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CHARLES D. MARTIN AND LAURA J. MARTIN, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RespondentMartin v. Comm'rDocket No. 15810-13
United States Tax Court 2017 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 46;September 27, 2017, FiledDecision text below is the first available text from the court; it has not been editorially reviewed by LexisNexis. Publisher's editorial review, including Headnotes, Case Summary, Shepard's analysis or any amendments will be added in accordance with LexisNexis editorial guidelines.
*46 Docket No. 15810-13. Filed September 27, 2017.
Ps owned a farm, renting a portion of the land to wholly owned S corporation C. C contracted with unrelated entity S to raise chickens according to S' exacting specifications. Ps followed S' specific instructions to build structures designed only to raise S' chickens. C paid Ps wages for their labor and rent for the use of the farm and structures. R asserts that the rent is subject to self-employment tax pursuant to
I.R.C. sec. 1402(a)(1) .Held : The facts of the instant case are not materially dis-tinguishable from the facts of ,McNamara v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1999-333rev'd ,236 F.3d 410">236 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2000). The U.S.Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
McNamara also reversed , andHennen v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1999-306 . In the light of the reversals by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the Court reconsiders its holdings.Bot v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1999-256- 2 -
Held ,further , Ps established that the rent received was at or below fair market value. R failed to show a sufficient nexus between the rental income and petitioners' obligations to participate in the production or management of the production of agricultural com-modities. Therefore, the rent Ps received pursuant to the lease is not includible in their net self-employment income. To the extent ,McNamara v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 1999-333">T.C. Memo. 1999-333 , andHennen v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1999-306 , are inconsistent with this*47 holding, they are not followed.Bot v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 1999-256">T.C. Memo. 1999-256Charles D. Martin and Laura J. Martin, pro se.
Lewis A. Booth II , for respondent.PARIS,
Judge : The Internal Revenue Service (IRS or respondent)determined deficiencies in petitioners' 2008 and 2009 Federal income tax of
$13,409 and $15,408, respectively. The question presented is whether rent
payments petitioners received are subject to self-employment tax under section
1402(a)(1).1
1Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of
facts, the exhibits attached thereto, and the exhibit admitted at trial are
incorporated by this reference. Petitioners resided in Texas when they timely
petitioned this Court. They were married during the years in issue.
Charles Martin holds a degree in agricultural engineering from Texas A&M
University. Since July 1999 Mr. and Mrs. Martin have owned a farm consisting of
more than 300 acres of land, various agricultural and horticultural structures, and
their personal residence. Mrs. Martin performed*48 the farm's bookkeeping; Mr.
Martin performed a portion of the physical labor and other management services
as necessary.2
In late 1999 petitioners began constructing the first of eight poultry houses
in which they would raise young chickens designated as broilers.3 The poultry
houses were built in accordance with detailed specifications provided by
Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Sanderson Farms)--a Fortune 1000 company and the third
2During 2000, 2001, and 2010 Mr. Martin spent most of the year away from the farm performing consulting services.
3These houses were specifically designed and built to raise broilers. Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 281 (2002) defines "broiler" as: "a chicken or other bird fit for broiling;
esp : a young chicken weighing up to 2 1/2 pounds dressed".- 4 -
largest poultry producer in the United States. The poultry houses were substantial
in size as each offered over 22,000 square feet of usable space. Petitioners also
installed specialized equipment for the broilers, including heating and air
conditioning, among numerous other improvements. The costs of these
improvements to petitioners' farm totaled more than $1.2 million.
In 2000 petitioners entered into*49 a Broiler Production Agreement (BPA) with
Sanderson Farms.4 This 15-year agreement contained extensive instructions and
requirements for petitioners, as the "growers" of broilers. In essence, Sanderson
Farms would deliver to petitioners a flock of broilers--along with the daily
necessary proprietary blend of feed for the birds--and 49 days later, it would return
to pick them up. The process would be repeated four or five more times each year.
Over the course of those 49-day cycles, petitioners were responsible for the
care of each flock of broilers using good poultry husbandry practices. In carrying
out Sanderson Farms' detailed instructions, petitioners were allowed to hire
additional laborers or employees. However, petitioners' discretion ended there.
Not only did Sanderson Farms retain ownership of the broilers, but it also retained
ownership of all feed consumed or unconsumed by the flock. Sanderson Farms
4Although Mr. Martin performed consulting work away from the farm during 2000, 2001, and 2010, the BPA obligations were fulfilled without exception.
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required the broilers to be cared for according to the standards of its proprietary
broiler growing program, and its employees checked on*50 the broilers daily
throughout the 49-day cycle. This program restricted the diet of the broilers to the
proprietary blend of feed delivered to each poultry house and other items
necessary for their health and wellbeing; it also required prior notice for any
deviation from the flock's engineered diet to be specifically approved by
Sanderson Farms.
In 2003 petitioners obtained an agricultural appraisal of their farm. The
appraisal not only detailed the value of the land and structures but also analyzed
the cost of running the broiler operation as an investment (and not as active
participants). On November 19, 2004, petitioners organized C L Farms, Inc. (CL
Farms), as an S corporation.5 Using the appraisal as a guide for the cost of labor
and management services and incorporating information gathered from other
broiler growers, petitioners entered into oral employee agreements with CL Farms
and set their salaries at amounts consistent with those of other growers.6 Mrs.
Martin would provide bookkeeping services to the corporation, and Mr. Martin,
5The Court takes judicial notice of this date, which is found in the records of the Texas secretary of state.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201 .6The 2003 appraisal suggests that the cost*51 of labor and management to run petitioners' farm is approximately $52,900 per year.
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along with any hired laborers or employees, would provide the requisite labor and
management services.
