Stephen D. Bowerman & Jani A. Bowerman v. Commissioner , 2014 T.C. Summary Opinion 26 ( 2014 )


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  • PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
    SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT
    BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY
    OTHER CASE.
    T.C. Summary Opinion 2014-26
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    STEPHEN D. BOWERMAN AND JANI A. BOWERMAN, Petitioners v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 18142-10S.                        Filed March 25, 2014.
    Stephen D. Bowerman and Jani A. Bowerman, pro sese.
    William D. Richard, Alicia H. Eyler, and Julie L. Payne, for respondent.
    SUMMARY OPINION
    GOEKE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section
    74631 in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the
    1
    All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the
    years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
    Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
    -2-
    decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall
    not be treated as precedent for any other case.
    Respondent determined deficiencies of $12,102 and $26,573 in petitioners’
    income tax for 2007 and 2008, respectively. He also determined petitioners were
    liable for section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties of $2,420.40 and $5,314.60
    for the same tax years, respectively. The issues for decision are:
    (1) whether petitioners are entitled to a deduction on Schedule C, Profit or
    Loss From Business, of $8,858 for mortgage interest for 2007. We hold they are
    not;
    (2) whether petitioners are entitled to Schedule C deductions of $24,045 and
    $34,615 for contract labor for 2007 and 2008, respectively. We hold they are
    entitled to deduct parts of those amounts;
    (3) whether petitioners are entitled to claim on Schedule C as cost of goods
    sold $49,550 for other costs for 2008. We hold they are entitled to claim part of
    that amount;
    (4) whether petitioners are entitled to employee business expense
    deductions claimed on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, of $13,276 and $20,782
    for 2007 and 2008, respectively. We hold they are not;
    -3-
    (5) whether petitioners are entitled to Schedule A deductions of $5,000 for
    certain attorney’s fees for 2007. We hold they are not;
    (6) whether petitioners are liable for accuracy-related penalties under
    section 6662(a). We hold they are, but the penalties must be adjusted for
    consistency with this opinion; and
    (7) whether petitioner Jani A. Bowerman qualifies for relief from joint and
    several liability for 2007 and 2008 under section 6015. We hold she does for part
    of each liability.
    Background
    Petitioners are married, and they lived together in Alaska when they filed
    their petition. Petitioners filed joint Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax
    Return, for the 2007 and 2008 tax years. For those tax years Mr. Bowerman was
    self-employed and earned income from various construction jobs, and Mrs.
    Bowerman worked as an administrative assistant for UPS. Respondent issued a
    notice of deficiency to petitioners in May 2010, reflecting his determination of
    several omissions from petitioners’ taxable income. The omissions resulted from
    petitioners’ failure to report interest and dividend income to Mrs. Bowerman,
    unemployment income to Mr. Bowerman, and additional interest income to both
    petitioners. Additionally, respondent disallowed various Schedule A and
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    Schedule C deductions and cost of goods sold petitioners claimed on their 2007
    and/or 2008 income tax returns and imposed accuracy-related penalties.
    Before trial we deemed several facts established. In particular, pursuant to
    Rule 91(f), we deemed established petitioners’ receipt of the unreported dividend,
    interest, and unemployment income.2
    Three categories of issues remained for trial: (1) whether petitioners were
    entitled to the Schedule C deductions and cost of goods sold they claimed, (2)
    whether petitioners were entitled to the Schedule A miscellaneous deductions they
    claimed, and (3) whether petitioners were liable for accuracy-related penalties. At
    trial an additional issue arose: whether Mrs. Bowerman is entitled to relief from
    joint and several liability for 2007 and 2008.
    On their 2007 Schedule C petitioners claimed an $8,858 mortgage interest
    deduction. For the same year they also claimed an $8,858 mortgage interest
    deduction on their Schedule A. Respondent disallowed the Schedule C deduction.
    2
    Respondent proposed a stipulation of facts and exhibits to which Mr.
