Harry E. Cole & Deborah L. Cole v. Commissioner , 2013 T.C. Summary Opinion 34 ( 2013 )


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  • PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
    SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT
    BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY
    OTHER CASE.
    
    T.C. Summary Opinion 2013-34
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    HARRY E. COLE AND DEBORAH L. COLE, Petitioners v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 14402-11S.                       Filed April 29, 2013.
    Harry E. Cole and Deborah L. Cole, pro sese.
    Nancy M. Gilmore, for respondent.
    SUMMARY OPINION
    GUY, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of
    section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was
    -2-
    filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by
    any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.
    Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners’ Federal income tax,
    additions to tax, and accuracy-related penalties for the years and in the amounts as
    follows:
    Addition to tax        Penalty
    Year      Deficiency      sec. 6651(a)(1)      sec. 6662(a)
    2006        $9,640             $1,408             $1,928
    2007         8,604                ---              1,721
    2008         7,405                664              1,481
    Petitioners filed a timely petition for redetermination with the Court pursuant to
    section 6213(a). At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in Maryland.
    1
    Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code), as amended,
    and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All
    monetary amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
    -3-
    After concessions,2 the issues remaining for decision are whether: (1)
    petitioners are entitled to deductions for casualty losses of $2,284 and $18,668 for
    2006 and 2008, respectively, related to flooding in their basement; (2) petitioners
    are entitled to a deduction for a casualty loss of $18,818 for 2007 related to damage
    to their car; (3) petitioners are liable for accuracy-related penalties under section
    6662(a) for the years in issue; and (4) Mrs. Cole is entitled to relief from joint and
    several liability under section 6015 for the years in issue.
    Background
    Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of
    facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by reference.
    Petitioners were married in 1985 and have two adult children. Although
    petitioners testified at trial that they consider themselves to be separated, they have
    never been divorced or legally separated, and they continued to reside in the same
    household at all times relevant to this case.
    2
    The parties agree that petitioners: (1) did not receive any rental income and
    they are not entitled to deduct any of the various expenses reported on Schedules C,
    Profit or Loss From Business, for the years in issue; (2) are not entitled to
    deductions of $28,434 and $9,460 for “other expenses” reported on Schedules A,
    Itemized Deductions, for 2007 and 2008, respectively; and (3) are entitled to claim
    one of their adult sons as a dependent and claim an education credit for his qualified
    tuition expenses for 2006. For the sake of clarity, other concessions are described
    in the text that follows. To the extent not discussed herein, other issues are
    computational and flow from our decision in this case.
    -4-
    During the years in issue neither petitioner was self-employed, and petitioners
    did not own any business or income-producing property.
    Petitioners maintained separate bank accounts and shared household
    expenses. Mr. Cole made monthly mortgage payments while Mrs. Cole paid
    grocery, utility, and other expenses. Petitioners also maintained a joint credit union
    account which they used as a repository for tax refund checks. The funds in the
    credit union account were used for household expenses.
    I. Mrs. Cole’s Education and Employment
    Mrs. Cole graduated from high school and is working toward a bachelor’s
    degree. From 1986 to 2006 she worked in the finance department at Bally Total
    Fitness, serving as a supervisor of telemarketers. She began to work in the customer
    service department for the Baltimore Orioles in 2007.
    II. Mr. Cole’s Employment and Related Business Expenses
    During the years in issue Mr. Cole worked as a railroad conductor and
    engineer for Norfolk Southern Corp. The parties stipulated that Mr. Cole qualified
    for “the special employee business expense rules for transportation workers” during
    the years in issue, and they agree that he is entitled to deductions for unreimbursed
    employee business expenses as follows:
    -5-
    Year       Vehicle expenses    Parking/tolls    Meals 1
    2006           $1,530               $130         $5,563
    2007              675                130          2,754
    2008              843                360          1,710
    1
    The parties stipulated that the expenses for meals listed in this
    schedule represent Mr. Cole’s expenditures “before the 50%
    reduction”. Sec. 274(n)(1) prescribes the general rule that the amount
    allowable as a deduction for meal and entertainment expenses is
    limited to 50% of the amount of these expenses. However, consistent
    with the parties’ stipulation that Mr. Cole qualifies for the special rule
    for transportation workers prescribed in sec. 274(n)(3), petitioners are
    allowed a deduction equal to 75% of these expenses for 2006 and 2007
    and 80% of these expenses for 2008. Sec. 274(n)(3)(B). Consistent
    with the agreement of the parties, deductions that petitioners otherwise
    claimed for employee business expenses in excess of those set forth in
    the schedule are disallowed.