In January 2005 Sanderson Farms approved petitioners' assignment of the
remainder of their BPA to CL Farms. Like petitioners' BPA, CL Farms' BPA
anticipated relying on employees to meet the requirements of good poultry
husbandry and the Sanderson Farms broiler growing program. CL Farms, rather
than petitioners, would be responsible as the grower; nothing in the BPA required
petitioners to personally perform the duties of grower.7 Sanderson Farms retained
title to the broilers and proprietary feed and--in addition to daily check-ins--was
willing and able to take over utility payments or the day-to-day care of a flock if
CL Farms failed to perform its duties.
On January 20, 2005, petitioners entered into a five-year lease agreement
with CL Farms by which CL Farms would rent from petitioners their farm
(excluding their residence, access to the residence, and 10 acres), structures,
176,000 square feet of poultry houses, and equipment.8 Over the course of the
7Mr. Martin signed the corporate signature page, personally*52 guaranteeing the growing obligations of CL Farms. Mrs. Martin did not.
8CL Farms used approximately 10 acres of land surrounding the broiler houses in conjunction with its BPA. The rest of the farm was actively used for grazing and other cattle-related activity. The amount of revenue generated by this
(continued...)
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five-year lease, CL Farms agreed to pay rent of $1.3 million to petitioners.9 The
agreement required CL Farms to remit each rent payment irrespective of whether it
had fulfilled its requirements as grower to Sanderson Farms or received sufficient
income. This amount represented fair market rent and was consistent with
amounts paid by other Sanderson Farm growers for the use of similar premises.
For 2008 and 2009 CL Farms fulfilled its duties under the lease, making all
of the necessary rent payments to petitioners, which petitioners reported as rental
income, excludable from self-employment income. At no point during the years in
issue did petitioners believe that they were--nor were they actually--obligated or
compelled to perform farm-related activities as a condition to CL Farms'
obligation pursuant to the lease to pay rent to petitioners. For 2008 and 2009 CL
Farms also fulfilled*53 its duties as grower to Sanderson Farms; petitioners were
similarly not obligated to perform farm-related activities in CL Farms' production
of agricultural commodities. Although petitioners materially participated in the
broiler production activity, CL Farms consistently hired numerous laborers to
8(...continued)
other activity during the years in issue was not insignificant, representing 11.5% of CL Farms' income for each of the years in issue.
9This amount was paid in installments following Sanderson Farms' payment for each grown flock of broilers; it was structured in that way to accommodate CL Farms' operational cashflow requirements.
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clean and reset the houses between flocks. CL Farms also hired professional and
legal counsel in conjunction with the farm's management. For 2008 and 2009 CL
Farms paid for labor, employee benefits, and professional services $77,796 and
$86,389, respectively.
Petitioners jointly filed Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for
2008 and 2009, reporting rental income from CL Farms of $259,000 and
$271,000, respectively. The IRS determined that these amounts were subject to
self-employment tax because they constituted net earnings from self-employment*54
under
section 1402(a)(1) . Petitioners timely sought redetermination of theresulting deficiencies in this Court.
OPINION
The sole issue in this case is whether the rent payments petitioners received
are subject to self-employment tax under
sections 1401 and1402(a)(1) for theyears in issue.
Section 1401 imposes a tax upon self-employment income; section1402 provides instructions for calculating the amount. As relevant to this case,
section 1402(a) provides:SEC. 1402(a) . Net Earnings From Self-Employment.--The term "net earnings from self-employment" means the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed by this subtitle * * *except that in computing such gross income and deductions * * *
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(1) there shall be excluded rentals from real estate and from personal property leased with the real estate * * * except that the preceding provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any income derived by the owner or tenant of land if
(A) such income is derived under an arrangement, between the owner or tenant and another individual, which provides that such other individual shall produce agricultural or horticultural commodities (including * * *
poultry * * *) on such land and that there shall be*55 material participation by the owner or tenant (as determined without regard to any activities of an agent of such owner or tenant) in the production or management of the production of such agricultural or horticultural commodities, and
(B) there is material participation by the owner or tenant (as determined without regard to any activities of an agent of such owner or tenant) with respect to any such agricultural or horticultural commodity * * *
Respondent contends that the rent payments petitioners received are subject
to self-employment tax because, taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, there existed an arrangement between petitioners and both CL
Farms and Sanderson Farms that required petitioners to materially participate in
the production of agricultural commodities on their farm. Conversely, petitioners
contend that the rent payments are not subject to self-employment tax for two
reasons. First, the rent payments were consistent with market rates, and there was
no nexus between the lease and either the BPA or the employment agreements.
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Second, their material participation was not required by either CL Farms' BPA or
their oral employment agreements with CL Farms.
I.
*56 McNamara v. Commissioner The parties base their arguments primarily on
McNamara v. Commissioner (
McNamara I ),T.C. Memo. 1999-333 ,rev'd ,236 F.3d 410">236 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2000), wherethis Court held--in virtually identical circumstances--that rental income from a
wholly owned corporation was received pursuant to an arrangement between the
parties to produce agricultural commodities on the farm within the meaning of
section 1402(a)(1)(A) , and onMcNamara v. Commissioner (McNamara II ), 236F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2000),
rev'g T.C. Memo. 1999-333 ,and rev'g Hennen v. Commissioner ,T.C. Memo. 1999-306 ,and rev'g Bot v. Commissioner , T.C.Memo. 1999-256, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed
this Court on the grounds that there was no nexus between the rental agreement
and any arrangement requiring the taxpayers' material participation.10
The McNamaras owned and operated their farm as a joint venture for a time
until they incorporated the farm under the name McNamara Farms.