    Bowerman orally agreed. Petitioners, however, failed to provide a signed copy of
    the proposed stipulation of facts to respondent. Respondent moved for an order to
    show cause pursuant to Rule 91(f), which we granted. Petitioners failed to
    respond to the order. Accordingly, we issued an order that respondent’s proposed
    stipulation of facts and exhibits be deemed established.
    -5-
    Petitioners reported income and expenses from Mr. Bowerman’s
    construction business on their 2007 and 2008 Schedules C. Respondent
    disallowed a $24,045 deduction for contract labor for 2007, a $34,615 deduction
    for contract labor for 2008, and $49,550 of cost of goods sold expenses for 2008.
    At trial Mr. Bowerman testified that the contract labor deductions were for
    payments he made to a contractor, Robert Chatman, and various day laborers. Mr.
    Bowerman testified that he paid these expenses in cash without corresponding
    employment records. Mr. Bowerman offered a signed statement from Mr.
    Chatman that listed the amounts Mr. Bowerman paid to Mr. Chatman in 2007 and
    2008. In the statement Mr. Chatman asserted that Mr. Bowerman had paid him
    $14,275 and $27,500 in 2007 and 2008, respectively, and paid day laborers an
    additional $4,500. Mr. Bowerman further testified that his recent attempts to find
    Mr. Chatman have been unsuccessful.
    On their 2008 Schedule C petitioners claimed cost of goods sold expenses
    for materials and supplies of $15,512 and for other costs of $49,550. Respondent
    disallowed the other costs component. Mr. Bowerman has offered numerous
    receipts and invoices for 2006, 2007, and 2008 to substantiate the expenses.
    On their 2007 Schedule A petitioners claimed a $5,000 deduction for
    attorney’s fees. Additionally, on their 2007 and 2008 Schedules A, petitioners
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    claimed deductions of $13,276 and $22,202, respectively, for employee business
    expenses related to Mr. Bowerman’s snowplowing activities. Petitioners did not
    report income from snowplowing activities on their 2007 and 2008 income tax
    returns or indicate that Mr. Bowerman was employed by a snowplowing company.
    Mr. Bowerman testified at trial that he was self-employed for 2007 and 2008.
    At trial Mr. Bowerman asserted that Mrs. Bowerman qualified for relief
    from joint and several liability. After the trial Mrs. Bowerman amended the
    petition to claim relief from joint and several liability.
    Discussion
    I. Burden of Proof
    Generally, taxpayers bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, that the determinations of the Commissioner in a notice of deficiency are
    incorrect. Rule 142(a)(1); Welch v. Helvering, 
    290 U.S. 111
    , 115 (1933).
    Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer bears the burden of
    proving entitlement to any claimed deductions. Rule 142(a)(1); INDOPCO, Inc. v.
    Commissioner, 
    503 U.S. 79
    , 84 (1992). To satisfy this burden, taxpayers must
    present sufficient records to substantiate their deductions. See sec. 6001;
    Hradesky v. Commissioner, 
    65 T.C. 87
    , 90 (1975), aff’d, 
    540 F.2d 821
    (5th Cir.
    -7-
    1976); Gorokhovsky v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-206, aff’d, __ Fed.
    Appx. __ (7th Cir. Oct. 22, 2013); sec. 1.6001-1, Income Tax Regs.
    Cost of goods sold is subtracted from gross receipts to determine gross
    income. Sec. 1.61-3, Income Tax Regs. Such costs are not treated as deductions
    and are not subject to the same rules as deductions. Metra Chem Corp. v.
    Commissioner, 
    88 T.C. 654
    , 661 (1987); Xuncax v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
    2001-226. Taxpayers are required, however, to substantiate any amounts claimed
    as cost of goods sold and maintain records sufficient for that purpose. Xuncax v.
    Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-226; sec. 1.6001-1, Income Tax Regs.
    The Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to an
    accuracy-related penalty. Sec. 7491(c). To meet that burden, the Commissioner
    must present sufficient evidence indicating that the penalty is appropriate. Higbee
    v. Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 438
    , 446 (2001). If the Commissioner meets this
    burden, to avoid the penalty the taxpayer must present evidence sufficient to
    persuade the Court that the penalty should not apply. 
    Id. at 447.
