Judith K. Blomberg v. Commissioner , 2014 T.C. Summary Opinion 82 ( 2014 )

PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT
BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY
OTHER CASE.
T.C. Summary Opinion 2014-82UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JUDITH K. BLOMBERG, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 12250-13S. Filed August 26, 2014.
Judith K. Blomberg, pro se.
John Schmittdiel and Christina L. Cook, for respondent.
SUMMARY OPINION
MARVEL, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section
74631 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Some monetary amounts are rounded.
-2-
Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any
other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.
Pursuant to section 6015 petitioner seeks review of respondent’s
determination to deny her relief from joint and several liability for Federal income
tax for 2010. Respondent determined an income tax deficiency of $14,014 in
petitioner and her former husband’s Federal income tax for 2010 and an accuracy-
related penalty under section 6662(a) of $2,803. Petitioner resided in Minnesota
when she filed her petition.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulated
facts and the facts drawn from stipulated exhibits are incorporated herein by
reference.
Petitioner graduated from law school in 1977 and is licensed to practice law
in Texas. She currently works as a lifecourse care guide, providing care to
patients with limited life expectancies.
I. Sale of Carnegie House
From a date that the record does not disclose to July 19, 2011, petitioner
was married to Don Frederick Russell. In 2010, during the pendency of their
divorce proceeding, petitioner and Mr. Russell sold a house at 3012 Carnegie
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Street, Houston, Texas (Carnegie house), for $1.46 million. On December 30,
2010, petitioner and Mr. Russell entered into an agreement whereby net proceeds
of $825,547 from the sale of the Carnegie house would be divided as follows: (1)
petitioner and Mr. Russell would each receive $200,000; (2) the remainder would
be placed in escrow for 30 days; and (3) at the end of the 30-day period, 50% of
the remainder would be paid to the trust account of Beverly Lord (petitioner’s
attorney) and 50% to the trust account of Richard Mintz (Mr. Russell’s attorney).
In April 2011 the escrow company disbursed $212,773 to each of the attorneys.
II. Divorce Decree
On July 19, 2011, the Harris County District Court of Texas (Harris County
district court) entered a final decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of
petitioner and Mr. Russell. The decree provided that Mr. Russell would receive
the remaining Carnegie house funds in the Mintz trust account after certain
payments, including a $32,500 payment to petitioner, had been made. The decree
further provided: “Failure to distribute said funds does not relieve DON
FREDERICK RUSSELL of the obligation to pay JUDITH KAY RUSSELL the
sum of $32,500.” With respect to petitioner and Mr. Russell’s 2010 Federal
income tax liability, the decree provided:
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It is agreed that DON FREDERICK RUSSELL and JUDITH KAY
RUSSELL shall be equally responsible for all federal income tax
liabilities of the parties from January 1, 2010 through December 31,
2010, and each party shall timely pay 50 percent of any deficiencies,
assessments, penalties, or interest due thereon * * *. The parties
agree that nothing contained herein shall be construed as or is
intended as a waiver of any rights that a party has under the “Innocent
Spouse” provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
III. 2010 Federal Income Tax Return
Sometime around August 2011 petitioner began experiencing difficulty
receiving mail at her Houston address. On September 25, 2011, petitioner
informed Mr. Russell that he should use Ms. Lord’s address instead of petitioner’s
Houston address to send mail to petitioner.
On September 23, 2011, Mr. Russell wrote to petitioner, stating: “[I]t looks
like we’re going to have some capital gains tax on the sale of the house.
According to * * * [Mr. Russell’s advisers], the costs basis for the house is the
purchase price plus improvements, closing costs on purchase and sale, including
commissions, etc.” Mr. Russell then listed the purchase price, various
improvements, and closing costs, totaling $840,578. He calculated the gain by
subtracting the adjusted basis from the sale price of $1.46 million and reduced the
gain by the $500,000 personal residence exclusion2 to arrive at a taxable gain of
2
Pursuant to sec. 121(a) and (b), taxpayers who file joint returns may
(continued...)