McNamara I ,10The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit consolidated with
McNamara I two other cases: , andHennen v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 1999-306">T.C. Memo. 1999-306 . Although this Court's discussion is generally directed towards theBot v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1999-256McNamara cases, the analysis and conclusions also apply to bothBot andHennen .- 11 -
slip op. at 2 . Pursuant to a written lease, McNamara Farms paid the McNamaras*57 avarying amount of rent each year; the land was used to produce agricultural
commodities.
. The McNamaras entered into employmentId. , slip op. at 2-3agreements with McNamara Farms.
. Mr. McNamara would serve asId. at 3general manager, responsible for field work, marketing, security, employee
management, and other usual and customary duties required by the agricultural
production operation of McNamara Farms.
Id. Mrs. McNamara would providebookkeeping services, as well as prepare meals for the farm's employees, do field
work, and perform such other usual and customary duties as might be delegated by
the employer from time to time.
. In essence, these agreements providedId. at 4that the McNamaras would continue to perform their then-current duties.
Id. at 3-4.
The McNamaras reported their rental income, but they did not report it as
subject to self-employment tax.
. The Commissioner determined that theId. at 5payments were properly includible in their net earnings from self-employment
under
section 1402(a)(1) .Id. The McNamaras contested this determination, andin
McNamara I this Court held in the Commissioner's favor, looking beyond theterms of the lease to the McNamaras' obligations within the overall scheme of
their farming operation.
. In arriving at this*58 conclusion, the Court tookId. at 8-9- 12 -
into account all the facts and circumstances and applied a broad interpretation of
"arrangement", noting that
where used in the Internal Revenue Code, the word "arrangement" refers to some general relationship or overall understanding between or among parties in connection with a specific activity or situation. Generally, it is not limited only to contractual relationships, or used in a way that suggests that its terms and conditions must be included in a single agreement, contractual or otherwise. Congress obviously recognized a distinction between a contract and the broader concept of an "arrangement", as is evident from those sections of the Internal Revenue Code that make reference to both. [
(quotingId. at 8 ).]Mizell v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1995-571The Court found that "the arrangement between * * * [the McNamaras] and
McNamara Farms provided, or contemplated, that * * * [the McNamaras]
materially participate in the production of agricultural commodities on the
farmland."
. The Court further ruled that both the McNamaras had,Id. at 9pursuant to that arrangement, materially participated in agricultural production and
concluded that the rental income was therefore farm rental income subject to
taxation as self-employment*59 earnings.
See id. at 10.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that
despite the existence of a separate employment agreement requiring the taxpayers'
material participation--and despite their actual material participation--a rental
agreement may stand on its own in certain circumstances.
McNamara II , 236 F.3d- 13 -
at 412-413. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted the
McNamaras' uncontradicted testimony that the rents in question were consistent
with market rates for agricultural land and held that "[r]ents that are consistent
with market rates very strongly suggest that the rental arrangement stands on its
own as an independent transaction and cannot be said to be part of an
'arrangement' for participation in agricultural production."
. The caseId. at 413was remanded to provide the Commissioner an opportunity to prove that there
existed "a nexus between the rents received by * * * [the McNamaras] and the
'arrangement' that requires the landlords' material participation."
Id. On remand, the McNamaras and the Commissioner submitted supplemental
briefing. After careful consideration, an order and decision was entered, finding
that the rents in question were*60 at or below fair market value and, accordingly,
there were no deficiencies in the McNamaras' Federal income tax for the years in
issue.
McNamara v. Commissioner , T.C. Dkt. No. 7537-98 (July 10, 2002).11Respondent has not argued that the instant case is distinguishable from
McNamara I . Instead, his argument is based solely upon this Court's following its11Substantially similar orders were entered in
Bot v. Commissioner , T.C. Dkt. No. 7970-98 (July 10, 2002), andHennen v. Commissioner , T.C. Dkt. No. 7535-98 (July 10, 2002).- 14 -
earlier analysis and holdings in
McNamara I ,Bot , andHennen .12 Petitioners,however, argue that
McNamara II was correctly decided and urge this Court toadopt the approach used by the Court of Appeals in analyzing their situation.
Upon reconsideration of this Court's opinion in
McNamara I , and itsreversal by the Court of Appeals, this Court concludes that it did not give
sufficient consideration to the requirement of
section 1402(a)(1) that the rent inquestion be "derived under" an arrangement requiring the landlord's material
participation. In other words, there was insufficient consideration given to the
"nexus between the rents received by [the] taxpayers and the 'arrangement' that*61
requires the landlords' material participation."
.McNamara II , 236 F.3d at 413This issue will be reviewed accordingly in the context of the instant case. And the
parties' contentions will be examined, taking into account the burden of proof,
12This Court has twice followed the Court of Appeals' decision in
McNamara II .See (applying the nexus test and finding that the rent in question was not subject to self-employment tax);Johnson v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2004-56 (applying the nexus test and finding that the rent in question was subject to self-employment tax). Each of these cases, however, was properly appealable in the Eighth Circuit; thus, in followingSolvie v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2004-55McNamara II , the Court cited , 757 (1970) (holding that this Court would follow a Court of Appeals opinion which is squarely on point where appeal from the decision would lie to that Court of Appeals and that court alone),Golsen v. Commissioner , 54 T.C. 742">54 T.C. 742aff'd ,445 F.2d 985">445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). The instant case, however, is properly appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; this Court is therefore not bound byMcNamara II and may decide whether to follow the analysis of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.- 15 -
which rests upon petitioners.
See Rule 142(a) . Petitioners do not contend--nordoes the Court find--that the burden of proof shifts to respondent*62 under section
7491 as to any issue of fact. Respondent's determinations are presumed to be
correct; petitioners must prove them erroneous in order to rebut the presumption
and satisfy their burden of proof.
