Michael v. Domulewicz and Mary Ann Domulewicz v. Commissioner ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                          
    129 T.C. No. 3
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    MICHAEL V. DOMULEWICZ AND MARY ANN DOMULEWICZ, Petitioners v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 10434-05.                Filed August 8, 2007.
    As part of a Son-of-BOSS transaction designed to
    create a basis of approximately $29.3 million in
    publicly traded stock purchased at a relatively minimal
    cost, P entered into a short sale of U.S. Treasury
    notes and contributed the proceeds of that sale and the
    related obligation to a partnership (DIP) in which P
    was one of three partners. Neither P nor DIP treated
    the obligation assumed by DIP as a liability under sec.
    752, I.R.C., and P did not compute his basis in DIP by
    taking the obligation into account. After DIP
    satisfied the obligation and received contributions of
    the publicly traded stock from its partners, the
    partners transferred their interests in DIP to DII, an
    S corporation of which they were shareholders. The
    transfer of partnership interests was followed by DII’s
    receipt of DIP’s distributed assets; i.e., the stock
    and cash. DII sold the stock and claimed a resulting
    capital loss of $29,306,024. On Ps’ 1999 Federal
    income tax return, P claimed his $5,858,801 share of
    the reported loss as a passthrough capital loss from
    - 2 -
    DII. P claimed that the loss offset a $5,831,772
    capital gain that P realized during the year. In an
    FPAA pertaining to DIP, R determined that the basis of
    the stock distributed by DIP was zero and that
    accuracy-related penalties under sec. 6662, I.R.C.,
    applied. When no petition was filed as to the FPAA, R
    did not assess any tax or accuracy-related penalty as
    to DII’s sale of the stock. Instead, R issued an
    affected items notice of deficiency to Ps as a
    predicate to assessing those amounts. Ps now move the
    Court to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction,
    asserting that the deficiency procedures of subch. B of
    ch. 63, I.R.C. (deficiency procedures), do not apply to
    R’s disallowance of the passthrough loss or to R’s
    determination of the accuracy-related penalties.
    Held: Sec. 6230(a)(2)(A)(i), I.R.C., makes the
    deficiency procedures applicable to R’s disallowance of
    the passthrough loss from DII.
    Held, further, R’s determination of the
    accuracy-related penalties is not subject to the
    deficiency procedures by virtue of the parenthetical
    text added to sec. 6230(a)(2)(A)(i), I.R.C., by the
    Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, sec.
    1238(b)(2), 
    111 Stat. 1026
    .
    David D. Aughtry, Eric M. Nemeth, and Paul L.B. McKenney,
    for petitioners.
    Meso T. Hammoud, for respondent.
    OPINION
    LARO, Judge:   This is a Son-of-BOSS case that is currently
    before the Court on petitioners’ motion to dismiss for lack of
    jurisdiction.   See generally Kligfeld Holdings v. Commissioner,
    
    128 T.C. 192
     (2007), and Notice 2000-44, 2000-
    2 C.B. 255
    , for a
    general description of Son-of-BOSS cases.   Petitioners petitioned
    - 3 -
    the Court to redetermine respondent’s determination of a
    $2,398,491 deficiency in their 1999 Federal income tax and a
    $946,750.80 accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a).1
    Those determinations were reflected in an affected items notice
    of deficiency issued to petitioners after no partner of DMD
    Investment Partners (DIP) timely petitioned the Court with
    respect to a notice of final partnership administrative
    adjustment (FPAA) mailed to Michael Domulewicz (petitioner) as
    DIP’s tax matters partner (TMP).   Copies of the FPAA also were
    mailed to each of DIP’s other partners.
    We decide the following issues:2
    1.   Whether section 6230(a)(2)(A)(i) makes the deficiency
    procedures of subchapter B of chapter 63 (deficiency procedures)
    applicable to respondent’s disallowance of petitioners’ claim to
    a passthrough loss from DMD Investments, Inc. (DII), an S
    corporation in which petitioner (through his grantor trust) was a
    1
    Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
    applicable versions of the Internal Revenue Code. Rule
    references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
    2
    We decide these issues with the aid of extensive briefing
    by the parties. The briefing was in the form of petitioners’
    memorandum, respondent’s response, petitioners’ reply, and
    respondent’s response to reply. After the Court filed
    respondent’s response to reply, petitioners moved the Court to
    allow them to make their arguments at a hearing. We shall deny
    that motion. The parties have adequately advanced their legal
    arguments, and further arguments would not significantly aid our
    decision process. See Rule 50(b)(3).