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$119,422. On September 25, 2011, petitioner replied: “You don’t have all the
correct information and you appear to be missing about $100,000 in
improvements.” Later that day, petitioner provided Mr. Russell with a list of
home improvement costs, stating:
There are many changes that need to be made and there should be no
real capital gain tax to be paid. After 17 years of ownership, I think
there are items we both forgot that would eliminate any remaining
tax. * * *
* * * * * * *
Improvements are at a minimum at least $105,128.00 per my above
list. Your numbers need to be adjusted. I am sure there are other
items I have forgotten. I think our tax should be zero as over 17 years
we would have had about $2,000 a year in repairs and improvements
not on the list. That estimate of other improvements would eliminate
the tax.
Later that night petitioner provided Mr. Russell with a second list of home
improvement costs, stating: “Adds an additional $19,500 to improvements I
previously sent. Miscellaneous repairs over 17 years that I have not remembered
should eliminate the rest of the gain.” Finally, petitioner wrote to Mr. Russell
again that night stating: “If you add your list of $12,000 plus [those] which I
forgot to everything I sent, the capital gains are eliminated.”
2
(...continued)
exclude from gross income up to $500,000 of gain from the sale or exchange of
the taxpayers’ “principal residence”.
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The next morning Mr. Russell wrote to petitioner, stating: “Got all of your
comments. Will make changes.” Petitioner replied, reminding him to send her
mail to Ms. Lord because she was experiencing difficulty receiving mail at her
Houston address.
On October 4, 2011, Mr. Russell informed petitioner that a draft of the 2010
return had been delivered to Ms. Lord’s office. On October 9, 2011, petitioner
wrote to Mr. Russell, asking him to pick up the signed return and her share of the
tax payment from Ms. Lord’s office later that week. Petitioner continued:
I have no way of verifying some of the information you supplied so I
am signing with the understanding that I cannot accept or reject your
information as I do not have documentation to know what is accurate.
My share of the taxes is 50% of 17,359.00 ($8,679.00) of which I
have already paid $7,212.00 per the tax return (my withholding). So I
owe $1,467.00 and my check will be for that amount.
On October 10, 2011, petitioner signed the 2010 return at Ms. Lord’s office.3 The
2010 return did not report any gain from the sale of the Carnegie house.
3
At trial petitioner testified that she did not review the return because she
was under “extreme stress”. However, in the light of the record, we do not find
credible petitioner’s assertion that she did not review the return, and we need not
accept her self-serving testimony. See Shea v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 183, 189,
(1999).
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IV. Audit of 2010 Return
On August 3, 2012, Mr. Russell informed petitioner that he had received a
notice from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regarding the sale of the Carnegie
house and that a response was due by August 22, 2012. Mr. Russell further
informed petitioner that he was working with his accountant to resolve the issue.
On August 13, 2012, Mr. Russell asked petitioner to provide him with copies of
any receipts that she had for improvements made on the house. That same day,
petitioner replied to Mr. Russell, stating:
I have no receipts. You need to get them for [sic] the contractors or
companies that did the work. * * *
I sent you the information you needed in prior emails. You should be
able to figure it out. I am sure you can get the info you need. * * *
On August 15, 2012, petitioner asked Mr. Russell not to contact her directly
and to direct all future communications with her through her attorney. On
September 25, 2012, petitioner informed Mr. Russell’s accountant that Ms. Lord
no longer represented her. Petitioner did not, however, provide Mr. Russell’s
accountant with an alternate address at which she could be reached.
In a Notice CP-2000 dated November 19, 2012, respondent determined that
petitioner and Mr. Russell had failed to report gain of $43,332 from the sale of the
Carnegie house in 2010 and that they were liable for an income tax deficiency of
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$14,014 and an accuracy-related penalty of $2,803. The notice informed
petitioner and Mr. Russell that if they paid their tax liability in full by December
19, 2012, they would owe $17,766. Pursuant to the notice and enclosed with a
letter dated December 14, 2012, Mr. Russell sent the IRS an $8,883 payment
representing his half of the deficiency and the accuracy-related penalty. The IRS
acknowledged Mr. Russell’s payment in a letter dated February 4, 2013.
On April 29, 2013, respondent mailed a notice of deficiency in which
respondent determined an income tax deficiency of $14,014 and an accuracy-
related penalty of $2,803 for 2010.