See id. ; , 115Welch v. Helvering , 290 U.S. 111">290 U.S. 111(1933).
II.
Social Security and Self-Employment In reexamining this Court's earlier analysis, it is best to understand the
intent behind
section 1402(a)(1) . To do so, it is helpful to examine the history ofthe Social Security provisions in
title 42 of the United States Code , which haveidentical counterparts in title 26. These sets of statutes are often viewed in pari
materia,
see, e.g. , , and should beRamsay v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1983-590construed to promote "a symmetrical parallel between the social security eligibility
provisions for self-employed persons and the corresponding income tax provisions
for taxing self-employed persons for social security purposes".
Johnson v. Commissioner ,60 T.C. 829">60 T.C. 829 , 833 (1973).Self-employed individuals were first brought under the Old Age and
Survivors Insurance Program (Program) in 1950.
Social Security Act Amendments of 1950 (SSA 1950), ch. 809,
sec. 104(a), 64 Stat. at 502 (adding- 16 -
what is presently
42 U.S.C. sec. 411(a) );id. sec. 208(a), 64 Stat. at 541 (addingwhat is presently
section 1402(a) ). In doing so, Congress deemed theseindividuals entitled to benefits and the incidence of the self-employment tax
"based upon the receipt of income from labor, which old*63 age, death, or disability
would interrupt; and not upon the receipt of income from the investment of capital,
which these events would presumably not affect."
Delno v. Celebrezze , 347 F.2d159, 161 (9th Cir. 1965). Self-employed farmers, however, were excluded from
coverage (and self-employment taxation). This exclusion was accomplished by
excepting from "net earnings from self-employment" income derived by a self-
employed individual from a business which if carried on by employees would
constitute agricultural labor. SSA 1950,
secs. 104(a) ,208(a) .In 1954 the exception was removed from each provision, bringing self-
employed farmers under the protection of the Program. Congress was careful,
however, to continue to exclude from net self-employment income any amounts
received as "rentals from real estate and from personal property leased with the
real estate" regardless of the method of payment.
Social Security Act Amendments of 1954, ch. 1206,
secs. 101(g) ,201(a) ,68 Stat. at 1055, 1087 .These provisions were amended again in 1956 to broaden coverage to include
farm owners or farm tenants if there was a "material participation by the owner or
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tenant in the production or the management of the production of * * * agricultural
* * * commodities."
Social Security Act Amendments of 1956,*64 ch. 836, secs.104(a), 201(e),
70 Stat. at 824, 840 .In 1960 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Henderson v. , 885 (5th Cir. 1960), commented on this revision, notingFlemming , 283 F.2d 882">283 F.2d 882that
[i]t was, to be sure, stated somewhat awkwardly by an exception to an exclusion. But we regard this as of no moment and treat it as another instance of Congressional English as Congress weaves and rips the Penelopean tax garment to meet the undulating underlying changes in legislative policy. [Citations omitted.]
In any event, the 1956 amendment was intended to bring a new and major group of
individuals under the Program.
.Id. at 887"Coverage of the program should be as nearly universal as is practicable. * * * Modifications would be made in the coverage requirements for farmers and farm workers to take into account the practical problems that have arisen since they were brought into the program by the 1954 amendments. Changes would be made in the provisions on insured status and benefit computations to give the newly covered groups equitable treatment as compared with those brought in earlier." Senate Calendar No. 2156, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Rpt. 2133, p. 1. [
.]Id. n.7This amendment "show[ed] a benevolent intent to protect citizens whose income
diminishes or*65 is wiped away because of old age or disability, and on the other
hand to exclude income which continues in spite of old age or disability such as
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the fruits of someone else's labor."
, 30 (5th Cir.Celebrezze v. Miller , 333 F.2d 29">333 F.2d 291964).
Courts have accordingly interpreted this intent to be that these provisions
"should be applied to exclude only payments for use of space, and, by implication,
such services as are required to maintain the space in condition for occupancy."
. However, when the tenant's payment includesDelno , 347 F.2d at 163compensation for substantial additional services--and when the compensation for
those services constitutes a material part of the payment--the "rent" consists
partially of income attributable to the performance of labor not incidental to the
realization of return from passive investment.
Id. In these circumstances, theentire payment is included in "net earnings from self-employment."
Id. The issue of separating return of investment from compensation for services
performed has long been identified. In fact, most self-employed individuals
receive income that is a combination of income from labor and invested capital.
Congress chose not to attempt the task of separating one from the other. Instead,
42 U.S.C. sec. 411(b)(1) imposed a ceiling*66 on the total annual net earnings fromself-employment that may be included in determining eligibility for benefits.
See also sec. 1402(b)(1) . This ceiling served to circumvent the income distortion that- 19 -
might otherwise result. Social Security: Hearings on
H.R. 2893 Before the H.R.Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st Cong. 1362-1365 (1949).
In the early 1960s several Courts of Appeals found that material
participation could be attributed to an individual through the efforts of an
employee or agent.
See, e.g. , (4th Cir. 1961)Harper v. Flemming , 288 F.2d 61">288 F.2d 61(holding that the activities of a bank, as agent for the owner, in management of the
owner's farm, constituted "material participation" by the owner in the production
and management of the farm within the
Social Security Act provisions); (holding that where the landowner, through her son asHenderson , 283 F.2d 882">283 F.2d 882her agent, made a "material participation" in the production or management of
production of cotton and corn, her income was self-employment income subject to
tax and that she was eligible for benefits);.
These provisions were intended to afford coverage to the broadest class of
individuals. And in 1974 Congress narrowed the exclusion by broadening the
exception for farm-related rental income.