    - 4 -
    20-percent shareholder.3    Petitioners argue that the deficiency
    procedures do not apply to this item.     Respondent argues to the
    contrary, asserting that a partner-level determination was
    required as to this item.    We agree with respondent.
    2.   Whether respondent’s determination of the
    accuracy-related penalties is subject to the deficiency
    procedures.   The parties agree that it is not.   So do we.4
    Background
    Petitioners are husband and wife, and they resided in
    Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, when their petition was filed with
    the Court.    They filed a joint 1999 Form 1040, U.S. Individual
    Income Tax Return, on or before August 18, 2000.
    Petitioner was a 20-percent shareholder of CTA Acoustics
    (CTA) when CTA was sold on April 30, 1999, at a gain to the
    shareholders of approximately $30 million.    Petitioner’s portion
    3
    DII’s other shareholders were the two other partners in
    DIP. Each of those other shareholders owned a 40-percent
    interest in DIP and a 40-percent interest in DII.
    4
    Petitioners’ motion states in part that the Court lacks
    jurisdiction over both issues because the applicable periods of
    limitation for assessment of the deficiency and penalties have
    expired. Because the expiration of the period of limitation is
    an affirmative defense and does not affect this Court’s
    jurisdiction, see Davenport Recycling Associates v. Commissioner,
    
    220 F.3d 1255
    , 1259 (11th Cir. 2000), affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1998-347
    ;
    Columbia Bldg., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 
    98 T.C. 607
    , 611 (1992);
    cf. Day v. McDonough, 
    547 U.S. 198
    ,    , 
    126 S. Ct. 1675
    , 1681
    (2006) (“A statute of limitations defense * * * is not
    ‘jurisdictional’”), we reject without further discussion the
    portion of petitioners’ arguments dealing with the period of
    limitation.
    - 5 -
    of the gain was $5,831,772, and he implemented a plan promoted by
    BDO Seidman and Jenkens & Gilchrist to create a $5,858,801 “loss”
    to report as an offset to that gain.    As discussed in more detail
    infra, the “loss” was reportedly generated by using a
    partnership, an S corporation, and a short sale of U.S. Treasury
    notes to create a basis of approximately $29.3 million in
    publicly traded stock purchased at a relatively minimal cost.5
    The transaction was similar to the transactions described in
    Notice 2000-44, supra.
    Under the plan, DIP was formed on April 30, 1999, with
    petitioner as a 20-percent partner and two other individuals (at
    least one of whom was a 40-percent shareholder of CTA) each with
    a 40-percent interest.6   On July 7, 1999, petitioner entered into
    a short sale of U.S. Treasury notes with a face value of
    $5,800,000.7   The U.S. Treasury notes matured on May 31, 2001,
    5
    As we recently explained in Kligfeld Holdings v.
    Commissioner, 
    128 T.C. 192
    , 195 n.6 (2007):
    A short sale is the sale of borrowed securities,
    typically for cash. The short sale is closed when the
    short seller buys and returns identical securities to
    the person from whom he borrowed them. The amount and
    characterization of the gain or loss is determined and
    reported at the time the short sale is closed. * * *
    6
    Petitioner held his interest in DIP through his grantor
    trust. Because all items from DIP flowed directly to petitioner
    through the grantor trust, we refer to petitioner’s interest in
    DIP as if he owned it directly.
    7
    Petitioner entered into the sale through his single-member
    (continued...)
    - 6 -
    and petitioner sold them on July 7, 1999, for $5,791,057.06
    (inclusive of $31,614.75 of accrued interest).   On July 8, 1999,
    petitioner contributed to DIP the proceeds of the short sale, the
    obligation to satisfy the short sale, and $116,000 in “margin
    cash”.   Neither petitioner nor DIP treated the short sale
    obligation assumed by DIP as a liability under section 752, and
    petitioner did not compute his basis in his interest in DIP by
    taking that obligation into account.   On July 14, 1999, DIP
    satisfied the short sale obligation (as well as similar short
    sale obligations assumed from DIP’s other partners) by purchasing
    U.S. Treasury notes with a face value of $29,500,000 for
    $29,402,053.78 plus accrued interest of $186,188.52 and
    delivering the U.S. Treasury notes in satisfaction of the short
    sales.
    On August 12, 1999, petitioner transferred to DIP 1,500
    shares of publicly traded stock in Integral Vision, Inc. (INVI).
