James & Marilyn Wadnizak v. Commissioner ( 2002 )


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    T.C. Summary Opinion 2002-1
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    JAMES & MARILYN WADNIZAK, Petitioners v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 6443-00S.             Filed January 14, 2002.
    James Wadnizak, pro se.
    Daniel J. Parent, for respondent.
    DINAN, Special Trial Judge:    This case was heard pursuant to
    the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
    effect at the time the petition was filed.   The decision to be
    entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
    should not be cited as authority.   Unless otherwise indicated,
    subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
    effect for the year in issue.
    - 2 -
    Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners’ Federal
    income tax of $4,731 for the taxable year 1995.
    The issue for decision is whether petitioners are entitled
    to a disabled access credit under sections 38 and 44.
    Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
    The stipulations of fact and the attached exhibits are
    incorporated herein by this reference.   Petitioners resided in
    Brentwood, California, on the date the petition was filed in this
    case.
    Petitioner husband (petitioner) purchased a panoramic x-ray
    machine in 1995 for use in his general dentistry practice at a
    cost of $16,012.75.   The new x-ray machine replaced and updated
    another panoramic x-ray machine which petitioner had purchased in
    1969, but which was still fully functional.   The new machine
    occupied substantially less space than the old machine, and,
    because of limited space in petitioner’s office, the new machine
    allowed petitioner to x-ray patients who were in wheelchairs or
    who used crutches or walkers.   In addition to the new panoramic
    x-ray, petitioner also had two periapical/bitewing x-ray machines
    purchased in 1980 and 1982.   Petitioner admitted at trial that,
    although he purchased the new panoramic x-ray machine because of
    its ability to treat disabled patients, the other two x-ray
    machines had been adequate in the past to meet the needs of his
    - 3 -
    disabled patients without resort to the replaced panoramic x-ray
    machine.
    On petitioners’ joint Federal income tax return for taxable
    year 1995, petitioners claimed a $4,731 disability access credit
    for the x-ray machine under sections 38 and 44.       Petitioners also
    claimed a $16,012 deduction for the x-ray machine on the Schedule
    C, Profit or Loss From Business, filed for petitioner’s dentistry
    practice.   The deduction was claimed pursuant to an election made
    by petitioners to expense the full purchase price of the x-ray
    machine under section 179(a).1
    In the statutory notice of deficiency, respondent’s sole
    adjustment was the disallowance of the disabled access credit.
    Respondent did not disallow the section 179(a) expense deduction.
    Subject to various limitations, an eligible small business
    is entitled to a disabled access credit for eligible access
    expenditures for the taxable year.       Secs. 38, 44.   The amount of
    the disabled access credit is determined under section 44 and is
    allowed as a general business credit under section 38.       In
    general, expenditures made to comply with the Americans With
    Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. 101-336, 
    101 Stat. 327
    ,
    are eligible access expenditures.    See sec. 44(c)(1); Fan v.
    Commissioner, 
    117 T.C. 32
     (2001).    Taxpayers are prohibited from
    1
    Petitioners also filed an amended return for taxable year
    1995. The changes made by this return are not relevant to this
    case and are reflected in the statutory notice of deficiency.
    - 4 -
    gaining a benefit from the same expenditure both for a disabled
    access credit and for another deduction or credit:    “In the case
    of any amount of the credit determined under this section * * *
    no deduction or credit shall be allowed for such amount under any
    other provision of this chapter.”    Sec. 44(d)(7)(A).
    A taxpayer may elect to expense, rather than capitalize,
    certain property used in a trade or business.    Sec. 179(a), (c).
    The election must be made on the taxpayer’s first income tax
    return for the taxable year to which the election applies.    Sec.
    179(c)(1)(B); sec. 1.179-5(a), Income Tax Regs.    Once made, the
    election is irrevocable and binding upon the taxpayer unless
    revoked with the consent of the Commissioner.    Sec. 179(c)(2);
    sec. 1.179-5(a) and (b), Income Tax Regs.    Taxpayers are
    prohibited from gaining a double benefit from a section 38
    credit:   “No credit shall be allowed under section 38 with
    respect to any amount for which a deduction is allowed under
    subsection (a).”   Sec. 179(d)(9).   The regulations similarly
    provide that “If a taxpayer elects to expense under section 179,
    no section 38 credit is allowable for the portion of the cost
    expensed.”   Sec. 1.179-1(g), Income Tax Regs.
    Section 179 and the regulations thereunder control in this
    case.   Petitioners elected to expense the entire purchase price
    of the x-ray machine on their 1995 tax return and were allowed a
    deduction in the full amount of its cost.    They consequently are
    - 5 -
    not entitled to a credit under sections 38 and 44 for any portion
    of its cost.   Sec. 179(d)(9); King v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1990-548
    ; sec. 1.179-1(g), Income Tax Regs.        At trial,
    petitioners conceded that entitlement to the credit would mean
    that they are not entitled to the full amount of the deduction.
    This concession presupposes the argument that petitioners could
    “disclaim” the deduction in favor of the credit even though they
    made a section 179(c) election.    This is not the case, however,
    because the election is irrevocable and binds petitioners.          Sec.
    179(c)(2); King v. Commissioner, supra;2 sec. 1.179-5(a) and (b),
    Income Tax Regs.
    Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
    Division.
    To reflect the foregoing,
    Decision will be entered
    for respondent.
    2
    Although we need not delve into the details of whether
    petitioners otherwise would have been entitled to the disabled
    access credit, we note that petitioner admitted that he had been
    able to adequately treat his disabled patients without access to
    a panoramic x-ray machine. See Fan v. Commissioner, 
    117 T.C. 32
    ,
    38-39 (2001) (taxpayers were not entitled to a disability access
    credit in part because of already existing compliance with the
    ADA).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 6443-00S

Filed Date: 1/14/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2018