    Except as otherwise provided in section 6015, taxpayers requesting relief
    from joint and several liability bear the burden of proof. Rule 142(a); Alt v.
    Commissioner, 
    119 T.C. 306
    , 311 (2002), aff’d, 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir.
    2004).
    -8-
    II. Schedule C Claims
    Section 162(a) provides a deduction for certain business-related expenses.
    To qualify for the deduction, an item must be (1) paid or incurred during the
    taxable year, (2) for carrying on any trade or business, (3) an expense, (4) a
    necessary expense, and (5) an ordinary expense. Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. &
    Loan Ass’n, 
    403 U.S. 345
    , 352 (1971). An expense is ordinary if it is normal,
    customary, or usual within the relevant business. See Deputy v. DuPont, 
    308 U.S. 488
    , 495 (1940). An expense is necessary if it is appropriate and helpful for the
    business. Commissioner v. Heininger, 
    320 U.S. 467
    , 471 (1943); Welch v.
    
    Helvering, 290 U.S. at 113
    .
    A. Mortgage Interest Deduction
    For 2007 petitioners claimed mortgage interest deductions of $8,858 on
    both their Schedule A and their Schedule C. Petitioners bear the burden of
    substantiating the Schedule C mortgage interest expense and proving that the
    expense was ordinary and necessary to Mr. Bowerman’s construction business.
    Respondent argues that petitioners failed to prove that they incurred and paid the
    expense during the taxable year and that the deduction is not a mere duplicate of
    the Schedule A deduction. Mr. Bowerman’s testimony did not address this issue,
    and petitioners have presented no evidence to substantiate the expense.
    -9-
    Accordingly, we agree with respondent and hold that petitioners have failed to
    carry their burden of proof regarding the Schedule C mortgage interest deduction.
    B. Contract Labor Deductions
    Petitioners claimed contract labor deductions of $24,045 and $34,615 for
    2007 and 2008, respectively. At trial Mr. Bowerman testified that Mr. Chatman
    worked for him as a contract laborer and acted as his agent, hiring additional
    laborers. Mr. Bowerman produced an unsworn statement from Mr. Chatman that
    stated Mr. Bowerman paid Mr. Chatman $14,275 in 2007, $27,500 in 2008, and
    $4,500 for day laborers. Mr. Bowerman also produced several pay statements and
    check copies from 2007 and 2008 for other workers. From this evidence we can
    determine that Mr. Bowerman paid and incurred contract labor expenses of
    $16,000 and $30,075 in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Mr. Chatman’s statement
    does not specify when Mr. Bowerman paid the day laborers the $4,500.
    Consequently, Mr. Bowerman has failed to prove he paid the $4,500 expense in
    either year. Mr. Bowerman has carried his burden of proof for contract labor
    deductions of $16,000 and $30,075 for 2007 and 2008, respectively.
    C. Cost of Goods Sold Expenditures
    For 2008 petitioners claimed a Schedule C cost of goods sold reduction in
    income of $65,062, which consisted of $15,512 for materials and supplies and
    -10-
    $49,550 for “other costs”. Respondent disallowed the other costs component. Mr.
    Bowerman provided many of his receipts for construction expenditures he made in
    2008. Although Mr. Bowerman failed to substantiate the full amount claimed, he
    has proven that he incurred at least $31,694.66 of cost of goods sold in 2008.
    Respondent argues that petitioners have failed to prove they incurred the
    expenditures for a business purpose. We disagree. The evidence demonstrates
    that petitioners incurred the expenditures in the course of Mr. Bowerman’s
    construction business. Respondent further argues that it is not clear whether Mr.
    Bowerman’s receipts substantiate expenditures included in the materials
    component or those included in the other costs component. We agree with
    respondent. We hold that Mr. Bowerman substantiated $31,694.66 of his total
    cost of goods sold but failed to substantiate the remaining $33,367.34. We hold
    petitioners failed to carry their burden of proof with regard to this latter amount.
    III. Schedule A Deductions
    Pursuant to section 162(a), taxpayers may deduct all of the ordinary and
    necessary expenses they pay or incur during the taxable year in carrying on a trade
    or business, including expenses paid or incurred as an employee. Lucas v.