See Act of Aug. 7, 1974, Pub. L. No.93-368,
sec. 10(a) and(b) ,88 Stat. at 422 (adding*67 "(as determined without regardto any activities of an agent of such owner or tenant)" after "material participation
by the owner or tenant" each place it appeared in
42 U.S.C. sec. 411 and section- 20 -
1402(a)(1), respectively). It is this version of
section 1402 that applies topetitioners in this case.
III.
Self-Employment Income A taxpayer's self-employment income is subject to self-employment tax.
Sec. 1401(a) and(b) . Self-employment tax is assessed and collected as part of theincome tax, must be included in computing any income tax deficiency or
overpayment for the applicable tax period, and must be taken into account for
estimated tax purposes.
Sec. 1401 ;see also sec. 1.1401-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Self-employment income generally is defined as "the net earnings from self-
employment derived by an individual".
Sec. 1402(b) .Section 1402(a) defines"net earnings from self-employment" as "the gross income derived by an
individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the
deductions allowed by this subtitle which are attributable to such trade or
business".
See also sec. 1.1402(a)-1, Income Tax Regs. The term "derived""necessitates a nexus between the income and the trade or business actually
carried on by the taxpayer."
, 599 (8th Cir.Bot v. Commissioner , 353 F.3d 595">353 F.3d 5952003) (involving individuals with the surname Bot distinct from those in
Bot v. Commissioner*68 ,T.C. Memo 1999-256">T.C. Memo. 1999-256 ),aff'g 118 T.C. 138">118 T.C. 138 (2002);Newberry v. Commissioner ,76 T.C. 441">76 T.C. 441 , 444 (1981). Under this Court's interpretation of the- 21 -
"nexus" standard, income must arise from some income-producing activity of the
taxpayer before that income is subject to self-employment tax.
Jackson v. Commissioner ,108 T.C. 130">108 T.C. 130 , 134 (1997).Section 1402(a)(1) generally excludes rental real estate income from thecomputation of a taxpayer's net earnings from self-employment. This exclusion,
however, also provides that rent derived by the owner of land is not excluded from
the computation of net earnings from self-employment if the income is derived
under an arrangement pursuant to which the owner is required to materially
participate in the agricultural production and the owner actually materially
participates.
Id. These self-employment tax provisions are construed broadly in favor of
treating income as earnings from self-employment.
Braddock v. Commissioner ,95 T.C. 639">95 T.C. 639 , 644 (1990); , 834 (1983);Hornaday v. Commissioner , 81 T.C. 830">81 T.C. 830S. Rept. No. 81-1669 (1950),
2 C.B. 302">1950-2 C.B. 302 , 354. Similarly, the rental incomeexclusion in
section 1402(a)(1) is to be strictly construed to prevent this exclusionfrom interfering with the congressional purpose of effecting maximum coverage
under the Social Security umbrella.
.Johnson v. Commissioner , 60 T.C. at 832- 22 -
A.
Agriculturally Related Rental Income As discussed, a taxpayer's net earnings from self-employment*69 generally
exclude rental income.
Sec. 1402(a)(1) . However, certain agriculturally relatedrental income is properly included in a taxpayer's net earnings from self-
employment if two requirements are met.
Id. First, the rental income must be"derived under an arrangement, between the owner or tenant and another
individual".
Id. Such an arrangement must specify that: (1) the other individual"shall produce agricultural * * * commodities" on the rented land and (2) the
owner or tenant shall materially participate in the production or management of
the production of those commodities.
Id. The second requirement is that theowner materially participate in that production or management of production.
Id. This Court, in
, interpreted "arrangement"McNamara I , slip op. at 8-9broadly, finding that although the rental and employment agreements were
separate, the Court would view the taxpayers' existing obligations within the
overall scheme of their farming operations. It was this view that allowed the
Court to conclude that "the arrangement between * * * [the McNamaras] and
McNamara Farms provided, or contemplated, that * * * [the McNamaras]
materially participate in the production of agricultural commodities on the
farmland."
. This result was not*70 a novel approach; in fact, courtsId. , slip op. at 9- 23 -
have long acknowledged that the income derived by individuals who own and
operate their own farms is often partially attributable to income of a rental
character.
See, e.g. , ;Delno , 347 F.2d at 163 .Henderson , 283 F.2d at 887-888The potential for unfairness of
section 1402(a)(1) in such situations is apparent.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, took a different
approach. In
, the court focused on the "derivedMcNamara II , 236 F.3d at 413under" requirement, finding that "the practical effect of the 'derived under'
language" was to require a nexus between the rents received by a taxpayer and the
"arrangement" requiring the landlord's material participation. The court noted:
[T]he mere existence of an arrangement requiring and resulting in material participation in agricultural production does not automatically transform rents received by the landowner into self-employment income. It is only where the payment of those rents comprise part of such arrangement that such rents can be said to derive from the arrangement.
Rents that are consistent with market rates very strongly suggest that the rental arrangement stands on its own as an independent transaction and cannot be said to be part of an "arrangement" for participation*71 in agricultural production. * * *
[
Id. ]Regardless of a taxpayer's material participation, if the rental income is shown to
be less than or equal to market value for rent, the income is presumed to be
unrelated to any employment agreement.
Id. At that point, the burden of- 24 -
production shifts to the Commissioner to show a nexus between the rent and the
taxpayer's obligation to materially participate. Such a showing would render the
lease and employment agreements part and parcel of a larger "arrangement".
Id. The analysis of
McNamara II tracks and resolves the issues arising inseparating true rental income from wage income in circumstances where farmers
receive separate payments.13 The test proffered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit does not contradict congressional intent. Rather, it supplements
existing factors for consideration and serves to implement congressional intent,
placing farmers in the same position as their urban contemporaries.