    On August 23, 1999, DIP sold 4,500 of the 7,500 shares of INVI
    stock contributed by the partners (in addition to 1,500 shares
    contributed by petitioner, the other two partners of DIP had
    contributed a total of 6,000 shares) and claimed a short-term
    7
    (...continued)
    limited liability company. Because that company is disregarded
    as an entity for Federal income tax purposes, see sec.
    301.7701-2(c)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see also Kligfeld
    Holdings v. Commissioner, 
    supra
     at 195 n.7, we refer to the sale
    as if it were entered into directly by petitioner.
    - 7 -
    capital loss of $2,278.   DIP reported as to the claimed loss that
    the 4,500 shares were purchased on August 11, 1999, at a cost of
    $10,893 and were sold for $8,615.    On August 24, 1999, petitioner
    transferred his interest in DIP to DII, which had been
    incorporated approximately 8 months earlier.    Petitioner and DII
    reported that transfer as a nontaxable exchange under section
    351, and DII claimed a carryover basis in the transferred
    partnership interest equal to petitioner’s basis in DIP.    As a
    result of this transfer (and similar contemporaneous transfers
    made by DIP’s two other partners), DIP dissolved and all of its
    assets, including the remaining 3,000 shares of INVI stock, were
    distributed and received by DII.    On DIP’s 1999 (final) Form
    1065, U.S. Partnership Return of Income, DIP reported for that
    year that it had realized (1) $1,961 in income, all from tax-
    exempt interest, and (2) a $110,611 short-term capital loss
    attributable to the sale of U.S. Treasury notes ($108,333) and
    the sale of the 4,500 shares of INVI stock ($2,278).    DIP also
    reported that it had paid $167,477 of interest expenses on
    investment debts and that it had distributed $30,447,106 in cash
    and/or marketable securities to its partners.    Petitioner, as a
    general partner of DIP, filed DIP’s 1999 return no later than
    April 17, 2000.
    At the time of DIP’s dissolution, DIP’s only assets were the
    INVI stock and minimal cash.   Pursuant to section 732(b), DII
    - 8 -
    claimed a basis in the INVI stock equal to its basis in DIP.   On
    December 30, 1999, DII sold some INVI stock for $5,716 and
    claimed on its 1999 Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S
    Corporation, that it had realized on the sale a long-term capital
    loss of $29,306,024.8   DII also claimed an ordinary loss of
    $1,053,400, resulting from its payment of fees to Jenkens &
    Gilchrist.   As to the claimed losses, an ordinary loss of
    $210,680 (representing petitioner’s share of the fees) and a
    long-term capital loss of $5,858,801 (representing petitioner’s
    share of the reported capital loss) passed through to petitioner,
    who claimed them on petitioners’ 1999 Federal income tax return.
    Petitioners claimed on that return that the $5,858,801 long-term
    capital loss offset a $5,831,772 long-term capital gain that
    petitioner had realized on April 30, 1999, from his sale of his
    stock in CTA.
    On October 15, 2003, respondent mailed the FPAA for 1999 to
    petitioner as DIP’s TMP.   Respondent determined in the FPAA that
    DIP was not entitled to deduct any of the claimed $110,611 short-
    term capital loss, that DIP was not entitled to deduct any of the
    claimed $167,477 of interest expenses, that the basis of the
    property (other than money) distributed by DIP was zero rather
    8
    DII’s 1999 Form 1120S reports that the INVI shares that
    were the subject of the sale were “acquired” on Dec. 3, 1997.
    DII’s 1999 Form 1120S does not report the number of INVI shares
    that DII sold on Dec. 30, 1999.
    - 9 -
    than $30,447,106 as claimed, and that a series of alternative
    accuracy-related penalties under section 6662 applied.   As to
    these items, respondent determined in the FPAA that:   (1) The
    basis of the property distributed by DIP was zero because DIP
    failed to substantiate the basis and, alternatively, the outside
    bases of DIP’s partners were not adjusted under section 752 on
    account of the short sale liability; (2) DIP’s claimed short-term
    capital loss and interest expense were disallowed for lack of
    substantiation; (3) DIP was a sham and was disregarded, and all
    transactions it engaged in were treated as engaged directly by
    the partners; (4) under section 1.701-2, Income Tax Regs., DIP’s
    partners were not treated as partners; (5) under section 1.701-2,
    Income Tax Regs., contributions to DIP had to be adjusted to
    reflect clearly the income of DIP and its partners; and (6) the
    40-percent accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a),
    (b)(3), (e), and (h) was imposed because any underpayment of tax
    resulting from adjustment of DIP’s basis in the stock was due to
    a gross valuation misstatement; the 20-percent accuracy-related
    penalty under section 6662(a), (b)(1), and (c) was imposed
    because any underpayment of tax arising from the adjustment of
    DIP’s basis was due to negligence or disregard of rules and
    regulations; or, alternatively, the 20-percent accuracy-related
    penalty under section 6662(a), (b)(2), and (d) was imposed
    - 10 -
    because any underpayment was attributable to a substantial
    understatement of tax.
