
period enables us to forecast total resources available
to us. The following table shows how much net cash is
used under our plans for spending in our major
investment categories:
($ Millions)
1999 2000 2001 3-year Total
Cash From Operations $383 $401 $434 $1,218
Capital Expenditures (201) (131) (120) (452)
Acquisitions, Net (300) (300) (300) (900)
Dividends (80) (83) (89) (252)
Annual Surplus/(deficit) ($198) ($113) ($75) ($386)
Thus over the 3 years of our plan, before repurchase,
our total spending would be around $400 million out of
the $1.0 billion held by the investment LLCs.
* * * * * * *
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Conclusion
In consideration of the resources we have available and
the capital and acquisition spending we anticipate, we
are recommending a gross repurchase level of
approximately 4-5 million shares per year for the plan
period. With approximately 3-4 million shares expected
to be issued each year through options and other equity
incentive programs, our planned repurchase level should
result in a net retirement of 1-2 million shares per
year in each of the next 3 years. This will allow us
to invest for our continued growth while returning us
to an optimal capital mix.
After the board of directors had considered the materials
that had been presented regarding these matters, the board
approved resolutions regarding the use of the LLC and Eagle
Publishing in Times Mirror’s share repurchase program.
On May 3, 1999, Udovic distributed a memorandum to, among
others, Unterman, Gastler, Niese, and Behnia regarding the
amendment of MB Parent’s restated certificate of incorporation to
permit the payment of dividends on the shares of MB Parent’s
common stock. Udovic’s memorandum contained the following
statements:
In connection with distributing to Times Mirror the
income of Eagle New Media Investments, LLC, attached is
a draft of a Restated Certificate of Incorporation of
CBM Acquisition Parent Co., Section 3(e) of Article V
of which has been amended to permit the payment of
dividends on shares of common stock. * * * Also
attached are drafts of Board and shareholder
resolutions approving the Restated Certificate of
Incorporation.
I have sent these drafts to Charlie Fontaine at Reed
who has agreed to coordinate having the Restated
Certificate approved and filed and dividends paid to
Times Mirror. The amounts currently proposed to be
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paid to Times Mirror as dividends are $14,808,000 for
the period ended December 31, 1998 and $4,536,000
(which is 65% of Eagle New Media’s post-preferred
dividend net income) for the quarter ended March 31,
1999. * * *
Reed agreed to the proposed amendment to MB Parent’s
restated certificate of incorporation because (1) Reed had no
interest in the profits generated by the LLC and (2) Reed
understood that none of the $1.375 billion that had been
contributed to the LLC would ever be returned to Reed.
On June 24, 1999, the board of directors of MB Parent
adopted resolutions that approved (1) the amendment of
MB Parent’s restated certificate of incorporation to permit the
payment of dividends on the shares of MB Parent’s common stock
and (2) the declaration and payment of dividends on MB Parent’s
common stock and voting preferred stock. These resolutions
stated, in pertinent part, the following:
4. Amendment of the Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of the Corporation.
* * * * * * *
RESOLVED, that the Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of the Corporation be further amended by
changing subsection (e) of Section 3 of the Article
thereof numbered “Article V” so that, as amended, said
subsection of said Article shall be and read as
follows:
“(e) Restrictions on Junior Payments. So long as
any shares of Voting Preferred Stock are
outstanding, the corporation shall not, except
only upon the unanimous vote of the Board of
Directors, (i) declare, pay or set apart for
payment any dividend on, or make any distribution
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in respect of, Junior Securities or any warrants,
rights, calls or options exercisable for, or
convertible into, any Junior Securities, either
directly or indirectly, whether in cash,
obligations or shares of the corporation or other
property (other than distributions or dividends
solely in the form of a particular class or series
of Junior Securities, or warrants, rights, calls
or options exercisable for, or convertible into,
such Junior Securities, to holders of such Junior
Securities), (ii) make any payment on account of,
or set apart for payment money for a sinking or
other similar fund for the purchase, redemption,
retirement or other acquisition for value of any
of, or redeem, purchase, retire or otherwise
retire for value any of, Junior Securities (other
than as a result of a reclassification of Junior
Securities or the exchange or conversion of one
class or series of Junior Securities for or into
another class or series of Junior Securities) or
any warrants, rights, calls or options exercisable
for, or convertible into, any of the Junior
Securities, or (iii) permit any corporation or
other entity directly or indirectly controlled by
the corporation to purchase, redeem, retire or
otherwise acquire for value any of the Junior
Securities or any warrants, rights, calls or
options exercisable for, or convertible into, any
Junior Securities.”
* * * * * * *
5. Declaration of Dividends.
RESOLVED, that, subject to the receipt of dividends due
to the Corporation upon the shares of capital stock of
MB held by the Corporation in respect of the period
from August 1, 1998 through June 30, * * * [1999], the
Corporation declare and pay dividends upon its capital
stock in respect of the period from August 1, 1998,
through June 30, 1999 as set forth below:
Class of Shares Gross Amount Amount per Share
Common Stock, par value $21,160,000.00 $21,160.00
$0.01 per share
Voting Preferred Stock, $ 3,466,145.20 $ 866.5653
par value $0.01
per share
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; and further
RESOLVED, that, in accordance with Section 15 of that
certain Limited Liability Company Agreement dated as of
July 28, 1998 (the “LLC Agreement”) among CBM
Acquisition Parent Co., LEXIS Inc. and The Times Mirror
Company (“TMC”), all Delaware corporations, the
Corporation demand from Eagle New Media Investments,
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, a
distribution in the amount of Twenty-One Million Eight
Hundred Two Thousand Seventy Dollars and Eighty-Seven
Cents ($21,802,070.87), to be paid not later than
July 1, 1999 to partially fund the aforesaid dividends;
* * *
Also on June 24, 1999, MB Parent’s stockholders, i.e., REUS,
REBV, and TMD, adopted resolutions that approved of the amendment
to MB Parent’s restated certificate of incorporation.
On June 30, 1999, Times Mirror, acting in its capacity as
manager of the LLC, approved a distribution of $21,802,070.87
from the LLC to MB Parent. MB Parent used this distribution to
pay the dividends that had been declared on its common stock and
its preferred stock on June 24, 1999. In this regard, MB Parent
distributed $21,160,000 to TMD and $642,070.87 (i.e., the
difference between the $3,466,145.20 dividend that MB Parent had
declared on its preferred stock and the $2,824,074.33 dividend
that had accumulated on the Bender participating preferred stock
owned by MB Parent between August 1, 1998, and June 30, 1999) to
REUS and REBV. MB Parent neither declared nor made any other
dividend distributions from the time of MB Parent’s organization
to the end of 2000.
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Summary of the LLC’s Investment Activity During 1999
During 1999, Times Mirror directed the LLC to purchase
(1) approximately 2.1 million shares of Times Mirror common stock
for between $125 million and $135 million; (2) interests in
several Internet media companies; (3) Newport Media, Inc., for
$132 million; (4) Airspace Safety Analysis Corp. and ASAC
International, LLC, for $14.5 million; and (5) ValuMail, Inc.
Times Mirror also directed the LLC to contribute $233,252,000 to
TMCT II, LLC, an entity formed for the purpose of retiring stock
held by the Chandler Trusts.
Times Mirror’s and MB Parent’s Income Tax Returns for 1998
On September 14, 1999, Gastler signed Times Mirror’s Form
1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for 1998. Times Mirror
did not disclose any information concerning the Bender
transaction on this Form 1120 or on any attachments to this
Form 1120.
On September 15, 1999, Vera Lang, treasurer of MB Parent,
signed MB Parent’s Form 1120 for 1998. Attached to MB Parent’s
Form 1120 for 1998 was Schedule L, Balance Sheet per Books, on
which MB Parent reported its total assets. According to the
Schedule L, the following amounts comprised MB Parent’s total
assets as of the end of 1998: (1) $1,613,268 of “Other current
assets” and (2) $1,457,251,204 of “Other investments”.
Furthermore, the following amounts comprised MB Parent’s “Other
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investments” as of the end of 1998: (1) $61,616,016 of “OTHER
INVESTMENTS” held by MB Parent; (2) $867,197,048 of “OTHER
INVESTMENTS” held by the LLC; and (3) $528,438,140 of “Marketable
securities” held by the LLC. MB Parent also reported the value
of its capital stock on this Schedule L. According to the
Schedule L, $68,750,000 of preferred stock comprised the total
value of MB Parent’s capital stock as of the end of 1998.
MB Parent did not report a value for its common stock on this
Schedule L. In addition, MB Parent reported its additional paid-
in capital on this Schedule L. According to the Schedule L, the
value of MB Parent’s additional paid-in capital was
$1.375 billion as of the end of 1998.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began its audit of Times
Mirror’s Form 1120 for 1998 sometime during February 2000. On
March 15, 2000, Gastler signed the cover sheet to a packet of
documents that Times Mirror provided to the IRS as part of this
audit. Included in this packet of documents was Form 8275,
Disclosure Statement, for the period January 1, 1997, through
December 31, 1998, for Times Mirror and its subsidiaries.