If the rent is at or below market value and the Commissioner can show that
the rental agreement has a sufficient nexus with an agreement requiring the
taxpayer's material participation, the first prong of the
section 1402(a)(1) test ismet and congressional*72 intent is protected.14 If the Commissioner cannot show a
sufficient nexus, however, congressional intent is not frustrated. Because
Congress provided an avenue by which the Court might determine the correct
13This Opinion does not endeavor to resolve the more difficult issue of separating rent and wage income in situations involving a single payment.
14
Compare (5th Cir. 1964),Celebrezze v. Miller , 333 F.2d 29">333 F.2d 29and (5th Cir. 1960),Henderson v. Flemming , 283 F.2d 882">283 F.2d 882with .Celebrezze v. Maxwell , 315 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963)- 25 -
amount of net self-employment income, taxpayers are afforded an opportunity to
pay the correct amount of tax. This serves to place farmers in the same position as
their urban contemporaries with respect to rental income that is insufficiently
related to their trade or business.
Congress' intent was to afford income protection to taxpayers who might
not otherwise be able to provide for themselves in old age. The provisions were
designed to address wage income lost in old age--not to augment a continuing
rental income stream. In those circumstances where the two agreements are truly
separate and distinct, the taxpayer is not in jeopardy of losing his rental income if
he is unable to materially participate. Rather, he must only hire someone else to
perform those tasks that he was otherwise performing.
Because this Court finds*73 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's
analysis and reasoning sound, the next step is to evaluate the facts of this case in
the light of
McNamara II .B.
Application of McNamara II Each of the requirements in
section 1402(a)(1) operates independently.Because the parties stipulated that petitioners materially participated in the
production of agricultural commodities on their farm during the years in issue, the
- 26 -
Court will limit its analysis to whether there existed an arrangement sufficient to
subject petitioner's rental income to self-employment tax.
With respect to the statute's first requirement--that income be derived under
an arrangement--
section 1.1402(a)-4(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. , explains:In order for rental income received by an owner or tenant of land to be treated as includible farm rental income, such income must be derived pursuant to a share-farming or other rental arrangement which contemplates material participation by the owner or tenant in the production or management of production of agricultural or horticultural commodities.
Such an arrangement may be oral or written, but it "must impose upon such other
person the obligation to produce one or more agricultural or horticultural
commodities (including * * * poultry * **74 *) on the land of the owner or tenant".
Id. subpara. (3). The arrangement must also require material participation by theowner; in its contemplation of the owner's material participation, the arrangement
may consider the sum of the participation in connection with the production or the
management of the production of agricultural or horticultural commodities.
Id. subparas. (1), (3). Under such circumstances, rental income is characterized as
includible farm rental income and accordingly considered earnings from
self-employment.
Id. subpara. (1).- 27 -
Irrespective of a taxpayer's material participation--actual, required, or
otherwise15--the taxpayer may establish that the rental agreement stands on its
own, unrelated to the taxpayer's farming activity.
.McNamara II , 236 F.3d at 413If the rental income received was at or below market value, the burden of
production then shifts to the Commissioner to show a nexus between the rent and
the agricultural arrangement requiring the taxpayer to materially participate.
Id. Such a showing would render the lease and employment agreements part and
parcel of a larger "arrangement".
Id. ;see also Johnson v. Commissioner , T.C.Memo. 2004-56 (following
McNamara II and finding an insufficient*75 nexus); (same but finding a sufficientSolvie v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2004-55nexus).
As shown by the evidence, the rent payments petitioners received
represented fair market rent and were consistent with amounts paid by other
Sanderson Farms growers for the use of similar premises. This is sufficient under
15Because the Court finds that the rental income is not includible in petitioners' net self-employment income because it was consistent with fair market rent and because respondent did not show a nexus between the rent and the arrangement requiring petitioners' material participation, there is no need to address petitioners' alternative contention that none of the agreements or contracts actually required their material participation.
- 28 -
McNamara II to establish that the agreement stands on its own, but the Court findsthat additional facts further support the Court's conclusion.
Petitioners invested a significant amount of money--over $1.2 million--in
the eight 22,000-square-foot broiler houses and other improvements, which were
all built according to the exacting specifications of Sanderson Farms. And
although the rental agreement covered petitioners' farm (excluding their residence,
access to the residence, and 10 acres), structures,*76 176,000 square feet of poultry
houses, and equipment, CL Farms used approximately 10 acres and these single-
use structures for purposes of the BPA. Practically speaking, this agreement
functions as a return on investment rather than a method of income
recharacterization.
As part of their agricultural appraisal, petitioners obtained a detailed
analysis of the costs of operating their farm purely as an investment. Petitioners,
in turn, priced CL Farms' activities, including labor and management costs, to
exceed the appraisal's projected costs. These amounts were not merely remainder
payments to petitioners after the rent checks were cashed. They were appropriate
amounts for CL Farms to spend for the services required to operate its broiler
- 29 -
houses as well as its grazing and other agricultural activities.16 The structuring of
these expenses further illustrates the lengths to which petitioners went to operate
CL Farms as a legitimate business and not as a method to avoid self-employment
tax.
These facts--supported by petitioners' testimony, documentation, and
briefing--provide strong evidence that the rental agreement should stand on its
own. Thus, the burden of production shifts to respondent to*77 show a nexus
between the rents and the agricultural arrangement requiring petitioners' material
participation.
This Court has previously evaluated the nexus between the rental income
and the taxpayer's production arrangement.
See, e.g. ,Bot v. Commissioner , 118T.C. 138 (finding value-added payments reported as rental income includible in
net self-employment income where the payments were directly related to the
volume of corn acquired and delivered by taxpayers);
Solvie v. Commissioner ,T.C. Memo. 2004-55 (same when rent payments were tied directly to the numberof pigs raised).