    No partner of DIP contested the FPAA timely; i.e., by March
    13, 2004, 150 days after its issuance.   As a result, respondent
    assessed the tax and penalties resulting from the disallowance of
    the short-term capital loss and the interest expense.
    Petitioners’ share of the tax, $19,466, was assessed on November
    29, 2004, and their share of the accuracy-related penalties,
    $3,893.20, was assessed on February 21, 2005.   Respondent did not
    assess any tax or penalty attributable to DII’s sale of the
    distributed stock but issued the affected items notice of
    deficiency as a predicate to assessing these amounts.
    On March 10, 2005, respondent issued to petitioners the
    affected items notice of deficiency for 1999.   In that notice,
    respondent determined the following three adjustments to income:
    (1) The reported long-term capital loss was disallowed and the
    amount realized of $1,143 was a gain given respondent’s
    determination in the FPAA that the basis of the property
    distributed by DIP was zero; (2) the $210,680 share of expenses
    was disallowed; and (3) petitioners’ computational itemized
    deductions were adjusted accordingly.    Respondent also determined
    in the affected items notice of deficiency the same set of
    alternative penalties under section 6662 that the FPAA stated
    were applicable.
    - 11 -
    Discussion
    Petitioners argue that the long-term capital gain and
    accuracy-related penalty determinations in the affected items
    notice of deficiency are computational adjustments which section
    6230(a) places outside the Court’s jurisdiction at the partner
    level.9    Respondent argues that the Court has jurisdiction to
    decide the issue concerning the long-term capital gain but not
    the issue concerning the accuracy-related penalties.      We agree
    with respondent.
    This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we may
    exercise our jurisdiction only to the extent provided by
    9
    In relevant part, sec. 6230(a) provides:
    SEC. 6230(a).    Coordination with Deficiency
    Proceedings.--
    (1) In general.--Except as provided in
    paragraph (2) or (3), subchapter B of this
    chapter shall not apply to the assessment or
    collection of any computational adjustment.
    (2) Deficiency proceedings to apply in
    certain cases.--
    (A) Subchapter B shall apply
    to any deficiency attributable to--
    (i) affected items
    which require partner
    level determinations
    (other than penalties,
    additions to tax, and
    additional amounts that
    relate to adjustments to
    partnership items) * * *
    - 12 -
    Congress.    See sec. 7442; see also GAF Corp. & Subs. v.
    Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 519
    , 521 (2000).      We have jurisdiction to
    redetermine a deficiency if a valid notice of deficiency is
    issued by the Commissioner and if a timely petition is filed by
    the taxpayer.    See GAF Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, supra at
    521.    We may decide issues only to the extent of our
    jurisdiction, and the fact that the parties agree that we lack
    jurisdiction to decide the issue concerning the accuracy-related
    penalties does not necessarily mean that we indeed lack
    jurisdiction to decide that issue.       See Charlotte’s Office
    Boutique, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    121 T.C. 89
    , 102-104 (2003),
    affd. 
    425 F.3d 1203
     (9th Cir. 2005).
    Partnerships are not subject to Federal income tax.    See
    sec. 701.    They are required, however, to file annual information
    returns reporting their partners’ distributive shares of income,
    gain, loss, deductions, or credits.      See sec. 6031; see also
    Randell v. United States, 
    64 F.3d 101
    , 103 (2d Cir. 1995).         The
    partners are required to report their distributive shares of
    those items on their personal Federal income tax returns.         See
    secs. 701, 702, 703, and 704.
    Before 1982, the Commissioner and the courts were required
    to adjust partnership items at the partner level.      See Randell v.