Referenced in an attachment to the Form 8275 were “Statements
previously submitted on February 18, 2000, indicating
reorganization of Matthew Bender and Company, per IRC
Section 368.” These statements included the following:
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MATTHEW BENDER & COMPANY
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO IRC
REG. 1.368-3
Matthew Bender & Company was disposed of pursuant to an
agreement and plan of merger dated April 27, 1998 by
and between The Times Mirror Company, TMD Inc, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Times Mirror and Reed Elsevier U.S.
Holdings Inc., Reed Elsevier Overseas BV,
CBM Acquisition Parent Co, MB Parent and CBM MergerSub
Corp. The transactions are fully described in the plan
of merger attached. The purpose of the transaction was
to dispose of Matthew Bender in a transaction that
would qualify as reorganization under Section 368 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended.
Times Mirror’s Financial Reporting Following the Close of the
Bender Transaction
On August 13, 1998, Unterman signed Times Mirror’s
Form 10-Q, Quarterly Report Pursuant To Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for the company’s quarterly
period ended June 30, 1998 (August 13, 1998, Form 10-Q).
Included in the August 13, 1998, Form 10-Q were condensed
consolidated financial statements for Times Mirror, notes to the
condensed consolidated financial statements, all of which were
unaudited, and management’s discussion and analysis of the
company’s financial condition and the results of the company’s
operations. The notes to these financial statements contained,
in pertinent part, the following comments:
Note 3–-Discontinued Operations
The Company signed definitive agreements with Reed
Elsevier plc on April 26, 1998 for the disposition of
Matthew Bender & Company, Incorporated (Matthew
Bender), the Company’s legal publisher, in a tax-free
reorganization and the sale of Times Mirror’s 50%
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ownership interest in Shepard’s. The two transactions
were valued at $1.65 billion in the aggregate and were
completed on July 31, 1998. The disposition of Matthew
Bender was accomplished through the merger of an
affiliate of Reed Elsevier with and into Matthew Bender
with Matthew Bender as the surviving corporation in the
merger. As a result of the merger, TMD, Inc., a wholly
owned subsidiary of Times Mirror, received all of the
issued and outstanding common stock of CBM Acquisition
Parent Co. (MB Parent). MB Parent is a holding company
that owns controlling voting preferred stock of Matthew
Bender with a stated value of $61,616,000 and
participating stock of Matthew Bender. MB Parent is
also the sole member of Liberty Bell I, LLC (Liberty
Bell I). Affiliates of Reed Elsevier own voting
preferred stock of MB Parent with a stated value of
$68,750,000 which affords them voting control over
MB Parent, subject to certain rights held by Times
Mirror with respect to Liberty Bell I. Concurrently
with the closing of the merger, the Company became the
sole manager of Liberty Bell I and controls its
operations and assets. At the time of the merger, the
principal asset of Liberty Bell I was $1,375,000,000 of
cash. The consolidated financial statements of Times
Mirror will include the accounts of Liberty Bell I.
The portion of the August 13, 1998, Form 10-Q entitled
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations” included the following statements:
General
In the second quarter of 1998, the Company reached
agreements to divest its legal publisher
Matthew Bender & Company, Incorporated (Matthew
Bender), its 50% ownership interest in legal citation
provider Shepard’s, and its health sciences publisher
Mosby, Inc. (Mosby). On July 31, 1998, the Company
completed the divestiture of Matthew Bender in a tax-
free reorganization and the sale of the Company’s
interest in Shepard’s to Reed Elsevier plc. The two
transactions were valued at $1.65 billion in the
aggregate. * * *
In anticipation of the expected impact of the
divestitures, the Company has begun a comprehensive
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review of its business configurations, operating
systems and other investments to determine economically
attractive actions it can take to prepare for future
growth. * * *
In addition, the pace of share repurchase activity
will be accelerated to result in the repurchase of
approximately 9.0 million shares of Series A common
stock in 1998. The Company purchased 2.1 million
shares through the 1998 second quarter. On July 27,
1998, the Company entered into a forward purchase
contract to purchase 2.0 million shares of Series A
common stock. Additionally, 2.7 million shares of
Series A common stock were purchased subsequent to
June 30, 1998.
* * * * * * *
Liquidity and Capital Resources
* * * * * * *
Acquisitions and Dispositions
* * * * * * *
* * * Concurrently with the closing of the Matthew
Bender transaction, the Company became the sole manager
of Liberty Bell I, LLC (Liberty Bell I), the principal
asset of which was approximately $1.38 billion of cash.
Subsequent to such closing, Liberty Bell I purchased
2.7 million shares of the Company’s Series A common
stock. The Company intends to deploy the remaining
assets of Liberty Bell I to finance acquisitions and
investments, including purchases of the Company’s
common stock, and does not intend to use those funds
for the Company’s working capital purposes or to retire
the Company’s debt. * * *
* * * * * * *
Common Share Repurchases
The Company repurchased 2.1 million and
6.5 million shares of its Series A common stock during
the year to date periods ended June 30, 1998 and 1997,
respectively. On July 27, 1998, the Company entered
into a forward purchase contract to purchase
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2.0 million shares of Series A common stock.
Additionally, Liberty Bell I purchased 2.7 million
shares of Series A common stock subsequent to June 30,
1998. The Company believes that the purchase of shares
of its common stock by Liberty Bell I is an attractive
investment for Liberty Bell I that will also enhance
Times Mirror shareholder value as well as offset
dilution from the shares of common stock issued under
the Company’s stock-based employee compensation and
benefit programs. * * *
On August 17, 1998, Unterman signed Times Mirror’s Form 8-K,
Current Report Pursuant To Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which reported the events of July 31, 1998,
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (August 17, 1998,
Form 8-K). Included in the August 17, 1998, Form 8-K was an
unaudited pro forma condensed consolidated balance sheet that
reflected Times Mirror’s disposition of Bender and its 50-percent
interest in Shepard’s. The adjustments shown in the pro forma
condensed consolidated balance sheet gave effect to Times
Mirror’s disposition of Bender and its 50-percent interest in
Shepard’s as if those transactions had occurred on June 30, 1998.
In so doing, the pro forma condensed consolidated balance sheet
recorded the gain on Times Mirror’s disposition of Bender and its
50-percent interest in Shepard’s by debiting “Cash and cash
equivalents”, an asset category, $1,649,650,000.
On February 22, 1999, Willes signed Times Mirror’s annual
shareholder report for 1998. In the section entitled “Letter to
Shareholders”, Willes made the following statements:
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1998 was a record year for Times Mirror. * * *
Clearly our biggest accomplishment last year was the
divestiture of Matthew Bender and Mosby for over
$2 billion in value, a whopping 17 times cash flow.
These transactions eliminated a major strategic
vulnerability for the company. And because they were
done in a tax-efficient way, we can redeploy the
resources in ways that will enhance the earnings power
of Times Mirror.
In addition, the section entitled “A Crisis of Growth” contained
the following statements:
In 1998 * * * [Newsday] again increased
circulation and revenue, partly because it employed
innovative ventures to do so. * * * It has organized
a separate effort to distribute advertising shoppers
throughout Long Island and New York City and a Times
Mirror affiliate just recently acquired a chain of
weekly papers to increase Newsday’s role in printed
advertising in its circulation area.
* * * * * * *
Fortunately for a company responding to a changing
world, Times Mirror has immense resources. The sale in
1998 of the Matthew Bender and Mosby legal and medical
publishing units has given Times Mirror a gain of
$1.35 billion.
That enormous chunk of capital awaits redeployment
in Times Mirror operations or in acquisition of other
companies. * * *
* * * Times Mirror is budgeting $300 million for
acquisitions in 1999. * * *
* * * Chains of small newspapers are being
acquired in the circulation areas of Newsday and The
Baltimore Sun. Up to $50 million a year is being
invested in venture capital backing for Internet start-
ups to gain expertise and give the company expertise
and participation in developing technologies.
* * * The big $1.3-billion proceeds from the
Mosby-Bender sale would be brought into play if
newspaper acquisition opportunity came up in adjacent
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markets, such as San Diego or Las Vegas. Times Mirror
could swing a very big acquisition: With its own
capital plus borrowing power, the company could easily
finance a $4-billion, even a $5-billion acquisition.
The section entitled “Financial Questions and Answers” contained
the following statements:
Following the 1998 divestitures, Times Mirror has
considerable cash resources. What are your priorities
for reinvestment?
Times Mirror has significant financial flexibility as
we enter 1999. With control over more than $1 billion
of cash resources and further debt capacity available,
we are very well positioned to pursue new
opportunities.