    III. Flooded Basement
    The basement in petitioners’ home was damaged because of flooding in 2006
    and 2008. Petitioners did not file a claim for reimbursement under their
    homeowner’s insurance policy for the damage incurred in either 2006 or 2008.
    Petitioners instead filed suit against the City of Baltimore, asserting that the flooding
    was attributable to malfunctions in the City’s main water line and seeking
    reimbursement of some or all of the damages. At the time of the trial in this case,
    petitioners’ suit was still pending, and petitioners testified that they were actively
    prosecuting the case.
    -6-
    IV. Damaged Mercedes
    In 2001 petitioners purchased a preowned 1999 Mercedes-Benz (Mercedes).
    In February 2007 the Mercedes was damaged and petitioners received a payment of
    $15,376 from their insurance company for the “total loss” of the vehicle. At the
    time petitioners submitted their insurance claim, the Mercedes had been driven
    82,685 miles. Petitioners failed to offer any evidence of their adjusted basis in or
    the fair market value of the Mercedes as of the date it was damaged in 2007.
    V. Tax Returns
    On August 14, 2008, petitioners filed joint Federal income tax returns for
    2006 and 2007. The parties agree that petitioners have additional wage income of
    $10,603 and additional income tax withholding of $851 for 2006. The record does
    not reflect whether the additional wage income is attributable to Mr. or Mrs. Cole or
    both of them. Petitioners filed a joint Federal income tax return for 2008 on January
    22, 2010. Petitioners concede that they are liable for additions to tax under section
    6651(a)(1) for late filing for 2006 and 2008.
    Petitioners claimed deductions on Schedules A for casualty losses of $2,284
    and $18,668 for 2006 and 2008, respectively, attributable to flood damage to their
    basement. Petitioners claimed a deduction for a casualty loss of $18,818 on line 14
    (“Other gains or (losses)”) of their 2007 return. Petitioners computed the loss,
    -7-
    which related to the damaged Mercedes, on section B of Form 4684, Casualties and
    Thefts, reserved for casualty gains or losses for business and income-producing
    property. Specifically, petitioners computed the $18,818 loss by subtracting
    $16,000 (approximate insurance reimbursement) from $34,818 (estimated adjusted
    basis).
    Petitioners claimed refunds of $4,008, $4,721, and $4,751 on their returns for
    the taxable years 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively.
    VI. Tax Return Preparation
    Petitioners’ tax returns for 2006 and 2007 were prepared by MBA Financial
    Services, and their return for 2008 was prepared by Okojie Associates, Inc. It was
    Mr. Cole’s practice to deliver the couple’s tax records to the return preparer and,
    after the returns were prepared, present them to Mrs. Cole for her signature. After
    the returns were prepared, petitioners routinely signed them without reviewing them
    in any detail. Although Mrs. Cole had never been introduced to the return preparer,
    she trusted that the returns were accurate.
    VII. Mrs. Cole’s Claim for Spousal Relief
    After filing the petition in this case, Mrs. Cole requested spousal relief under
    section 6015 for the years in issue. Respondent concedes that Mrs. Cole is entitled
    to relief from joint and several liability only in respect of so much of the
    -8-
    deficiencies, additions to tax, and accuracy-related penalties as is attributable to Mr.
    Cole’s disallowed employee business expenses.