    United States, 
    supra at 103
    .    Because this requirement resulted
    in a duplication of administrative and judicial resources and
    - 13 -
    inconsistent results among partners, Congress enacted the unified
    audit and litigation procedures of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
    Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. 97-248, sec. 401, 
    96 Stat. 648
    , intending to remove the substantial administrative
    burden occasioned by duplicative audits and litigation and to
    provide consistent treatment of partnership income, gain, loss,
    deductions, and credits among all partners in the same
    partnership.    See Randell v. United States, 
    supra at 103
    ;
    H. Conf. Rept. 97-760, at 599-600 (1982), 1982-
    2 C.B. 600
    ,
    662-663.   The TEFRA procedures determine the proper treatment of
    “partnership items” at the partnership level in a single, unified
    audit and judicial proceeding.    See Randell v. United States,
    
    supra at 103
    ; H. Conf. Rept. 97-760, supra at 599-600, 1982-2
    C.B. at 662-663.    In this context, the term “partnership items”
    includes any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit
    that the Secretary has determined is “more appropriately
    determined at the partnership level than at the partner level.”
    Sec. 6231(a)(3); see also sec. 301.6231(a)(3)-1(a), Proced. &
    Admin. Regs.
    Where the Commissioner disagrees with a partnership’s
    reporting of a partnership item, the Commissioner must mail an
    FPAA before assessing the partners with any amount attributable
    to that item.    See secs. 6223(a)(2), (d)(2), 6225(a).   The TMP
    has 90 days from the date of the mailing of the FPAA to contest
    - 14 -
    the adjustments in the FPAA by filing a petition in this Court, a
    Federal District Court, or the Court of Federal Claims.   See sec.
    6226(a).   If the TMP does not file such a petition, any other
    partner entitled to notice of partnership proceedings may file a
    petition within 60 days after the close of the 90-day period.
    See sec. 6226(b)(1).   If a petition is filed, all partners with
    interests in the outcome are treated as parties, see sec.
    6226(c), (d)(1)(B), and the court in which the petition is filed
    has jurisdiction to readjust all “partnership items” to which the
    FPAA relates, see sec. 6226(f).10   The timely mailing of the FPAA
    to the applicable address suspends the running of the limitations
    period for assessing any income taxes that are attributable to
    any partnership item or affected item.   See sec. 6229(d); cf.
    Martin v. Commissioner, 
    436 F.3d 1216
    , 1226 (10th Cir. 2006)
    (concluding that the filing of a petition for a redetermination
    of an income tax deficiency suspends the running of the period of
    10
    When a proper petition is filed with a court in
    accordance with sec. 6226(a) or (b), the scope of the court’s
    jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s adjustment to a
    partnership item is defined by sec. 6226(f) as follows:
    SEC. 6226(f). Scope of Judicial Review.--A court
    with which a petition is filed in accordance with this
    section shall have jurisdiction to determine all
    partnership items of the partnership for the
    partnership taxable year to which the notice of final
    partnership administrative adjustment relates, the
    proper allocation of such items among the partners, and
    the applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or
    additional amount which relates to an adjustment to a
    partnership item.
    - 15 -
    limitations for assessment of the taxpayer’s income tax, even
    when the petition is not authorized or ratified by the taxpayer),
    affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 2003-288
    , supplemented by 
    T.C. Memo. 2004-14
    .
    This suspension continues for the period during which a
    proceeding may be brought in this Court, for the pendency of any
    proceeding actually brought, and for 1 year thereafter.    See sec.
    6229(d).
    After a final partnership-level adjustment has been made to
    a partnership item in a unified partnership proceeding, a
    corresponding “computational adjustment” must be made to the tax
    liability of a partner.   See sec. 6231(a)(6) (defining
    “computational adjustment” as “the change in the tax liability of
    a partner which properly reflects the treatment under this
    subchapter of a partnership item”, and providing that “All
    adjustments required to apply the results of a proceeding with
    respect to a partnership under this subchapter to an indirect
    partner shall be treated as computational adjustments.”); see
    also sec. 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii).11    A computational adjustment may
    then affect the amounts of other items on a partner’s return.
    Where an increase in a partner’s tax liability is attributable to
    an “affected item” that flows strictly from a computational
    adjustment, no notice of deficiency need be sent to the partner,
    11
    The parties agree that the deficiency determined in the
    affected items notice of deficiency is a computational
    adjustment.