But see (findingJohnson v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2004-56an insufficient nexus). But despite petitioners' presentation and the Court's
16Although the lease payments were structured to follow each flock, CL Farms earned only 88.5% of its annual income through the BPA. Neither party addressed CL Farms' other agricultural activity, so it will not be discussed further.
- 30 -
previous application of the well-reasoned nexus requirement in
Solvie andJohnson , respondent did not brief this issue.Instead, respondent puts all of his proverbial eggs in the
McNamara I basket, noting in his brief the Commissioner's nonacquiescence in the Court of
Appeals' decision, citing
AOD 2003-03 , 2003-2 C.B. xxiii,*78 and arguing for theCourt to interpret "arrangement" broadly to include any and all contracts related to
CL Farms.
Without alternative, this Court must conclude that the rental agreement is
separate and distinct from petitioners' employment obligations and, therefore, the
rental income is not includible in their net self-employment income.
IV.
Conclusion Using the
McNamara II analysis, the Court finds that petitioners'agriculture-related rental income is not included in their net self-employment
income under
section 1402(a)(1) . Petitioners have shown that the rent paymentswere at or below market value, and respondent failed to show--and the record does
not contain sufficient evidence showing--a nexus between the rents and the
agricultural arrangement requiring petitioners' material participation.
- 31 -
To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties,
Decision will be entered under .Rule 155 Reviewed by the Court.
MARVEL, FOLEY, VASQUEZ, GALE, THORNTON, GOEKE, HOLMES, MORRISON, KERRIGAN, BUCH, and PUGH,
JJ ., agree with this opinion of the Court.- 32 -
GUSTAFSON,
J ., dissenting: The outcome determined in the opinion ofthe Court is attractive, but its reasoning is based on a fair-market safe harbor that
is not warranted*79 by the actual text of
section 1402(a)(1) as enacted by Congress;and for that reason I join Judge Nega's dissent. I write separately to criticize the
resulting evidentiary regime that the majority creates ex nihilo.
The majority adopts the holding of
McNamara v. Commissioner , 236 F.3d410 (8th Cir. 2000),
see op. Ct. pp. 27-28, which it interprets as follows,see op.Ct. pp. 23-24:
Regardless of a taxpayer's material participation, if the rental income is shown to be less than or equal to market value for rent, the income is
presumed to be unrelated to any employment agreement. * * * At that point,the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner to show a nexus between the rent and the taxpayer's obligation to materially participate. * * * [Emphasis added.]In fact, the
McNamara opinion says nothing about any "presum[ption]" nor aboutthe "burden of production" or any shift therein. Rather, this regime is newly
announced today by the Tax Court, and it is not warranted.
Where an agreement calls for rent payments that exceed what the market
would actually bear, that excess is evidence that things may not be what they
seem, and may be evidence that there is an arrangement in which compensation for
labor is being*80 disguised as rent, so that self-employment tax may be improperly
- 33 -
avoided. On the other hand, where an agreement calls for rent payments at fair
market value (so that, as an economic matter, the rental agreement might plausibly
stand on its own),1 I assume, along with the majority, that the fair-market rent is
evidence that the arrangement may not involve disguised compensation for labor.
That is, the fact of fair-market rent may be relevant to the question of whether, for
purposes of
section 1402(a)(1) , there is no arrangement linking rent and labor.But relevancy should not be equated with sufficiency. It is entirely possible
(as the opinion of the Court effectively admits, by inviting the IRS to offer
counter-evidence) that, notwithstanding the ostensibly reasonable rent, a fair-
market rental agreement could be part of an "arrangement" under which the rental
agreement is contingent on (and is therefore linked to) an agreement providing
compensation for labor. Given that possibility, there is nothing in the statute, in
logic, in custom, or in common experience that makes the
absence of an1The opinion of the Court indiscriminately refers to rent "
at or below market value" (emphasis added); but rentbelow *81 market value implicates other questions. If rent is beingunder paid, is the recipient seeking to maximize his Social Security benefits byinflating his compensation for labor? Or is the bargain rent an inducement to the payor to hire the recipient to perform labor for which he might otherwise not be hired (clearly an "arrangement" undersection 1402(a)(1) )? I believe the majority is plainly wrong if, as it appears, it holds,see op. Ct. pp. 27-28 that where "the rental income received was at orbelow market value ," it should be presumed that the taxpayer has "establish[ed] that the rental agreement stands on its own". (Emphasis added.) On the contrary, proof that rent is set at a ratebelow market value indicates that the rental agreementdoes not stand on its own.- 34 -
arrangement so probable that, on the taxpayer's mere showing of a fair-market
rent, we necessarily relieve him of the burden of producing additional evidence of
such absence unless the Commissioner can come forward with
some evidence thatthere
is an arrangement--but that is the nature of an evidentiary presumption, andthe opinion of the Court gives no reason for it.
To show the absence of an "arrangement", the reasonableness of the rent is
only one of the pieces of evidence that a taxpayer might present, along with, for
instance, his own or the tenant's testimony that there is no arrangement. There is
no reason to select the reasonableness of the rent as a special fact that somehow
gives rise to a presumption and shifts the burden of production.
ASHFORD,
J ., agrees with this dissent.- 35 -
NEGA,
J ., dissenting: The opinion of the Court chooses to apply the Courtof Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in
McNamara II outside the EighthCircuit. I believe that the plain reading of the statute is inconsistent with the Court
of Appeals' reading. Consequently, I would*82 not extend its reading to the instant
case.