Unterman and Times Mirror’s board of directors signed Times
Mirror’s 1998 Form 10-K on March 4, 1999. Part I contained the
following statements:
During 1998, Times Mirror engaged in several
strategic transactions including the divestiture of
Matthew Bender & Company, Incorporated, a publisher of
legal information, the Company’s 50% interest in
Shepard’s, a legal citation provider, and Mosby, Inc.,
a publisher of health science information. * * * In
February 1999, an investment affiliate of the Company
acquired Newport Media, Inc., a publisher of shopper
publications in the Long Island and New Jersey areas.
The Company continued to have an active share
purchase program with a total of 16.7 million shares of
Series A Common Stock acquired by the Company or its
affiliates during 1998 * * *. In 1998, the Company, in
anticipation of the expected impact of divestitures,
also began a comprehensive review of its business
configurations, operating systems and other investments
to determine economic actions it could take to prepare
for future growth. * * *
Part II contained, among other information, management’s
discussion and analysis of the company’s financial condition and
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results of operations, the audited consolidated financial
statements for Times Mirror, and the notes to the company’s
consolidated financial statements. According to Times Mirror’s
consolidated balance sheets, the company’s current assets totaled
$1,629,259,000 as of December 31, 1998, and its total assets
amounted to $4,218,306,000 as of that time. Both of these
amounts included the “proceeds of reorganization”, i.e., the
proceeds from (1) the Bender transaction, (2) the sale of Times
Mirror’s 50-percent interest in Shepard’s, and (3) the Mosby
transaction.
The portion of part II of Times Mirror’s 1998 Form 10-K that
comprised management’s discussion and analysis of Times Mirror’s
financial condition and results of operations contained the
following statements:
OVERVIEW
The Company achieved record earnings in 1998 with
net income of $1.42 billion, or $16.06 per share on a
diluted basis, compared with 1997 net income of
$250.3 million, or $2.29 per share. The 1998 results
reflect:
• An after-tax gain of $1.35 billion, or $15.50
per share, on the disposition of Matthew
Bender/Shepard’s and Mosby and $30.8 million,
or $.35 per share, of after-tax losses
associated with discontinuance of certain
other businesses.
* * * * * * *
• Share purchases in 1998 which reduced
the number of shares of common stock
outstanding for financial reporting
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purposes to 73.4 million at December 31,
1998 compared with 87.9 million at
December 31, 1997.
* * * * * * *
Discontinued Operations
On July 31, 1998, the Company completed the
divestiture of Matthew Bender & Company, Incorporated
and its 50% ownership in legal citation provider
Shepard’s to an affiliate of Reed Elsevier, Inc. in a
transaction valued at $1.65 billion. Additionally, on
October 9, 1998, the Company completed the divestiture
of Mosby, Inc., its health science and medical
publisher, to Harcourt General, Inc. in a transaction
valued at $415.0 million.
* * * * * * *
Share Purchases
Share purchases continued in 1998 through open
market transactions, accelerated purchases and
purchases by an affiliated limited liability company.
A total of 16.7 million Series A common shares were
acquired during 1998 which more than offset 2.1 million
shares issued as a result of the exercise of stock
options.
CONSOLIDATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
* * * * * * *
1998 Compared with 1997
* * * * * * *
Earnings per share for 1998 benefited principally
from the net gain on divestitures as well as a
reduction in the average number of common shares
outstanding and lower preferred dividend requirements.
* * *
Net interest expenses declined in 1998 due to an
increase in interest income resulting from investment
activity of the affiliated limited liability companies
created as part of the Matthew Bender and Mosby
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transactions. Higher interest income more than offset
a rise in interest expense primarily due to increased
debt levels attributable to common stock purchases, the
1997 third quarter recapitalization and new
acquisitions.
* * * * * * *
LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES
* * * * * * *
Acquisitions
* * * * * * *
In February 1999, Eagle New Media Investments,
LLC, an investment affiliate of the Company, acquired
Newport Media, Inc., a publisher of shopper
publications in the Long Island and New Jersey areas,
for $132 million.
Dispositions
On July 31, 1998, the Company completed the
divestiture of Matthew Bender in a tax-free
reorganization and the sale of the Company’s 50%
ownership interest in Shepard’s to Reed Elsevier plc.
The two transactions were valued at $1.65 billion in
the aggregate. Proceeds from the sale of Shepard’s
were used to pay down commercial paper and short-term
borrowings of $222.4 million. Concurrently with the
closing of the Matthew Bender transaction, the Company
became the sole manager of Eagle New Media Investments,
LLC (Eagle New Media). At December 31, 1998, the
assets of Eagle New Media were $605.8 million of cash
and cash equivalents, $753.0 million of Times Mirror
stock, $15.0 million of marketable securities and
$22.3 million of other assets. On October 9, 1998, the
Company completed the divestiture of Mosby, Inc. to
Harcourt General, Inc. in a transaction valued at
$415.0 million. Concurrently with the closing of the
Mosby, Inc. transaction, the Company became the sole
manager of Eagle Publishing Investments, LLC (Eagle
Publishing). At December 31, 1998, the assets of Eagle
Publishing were $377.2 million of cash and cash
equivalents, $34.5 million of marketable securities and
$20.1 million of other assets. * * * The Company
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intends to deploy the assets of both LLCs to finance
acquisitions and investments, including purchases of
the Company’s common stock, and does not intend to use
those funds for the Company’s general working capital
purposes. For financial reporting purposes, Eagle New
Media and Eagle Publishing are consolidated with the
financial results of the Company.
The portion of part II of Times Mirror’s 1998 Form 10-K that
comprised the notes to the company’s consolidated financial
statements included the following:
Note 4–-Reorganization
During the third quarter of 1998, the Company
completed the disposition of Matthew Bender in a tax-
free reorganization with Reed Elsevier plc. The
disposition of Matthew Bender was accomplished through
the merger of an affiliate of Reed Elsevier with and
into Matthew Bender with Matthew Bender as the
surviving corporation in the merger. As a result of
the merger, TMD, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Times Mirror, received all of the issued and
outstanding common stock of CBM Acquisition Parent Co.
(MB Parent). MB Parent is a holding company that owns
controlling voting preferred stock of Matthew Bender
with a stated value of $61,616,000 and participating
stock of Matthew Bender. MB Parent is also the sole
member of Eagle New Media Investments, LLC (Eagle New
Media). Affiliates of Reed Elsevier owned voting
preferred stock of MB Parent with a stated value of
$68,750,000 which affords them voting control over MB
Parent, subject to certain rights held by Times Mirror
with respect to Eagle New Media. Concurrently, with
the closing of the merger, the Company became the sole
manager of Eagle New Media and controls its operations
and assets. At December 31, 1998, the assets of Eagle
New Media were $605,786,000 of cash and cash
equivalents, $752,956,000 (13,362,000 shares) of
Series A common stock of Times Mirror, $14,952,000 of
marketable securities and $22,270,000 of other assets.
The consolidated financial statements of the Company
include the accounts of Eagle New Media.
* * * * * * *
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The Company intends to deploy the assets of both
LLCs to finance acquisitions and investments, including
purchases of the Company’s common stock, and does not
intend to use those funds for the Company’s general
working capital purposes.
* * * * * * *
Note 13–-Capital Stock and Stock Purchase Program
* * * * * * *
Treasury Stock. Treasury stock includes shares of
Series A common stock and Series A preferred stock
owned by affiliates as well as Series A common stock
purchased by the Company as part of the stock purchase
program. Approximately 13,262,000 * * * shares of
Series A common stock included in treasury stock are
owned by Eagle New Media * * *
Stock Purchases. During 1998, the Company and
Eagle New Media purchased 16,355,000 common shares for
a total cost of $947,203,000. * * *
* * * * * * *
In connection with the Company’s ongoing stock
purchase program, in October 1998, the Company’s Board
of Directors authorized the purchase over the next two
years of an additional 6,000,000 shares of common
stock. The aggregate remaining shares authorized for
purchase at December 31, 1998 was approximately
1,100,000 shares. The Company believes that the
purchase of shares of its common stock is an attractive
investment for Eagle New Media which will enhance Times
Mirror shareholder value as well as to offset dilution
from shares of common stock issued under the Company’s
stock-based employee compensation and benefit program.
In February 1999, the Board of Directors authorized the
purchase of an additional amount of up to 6,000,000
shares of its Series A common stock.
* * * * * * *
Note 21–-Subsequent Events
* * * * * * *
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In February 1999, Eagle New Media Investments,
* * * LLC, an investment affiliate of the Company,
acquired Newport Media, Inc., a publisher of shopper
publications in the Long Island and New Jersey areas,
for approximately $132,000,000.
Efrem Zimbalist III, who had succeeded Unterman as chief
financial officer of Times Mirror, signed Times Mirror’s 1999
Form 10-K on March 29, 2000. Part I contained the following
statements:
ITEM 1. BUSINESS.