    Discussion
    As a general rule, the Commissioner’s determination of a taxpayer’s liability
    in a notice of deficiency is presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of
    proving that the determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 
    290 U.S. 111
    , 115 (1933).
    Petitioners have not complied with the Code’s substantiation requirements.
    Therefore, the burden of proof as to any relevant factual issue does not shift to
    respondent under section 7491(a). See sec. 7491(a)(1) and (2); Higbee v.
    Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 438
    , 442-443 (2001).
    Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer generally bears
    the burden of proving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a);
    INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    503 U.S. 79
    , 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v.
    Helvering, 
    292 U.S. 435
    , 440 (1934). A taxpayer must substantiate deductions by
    keeping and producing adequate records that enable the Commissioner to determine
    the taxpayer’s correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 
    65 T.C. 87
    , 89-90 (1975), aff’d per curiam, 
    540 F.2d 821
     (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v.
    Commissioner, 
    43 T.C. 824
    , 831-832 (1965). A taxpayer claiming a deduction on a
    -9-
    Federal income tax return must demonstrate that the deduction is allowable pursuant
    to a statutory provision and must further substantiate that the expense to which the
    deduction relates has been paid or incurred. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner,
    
    65 T.C. at 89
    -90.
    When a taxpayer establishes that he or she paid or incurred a deductible
    expense but fails to establish the amount of the deduction, the Court normally may
    estimate the amount allowable as a deduction. Cohan v. Commissioner, 
    39 F.2d 540
    , 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 
    85 T.C. 731
    , 742-743
    (1985). There must be sufficient evidence in the record, however, to permit the
    Court to conclude that a deductible expense was paid or incurred in at least the
    amount allowed. Williams v. United States, 
    245 F.2d 559
    , 560 (5th Cir. 1957).
    I. Casualty Losses
    Under section 165(a), a taxpayer generally is allowed as a deduction any loss
    sustained during the taxable year that is not compensated for by insurance or
    otherwise. However, in the case of an individual, and as is relevant here, section
    165(c)(3) limits the deduction to losses of property arising from fire, storm,
    shipwreck or other casualty, or from theft. The amount of a casualty loss is
    generally the lesser of the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property or the diminution
    in the fair market value of the property caused by the casualty.
    - 10 -
    Sec. 1.165-7(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.; see Lamphere v. Commissioner, 
    70 T.C. 391
    , 395 (1978) (and cases cited thereat).3 In the case of a loss described in section
    165(c)(3), the loss is allowed only to the extent that the amount of the loss arising
    from each casualty exceeds $100 and then only to the extent that the aggregate
    amount of such losses exceeds 10% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Sec.
    165(h)(1), (2)(A).
    If, in the year of the casualty, there exists a claim for reimbursement with
    respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, the loss is not sustained
    until it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty whether such reimbursement
    will be received. Sec. 1.165-1(d)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs. Whether a reasonable
    prospect of recovery exists is determined by an examination of the facts and
    circumstances. 
    Id.
     Whether reimbursement will be received may be ascertained
    with reasonable certainty, for example, by settlement, adjudication, or abandonment
    of the claim. 
    Id.
    3
    In determining the amount of loss deductible under section 165, the
    taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property is the amount of the adjusted basis
    prescribed in sec. 1.1011-1, Income Tax Regs., for determining the loss from the
    sale or other disposition of the property involved. Sec. 1.165-7(b)(1)(ii),
    Income Tax Regs.; see sec. 1.165-1(c)(1), Income Tax Regs. Also in determining
    the amount of loss deductible under sec. 165, fair market value generally shall be
    ascertained by competent appraisal. Sec. 1.165-7(a)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs.; see
    Gay v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1980-19
    .
    - 11 -
    A. Flood Damages
    Petitioners claimed deductions for casualty losses related to damages
    sustained when their basement was flooded in 2006 and 2008. However, petitioners
    filed suit against the City of Baltimore seeking reimbursement for those damages,
    and they confirmed at trial that the litigation is ongoing.