    Commissioner, 
    79 T.C. 1
    , 6 (1982). To satisfy their burden of substantiation,
    taxpayers must present sufficient permanent records or books of account to
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    support the amounts of deductions claimed on the return. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-
    1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs.
    A. Employee Business Expense Deduction
    Petitioners claim they are entitled to deduct $13,276 and $20,782 in
    unreimbursed employee expenses for 2007 and 2008, respectively. The amounts
    consist of vehicle expenses and other business expenses. Petitioners’ returns
    indicate that the expenses related to Mr. Bowerman’s snowplowing employment.
    Petitioners did not report income related to Mr. Bowerman’s snowplowing activity
    on their 2007 and 2008 returns, nor did they indicate that Mr. Bowerman was an
    employee of a snowplowing company during those years. At trial Mr. Bowerman
    admitted that he did not have any business-related expenses as an employee during
    2007 and 2008 because he was not working as an employee during that time.
    Although the expenses are not deductible as Schedule A employee expenses,
    petitioners might have been able to deduct them as Schedule C business-related
    expenses if they had properly substantiated them.
    Mr. Bowerman testified that the expenses were for vehicle maintenance,
    mileage, fuel, and a vehicle he purchased for Mr. Chatman. We gave petitioners
    ample opportunity after trial to submit supplemental documentation substantiating
    the expenses. Petitioners failed to do so. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled
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    to deduct any of the expenses they claimed as unreimbursed employee expenses on
    their 2007 and 2008 Schedules A.
    B. Attorney’s Fees Deduction
    Petitioners claimed a $5,000 deduction for 2007 for attorney’s fees. Mr.
    Bowerman testified that the deduction was for legal fees he incurred concerning
    his former employment. Petitioners, however, submitted no documentation to
    substantiate the purpose or amounts of the expenses they incurred. Mr.
    Bowerman’s testimony is insufficient to substantiate the expense. See secs.
    162(a), 6001. Accordingly, we hold petitioners have failed to carry their burden of
    proving their entitlement to the $5,000 attorney’s fees deduction for 2007.
    IV. Accuracy-Related Penalties
    Section 6662(a) and (b)(2) imposes an accuracy-related penalty if any part
    of an underpayment of tax resulted from a substantial understatement of income
    tax. The penalty is 20% of the portion of the underpayment of tax to which the
    section applies. Sec. 6662(d).
    The Commissioner bears the burden of production on the applicability of an
    accuracy-related penalty. Sec. 7491(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 446
    .
    Once the Commissioner meets this burden, the taxpayer bears the burden of
    -13-
    proving that the penalty is inappropriate because of reasonable cause and good
    faith. See sec. 6664(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 446
    -447.
    Respondent meets his burden of production by showing that petitioners’
    understatements of income tax are “substantial”. Individuals substantially
    understate their income tax when they understate their tax by an amount that
    exceeds the greater of $5,000 or 10% of the tax required to be shown on the
    return. Sec. 6662(d)(1). Petitioners’ understatements exceed the threshold, even
    after we reduce them to account for our holdings above. Respondent has therefore
    met his burden of production.
    Petitioners bear the burden of proving that the accuracy-related penalty is
    inappropriate because of reasonable cause and good faith. Whether the taxpayer
    acted with reasonable cause and good faith is determined by the relevant facts and
    circumstances, and, most importantly, the extent to which the taxpayer attempted
    to assess the proper tax liability. Brunsman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-
    291. Mr. Bowerman testified that “when I was inputting this stuff at night when
    I’d get home from work, a lot of times I wasn’t paying attention to where I was
    sticking it * * * and sometimes I was paying attention and it would go in the right
    spot, and sometimes I wasn’t and it wouldn’t.” It is clear from Mr. Bowerman’s
    testimony that petitioners’ attempts to assess the proper tax liabilities were not
    -14-
    made with reasonable cause or in good faith. Accordingly, we hold that
    petitioners’ underpayments are attributable to substantial understatements of
    income tax, and the 20% penalty applies for both 2007 and 2008.