    - 16 -
    and any error in the computational adjustment must be challenged
    in a refund suit.   See sec. 6230(c); see also sec. 6231(a)(5)
    (defining “affected item” as “any item to the extent such item is
    affected by a partnership item”).   If an increased liability
    stemming from an affected item requires a factual determination
    at the partner level, however, the normal deficiency procedures
    outlined in sections 6212 and 6213 apply, and the Commissioner
    must issue an affected items notice of deficiency to the partner
    in order to assess tax attributable to the affected item.   See
    sec. 6230(a)(2)(A)(i); see also sec. 301.6231(a)(6)-1T(a)(2),
    Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 
    64 Fed. Reg. 3840
     (Jan. 26,
    1999).12
    As to respondent’s determination in the affected items
    notice of deficiency concerning the long-term capital gain, the
    parties dispute whether that computational adjustment required a
    factual determination at the partner level.   Petitioners argue
    12
    Sec. 301.6231(a)(6)-1T(a)(2), Temporary Proced. & Admin.
    Regs., 
    64 Fed. Reg. 3840
     (Jan. 26, 1999), states:
    (2) Changes in a partner’s tax liability with
    respect to affected items that require partner level
    determinations (such as a partner’s at-risk amount to
    the extent it depends upon the source from which the
    partner obtained the funds that the partner contributed
    to the partnership) are computational adjustments
    subject to deficiency procedures. Nevertheless, any
    penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount that
    relates to an adjustment to a partnership item may be
    directly assessed following a partnership proceeding,
    based on determinations in that proceeding, regardless
    of whether partner level determinations are required.
    - 17 -
    that such a factual determination was not required.     We disagree.
    As to DII’s sale of the stock distributed by DIP, respondent
    determined in the FPAA only the partnership item components of
    any resulting assessment; respondent was required to make further
    partner-level factual determinations as to any such assessment.
    The claimed long-term capital loss reportedly passed from DII to
    petitioner and resulted from DII’s sale of INVI stock.
    Respondent needed to determine, among other things, whether the
    stock that was the subject of the sale was the same stock
    distributed by DIP, the portion of the stock actually sold, the
    holding period for the stock, and the character of any gain or
    loss.     The fact that these partner-level determinations, once
    made, may not have changed respondent’s partnership
    determinations as to DIP is of no concern.     Neither the Code nor
    the regulations thereunder require that partner-level
    determinations actually result in a substantive change to a
    determination made at the partnership level.
    Nor did the FPAA definitively determine the outside basis of
    any DIP partner.     Thus, when a partner-level determination is
    required to determine a partner’s basis, the deficiency
    procedures apply although the determination may or may not
    actually alter the final result.13    See Dial USA v. Commissioner,
    13
    We note, however, that respondent in the FPAA made
    several partnership-item determinations that the partners were
    (continued...)
    - 18 -
    
    95 T.C. 1
     (1990).   What the FPAA did do was determine a tentative
    outside basis of each DIP partner and then transfer that
    tentative outside basis to the distributed stock under section
    732(b).   While the tentative basis in the distributed property
    was zero, and DIP’s partners were required by section 732(b) to
    take bases in the distributed stock equal to their outside bases
    in DIP, petitioner’s outside basis in DIP did not necessarily
    equal DIP’s inside basis in its assets.   (Nor was petitioner’s
    outside basis otherwise required under subtitle A to be taken
    into account for DIP’s 1999 taxable year.)   According to the
    FPAA, petitioner’s outside basis in DIP was zero, which made the
    basis of the distributed INVI stock zero and, subject to any
    partner-level factual determinations, potentially eliminated
    13
    (...continued)
    required to take into account in computing their outside bases in
    DIP. The FPAA, for example, determined that the short sale
    obligation was a liability under sec. 752. Respondent also
    determined in the FPAA that DIP’s partners received constructive
    distributions of cash that reduced their outside bases in DIP
    under sec. 733(1) when their shares of the short sale liability
    was reduced. See also secs. 705(a)(2), 752(b). Both partnership
    liabilities and partnership distributions are partnership items
    within the meaning of sec. 6231(a)(3). See sec.
    301.6231(a)(3)-1(a)(1)(v), (4), Proced. & Admin. Regs. While the
    factual and legal determinations made at the partnership level
    are conclusive in determining components of outside basis, the
    ultimate determination of outside basis is made only in a
    subsequent partner-level affected items proceeding such as we
    have here. See Gustin v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2002-64
    ; cf.
    Univ. Heights v. Commissioner, 
    97 T.C. 278
     (1991).
    - 19 -
    petitioners’ long-term capital loss while potentially adding a
    long-term capital gain.