GENERAL
* * * * * * *
During 1999, Times Mirror engaged in several
strategic transactions including the acquisition by an
investment affiliate of Newport Media, Inc., a
publisher of shopper publications in the New York and
New Jersey areas, ValuMail, Inc., a shared mail company
that distributes preprinted advertising in Connecticut
and Massachusetts, and Airspace Safety Analysis
Corporation, a provider of airspace utilization and
Federal Aviation Administration compliance services for
the telecommunications and aviation industries. * * *
In September 1999, Times Mirror, its affiliates
and its largest stockholders, the Chandler Trusts,
completed a transaction that, for financial reporting
purposes, reduced Times Mirror’s outstanding common
stock by 12.4 million shares and reduced Times Mirror’s
then outstanding Series C Preferred Stock by 501,000
shares. * * *
The annual report referred to various investment activities in
newspaper publishing as directly engaged in by Times Mirror. The
annual report contained no reference to Reed as having any
interest in the “affiliate” actually engaged in the investment
activity.
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Part II of Times Mirror’s 1999 Form 10-K contained, among
other information, management’s discussion and analysis of the
company’s financial condition and results of operations, audited
consolidated financial statements for Times Mirror, and the notes
to the company’s consolidated financial statements. The portion
of part II that comprised management’s discussion and analysis of
Times Mirror’s financial condition and results of operations
contained the following statements:
Overview
* * * * * * *
1999 Recapitalization
In September 1999, the Company completed a
recapitalization transaction with its largest
shareholders, the Chandler Trusts, in which the
Company, including certain of its affiliates, and the
Chandler Trusts each contributed assets worth
$1.24 billion to TMCT II, LLC, a newly formed limited
liability company. The 1999 recapitalization resulted
in a net effective reduction, for financial reporting
purposes, in the number of shares of the Series A and C
common stocks by 12.4 million shares and in the
Company’s Series C-1 and C-2 preferred stocks by
501,000 shares. * * *
* * * * * * *
Liquidity and Capital Resources
* * * In 1999, funds from the Company’s
investment affiliates created as part of the 1998
divestitures of the Company’s legal and medical
publishing businesses, as well as proceeds from new
debt issuances were used to finance the 1999
recapitalization and acquisitions. In the second half
of 1998, the company utilized a portion of the
investment affiliates resources for share purchases and
acquisitions. * * *
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* * * * * * *
Dispositions
* * * * * * *
In July 1998, the Company completed the
divestiture of Matthew Bender in a tax-free
reorganization and the sale of the Company’s 50%
ownership interest in Shepard’s to Reed Elsevier plc.
The two transactions were valued at $1.65 billion in
the aggregate. In October 1998, the Company completed
the divestiture of Mosby, Inc. to Harcourt General,
Inc. in a transaction valued at $415.0 million.
Concurrently with the closing of the Matthew Bender and
Mosby, Inc. transactions, the Company became the sole
manager of Eagle New Media Investments, LLC (Eagle New
Media) and Eagle Publishing Investments, LLC (Eagle
Publishing). A substantial portion of the assets of
Eagle New Media and Eagle Publishing were utilized in
connection with the 1999 recapitalization (see Note 2).
The Company intends to deploy the assets of both Eagle
New Media and Eagle Publishing to finance acquisitions
and investments, including purchases of the Company’s
common stock, and does not intend to use those funds
for the Company’s general working capital purposes.
Common Share Purchases
During 1999, the Company and Eagle New Media
purchased 3.2 million shares of the Company’s Series A
common stock which more than offset 2.0 million shares
issued as a result of the exercise of stock options
* * *.
The Company believes that the purchase of shares
of its common stock is an attractive investment for
Eagle New Media which will also enhance Times Mirror
shareholder value as well as offset dilution from
shares of common stock issued under the Company’s
stock-based employee compensation and benefit programs.
The Company and its affiliates expect to make share
purchases primarily to offset stock option exercises,
during the next two years in the open market or in
private transactions, depending on market conditions,
and such purchases may be discontinued at any time.
* * * As of December 31, 1999, the Company and its
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affiliates are authorized to purchase 3.9 million
shares of Series A common stock.
The LLC’s Financial Statements for the Fiscal Years Ended
December 31, 1999 and 1998
On April 6, 2000, Udovic faxed to Fontaine a copy of the
LLC’s unaudited financial statements for the fiscal years ended
December 31, 1999 and 1998. A statement of operations was part
of these financial statements. On the statement of operations,
the LLC reported $2,435,000 and $10,132,000 of dividend income
attributable to its Times Mirror stock for 1998 and 1999,
respectively.
Included with the LLC’s financial statements were notes that
contained, in pertinent part, the following comments:
Note 1–-Basis of Preparation
* * * The Company’s sole manager is The Times Mirror
Company who controls its operations and assets. The
Company began operations on July 31, 1998.
* * * * * * *
Note 2--Cash and Cash Equivalents, Marketable
Securities, Available-for-sale Securities and
Investments
* * * * * * *
Investments in Times Mirror stock are reported at cost,
as they are restricted from sale because the Company is
considered an affiliate of Times Mirror. The fair
value of the Times Mirror stock based on its quoted
market price was $1,015,186,000 and $742,666,000 at
December 31, 1999 and 1998, respectively. * * *
* * * * * * *
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Note 4--1999 Recapitalization
In September 1999, the Company and certain of its
affiliates participated in a transaction (1999
recapitalization) involving agreements with Times
Mirror Company’s largest shareholders, Chandler Trust
No. 1 and Chandler Trust No. 2. The 1999
recapitalization resulted in the formation of a new
limited liability company, TMCT II, LLC (TMCT II).
Pursuant to the TMCT II contribution agreement, the
Company contributed a total of $233,252,000 in cash and
cash equivalents.
On May 31, 2000, the board of directors of MB Parent accepted and
approved the LLC’s financial statements for the fiscal years
ended December 31, 1999 and 1998.
IRS Determinations
On August 14, 2002, the IRS sent to petitioner a statutory
notice of deficiency with respect to petitioner’s Federal income
tax for 1998. In the statutory notice of deficiency, the IRS
made the following determinations regarding the Bender
transaction:
1. $1,375,000,000 is the amount realized in 1998
under Code section 1001 by TMD in exchange for the 100%
common stock interest in MB [Bender].
2. In 1998, TMD must recognize capital gain in
the amount of $1,322,035,840, as computed below. * * *
TMD’s exchange of its 100% common stock interest in MB
is ineligible for nonrecognition treatment under Code
section 354 because the series of prearranged
transactions that included the merger of Bender
Mergersub into MB failed to qualify as a
“reorganization” under section 368 of the Code.
In addition, the IRS explained the basis for its determinations
under the following headings: “A. TMD CASHED OUT ITS INVESTMENT
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IN MB”, “B. TMD FAILED TO EXCHANGE ITS MB COMMON STOCK FOR STOCK
OF MB PARENT WORTH AT LEAST $1.1 BILLION”, and “C. AFTER THE
MERGER, POST-MERGER MB, THE SURVIVING CORPORATION FAILED TO HOLD
‘SUBSTANTIALLY ALL’ OF ITS PROPERTIES AND THE PROPERTIES OF THE
‘MERGED’ CORPORATION”. Under the last heading, the notice
elaborated:
D. TMD RECEIVED CONSIDERATION OTHER THAN VOTING
STOCK.
To qualify as a reorganization under Code section
368(a)(1)(B), only voting stock may be used by the
acquiring corporation. The merger of Bender Mergersub
into MB could not qualify as a “B” reorganization if
TMD received, in exchange for its MB common stock, any
consideration other than voting stock (“boot”).
In exchange for its MB common stock, TMD received
MB Parent common stock and constructively received the
rights to manage Eagle I, which it assigned to TM.
Immediately after the merger, Eagle I’s sole asset was
$1.375 billion in cash. The provisions of the Eagle I
LLC Agreement, coupled with the broad powers granted to
the manager, gave TM direct access to and control over
the $1.375 billion.
The rights to manage Eagle I were not voting
stock, had substantial value, and were constructively
received by TMD in exchange for its MB common stock.
Since TMD received boot in exchange for its interest in
MB, the merger of Bender Mergersub into MB failed to
qualify as a reorganization under Code section
368(a)(1)(B).
The notice also determined that section 269 applies to deny
nonrecognition treatment of the Bender transaction.
During trial of this case, the parties agreed that TMD’s
adjusted basis in its Bender common stock was $78,454,130 as of
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July 31, 1998, rather than the $52,964,160 amount that had been
determined by the IRS in the statutory notice of deficiency.
ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT
The primary consideration received by Times Mirror, through
TMD, for transferring control over the operations of Bender to
Reed was control over $1.375 billion paid by Reed, through
MB Parent, to the LLC.
The agreements and corporate organization documents entered
into by Times Mirror and Reed negated any meaningful fiduciary
obligations between Times Mirror and Reed with respect to Times
Mirror’s control over the cash or Reed’s operation of Bender.
The MB Parent common stock held by TMD had a value of less
than $1.1 billion and less than 80 percent of the $1.375 billion
paid by Reed.
The Bender transaction effected a sale of Bender by TMD to
Reed.