    V. Innocent Spouse Relief
    In general, married individuals who file a joint return are jointly and
    severally liable for the tax arising from the return. Sec. 6013(d)(3). Section 6015
    allows a spouse to obtain relief from joint and several liability in certain
    circumstances.
    A. Section 6015(b) Relief
    A taxpayer may seek relief from joint and several liability under section
    6015(b) if: (1) the taxpayer has filed a joint return for the taxable year, (2) on the
    return there is an understatement of tax attributable to the other taxpayer, (3) the
    taxpayer establishes that in signing the return she did not know and had no reason
    to know of the understatement, (4) taking into account the facts and circumstances,
    it is inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for the deficiency attributable to the
    understatement, and (5) the taxpayer elects innocent spouse relief within two years
    of the beginning of collection activities. Respondent contends that Mrs.
    Bowerman has failed to satisfy the third and fourth requirements.
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    1. Knowledge Requirement
    An understatement of tax may result from underreporting income or from
    improperly claiming deductions. Concerning the knowledge requirement, several
    Courts of Appeals have distinguished between omitted income and erroneous
    deduction cases for purposes of determining whether a putative innocent spouse
    “had no reason to know” of the understatement. See sec. 6015(b)(1)(C); Price v.
    Commissioner, 
    887 F.2d 959
    , 963 (9th Cir. 1989). In omitted income cases, courts
    have held that taxpayers have a reason to know of an understatement if they know
    of the transaction giving rise to the claimed tax benefits. Greer v. Commissioner,
    
    595 F.3d 338
    , 346 (6th Cir. 2010), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2009-20.
    Mrs. Bowerman does not qualify for relief from joint and several liability
    attributable to her omitted income. Among the items of unreported income were
    interest and dividends paid solely to Mrs. Bowerman. Additionally, the U.S.
    Department of the Treasury paid interest to Mr. and Mrs. Bowerman jointly. Mrs.
    Bowerman had reason to know of these items because she knew of the underlying
    assets. Mrs. Bowerman also does not qualify for relief from joint and several
    liability related to Mr. Bowerman’s unreported unemployment income. Petitioners
    have presented no evidence to refute Mrs. Bowerman’s knowledge of this income.
    -16-
    Accordingly, she is ineligible for section 6015(b) relief from tax related to
    petitioners’ unreported interest, dividend, and unemployment income.
    When the understatement of tax liability results from improper deductions,
    courts have applied a reasonably prudent person standard to evaluate knowledge.
    Courts have generally found that a taxpayer knew or had reason to know of an
    understatement if a reasonably prudent person in the taxpayer’s position would
    have known the return contained a substantial understatement. Reser v.
    Commissioner, 
    112 F.3d 1258
    , 1267 (5th Cir. 1997), aff’g in part, rev’g in part
    T.C. Memo. 1995-572; Resser v. Commissioner, 
    74 F.3d 1528
    , 1536 (7th Cir.
    1996), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1994-241; Kistner v. Commissioner, 
    18 F.3d 1521
    , 1527
    (11th Cir. 1994), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1991-463; Hayman v. Commissioner, 
    992 F.2d 1256
    , 1261 (2d Cir. 1993), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1992-228; Erdahl v.
    Commissioner, 
    930 F.2d 585
    , 589 (8th Cir. 1991), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1990-101. In
    applying this standard, we consider four factors: (1) the taxpayer’s education, (2)
    the taxpayer’s involvement in the family’s financial affairs, (3) the presence of
    unusual or lavish expenses beyond the family’s norm, and (4) the other spouse’s
    evasiveness or deceitfulness concerning the family’s finances. Price v.
    
    Commissioner, 887 F.2d at 965
    .
    -17-
    Mrs. Bowerman does qualify for relief from tax or additions to tax resulting
    from Mr. Bowerman’s erroneous deductions.3 On the basis of the four factors of
    the Price test, we hold that Mrs. Bowerman did not know or have reason to know
    of the understatement. First, although there is no specific evidence in the record
    of Mrs. Bowerman’s education, her employment as an administrative assistant for
    UPS does not indicate any specialized knowledge of finance, business, or taxation.