V. Payment of $32,500 Required by Divorce Decree
On August 16, 2011, Ms. Lord informed Mr. Mintz that petitioner had not
received the $32,500 payment required by the divorce decree. Subsequently, on
August 19, 2011, Mr. Mintz wrote a check to petitioner for $32,500, which Ms.
Lord received on August 23, 2011. On October 21, 2011, petitioner attempted to
deposit the check, but it was rejected for insufficient funds.
On September 16, 2011, Mr. Mintz wrote a check to Mr. Russell for the
remaining Carnegie house funds of $116,932. We infer from the record that
sometime between September 16 and October 21, 2011, Mr. Russell successfully
deposited his check.
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On February 20, 2012, petitioner filed a grievance against Mr. Mintz with
the State Bar of Texas’ Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel because he failed
to pay her the $32,500 required by the divorce decree. On December 21, 2012, the
Supreme Court of Texas accepted Mr. Mintz’s resignation from the bar. At that
time, Mr. Mintz had three disciplinary matters pending against him. Also on
December 21, 2012, the Supreme Court of Texas issued an order requiring Mr.
Mintz to pay petitioner restitution of $32,500 as a condition for reinstatement.
On March 1, 2013, Mr. Mintz wrote to petitioner, Mr. Russell, and Ms. Lord
apologizing for the missing funds and for mismanaging his practice. Mr. Mintz
admitted that he had operated his practice with funds from his client trust account
and further admitted that he had paid both business and living expenses from that
account. Mr. Mintz explained that while the funds had been in the client trust
account when he wrote the $32,500 check to petitioner in August 2011, there was
a shortfall when she attempted to negotiate her check months later.
In or around February 2013 petitioner filed an enforcement action against
Mr. Russell and Mr. Mintz in the Harris County district court to compel them to
pay $32,500. In a counterpetition Mr. Russell sought, among other things, to
compel petitioner to pay her half of the 2010 Federal income tax deficiency and
penalty. In an order dated June 26, 2013, the Harris County district court granted
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petitioner’s enforcement petition in part and entered judgment against Mr. Mintz
of $32,500, plus accrued prejudgment interest of $3,047, postjudgment interest of
5%, and attorney’s fees of $6,538. The court denied petitioner’s claim for relief
against Mr. Russell and also denied Mr. Russell’s counterpetition. As of the date
of trial Mr. Mintz had not made any payment on the judgment. Petitioner,
however, was taking steps to collect on her judgment.
VI. Petitioner’s Financial Condition
On or around May 23, 2013, petitioner submitted to the IRS a Form 8857,
Request for Innocent Spouse Relief. In an exhibit enclosed with her request,
petitioner described her financial status as of May 23, 2013, as follows:
Assets Debts
Townhouse $190,500 Credit card $20,000
Automobile 30,000 Legal fees 1,500
IRA 6,000 Car loan 6,400
Cash 70,000 Total 27,900
Personal property 30,000
Iowa property 1,000
Total 327,500
Petitioner claimed that she had monthly expenses totaling $5,563 as of May 2013.4
In rejecting petitioner’s request for relief under section 6015(f), respondent
4
At trial petitioner testified that she had current cash holdings of $50,000.
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concluded that petitioner would not suffer financial hardship if section 6015(f)
relief were denied.
Discussion
Generally, married taxpayers who file a joint Federal income tax return are
jointly and severally liable for the tax reported or reportable on the return. Sec.
6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 282 (2000). Section 6015,
however, allows a spouse to obtain relief from joint and several liability in certain
circumstances. Section 6015(a)(1) provides that a spouse who has made a joint
return may elect to seek relief from joint and several liability under section
6015(b) (dealing with relief from liability for an understatement of tax with
respect to a joint return). Section 6015(a)(2) provides that an eligible spouse may
elect to limit that spouse’s liability for any deficiency with respect to a joint return
under section 6015(c) (dealing with relief from joint and several liability for
taxpayers who are no longer married or who are legally separated or no longer
living together). If a taxpayer does not qualify for relief under either section
6015(b) or (c), the taxpayer may seek equitable relief under section 6015(f).
Petitioner does not argue that she is entitled to relief under section 6015(b) or (c)
but argues that she is entitled to relief under section 6015(f).