OPINION
Section 354(a) states the general rule that “No gain or loss
shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a
party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such
corporation or in another corporation a party to the
reorganization.” Section 356 requires recognition of gain from
an exchange in which property other than that permitted under
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section 354 (or section 355) (i.e., boot) is received; the gain
recognized is not in excess of the sum of money or the fair
market value of other property received in the exchange. Section
368 sets forth definitions of corporate reorganizations that
qualify for nontax treatment under section 354(a).
Times Mirror and its advisers intended that the Bender
transaction qualify as a tax-free “reverse triangular merger”
under section 368(a)(1)(A) and (2)(E). As described by
petitioner, a reverse triangular merger is a statutory merger in
which the merged corporation (MergerSub) merges with and into the
target corporation (Bender) in exchange for stock of a
corporation (MB Parent), which, immediately prior to the merger,
controlled the merged corporation.
Respondent contends that the Bender transaction does not
qualify as a reverse triangular merger because TMD received more
than qualifying stock of MB Parent and the transaction thus fails
to satisfy the “exchange” requirement of section
368(a)(2)(E)(ii), that is: “in the transaction, former
shareholders of the surviving corporation exchanged, for an
amount of voting stock of the controlling corporation, an amount
of stock in the surviving corporation which constitutes control
of such corporation.” Section 368(c) defines “control” as “the
ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
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and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all
other classes of stock of the corporation.” Respondent argues
that TMD’s gain on the Bender transaction is taxable unless the
fair market value of qualifying consideration, the MB Parent
common stock, was at least equal in value to a “controlled block”
(80 percent) of Bender stock. The parties agree that this
requirement means that the MB Parent common stock must have had a
value of $1.1 billion for the transaction to qualify as a reverse
triangular merger.
Alternatively, and in order to assert reliance on certain
rulings of respondent, petitioner argues that the Bender
transaction qualifies under section 368(a)(1)(B), which provides:
SEC. 368(a). Reorganization.--
(1) In general.–-For purposes of parts I and
II and this part, the term “reorganization”
means--
* * * * * * *
(B) the acquisition by one corporation,
in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock (or in exchange solely for all
or a part of the voting stock of a
corporation which is in control of the
acquiring corporation), of stock of another
corporation if, immediately after the
acquisition, the acquiring corporation has
control of such other corporation (whether or
not such acquiring corporation had control
immediately before the acquisition);
Petitioner’s alternative position would not require valuation of
the MB Parent common stock. It would, however, require us to
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conclude that Times Mirror’s control over the cash in the LLC was
not part of the consideration received in the Bender transaction
because it was not intended by Times Mirror or Reed to be a
“separate asset”.
Respondent argues that the Bender transaction did not
qualify under section 368(a)(1)(B) because TMD did not exchange
its Bender stock solely for voting stock. In addition,
respondent argues that petitioner has belatedly changed its
theory and should be precluded from doing so.
In form, at the conclusion of the Bender transaction, TMD
was the holder of MB Parent common stock and no longer owned
Bender common stock. Determination of whether the MB Parent
common stock had a value of $1.1 billion or, in the alternative,
whether the sole consideration exchanged for the Bender common
stock was the MB Parent common stock requires a factual analysis
of the totality of the Bender transaction. Because the same
facts lead us to our conclusions on both theories, we do not need
to decide whether petitioner is too late in asserting its section
368(a)(1)(B) argument.
Factual Analysis of the Bender Transaction
Not surprisingly, the parties differ significantly in their
descriptions of the Bender transaction. While paraphrasing
portions of the record, the parties cannot resist characterizing
events in a manner consistent with their respective positions.
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Petitioner emphasizes the formalities of the multicorporate
structure, which undeniably was intended and carefully designed
to comply with the requirements for a tax-free reorganization
under section 368. Petitioner asserts that “respondent
erroneously substitutes his version of the Bender transaction for
what actually transpired.”
Respondent does not deny that there was a business purpose
for the Bender transaction, i.e., the desire of Times Mirror to
get out of the legal publishing business because of the trends in
that market. Pointing to specific aspects and results of the
transaction, however, respondent argues:
All of the unusual features of the Bender
Transaction structure, the creation of a dormant
intermediary company (MB Parent) and an enslaved LLC
(Eagle I), the interlocking tiers of redeemable Bender
and MB Parent voting preferred stock that transferred
virtually complete control over Bender to Reed, and the
provisions of the LLC Agreement, that transferred
absolute control over the cash to the manager (TM),
were united to a single purpose: segregate and seal
off TM’s interest in the cash and Reed’s interest in
Bender, one from the other.
The substance of the Bender Transaction is a swap.
TM gave up Bender for the right to control and
distribute to itself at will $1.375 billion of cash.
Reed gave up $1.375 billion of cash for ownership and
control of Bender. This is hardly the kind of
readjustment of continuing interests in property under
modified corporate form that marks a real
reorganization. * * *
The proposed findings of fact set forth in the briefs of the
parties cannot be adopted as our findings because they lack
objectivity either by omission or in argumentative descriptions.
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Rather than attempting to reconcile the parties’
characterizations of particular events, we have reviewed the
entire record and related in great detail the contemporaneous
statements of the parties to the Bender transaction, the
contractual terms, the subsequent conduct of the parties to the
transaction, and the representations of Times Mirror to
shareholders and to regulatory bodies. The form of the
transaction includes the totality of the contractual arrangements
and is not limited to the design, characterization, and labels
put on the arrangements by the Times Mirror tax advisers. In
analyzing the terms and provisions of the contractual
arrangements, we have considered the interpretation of the
parties to them, as demonstrated by their conduct.
Times Mirror’s View of the Bender Transaction
Times Mirror, for good business reasons, decided to take
advantage of the existing trends in legal publishing and the
strong desire of Wolters Kluwer and Reed to acquire Times
Mirror’s interest in Bender and Shepard’s. The bidders agreed to
the CJV “reorganization” structure promoted by PW and GS and
endorsed by GD&C and E&Y because that was the only way they could
acquire their target.
Times Mirror was anxious to have the significant proceeds of
its divestiture of Bender to spend on repurchasing its own stock
and diversifying into other emerging areas. After the proposed
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structure of the divestiture was presented to the competing
bidders, at the board meeting on April 24, 1998, the board of
directors was told:
The Price Waterhouse structure separates ownership and
control so that the acquiring company controls Matthew
Bender and Times Mirror controls an amount of cash
equivalent to Matthew Bender’s value, but without
having paid a tax for the shift in control.
The steps in this structure * * * involve the creation
of a special purpose corporation (referred to as
MB Parent * * *) that is owned partly by Times Mirror
and partly by the acquiring company. This special
purpose corporation is controlled by the acquiring
company through its ownership of relatively low value,
nonparticipating preferred stock with 80% voting
control. MB Parent in turn owns preferred stock and
nonvoting common stock in an acquisition subsidiary
that will merge with Matthew Bender and a nonvoting
interest in a single member limited liability company
that holds the cash referred to above. As a result of
the merger of Matthew Bender into the acquisition
subsidiary, Times Mirror will own all of the common
stock and remaining 20% voting power of MB Parent, the
special purpose corporation. However, even though
Times Mirror will not have voting control over
MB Parent, it will control the limited liability
corporation holding all of the cash by virtue of being
the sole (nonequity) manager of the LLC.
The results are as follows:
• Times Mirror will control the LLC, thereby
controlling the cash in it and any assets or
businesses acquired with such cash.
• Times Mirror and the LLC will be consolidated for
financial reporting purposes.
• The acquiring company will control Matthew Bender
and will be able to consolidate for financial
reporting purposes.
• The merger of Matthew Bender into the acquisition
subsidiary in exchange for MB Parent common stock
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will qualify as a tax-free reorganization for tax
purposes (even though such common stock does not
carry with it voting control).
• MB Parent, the LLC and Matthew Bender will not be
consolidated for tax purposes with either Times
Mirror or the acquiring company.
• At some later date and upon mutual agreement, the
Matthew Bender and MB Parent preferred stock can
be redeemed at face value and the nonvoting common
can be redeemed at a formula price, which would
leave the acquiring company as the sole owner of
Matthew Bender and Times Mirror as the sole, and
controlling owner of MB Parent, with the ability
to liquidate MB Parent and the LLC without a tax
cost.
In a memorandum dated April 29, 1998, E&Y recorded the
following:
Times Mirror has entered into an agreement with Reed
Elsevier for the sale of Matthew Bender for
$1,375,000,000 and the sale of Times Mirror’s interest
in Shepard’s Inc. for $225,000,000. The sale of
Matthew Bender is structured as a reorganization in
which the $1,375 million proceeds from the sale will
end up in an LLC whose ownership is as shown in the
attached chart. Through the various shareholder
agreements, certificates of incorporation and the LLC
management agreement, Times Mirror has total control
over the assets and operations of the LLC and Reed
Elsevier has total control over the assets and
operations of Matthew Bender. The structure is
designed to result in no tax due by Times Mirror on the
profit from the sale of Matthew Bender.