The relevant Internal Revenue Code provision is
section 1402(a)(1) . Forthe determination of net earnings from self-employment (which are generally
subject to self-employment tax), this section provides an exclusion for "rentals
from real estate and from personal property leased with the real estate * * *
together with the deductions attributable thereto, unless such rentals are received
in the course of a trade or business as a real estate dealer". However, this
exclusion, by its terms,
shall not apply to any income derived by the owner or tenant of land if (A) such income is derived under an arrangement, between the owner or tenant and another individual, which provides that such other individual shall produce agricultural or horticultural com-modities (including livestock, bees, poultry, and fur-bearing animals and wildlife) on such land, and that there shall be material participa-tion by the owner or tenant (as determined without regard to any activities of an agent of such owner or tenant) in the production or the management of the production of such agricultural or horticultural commodities, and (B) there is material participation by the owner or tenant (as determined*83 without regard to any activities of an agent of such owner or tenant) with respect to any such agricultural or horticultural commodity * * * [
Id. ]- 36 -
On its face the statute does not provide a special rule for "at or below fair
market rents". Had Congress wanted to provide such a special rule, I see no
reason for its absence from the current statute.
Focusing only on the plain wording of the Code, I do not believe that the
Court of Appeals' interpretation is the best reading. Under our caselaw, I would
still treat
McNamara II as binding in the circuit in which it was decided.See , 757 (1970),Golsen v. Commissioner , 54 T.C. 742">54 T.C. 742aff'd ,445 F.2d 985">445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.1971). I would not, however, expand its application beyond the Eighth Circuit.
In
, the Court of Appeals faulted the TaxMcNamara II , 236 F.3d at 413Court's opinion for failing to take into account the "nexus between the rents
received by Taxpayers and the 'arrangement' that requires the landlords' material
participation." The Court of Appeals focused on the two words "derived under" in
the statute to enunciate a new standard, stating that
the mere existence of an arrangement requiring and resulting in material participation in agricultural production does not automatically transform rents received by the landowner into self-employment*84 income. It is only where the payment of those rents comprise part of such an arrangement that such rents can be said to derive from the arrangement.
Rents that are consistent with market rates very strongly sug-gest that the rental arrangement stands on its own as an independent transaction and cannot be said to be part of an "arrangement" for participation in agricultural production. Although the Commissioner
- 37 -
is correct that, unlike other provisions in the
Code, § 1402(a)(1) contains no explicit safe-harbor provision for fair market value transactions, we conclude that this is the practical effect of the "derived under" language.[
Id. ]I think that the words "derived under" are too slender a reed to support such
a construction of the tax law. I believe the better reading of the statute is that the
entire arrangement is what determines the tax consequences for self-employment
purposes. In that regard I would endorse the jurisprudence in
Mizell v. Commissioner ,T.C. Memo. 1995-571 .Section 1402(a) provides a comprehensivestructure for defining "net earnings from self-employment." We must not forget
that there can be other streams of income besides "rents" in many single
transactions to which the other paragraphs of
section 1402(a) must be applied toreach*85 an accurate determination of an individual's "net earnings from self-
employment." A better reading of
section 1402(a)(1) , including the words"derived under", is that the arrangement as a whole must be the focus instead of
what the parties define as falling within two or more income streams (in this case
payments for personal services and for the use of real estate and personal
property). I will have more to say below about the hazards of relying on the
parties to a contract for purposes of characterizing amounts eligible for an
- 38 -
exception from self-employment tax, when only one of those parties will have
self-employment tax liability.
While we will never know exactly what Congress intended in regard to this
provision, it is entirely plausible that Congress declined to include such a safe
harbor because it had concerns about the practical limitations of a "market rate
rental" exception from self-employment tax. All taxpayers have an interest in
legally seeking to maximize their after-tax profits. Surely that would include self-
employment tax costs once enough such tax had been paid to ensure coverage for
the taxable year under Social Security. The facts of this case clearly illustrate that
a single transaction*86 between a taxpayer and another individual may result in
multiple types of income. In this case the contract anticipates at least personal
service income and income paid for the use of real estate and personal property.
Not readily apparent in the facts of the instant case, but often involved in other
transactions involving the determination of net earnings from self-employment,
are other types of income such as dividends, interest, and capital gains.
There are examples too numerous to count where the existence of a tax-
indifferent party leads to an agreement between two parties to mischaracterize a
transaction to provide an unjustified tax result for the non-tax-indifferent party.
For example, if Sanderson Farms gets the same tax outcome for its payments
- 39 -
under a contract with a producer (e.g., petitioners) regardless of the proportion of
contract payments subject to self-employment tax to the producer, then Sanderson
Farms may not have any reason to dispute the producer's characterization of the
amount of the contract payments for which the producer is subject to self-
employment tax. Further, if Sanderson Farms' competitors were also tax
indifferent and agreed to such a favorable characterization,*87 then Sanderson Farms
might be competitively disadvantaged if it did not follow suit. Indeed, both parties
to such an arrangement could share in any tax reduction resulting from the
mischaracterization of an amount by slightly reducing the overall contract price
under the arrangement.
While the record in the instant case does not readily provide an answer to
the question whether this transaction had a tax-indifferent party as to petitioner's
self-employment tax liability, that is unimportant. What is important is whether
one believes that concerns such as this could have led Congress to decline to
provide a safe harbor for "at or below market rents" under
section 1402(a)(1) .Again, I am not aware of legislative history either for or against such a notion. I
would only say that such a concern is compelling justification for the absence of
such a statutory safe harbor and is a compelling argument against the judicially
imposed safe harbor under
McNamara II .- 40 -
GUSTAFSON, LAUBER, and ASHFORD,
JJ ., agree with this dissent.
Document Info
Docket Number: Docket No. 15810-13
Filed Date: 9/27/2017
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020