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I. The Standard and Scope of Review
In determining whether a taxpayer is entitled to equitable relief under
section 6015(f), we apply a de novo standard and scope of review. Porter v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). Petitioner bears the burden of proving
that she is entitled to relief under section 6015(f). See id.; see also Rule 142(a)(1).
The Commissioner has prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43
I.R.B. 397, modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, for
determining whether a requesting spouse qualifies for relief under
section 6015(f). This Court considers those guidelines, but is not bound by them,
in evaluating the facts and circumstances of a case. See Pullins v. Commissioner,
136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210.
II. Threshold Conditions
Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400, sets forth seven
threshold conditions that a requesting spouse must satisfy to be eligible to submit
a request for relief under section 6015(f): (1) the requesting spouse filed a joint
Federal income tax return for the tax year or years for which relief is sought; (2)
the requesting spouse does not qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c); (3)
the claim for relief is timely filed; (4) no assets were transferred between the
spouses as part of a fraudulent scheme; (5) the nonrequesting spouse did not
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transfer disqualified assets to the requesting spouse; (6) the requesting spouse did
not knowingly participate in the filing of a fraudulent joint return; and (7) the
liability from which relief is sought is attributable to an item of the nonrequesting
spouse, unless an exception applies. An exception applies in any one of the
following circumstances: (1) the item is attributable to the requesting spouse
solely due to the operation of community property law; (2) the item is only
nominally owned by the requesting spouse; (3) unbeknownst to the requesting
spouse, the funds intended for the payment of tax were misappropriated by the
nonrequesting spouse for the nonrequesting spouse’s benefit; (4) the requesting
spouse establishes that he or she was the victim of abuse before the return was
filed; or (5) the requesting spouse establishes that the nonrequesting spouse’s
fraud is the reason for the erroneous item. Id. sec. 4.01(7).
Petitioner does not meet the seventh threshold requirement because the item
giving rise to the deficiency is the gain from the sale of the Carnegie house.
Petitioner jointly owned the house with Mr. Russell, joined with him in selling the
house, and received half of the net proceeds. The gain from the sale of the house
is therefore attributable to both her and Mr. Russell. Moreover, Mr. Russell has
already paid the IRS his half of the deficiency and the penalty. Therefore, the
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unpaid portions of the deficiency, the penalty, and the interest are properly
attributable to petitioner.
Petitioner attempts to avoid the above conclusion by claiming that she
qualifies under the abuse exception of Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01(7)(d), 2013-
43 I.R.B. at 400. Petitioner alleges that “[a]buse did exist during the marriage but
not the type of abuse that is stated on the innocent spouse form.” The abuse
exception requires that as a result of the abuse, the requesting spouse was not able
to challenge the treatment of any items on the return. Id.; see also Deihl v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-176 (holding that the abuse exception did not
apply where the requesting spouse failed to establish that she did not challenge the
treatment of items for fear of retaliation by the nonrequesting spouse).
Petitioner has not shown that the abuse she allegedly suffered prevented her
from challenging the decision not to report gain from the sale on the 2010 joint
return. Although petitioner contends that she did not give Mr. Russell her address
because of “safety concerns”, the record establishes that she asked Mr. Russell to
send correspondence to Ms. Lord’s office because she was experiencing difficulty
receiving mail at her Houston address. Equally unconvincing is petitioner’s
contention that she asked Mr. Russell “to cease email communication in August
2012 when the emails from him became threatening”. The record is devoid of any
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threatening emails from Mr. Russell, and we infer from their absence that none
exist.
The record does not establish that petitioner suffered any abuse. The record
does establish, however, that petitioner actively intervened to convince Mr.
Russell that they had no gain from the Carnegie house sale. Mr. Russell initially
calculated taxable gain on the sale to be $119,422. Petitioner, however, repeatedly
wrote to Mr. Russell stating that any gain was eliminated by the repairs and
improvements that they had made to the house. These exchanges demonstrate
that, not only did petitioner challenge the tax treatment of the Carnegie house sale,
but that the 2010 joint return reflected her position.
On this record, we find that petitioner does not satisfy the seventh threshold
condition of Rev. Proc. 2013-34, supra.5 Consequently, we need not address the
factors for determining equitable relief under Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.02 or
4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. 400-403.