* * * * * * *
Consolidation
* * * Times Mirror controls the assets of the LLC
through the management agreement, which specifically
states that Times Mirror has no fiduciary duty to the
holder of Acquisition Parent and may use its discretion
as to the use of the assets. Times Mirror may have the
LLC buy its own debt instruments or Times Mirror stock,
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make business acquisitions or any other transaction to
the benefit of Times Mirror. The only limitation is
that Times Mirror may not upstream LLC assets to
itself.
* * * * * * *
Times Mirror has the ability to ensure that the Board
of Directors of Acquisition Parent may not do anything
that may affect the control or viability of the LLC.
Certain board actions require the unanimous vote of the
Board. These include:
• the incurrence of indebtedness or guarantees of
indebtedness of Acquisition Parent
• the sale, transfer or other disposition, pledge or
assignment of any portion or all of its LLC
interest
• the issuance of any other securities of
Acquisition Parent
All of these factors indicate that Times Mirror not
only controls the assets of the LLC, but also is the
beneficiary of all of the ownership risks and rewards
of the LLC. * * *
We cannot improve on the descriptions of the Bender
transaction in the above contemporaneous statements of the
participants. Little more would be required to conclude that the
Bender transaction was, in substance, a sale. The issue in this
case, however, is to determine whether the “reorganization”
structure satisfies the requirements of sections 354(a) and 368
and precludes taxation of the gain derived from the transaction.
Fiduciary Obligations Among the Parties
In the context of the dispute over the value of the MB
Parent common stock received by TMD, as discussed below,
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petitioner argues that Times Mirror, as manager of the LLC, had
fiduciary obligations that precluded unlimited use of the LLC’s
cash and prevented a conclusion that TMD or Times Mirror realized
the proceeds of a sale of Bender. Respondent contends that Times
Mirror’s only fiduciary obligation under the management agreement
was to itself. The LLC agreement dated July 28, 1998, contained
provisions including the following:
9. Management.
a. The Manager shall have the sole right to
manage the business of the Company and shall have all
powers and rights necessary, appropriate or advisable
to effectuate and carry out the purposes and business
of the Company, and no Member or other person other
than the Manager shall have any authority to act for or
bind the Company or to vote on or approve any of the
actions to be taken by the Company (unless otherwise
expressly required by the Act or other applicable law).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Initial Manager
shall not take any action in respect of or on behalf of
the Company, other than the opening of one or more bank
accounts in the name of the Company, the appointment of
an agent for service of process for the Company and the
performance of other ministerial duties in connection
with the organization and formation of the Company.
Accordingly, as of the Effective Time of the Merger,
the Company shall have no liabilities or obligations
other than pursuant to this Agreement.
* * * * * * *
e. Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, to the fullest extent permitted by law,
including Section 18-1101(c) of the [Delaware Limited
Liability Company] Act, and without creating any duties
or obligations of the Manager by implication or
otherwise, it is expressly acknowledged and agreed that
to the extent the Manager owes any fiduciary duties or
similar obligations to the Initial Member [MB Parent]
under any principles of law or equity or otherwise,
such duties and obligations shall be owed solely to the
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holders of the Initial Member’s [MB Parent’s] common
equity and not to the holders of any other class of the
Initial Member’s [MB Parent’s] equity.
Petitioner’s brief, in attacking respondent’s valuation experts,
asserts:
The LLC Agreement was written with the
understanding that the manager, TM, would be the 100%
indirect owner of the MBP [MB Parent] Common. * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * the management authority and the MBP Common were
not owned by two parties; TM was not only the manager,
but also the 100% indirect owner of the MBP Common,
which was directly owned by a holding company which TM
had created to hold TM’s property. The rights to be
valued are in fact the rights held by one party. * * *
Petitioner does not point to any provision in the
documentation of the transaction that restricts Times Mirror’s
use of the LLC’s cash, although petitioner asserts limitations
under Delaware law. Representations of Times Mirror to its
shareholders indicated that the cash in the LLC would not be used
for working capital but would be used for repurchase of stock and
strategic investments. However, nothing in the documents
contains this restriction on the use of cash for working capital,
which was a management decision consistent only with tax advice
given to Times Mirror. The advisers, Shefter and Behnia, had
made it clear to Reed before the transaction that “the LLC
agreement will not contain any restrictions on the use of the
cash.” In any event, cash is fungible. Use of the LLC’s cash in
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Times Mirror’s ambitious stock repurchase program obviously freed
up other resources to be used for working capital.
Reed’s vice president of taxes, Fontaine, who negotiated the
structure on behalf of Reed, testified:
Q [Counsel for petitioner] And what was Reed’s
position with regard to nonvoting common stock in the
structure?
A [Fontaine] Reed did not like the fact that it
was common stock. We were hoping that it would be
changed to a preferred stock because of issues
surrounding fiduciary duties.
Q Could you elaborate?
A Generally speaking, a common shareholder is
owed a fiduciary duty, and because Matthew Bender at
the time would have had a common shareholder of MB
Parent, and indirectly TMD, that that would be–-there
would be a fiduciary duty ultimately to Times Mirror as
a result of that shareholding as to the operations of
Matthew Bender.
Q What was the result of those negotiations?
A The nonvoting common stock was changed to
nonvoting participating preferred stock.
Thus, the parties understood that they were deliberately negating
any fiduciary obligations owed to Reed with respect to the cash
or owed to Times Mirror or TMD with respect to Bender operations.
Times Mirror’s understanding of its rights with respect to
the cash was described in its report to the board on October 8,
1998, as follows:
Since the July Board meeting, we have continued to
sharpen our focus on our intended use of the proceeds
from the Mosby and Matthew Bender dispositions as well
as our continuing significant free cash flow. It had
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not been our assumption that we would immediately turn
around and use these resources as a war chest to
finance a major acquisition program, and over the past
several months we tested this presumption by examining
in detail the prospect for value creation and the
acceleration of earnings growth through acquisitions.
* * *
All subsequent reports to the board, the shareholders, and the
SEC represented that the cash proceeds of the divestiture of
Bender were controlled by Times Mirror and were being used for
Times Mirror’s strategic repurchase of stock and new
acquisitions. Although petitioner disputes the legal
significance of these representations, it has never suggested
that the representations were not entirely consistent with the
terms of the documentation of the Bender transaction.
In 1999, Times Mirror, as manager of the LLC, effected a
$21,160,000 cash dividend on MB Parent’s common stock. Reed
agreed to the amendments to MB Parent’s corporate documents
because Reed had unequivocally given up any interest in the
$1.375 billion or in the earnings on that amount.
Consideration for the Transfer of Bender to Reed
For purposes of section 368, the basic factual determination
to be made is whether, under the contractual arrangements, the
consideration received by TMD, the formal “divestor” of Bender,
from MB Parent, the formal “divestee”, was, as petitioner
contends, common stock of MB Parent worth at least $1.1 billion
or whether, as respondent contends, the consideration received
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was title to the common stock plus effective control over
$1.375 billion–-the amount paid by Reed in the transaction.
Certainly from the standpoint of Times Mirror, control of the
funds was the most important asset received. From the standpoint
of Reed, control of the Bender operations was the most important
asset received. Neither TMD nor MB Parent had officers or
employees. TMD had no operations independent of Times Mirror,
and MB Parent had no operations independent of Reed. Unterman
testified that Times Mirror was appointed manager of the LLC
because TMD had no employees and was solely owned by Times
Mirror. He further testified:
Q [Counsel for petitioner] From your perspective
as chief financial officer of Times Mirror, was Times
Mirror’s management authority over the assets of the
LLC a separate part of the consideration Times Mirror
received for Matthew Bender?
A [Unterman] Not at all. It was all one deal.
Q Could you explain your response, please?
A Well, the economic asset was the cash that was
in MB parent, and the LLC was a way of assuring that
the cash would be invested in a manner that was
parallel of Times Mirror’s interests at all times.
Under the combined terms of the management agreement, MB Parent’s
restated certificate of incorporation, MergerSub’s certificate of
incorporation, the MB Parent stockholders agreement, and the
MergerSub shareholders agreement, all incidents of ownership of
the $1.375 billion were shifted to Times Mirror as of July 31,
1998.
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Examination of the voting, dividend, redemption, and
liquidation provisions of the documents, quoted at length in our
findings, confirms respondent’s view that only Times Mirror had a
continuing economic interest in the cash, and only Reed had a
continuing economic interest in Bender. The structure of MB
Parent and the dividend provisions assured that any dividends
paid to MB Parent from the operations of Bender would be paid to
Reed as dividends on MB Parent’s preferred stock. Moreover, when
the structure was ultimately unwound, TMD would own MB Parent and
the LLC and Reed would own Bender.