    Second, we find credible Mr. Bowerman’s testimony that Mrs. Bowerman was
    entirely unaware of the details of Mr. Bowerman’s business. Third, nothing in the
    record indicates changes in family income or spending, but petitioners bear the
    burden of proving that no changes occurred. Because petitioners have presented
    no evidence on the matter, this factor weighs in respondent’s favor. See Rule
    142(a). Finally, we do not find that Mr. Bowerman consciously deceived Mrs.
    Bowerman or hid his erroneous deductions from her. However, the record
    demonstrates that he did not involve Mrs. Bowerman in managing his business or
    maintaining his records. Considering these factors, we hold Mrs. Bowerman had
    no reason to know of her husband’s erroneous deductions.
    3
    For purposes of this section, we include Schedule A itemized deductions,
    Schedule C business deductions, and Schedule C cost of goods sold expenditures
    under the umbrella term “erroneous deductions” (even though cost of goods sold
    is a reduction in gross receipts, not a deduction).
    -18-
    2. Equity Requirement
    Respondent argues that it would not be inequitable to hold Mrs. Bowerman
    liable for Mr. Bowerman’s errors. We disagree. In analyzing the equity of
    imposing liability, we must consider all of the facts and circumstances, including
    whether the requesting spouse significantly benefited from the understatement.
    Sec. 1.6015-2(d), Income Tax Regs. The record does not indicate that Mrs.
    Bowerman significantly benefited from the erroneous deductions. Accordingly,
    we believe fairness dictates granting Mrs. Bowerman relief from joint and several
    liability for tax or additions to tax related to Mr. Bowerman’s improper
    deductions.
    Because none of the other requirements of section 6015(b) are in dispute,
    we hold Mrs. Bowerman is entitled to relief from joint and several liability for tax
    or additions to tax related to Mr. Bowerman’s improper deductions for 2007 and
    2008.
    B. Section 6015(c) or (f) Relief
    Section 6015 allows a spouse to obtain relief from joint and several liability
    in three different circumstances. First, a taxpayer may seek relief under section
    6015(b), outlined above. We hold Mrs. Bowerman is entitled to section 6015(b)
    relief for the erroneous deductions, not the items of omitted income. Second, a
    -19-
    requesting spouse may seek relief under section 6015(c) if the requesting spouse is
    no longer married to or is legally separated from the nonrequesting spouse. Mrs.
    Bowerman fails to qualify for any relief under section 6015(c) because she is still
    married to and resides with Mr. Bowerman.
    Third, a requesting spouse who does not qualify for relief under section
    6015(b) or (c) may nonetheless avoid joint and several liability if, taking into
    account all the facts and circumstances, the Secretary determines it is inequitable
    to hold that individual liable for any unpaid tax or deficiency. Sec. 6015(f). Rev.
    Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, provides a list of factors that the
    Commissioner will consider in making a section 6015(f) determination. The
    factors include: marital status, economic hardship, knowledge or reason to know,
    the nonrequesting spouse’s legal obligation, significant benefit, compliance with
    income tax laws, and mental or physical health. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03,
    2013-34 I.R.B. at 400-403.
    Mrs. Bowerman fails to qualify for relief under section 6015(f) for the
    omitted income because such relief is based on the facts and circumstances and
    Mrs. Bowerman has given no facts or circumstances that indicate denying relief
    would be inequitable. Mrs. Bowerman bears the burden of proving facts and
    circumstances relating to the factors specified in Rev. Proc. 
    2013-34, supra
    . See
    -20-
    Rule 142(a)(1). Moreover, the fact that nearly all of the items of omitted income
    bore Mrs. Bowerman’s name leads us to conclude that Mrs. Bowerman does not
    qualify for relief under section 6015(f) for the items of omitted income.
    Because Mrs. Bowerman has not satisfied the requirements of section
    6015(c) or (f), we hold she is not entitled to relief from joint and several liability
    for tax or additions to tax related to the items of omitted income.
    To reflect the foregoing and petitioners’ concessions,
    Decision will be entered
    under Rule 155.