III. Other Arguments Raised by Petitioner
Although we give due consideration to the guidelines set forth in Rev. Proc.
2013-34, supra, our consideration of the guidelines does not prevent us from
5
Neither party argues that any of the other exceptions to the seventh
threshold requirement applies in this case.
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considering additional facts and circumstances and arguments in deciding whether
the taxpayer is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f). See Pullins v.
Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 438-439; Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210.
Accordingly, we address petitioner’s other arguments for relief.
Petitioner argues that she was deprived of the opportunity to contest the
deficiency amount because Mr. Russell continued to send documents to Ms. Lord
after petitioner informed him that Ms. Lord no longer represented her and because
Mr. Russell failed to send IRS correspondence to her within three days of receipt,
as required by the divorce decree. Petitioner alleges that Mr. Russell received an
IRS notice as early as August 1, 2012.
We do not find this argument to be persuasive for several reasons. Mr.
Russell sent correspondence to Ms. Lord at petitioner’s direction. When petitioner
informed Mr. Russell that Ms. Lord no longer represented her, she did not provide
him with a new address to which he should send future correspondence. In
addition, the record shows that Mr. Russell informed petitioner of the IRS notice
as early as August 3, 2012, and on August 13, 2012, asked her for any receipts in
her possession that would support a higher adjusted basis in the Carnegie house.
Although the record does not clearly establish whether Mr. Russell timely sent a
copy of the notice to Ms. Lord, petitioner has failed to prove that she was
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prejudiced by any alleged noncompliance. At trial petitioner admitted that she was
aware of the IRS audit of the 2010 return and further admitted that she submitted
information during the audit that contributed to a significant reduction in the
original proposed deficiency. Moreover, petitioner does not challenge the
deficiency in this current proceeding. Accordingly, we decline to award relief on
this ground.
Petitioner also argues that as of October 10, 2011, she had paid $7,2176 in
Federal income tax through her withholdings and Mr. Russell had made no
payments. The record shows, however, that petitioner had already taken her
withholding into account in calculating how much of the tax liability shown on the
2010 return she was required to pay. Excluding the current unpaid balance of the
2010 liability, the record supports the inference that petitioner and Mr. Russell
each paid 50% of the joint tax liability shown on their 2010 return. Accordingly,
we decline to award relief on this ground.
Petitioner contends that the Harris County district court has already “ruled
that the 50% tax liability provision in the divorce decree is not enforceable”
against her. Petitioner bases her argument on the court’s order entered June 26,
2013, which denied Mr. Russell’s counterpetition. We do not interpret the Harris
6
The record establishes that petitioner’s withholding for 2010 was $7,212.
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County district court’s summary denial of Mr. Russell’s counterpetition to
constitute its determination as to petitioner’s Federal tax liability. We cannot
discern from the record the reasons for the summary denial of Mr. Russell’s
counterpetition and will not infer from this action that the State court made any
determination with respect to petitioner’s Federal income tax liability.
Finally, petitioner argues that she is entitled to equitable relief under section
6015(f) because she was never paid the $32,500 to which she was entitled under
the divorce decree. While we are sympathetic to petitioner’s situation and
understand her frustration, the record establishes that she did not receive the
money because Mr. Mintz mismanaged his client trust account. The record further
establishes that Mr. Russell received the remaining amount of the house sale
proceeds after the $32,500 had already been subtracted. Petitioner has failed to
establish that Mr. Russell was in any way responsible for, or benefited from, Mr.
Mintz’s financial improprieties. We also note that petitioner has a judgment
against Mr. Mintz for the full $32,500 she is owed under the divorce decree plus
interest and attorney’s fees, and she is taking steps to collect on that judgment.
Petitioner has not established that Mr. Mintz’s failure to pay the $32,500
has caused her any financial difficulty or that a denial of relief under section
6015(f) would result in financial hardship. The record demonstrates that petitioner
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has sufficient assets to pay the unpaid balance of the 2010 tax liability.
Accordingly, we decline to grant relief on this ground as well.
IV. Conclusion
After considering all of the facts and circumstances and the parties’
arguments for and against relief, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to relief
from joint and several liability under section 6015(f).
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered for
respondent.