    Petitioners argue that respondent could and should have
    assessed tax as to the computational adjustment concerning the
    long-term capital gain when no one timely filed a petition as to
    the FPAA.   We disagree.   Petitioners rely erroneously on Olson v.
    United States, 
    172 F.3d 1311
     (Fed. Cir. 1999), and Bob Hamric
    Chevrolet, Inc. v. United States, 
    849 F. Supp. 500
     (W.D. Tex.
    1994), to support their argument.   Unlike there, respondent could
    not have made an assessment as to the long-term capital gain
    determination simply by examining petitioners’ 1999 Federal
    income tax return and making mere ministerial adjustments.    See,
    e.g., Olson v. United States, supra at 1318.   In fact,
    petitioners’ 1999 Federal income tax return does not even
    reference the object of the sale underlying the claimed long-term
    capital loss.14   Nor do the distributions reported on DIP’s 1999
    14
    Petitioners signed their 1999 Federal income tax return
    on Apr. 14, 2000, and filed the return on or before Aug. 18,
    2000. The return, which was self-prepared, claimed that
    petitioners had realized a $210,680 passthrough loss from
    petitioner’s grantor trust and did not include any further
    explanation as to the loss. Petitioner reported the long-term
    capital loss on a 1999 Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for
    Estates and Trusts, filed on behalf of his grantor trust. The
    Form 1041 reported that a long-term capital loss of $5,858,801
    was realized during the year “From Partnership, S Corps. &
    Fiduciaries” and that the loss was “Other K-1 Information”. (The
    Form 1041 did not include any Schedule K-1, Shareholder’s Share
    of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc.) The Form 1041 was prepared
    by BDO Seidman on May 16, 2000, signed by petitioner on Oct. 25,
    (continued...)
    - 20 -
    partnership return appear on petitioners’ 1999 Federal income tax
    return.    We also observe that DIP’s 1999 partnership return does
    not reference or identify DII and that DII’s 1999 tax return does
    not indicate that the INVI stock that was the subject of the
    reported sale was received in a distribution from DIP.     We
    conclude that we have jurisdiction over the deficiency determined
    in the affected items notice of deficiency.
    We now decide whether we have jurisdiction to decide the
    issue concerning the accuracy-related penalties.   When no
    petition was filed timely as to the FPAA, respondent assessed
    only that portion of the accuracy-related penalties attributable
    to the disallowance in the FPAA of DIP’s deductions of the short-
    term capital loss and interest expense.   Respondent now concedes
    that the accuracy-related penalties determined in the affected
    items notice of deficiency should be dismissed for lack of
    jurisdiction.   Petitioners concur with this concession.    So do
    we.
    The applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or
    additional amount relating to an adjustment to a partnership item
    (collectively, partnership item penalties) is generally
    determined at the partnership level and assessed on the basis of
    partnership-level determinations.   See sec. 6221; see also sec.
    14
    (...continued)
    2000, and filed on or before Oct. 30, 2000.
    - 21 -
    301.6221-1T(c), Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 
    64 Fed. Reg. 3838
     (Jan. 26, 1999) (partnership-level determinations include
    all legal and factual determinations underlying the determination
    of partnership-level penalties, including partnership-level
    defenses but not partner-level defenses).   Before the Taxpayer
    Relief Act of 1997 (TRA), Pub. L. 105-34, 
    111 Stat. 788
    ,
    partnership-item penalties were determined at the partner level
    through the deficiency procedures after the partnership
    proceedings to which they related were over.   TRA section
    1238(b)(2), 
    111 Stat. 1026
    , changed that treatment by, inter
    alia, inserting into section 6230(a)(2)(A)(i) the parenthetical
    text “other than penalties, additions to tax, and additional
    amounts that relate to adjustments to partnership items”.     Under
    a plain reading of this amendment, the effect of the amendment
    was to remove partnership-item penalties from the deficiency
    procedures effective for partnership taxable years ending after
    August 5, 1997.