The foregoing factual analysis demonstrates that the
consideration received by TMD, as the investment subsidiary of
Times Mirror, was not common stock in MB Parent but was control
over the cash deposited in the LLC. In relation to the arguments
over expert testimony, as discussed below, petitioner asserts
that the common stock and the management authority cannot be
valued separately because it would have been unthinkable to
transfer them separately. But this argument does not aid
petitioner’s case. Recognizing that no one would separately
purchase either the common stock or the management authority
confirms respondent’s argument that common stock was not the only
consideration for the transfer and that the common stock, viewed
alone, did not have the value necessary for the transaction to
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qualify under the reorganization provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.
Valuation of MB Parent Common Stock
Petitioner argues that Times Mirror and Reed “conclusively”
agreed that the MB Parent common stock was worth $1.375 billion.
In the context of the entire agreement, however, the description
of the consideration in the merger agreement as common stock was
merely a recital consistent with the intended tax effect. We
have examined the corporate governing documents to determine
whether the MB Parent common stock possessed the requisite value
for purposes of section 368(c). Cf. Alumax Inc. v. Commissioner,
109 T.C. 133, 177-191 (1997), affd. 165 F.3d 822 (11th Cir.
1999).
The factual analysis of the transaction compels the
conclusion that the management authority over the cash in the LLC
had far more value to Times Mirror than the MB Parent common
stock and thus represented the bulk of the consideration. For
completeness, we discuss briefly the expert testimony and the
context of petitioner’s effective concession that the MB common
stock and the management authority over the LLC were inseparable,
which we conclude establishes that common stock was not the sole
consideration for the Bender transaction.
Petitioner’s expert, Michael Bradley (Bradley), used a “net
asset value approach” to determine that MB Parent’s common stock
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was worth $1.375 billion. Using an “avoided costs approach”,
Bradley determined that the management authority might have a
fair market value ranging from $9.2 million to $44.1 million.
Bradley, however, gave no apparent consideration to the
contractual aspects of the Bender transaction and assumed--
contrary to any reasonable expectation or contractual
possibility-–the immediate dissolution of MB Parent, Bender, and
the LLC as of July 31, 1998, the date of the transaction.
Bradley and petitioner’s other experts, in rebuttal to
respondent’s experts, asserted that, if separated from economic
ownership of the common stock of MB Parent, the management
authority had no value to a hypothetical purchaser.
Respondent presented three experts who had separately valued
the management authority and the MB Parent common stock. Alan C.
Shapiro (Shapiro) provided an opinion of the fair market value of
the common stock immediately after the merger. Like Bradley,
Shapiro began with a determination of net asset value. Shapiro,
however, reviewed all of the contractual arrangements and
corporate governing documents and concluded that the MB Parent
common stock should be discounted substantially for lack of
control over the assets. Using various assumptions, such as the
net value of MB Parent’s assets after liabilities and the scope
of fiduciary responsibilities by the manager, Shapiro concluded
that the fair market value of the MB Parent common stock ranged
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from a negative number, through worthless, to a maximum of
$337 million.
Respondent also presented the testimony of William R. Zame
(Zame), an economics and mathematics professor, who applied game
theory principles to determine the value of the MB Parent common
stock uncoupled from the management rights over the LLC. Zame
acknowledged that his computed value was not the same as fair
market value. He did, however, recognize that:
[because] the common stock of MB Parent represents a
derivative claim to the resources of Eagle I, by
analyzing the nature of that derivative claim it is
possible to determine the amount a rational, well-
informed investor might be willing to pay for this
claim, keeping in mind that there are other competing
claims to the resources of Eagle I. It is value in
this sense that this report estimates.
Zame applied probabilities to various assumptions and determined
the most plausible estimates of the value of the MB Parent common
stock as a fraction of the value of the LLC’s assets. His
analysis concluded that the “upper bounds of the stand-alone
value” of the MB Parent common stock ranged from .595 to .800 of
the value of the LLC.
Another of respondent’s experts, Michael J. Barclay
(Barclay), addressed the value of the management authority from a
financial standpoint. Barclay also considered alternative
assumptions about fiduciary duty and concluded that, without a
fiduciary duty from the manager to the LLC, MB Parent, or the MB
Parent common stockholder, the management authority would have a
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value approaching $1.375 billion. Assuming a fiduciary duty,
Barclay opined that the management authority would have a value
of 40 percent of $1.375 billion.
Referring to Bradley’s report, petitioner asserts:
Respondent’s valuation approach caused his experts to
value rights that did not exist: common stock in an
entity managed by an unrelated, hostile manager, and a
management authority giving unconstrained powers to an
unrelated, hostile manager. Respondent’s experts
assumed a hypothetical transaction with no resemblance
to the actual transaction or rights. * * *
Petitioner claims that the management authority was an
uncompensated obligation, not an asset, assigned to Times Mirror
as the “residual claimholder” of the LLC’s assets.
It is indeed unlikely that the authority of Times Mirror
under the management agreement would be separated from TMD’s
ownership of the MB Parent common stock in the real world.
However, separation of the management authority from the putative
holder of the cash is part of the structure adopted by Times
Mirror so that it could maintain its position that the only
consideration received by TMD in the Bender transaction was the
MB Parent common stock. Times Mirror and its advisers created
the scenario that makes it necessary to value the MB Parent
common stock at least as a portion of the total consideration.
To support its statutory argument, petitioner is asking us to
give effect to a fictional separation of the MB Parent common
stock transferred to TMD from the management authority
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transferred to Times Mirror. Additionally, petitioner’s
criticism of respondent’s experts’ valuation applies equally to
petitioner’s valuation, i.e., petitioner’s experts ignore
relevant facts concerning the property to be valued.
We do not need to reach any judgment about the fiduciary
obligations that may or may not exist under Delaware law. It is
enough to observe that there is uncertainty on that subject,
which uncertainty affects value. See Estate of Newhouse v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 231-233 (1990). We need not determine
actual value of the MB Parent common stock, only proportionate
value, i.e., whether the stock represents 80 percent of the total
consideration paid by Reed. It is possible to engage in
interminable arguments about the reports of the various experts
presented by the parties in this case. To do so, however, would
serve no useful purpose, because it would not affect the
commonsense conclusions that (1) the MB Parent common stock
cannot be isolated and treated as the sole consideration
transferred to TMD for its divestiture of Bender and (2) the
common stock of MB Parent, objectively, had a value less than
$1.1 billion and less than 80 percent of the $1.375 billion paid
by Reed.
Pertinent Precedents
Respondent invites us to adopt a broad-based approach and
apply the “spirit” of the reorganization provisions in order to
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deter the type of abuse that respondent perceives the Bender
transaction to be. We need not and do not accept respondent’s
invitation. We are, however, mindful of the precedents and
judicial homilies that support respondent’s position.
The source of most “substance over form” arguments, of
course, is Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In oft
quoted language, the Supreme Court framed the issue as follows:
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of
what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid
them, by means which the law permits, cannot be
doubted. But the question for determination is whether
what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing
which the statute intended. * * * [Id. at 469;
citations omitted.]
Gregory involved a purported statutory reorganization and
thus is particularly applicable here. Petitioner argues,
however, that “In the 70 years since Gregory was decided, no
court has applied substance-form principles to override technical
compliance supported by business purpose and true economic
effect.” Indeed, in Gregory, the Supreme Court disregarded the
form of a transaction as having no independent significance.
Before elaborating on the application of this principle and “true
economic effect” in this case, we acknowledge the so-called
progeny of Gregory.
Respondent cites Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609,
613-614 (1938), in which the Supreme Court stated that “A given
result at the end of a straight path is not made a different
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result because reached by following a devious path. * * * The
controlling principle will be found in Gregory v. Helvering”.
Respondent also relies on another “reorganization” case,
West Coast Mktg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 32 (1966), in
which the sole stockholder and president of the taxpayer
corporation desired to dispose of certain land. In order to
qualify the disposition as a tax-free reorganization under
sections 354(a)(1) and 368(a)(1)(B), a corporation, Manatee, was
formed, and the subject land was transferred to Manatee in
exchange for stock. The stock of Manatee was then transferred to
the acquiring corporation in exchange for its stock. Thereafter,
Manatee was liquidated. Citing Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering,
supra, and Gregory v. Helvering, supra, this Court acknowledged
that the transaction fell literally within the reorganization
provisions but held that “the tax consequences must turn upon the
substance of the transaction rather than the form in which it was
cast.” West Coast Mktg. Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 40.
Respondent argues that MB Parent in the instant case is
comparable to the intermediary corporation in West Coast Mktg.
Corp. in that it had no business, no offices, and no employees,
and it served no purpose other than to create the form necessary
to support a claim for tax-free reorganization treatment.
In addition to cases cited above, respondent relies on the
legislative history of the reorganization provisions, various
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legislative attempts to prevent abuse, and cases discussing
continuity of proprietary interest as “the judicial bulwark and
backstop for limiting deferral [nonrecognition] to the kinds of
transactions that Congress intended should qualify.” See
Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462(1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1932). Petitioner responds with the assertion that “Stock
as consideration has always satisfied” the continuity of
proprietary interest requirement “even when the stock conveys a
highly attenuated economic interest in the acquiring
corporation.” Here, however, petitioner is again assuming that
stock was the sole consideration for the divestiture of Bender–-
an assumption we reject under the facts of this case for the
reasons discussed above. Moreover, the interest of the MB Parent
common stock held by TMD in the Bender operations is not merely
“highly attenuated”; it is expressly negated by the evidence.