    Given that petitioners continue to prosecute their claim against the City of
    Baltimore, and in the absence of any evidence suggesting that the prospect of a
    recovery is unlikely, they have not sustained a casualty loss and no loss can be
    calculated for 2006 or 2008 until it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty
    whether they will be reimbursed for the damages in question. See 
    id.
    Consequently, we sustain respondent’s determination disallowing deductions for
    casualty losses for 2006 and 2008 related to flooding in petitioners’ basement.
    B. Damaged Mercedes
    Petitioners claimed a deduction for a casualty loss related to the damaged
    Mercedes. Considering the parties’ stipulation that petitioners did not own any
    business or income-producing property during the years in issue, it is clear that
    petitioners erred in computing the loss related to the Mercedes on Form 4684 and
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    reporting the item “above the line”, i.e., on line 14 of their 2007 return.4 In any
    event, petitioners did not offer any evidence of their adjusted basis in or the fair
    market value of the Mercedes immediately before it was damaged that would permit
    the Court to accurately measure or even estimate the amount of the casualty loss
    (after accounting for petitioners’ insurance recovery of $15,376). It is well
    established that if a taxpayer fails to prove his or her adjusted basis in the property
    involved, no casualty loss is allowable. Zmuda v. Commissioner, 
    79 T.C. 714
    , 727
    (1982), aff’d, 
    731 F.2d 1417
     (9th Cir. 1984). On the record presented, we sustain
    respondent’s determination disallowing the deduction for the casualty loss
    petitioners reported in 2007 in respect of the Mercedes.
    II. Accuracy-Related Penalties
    Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) imposes a penalty equal to 20% of the amount of
    any underpayment attributable to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.
    4
    A deduction reported “above the line” is subtracted from gross income in
    computing adjusted gross income (AGI). Sec. 62(a). In contrast, “below-the-line”
    deductions (including itemized deductions and the standard deduction, see sec.
    63(b), (d), (e)) are subtracted from AGI in computing taxable income. Above-the-
    line deductions typically may be claimed in addition to itemized deductions or the
    standard deduction and offer the added benefit of reducing AGI which in turn is
    used as a measure to limit other tax benefits. See, e.g., Calvao v. Commissioner,
    
    T.C. Memo. 2007-57
    , slip op. at 5 n.6.
    - 13 -
    The term “negligence” includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply
    with tax laws, and “disregard” includes any careless, reckless, or intentional
    disregard of rules or regulations. Sec. 6662(c). Negligence also includes any failure
    to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Sec. 1.6662-
    3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.; see Olive v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. ____, ____ (slip
    op. at 40) (Aug. 2, 2012).
    Section 6664(c)(1) provides an exception to the imposition of the accuracy-
    related penalty if the taxpayer establishes that there was reasonable cause for, and
    the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to, the underpayment. Sec. 1.6664-
    4(a), Income Tax Regs. The determination of whether the taxpayer acted with
    reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into
    account the pertinent facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax
    Regs. Reliance on a tax professional may demonstrate that the taxpayer had
    reasonable cause and acted in good faith where the taxpayer establishes that: (1) the
    adviser was a competent professional with sufficient expertise to justify the
    taxpayer’s reliance; (2) the taxpayer provided the adviser with necessary and
    accurate information; and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the
    adviser’s judgment. 3K Inv. Partners v. Commissioner, 
    133 T.C. 112
    , 117 (2009);
    DeCleene v. Commissioner, 
    115 T.C. 457
    , 477 (2000).
    - 14 -
    With respect to a taxpayer’s liability for any penalty, section 7491(c) places
    on the Commissioner the burden of production, thereby requiring the Commissioner
    to come forward with sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose
    the penalty. Higbee v. Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. at 446
    -447. Once the
    Commissioner meets his burden of production, the taxpayer must come forward
    with persuasive evidence that the Commissioner’s determination is incorrect. Id. at
    447; see Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 
    290 U.S. at 115
    .