    Although a plain reading of the statute is ordinarily
    conclusive, a clear legislative intent that is contrary to the
    text may sometimes lead to a different result.   See, e.g.,
    Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 
    447 U.S. 102
    ,
    108 (1980); United States v. Am. Trucking Associations, 
    310 U.S. 534
    , 543 (1940).   No such clear contrary legislative intent is
    present here; indeed, the legislative history of the statute
    - 22 -
    supports its plain reading.   In its report underlying the
    amendment adding the parenthetical text to section
    6230(a)(2)(A)(i), the House Committee on Ways and Means explained
    that it had proposed the amendment because
    Many penalties are based upon the conduct of the
    taxpayer. With respect to partnerships, the relevant
    conduct often occurs at the partnership level. In
    addition, applying penalties at the partner level
    through the deficiency procedures following the
    conclusion of the unified proceeding at the partnership
    level increases the administrative burden on the IRS
    and can significantly increase the Tax Court’s
    inventory. [H. Rept. 105-148, at 594 (1997), 1997-4
    C.B. (Vol. 1) 319, 916.15]
    The House committee report goes on to explain that the proposed
    amendment “provides that the partnership-level proceeding is to
    include a determination of the applicability of penalties at the
    partnership level.   However, the provision allows partners to
    raise any partner-level defenses in a refund forum.”   
    Id.
    Given the enactment of the amendment, we conclude that the
    deficiency procedures no longer apply to the assessment of any
    partnership-item penalty determined at the partnership level,
    regardless of whether further partner-level determinations are
    required.   The Secretary in interpreting the amendment has
    15
    The Senate Finance Committee stated similarly in its
    report. See S. Rept. 105-33, at 261 (1997), 1997-4 C.B. (Vol. 2)
    1067, 1341; see also H. Conf. Rept. 105-220, at 685 (1997),
    1997-4 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1457, 2155 (stating that “The Senate
    amendment is the same as the House bill” and that “The conference
    agreement follows the House bill and the Senate amendment, with
    technical modifications”).
    - 23 -
    concluded similarly.   See sec. 301.6231(a)(6)-1T(a)(2), Temporary
    Proced. & Admin. Regs., quoted supra note 12 (explaining that any
    penalty related to an adjustment of a partnership item is not
    subject to the deficiency procedures and may be directly assessed
    following a partnership proceeding, on the basis of
    determinations in that proceeding, regardless of whether
    partner-level determinations may be required).16   Because the
    amendment is applicable to this case, i.e., the relevant taxable
    year of DIP ended after August 5, 1997, we shall dismiss for lack
    of jurisdiction the part of this case that pertains to the
    accuracy-related penalties.   Accord Fears v. Commissioner,
    129 T.C.     (2007).
    We note in closing that we are not unmindful that a plain
    reading of section 6230(a)(2)(A)(i), as amended by TRA section
    1238(b)(2), may sometimes permit (as it apparently does here) the
    Commissioner to assess a partnership-item penalty before the
    deficiency to which the penalty relates is adjudicated.    We doubt
    that the drafters of the statute and the regulations, in
    excluding partnership item penalties from the deficiency
    procedures, contemplated a situation like this where the
    deficiency underlying the partnership-item penalty is
    16
    See also sec. 301.6231(a)(6)-1(a)(3), Proced. & Admin.
    Regs., effective for partnership taxable years beginning on or
    after Oct. 4, 2001 (language similar to that in sec.
    301.6231(a)(6)-1T(a)(2), Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
    supra).
    - 24 -
    incorporated in an affected items notice and itself made subject
    to review under the deficiency procedures before it can be
    assessed.   All the same, we apply the statute as written in
    accordance with its plain reading and leave to the legislators
    the job of rewriting the statute, should they decide to do so, to
    take into account the situation at hand.   See, e.g., Arlington
    Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.     ,      ,
    
    126 S. Ct. 2455
    , 2459 (2006) (stating that “When the statutory
    language is plain, the sole function of the courts--at least
    where the disposition required by the text is not absurd--is to
    enforce it according to its terms” (citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted)).   We do not believe that our plain
    reading of the statute leads to an “absurd or futile result”, or
    produces a result that is “an unreasonable one ‘plainly at
    variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole’”.      United
    States v. Am. Trucking Associations, supra at 543 (quoting Ozawa
    v. United States, 
    260 U.S. 178
    , 194 (1922)).   To be sure, both
    parties read the statute similarly in requesting the same result
    that we reach herein as to the partnership-item penalties, and
    neither party suggests that a plain reading of the statute in
    this case is unreasonable, absurd, or inconsistent with
    legislative intent.
    - 25 -
    To reflect our conclusions and holdings above, we shall
    grant petitioners’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as
    to the accuracy-related penalties.      We shall deny petitioners’
    motion in all other regards.   We have considered all of the
    parties’ arguments, and all arguments not discussed herein have
    been rejected as moot, irrelevant, or without merit.
    An appropriate order
    will be issued.