Petitioner does not address Minn. Tea Co. or West Coast
Mktg. Corp. Petitioner relies on Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner,
90 T.C. 171 (1988), affd. without published opinion 886 F.2d 1318(7th Cir. 1989), as demonstrating the limitations on applying
substance over form analysis to recast a transaction that, on its
face, complies with the formal requirements of a statute.
Respondent notes that Esmark, Inc. reaffirmed the notion that a
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taxpayer’s receipt of a substantial amount of cash for its
property is the hallmark of a sale. See id. at 187.
In J.E. Seagram Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 75, 94
(1995), the taxpayer, arguing against reorganization treatment in
an effort to establish a recognizable loss, relied on the
rationale of Esmark, Inc., and this Court responded:
Esmark Inc. involved a series of related
transactions culminating in a tender offer and
redemption of a part of the taxpayer’s stock in
exchange for certain property. The Commissioner,
seeking to apply the step transaction doctrine, sought
to recharacterize the tender offer/redemption as a sale
of assets followed by a self-tender. While it is true
that we held that each of the preliminary steps leading
to the tender offer/redemption had an independent
function, we also held that the form of the overall
transaction coincided with its substance, and was to be
respected. In the case before us, petitioner would
have us respect the independent significance of
DuPont’s tender offer, but disregard the overall
transaction, which included the merger. That result
would, of course, be inconsistent as an analogy with
the result in Esmark, Inc. We therefore decline
petitioner’s request that we apply Esmark, Inc. to the
facts of this case. [Id. at 94.]
We believe that the J.E. Seagram Corp. analysis is helpful in
this case. In J.E. Seagram Corp. and in Esmark, Inc., we
declined to give conclusive effect to a single part of a complex
integrated transaction, as petitioner would have us do here.
Petitioner relies primarily on two aspects of the
documentation to conclude that the Bender transaction qualifies
as a tax-free reorganization. The first is the form by which MB
Parent common stock flowed to TMD and by which Bender preferred
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stock flowed to MB Parent. We agree with respondent that this
case is more like West Coast Mktg. Corp. than like Esmark, Inc.
There are differences, of course. MB Parent was not intended to
be, and has not been, liquidated as promptly as the intermediary
in West Coast Mktg. Corp. Additionally, MB Parent was putatively
formed by the acquirer rather than by the party divesting itself
of the property. Given the terms of MB Parent’s governing
documents and the structure of its several classes of stock,
however, it has no more function than the intermediary in West
Coast Mktg. Corp. By contrast to the facts in Esmark, Inc., here
there is no uncontrolled participation by persons who are not
parties to the contractual arrangement, such as the public
shareholders in Esmark, Inc., to give substantive economic effect
to the existence of MB Parent. To disregard the existence of
MB Parent is not to ignore any meaningful step in the transfer of
Bender from Times Mirror to Reed.
Second, petitioner asserts that “the evidence conclusively
establishes that the parties valued the MBP Common at
$1.375 billion.” Petitioner argues that the agreement of the
parties as to value was the result of arm’s-length negotiations
between Times Mirror and Reed. The arm’s-length negotiation,
however, led to the parties’ agreeing to adopt the form of
tax-free reorganization, which required a recital that the common
stock was the consideration being exchanged for the Bender stock.
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That language was consistent with Times Mirror’s tax objectives,
which were accepted by Reed when Reed concluded that it could not
acquire the Bender stock without agreeing to those terms. While
terms negotiated between the parties may produce evidence of
value, they are not conclusive. Cf. Berry Petroleum v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 584, 615 (1995), affd. without published
opinion on other issues 142 F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1998). In the
instant case, the negotiated terms are overcome by the evidence,
as discussed above, that the MB Parent common stock did not have
a value of $1.375 billion or even 80 percent of that amount.
Once petitioner acknowledges and asserts that the MB Parent
common stock cannot be separated from the authority of Times
Mirror, the “ultimate claimholder”, to manage the cash in the
LLC, the putative 20-percent voting power of the common stock in
MB Parent and the bare title of MB Parent in the LLC should be
disregarded. MB Parent clearly serves no purpose and performs no
function apart from Times Mirror’s attempt to secure the desired
tax consequences. In this context, we agree with respondent’s
reliance on Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573
(1978), observing that “the simple expedient of drawing up
papers” is not controlling for tax purposes when “the objective
economic realties are to the contrary.”
As we indicated at the beginning of our factual analysis,
our understanding of the Bender transaction gives full effect to
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all of the contractual terms other than the labels assigned. As
we indicated in our discussion of the dispute over valuation of
the common stock, we agree that it is unrealistic to separate the
common stock in MB Parent from the authority to manage
$1.375 billion in cash held by Times Mirror through the
management agreement. Thus, we are simply looking at the
operative terms of the Bender transaction by analyzing the
respective rights of the parties to it as interpreted by them
before, on, and after July 31, 1998.
The evidence compels the conclusion that Times Mirror
intended a sale, assured that it would receive the proceeds of
sale for use in its strategic plans, used the proceeds of sale in
its strategic plans without limitation attributable to any
continuing rights of Reed, and represented to shareholders and to
the SEC that it had full rights to the proceeds of sale. None of
these actions were inconsistent with the contractual terms.
Thus, we need not “substitute respondent’s version” for “what
actually transpired.” We deal only with what actually transpired
and give effect to the legal documentation of the Bender
transaction, with key points emphasized by the terms of the
documents and the statements made by Times Mirror representatives
about what was accomplished in the Bender transaction.
In a different but analogous context, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has stated:
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The freedom to arrange one’s affairs to minimize taxes
does not include the right to engage in financial
fantasies with the expectation that the Internal
Revenue Service and the courts will play along. The
Commissioner and the courts are empowered, and in fact
duty-bound, to look beyond the contrived forms of
transactions to their economic substance and to apply
the tax laws accordingly. That is what we have done in
this case and that is what taxpayers should expect in
the future. * * * [Saviano v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d
643, 654 (7th Cir. 1985), affg. 80 T.C. 955 (1983).]
From any perspective, the “true economic effect”
(petitioner’s words, quoted above) of the Bender transaction was
a sale. Because the consideration paid by the buyer, to wit,
unfettered control over $1.375 billion in cash, passed to the
seller from the buyer, the Bender transaction does not qualify as
a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(B), which requires that
the exchange be solely for stock. Because the MB Parent common
stock lacked control over any assets, its value was negligible in
comparison to the $1.1 billion value that would be required to
qualify the Bender transaction as a tax-free reorganization under
section 368(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(E).
Evidentiary Matters
The extensive stipulations of the parties included certain
documents to which objections were made with the understanding
that the objections would be discussed in the posttrial briefs.
Respondent objected on relevance, materiality, and hearsay
grounds to four articles concerning the failed merger between
Reed and Wolters Kluwer. Petitioner did not address these
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materials in the briefs, and we have not relied on them in our
findings. The relevance and hearsay objections will be
sustained.
Petitioner objects to certain exhibits proposed by
respondent, consisting of documents provided to respondent by
petitioner or its representatives during the audit and during
pretrial negotiations and preparation. Petitioner objects to the
materials on the grounds of relevance, relying on Greenberg’s
Express, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324, 327 (1974). As to
one document authored by petitioner’s counsel, petitioner also
objects that it was provided in settlement negotiations. See
Fed. R. Evid. 408. Although respondent disputes whether
petitioner can rely on the rule of Greenberg’s Express, Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra, respondent does not show how the materials
in question are helpful in our resolution of this case. We have
not relied on them in our findings of fact. Petitioner’s
relevance objections are sustained.
Petitioner objected at trial and renews on brief an
objection to the testimony of Brian Huchro (Huchro), a senior
staff accountant in the Division of Enforcement at the SEC who
testified on SEC reporting requirements of publicly held
companies. Huchro was identified in the trial memorandum and
submitted a report as a rebuttal witness to Arthur C. Wyatt
(Wyatt), whose report had been submitted by petitioner. At the
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time of trial, petitioner decided not to call Wyatt and then
raised objection to Huchro’s testimony. We do not rely on
Huchro’s report in our findings of fact. The representations
made by Times Mirror in various SEC filings are recounted only to
show that such representations were made, and we need not draw
any conclusions about what was required by the SEC or the
relationship of SEC rules to Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles.
We have considered the arguments of the parties that were
not specifically addressed in this Opinion. Those arguments are
irrelevant to our decision. In view of our resolution of the
primary issue, we do not address respondent’s alternative
argument under section 269. To reflect the foregoing and to
provide for resolution of the Mosby issues, neither tried nor
addressed in this opinion,
An appropriate order
will be issued.