    Respondent has discharged his burden of production under section 7491(c) by
    showing that petitioners failed to keep adequate records and properly substantiate
    their claimed deductions. See sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
    Although petitioners relied on paid tax preparers, there is no evidence in the
    record regarding the preparers’ respective experience or qualifications that would
    support the conclusion that petitioners reasonably relied on them. There is no
    indication that the preparers took the time to review the returns with petitioners, and
    petitioners admitted that they did not undertake to thoroughly review them on their
    own.
    Taxpayers have a duty to review their tax returns before signing and filing
    them, and the duty of filing accurate returns cannot be avoided by placing
    responsibility on a tax return preparer. Metra Chem Corp. v. Commissioner, 88
    - 15 -
    T.C. 654, 662 (1987); Magill v. Commissioner, 
    70 T.C. 465
    , 479-480 (1978), aff’d,
    
    651 F.2d 1233
     (6th Cir. 1981).
    Petitioners failed to establish that their reliance on the return preparers was
    reasonable or in good faith. Thus, on the record presented, we are unable to
    conclude that petitioners acted with reasonable cause and in good faith within the
    meaning of section 6664(c)(1). Accordingly, petitioners are liable for the accuracy-
    related penalty under section 6662(a) for each year in issue.
    III. Spousal Relief
    Generally, married taxpayers may elect to file a joint Federal income tax
    return. Sec. 6013(a). After making the election, each spouse is jointly and severally
    liable for the entire tax due. Sec. 6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 276
    , 282 (2000). If certain requirements are met, however, an individual may be
    relieved of joint and several liability under section 6015. Except as otherwise
    provided in section 6015, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving his or her
    entitlement to relief. Rule 142(a); Porter v. Commissioner, 
    132 T.C. 203
    , 210
    (2009); Alt v. Commissioner, 
    119 T.C. 306
    , 311 (2002), aff’d, 
    101 Fed. Appx. 34
    (6th Cir. 2004).
    There are three types of relief available under section 6015. In general,
    section 6015(b) provides full or apportioned relief from joint and several liability for
    - 16 -
    understatements of tax on a return, section 6015(c) provides apportioned relief in
    respect of a deficiency to taxpayers who are divorced or separated,5
    and in certain circumstances section 6015(f) provides equitable relief from joint and
    several liability if relief is not available under subsection (b) or (c).
    A. Section 6015(b)
    To be eligible for relief under section 6015(b), the requesting spouse must
    establish, inter alia, that the understatement of tax is attributable to erroneous items
    of the nonrequesting spouse and, in signing the return, the requesting spouse “did
    not know, and had no reason to know” of the understatement of tax. Sec.
    6015(b)(1)(B) and (C).
    The understatements of tax on petitioners’ joint returns for the years in issue
    are in large part attributable to the disallowance of substantial deductions for
    casualty losses and “other expenses” petitioners reported on Schedules A and
    business expenses they reported on Schedules C.6 On the record presented, we
    5
    Petitioners were not divorced or legally separated at the time Mrs. Cole
    elected to claim spousal relief, and they were continuously residing in the same
    household during all relevant periods. Therefore, Mrs. Cole is not eligible for relief
    under sec. 6015(c). See sec. 6015(c)(3)(A)(i).
    6
    As previously mentioned, petitioners concede that they are not entitled to
    deductions for various expenses reported on Schedules C for each of the years in
    issue, and they are not entitled to deductions for “other expenses” reported on
    (continued...)
    - 17 -
    cannot say that the understatements are attributable in whole or in part to erroneous
    items of Mr. Cole alone. In short, Mrs. Cole was a participant in the ongoing
    litigation with the City of Baltimore in which petitioners were seeking damages
    related to flooding in their basement, and she did not offer any testimony or other
    evidence that she was unaware of the transactions giving rise to any of the
    disallowed deductions reported on Schedules A and C. Thus, we conclude that the
    erroneous items are attributable to both petitioners.
    Moreover, we conclude that Mrs. Cole had reason to know of the
    understatements of tax within the meaning of section 6015(b)(1)(C). A spouse
    seeking relief under section 6015(b) has reason to know of the understatement “if a
    reasonably prudent taxpayer in her position at the time she signed the return could
    be expected to know that the return contained the * * * understatement.” Price v.
    Commissioner, 
    887 F.2d 959
    , 965 (9th Cir. 1989). A taxpayer has reason to know
    of an understatement if she had a duty to inquire and failed to satisfy that duty. 
    Id.
    A joint tax return reporting a large deduction that significantly reduces a couple’s
    tax liability generally puts both spouses on notice that the return may contain an
    understatement. See Levin v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1987-67
    .
    6
    (...continued)
    Schedules A for 2007 and 2008.
    - 18 -
    Although Mrs. Cole did not review the returns in any detail when they were
    presented to her for signature, she nevertheless is charged with constructive
    knowledge of their contents. See Price v. Commissioner, 
    887 F.2d at 965-966
    ; see
    also Von Kalinowski v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2001-21
    . A spouse cannot
    obtain relief under section 6015 in a case involving disallowed deductions “‘by
    simply turning a blind eye to--by preferring not to know of--facts fully disclosed on
    a return, of such a large nature as would reasonably put such spouse on notice that
    further inquiry would need to be made’”. Price v. Commissioner, 
    887 F.2d at 965
    (quoting Levin v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1987-67
    ).
    Petitioners claimed large deductions for each of the years in issue which
    served to offset their wage income and resulted in claims for refunds. Considering
    all the facts and circumstances, we conclude that Mrs. Cole was obliged to inquire
    further and she failed to do so. See, e.g., Wiener v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2008-230
    . As a result, we hold that Mrs. Cole does not meet the requirements of
    section 6015(b)(1)(B) and (C), and she does not qualify for relief from joint and
    several liability under section 6015(b).
    B. Section 6015(f)
    Section 6015(f) grants the Commissioner discretion to relieve an individual
    from joint liability, where relief is not available under section 6015(b) or (c), if,
    - 19 -
    taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
    individual liable for any unpaid tax or deficiency. As directed by section 6015(f),
    the Commissioner has prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-
    2 C.B. 296
    , modifying Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-
    1 C.B. 447
    , that are used in determining
    whether it is inequitable to hold a requesting spouse liable for all or part of the
    liability for any unpaid tax or deficiency. Although the Court consults these
    guidelines when reviewing the Commissioner’s denial of relief, see Washington v.
    Commissioner, 
    120 T.C. 137
    , 147-152 (2003), we are not bound by them inasmuch
    as our analysis and determination ultimately turns on an evaluation of all the facts
    and circumstances, see Pullins v. Commissioner, 
    136 T.C. 432
    , 438-439 (2011).7
    Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297, sets forth seven threshold
    conditions that must generally be satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a
    request for equitable relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(7),
    7
    On January 5, 2012, the Commissioner issued Notice 2012-8, 2012-
    4 I.R.B. 309
    , announcing that a proposed revenue procedure updating Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
    2003-
    2 C.B. 296
    , will be forthcoming. That proposed revenue procedure, if
    finalized, will revise the factors that the Commissioner will use to evaluate requests
    for equitable relief under sec. 6015(f). Consistent with the Court’s approach in
    Sriram v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2012-91
    , we have evaluated the record in this
    case against the factors set forth in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, supra, in view of the fact
    that the revenue procedure proposed in Notice 2012-8, supra, is not final.
    - 20 -
    requires that the income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief
    be attributable to an item of the “nonrequesting spouse”, unless one of the
    enumerated exceptions applies, which none does in this case.
    As discussed above, Mrs. Cole failed to show that the understatements of tax
    for the years in issue are attributable to erroneous items of Mr. Cole or that he was
    evasive or somehow attempted to deceive her with regard to the disputed
    deductions. In the light of all the facts and circumstances, we conclude that Mrs.
    Cole is not entitled to relief from joint and several liability for the years in issue
    pursuant to section 6015(f).
    To reflect the foregoing,
    Decision will be entered under
    Rule 155.